Tupper v. Cadwell, 53 Mass. 559

Tupper v. Cadwell

53 Mass. 559 | Mass. | 1847

Dewey, J.

An infant may make a valid contract for necessaries ; and the matter of doubt in the present case is, what expenditures are embraced in the term 1 necessaries.’ In Co. Lit. 172 a, it is said, “ an infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, necessary physic, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards.” The term ‘ necessaries,’ it is well settled, also embraces necessary articles for the support of his wife and children, if he has such to maintain. The wants to be supplied are, however, personal; either those for the body, as food, clothing, lodging, and the like ; or those necessary for the proper cultivation of the mind, as instruction suitable and requisite to the useful development of the intellectual powers, and qualifying the individual to engage in business when he shall arrive at the age of manhood.

It has sometimes been contended that it was enough to charge the party, though a minor, that the contract was one plainly beneficial to him in a pecuniary point of view. That proposition is by no means true, if, by it, it be intended to sanction an inquiry, in each particular case, whether the *563expenditure, or articles contracted for, were beneficial to the pecuniary interests of the minor. The expenditures are to be limited to cases where, from their very nature, expenditures for such purposes would be beneficial; or, in other words, they must belong to a class of expenditures which are in law termed beneficial to the infant. What subjects of expenditure are included in this class is a matter of law, to be decided by the court. The further inquiry may often arise, whether expenditures, though embraced in this class, were necessary and proper, in the particular case; and this may present a question of fact. It is therefore a preliminary question to be settled, whether the alleged liability arises from expenditures for what the law deems ‘ necessaries,’ and unless that be shown, it is not competent to introduce evidence to show that, in a pecuniary point of view, the expenditure was beneficial to the minor, as that is irrelevant.

No authority has been found which, in our opinion, sustains the position that a minor is liable for expenditures upon his real estate, of the character and under the circumstances here stated. No necessity can exist for such expenditures, solely upon the credit of the minor. The fact that he has real estate which may require supervision, and may need repairs, furnishes the proper occasion for the appointment of a guardian, through whose agency such repairs can be made, and, as the law assumes, more judiciously made, than through the agency of the minor. An infant is not liable for goods bought to furnish his shop and to enable him usefully to continue trade, although he keeps a public shop. Whittingham v. Hill, Cro. Jac. 494. Whywall v. Champion, 2 Stra. 1083. 2 Stark. Ev. 726. See also Dilk v. Keighley, 2 Esp. R. 480. In such cases, the law deems the infant incompetent to carry on business, and for that reason holds him not liable for articles furnished him for trade, irrespective of the question whether, in the particular state of his business, the addition to his stock was actually beneficial. That question is not open, in such cases. We think a similar rule prevails as to expenditures for improvements upon the real estate *564of a minor. The law deems him incompetent to make such contracts; and they not being of the class embraced in the term ‘ necessaries,’ no legal liability arises for such expenditures, as against the infant personally.

The exceptions being sustained upon this ground, we have not thought it necessary to consider the effect of the former judgment, recovered against Mary Cadwell, for the same repairs.

New trial ordered.