{¶ 2} The evidence produced at trial showed that appellant was involved in a business venture with Norman Mease ("Mease") and Ronald Hughes ("Hughes"), who are not parties to this action. Appellant claims that, in December 2000, Mease absconded with money and property rightfully belonging to appellant, and that Mease failed to pay appellant for a year of labor. Appellant claims these losses amounted to approximately $85,000. Shortly thereafter, Mease filed a complaint with the local police department alleging that appellant forged Mease's name to a business incorporation document that had been filed with the Secretary of the State of Ohio.
{¶ 3} After receiving Mease's complaint, the local police department contacted the Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification ("BCI"), a division of the office of the Attorney General of Ohio, for assistance. In February 2001, BCI agent Rhonda Dendinger ("Dendinger"), and local police officer Terry Botdorf ("Botdorf"), interviewed appellant. Before the interview began, appellant told Dendinger he was afflicted with bipolar disorder and that he had just taken medication.2 During the interview, appellant acknowledged signing Mease's and Hughes' names, but claimed he did so with their permission. Appellant also claimed his actions were not undertaken with a purpose to defraud.
{¶ 4} Dendinger concluded that Mease's signature appeared to have been affixed by someone other than Mease, and reported the results of her investigation to the county prosecutor. The county prosecutor exercised his discretion and declined to prosecute Mease's complaint, deeming it to be more civil than criminal in nature. It was also determined that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, and no forgery charge was ever filed against appellant.
{¶ 5} At oral argument, appellant contended that, when a person appears pro se, the court takes upon itself the constitutional responsibility to keep the playing field level when facing a party who is represented by counsel. However, parties "`who choose to represent themselves in judicial proceedings are entitled to no greater constitutional protections than those who choose to be represented by counsel.'" FranklinCty. Dist. Bd. of Health v. Sturgill (Dec. 14, 1999), Franklin App. No. 99AP-362, quoting Justice v. Kolb (June 3, 1980), Franklin App. No. 79AP-768.
{¶ 6} The same rules, procedures and standards apply to one who appears pro se as apply to those litigants who are represented by counsel. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel,
{¶ 7} As we apply procedural rules to all parties equally, whether represented by counsel or not, it is also a fundamental principle of judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on their merits, rather than on procedural grounds, whenever possible. State ex rel. Sudlow v. Hancock Cty. Bd. ofCommrs. (2001),
{¶ 8} We begin our analysis by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. Determining the credibility of witnesses and the relative weight of their testimony are exclusively within the province of the trier of fact, who in this case is the trial judge. "* * * [T]the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony." Seasons Coal Co. v.Cleveland (1984),
{¶ 9} Appellant claims appellee was negligent by continuing to question him after learning he was afflicted with bipolar disorder. In a negligence action, an appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant, "not only had a duty to the plaintiff, but that defendant's breach of that duty was the proximate cause of any injuries suffered by the plaintiff." Dillhoff v. Dept. of Transp. (May 19, 1988), Franklin App. No. 88AP-124; Jones, Stranathan Co. v. Greaves
(1874),
{¶ 10} Appellant alleges appellee violated a duty it owed him pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 11} Dendinger testified at trial that, appellant appeared to be communicating clearly and coherently, and that she treated appellant professionally. She further testified that appellant was informed he was free to leave the interview at any time. Appellant confirmed at trial that he did leave the interview at the point at which he became uncomfortable. At oral argument, appellant stated he is "high-functioning," and that to the untrained observer he may well appear normal.
{¶ 12} Under these facts, appellant could only have satisfied the definition of "disabled person," pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 13} Appellant further alleges that appellee was negligent because it "did not investigate for the truth." (Brief of Appellant, at 9.) More accurately stated, appellant contends appellee should have continued its investigation until it proved that appellant was innocent of Mease's forgery claim. Appellant claims that by "unilaterally" deciding not to prosecute, appellee deprived him of his right to clear his name.
{¶ 14} A prosecuting attorney has wide discretion in determining whether the public is best served by instituting criminal proceedings, and will not be compelled to prosecute a complaint except where the failure to prosecute constitutes an abuse of that discretion.3 State ex rel. Master v.Cleveland (1996),
{¶ 15} A finding of "not guilty" in a criminal trial is not equivalent to a finding that the accused is actually innocent.Walden v. State (1989),
{¶ 16} Appellant's common theme throughout his brief and at oral argument is that he did not receive a fair trial before the Court of Claims. Appellant alleges the Court of Claims deprived him of due process by failing to order the attendance of subpoenaed witnesses Lanny Hopkins ("Hopkins") and Collette Mease ("Mrs. Mease") at trial, failing to compel discovery, and failing to wait until a transcript was prepared before rendering a verdict. A trial judge has broad discretionary authority over discovery matters. An appellate court will not reverse a discovery ruling absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by acting unreasonably, unconscionably, or arbitrarily. Bozeman v. Wendy's Intern., Inc. (Aug. 21, 2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-112.
{¶ 17} Hopkins and Mrs. Mease were properly subpoenaed but did not appear at trial. According to the trial transcript, appellant called Hopkins to testify. In Miller v. Miller (Aug. 21, 1980), Franklin App. No. 80AP-168, we explained:
A reviewing court cannot rule upon the exclusion of evidence by the trial court unless the rejected evidence has been made a part of the transcript of proceedings or record. Mingo Junction v.Sheline (1935),
Here, appellant made no attempt to proffer into the record what the excluded evidence would have tended to prove. * * * Therefore, this court cannot determine whether the exclusion or the testimony would constitute prejudicial error.
See, also, Galloway v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review (July 5, 1990), Summit App. No. C.A. 14404 (issue not preserved for appeal where, at hearing, appellant did not object to failure to enforce subpoena and did not proffer what he believed the evidence would have shown). Here, appellant did not make an offer of proof into the record, stating what he expected the testimony of either Hopkins or Mrs. Mease would have been. In the absence of such a proffer, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by allowing the trial to proceed without their testimony.
{¶ 18} Appellant claims he received incomplete discovery responses from appellee the night before trial. Appellant did not inform the trial judge, and has not informed this court, what evidence he did not receive, how it would have been relevant or how its late disclosure caused him harm. Consequently, we are unable to determine that the trial court abused its discretion by not compelling the production of discovery.
{¶ 19} On October 10, 2002, approximately two months after trial, but before verdict, appellant asked the court to reopen the hearing and require Mrs. Mease to appear. The court construed his motion as one seeking a new trial, pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A), and journalized an entry denying the motion as premature because no verdict had been rendered. Appellant's motion did not contain a proffer of the substance or relevance of Mrs. Mease's testimony. Appellant did not renew his motion after judgment was entered, as Civ.R. 59(B) allows. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's motion to reopen the hearing.
{¶ 20} Finally, appellant claims the trial judge ignored evidence and erred by relying only on his trial notes and memory in rendering a verdict. There is no legal authority for appellant's assertion that a finder of fact must wait for a trial transcript to be prepared before rendering a verdict. The court's decision recites the facts as it determined them to be, sets forth the applicable law, and applied the law to the relevant facts. The fact that the trial judge rendered a verdict unfavorable to appellant does not mean evidence was ignored. Appellant's claim of error on this basis is not well-taken.
{¶ 21} We have reviewed the entire record below and have fully considered the issues appellant has raised on appeal. We find no error in the judgment by the Court of Claims, either as it applied the law to the facts or in its procedural handling of the rights of the parties. The judgment of the Court of Claims is supported by the evidence, is not against its manifest weight, and comports with constitutional due process standards. Accordingly, we overrule the issues presented in appellant's brief, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims.
Judgment affirmed.
Bryant and Petree, JJ., concur.