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Tully v. State
730 P.2d 1206
Okla. Crim. App.
1986
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*1 rеad, part, “after verdict jury’s count the felony of-

having twice convicted been

fenses, imprison- assess penitentiary for a term of

ment in the state years.” assignment

Appellant’s seventh imposed

of error that the sentences asserts count, is, twenty years, should

on each Insofar the conscience of Court.

shock for each is the minimum sentence each count, shock

respective they do not However, it is this

Court’s conscience. running opinion that

writer’s pun consecutively is excessive

sentences my colleague’s

ishment. But because of majority

positions, the Court opinion provision that the for the con excessive, sentences is not due to

secutive appellant. convictions of There former

fore, the decision of this Court it must be shall be made to

that the four sentences consecutively.

run of this Court

It is therefore order judgments sentences in

that the CRF-

84-36, provide the sentences on which consecutively

four to run shall counts

affirmed. BUSSEY, JJ.,

PARKS and concur. TULLY, and, Leport Molly

Grant Rose

Kjelden, Appellant, Oklahoma, Appellee.

STATE

No. F-82-671. Appeals

Court of Criminal of Oklahoma.

Dec. *2 Burglary Degree.

victed of in the Second (5) (7) was convicted to She five and seven imprisonment years’ respectively. These cases have been appeal. consolidated for conviction, We reverse each and remand for a new trial.

The essential facts of this case are undis- puted by litigants. the evening On July Jackie Frick was accosted Douglas James Davis outside thе Blue in Stillwater, Room Bar Oklahoma. Davis beat Frick senseless with an aluminum and, along baseball bat Tully, took his money.1 Tully escaped and Davis in a car by appellant ‍‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‍Kjelden. driven leaving After bar, the trio drove to Frick’s trailer home. Davis and Tully broke into the home and stole numerous items. The three early were arrested the next morning at the home of Thomas Graham and Mike Kjelden. The evidence also revealed that midnight evening Frick died around the assault. Tully

The State’s was that conspired Frick, Kjelden and to rob Mr. and Szlichta, Szlichta & Christopher C. Frick’s that death arose from the commis- Stillwater, Morgan, for appellant, Grant planned robbery. sion of It also was Leport Tully. maintained, primarily through Davis’ testi- Jr., Murphy, Murphy Robеrt M. & Mur- mony, Tully Kjelden and voluntarily P.C., Stillwater, phy, appellant, Molly for robbery entered into the scheme. Kjelden. Rose disputed The defense and Turpén, Gen., Atty. Michael C. William Tully Kjel- raised claim of a and Luker, Gen., H. Atty. City, Asst. Oklahoma they nothing den both asserted knew about appellee. for any planned robbery, and forced Davh enter into their criminal activities OPINION evening. PARKS, Presiding Judge: During testimony, Tully and Tully, appellant, Leport Kjelden accompanying Grant admitted Davis to evening. Kjelden convicted for Room that the offenses Murder the Blue testi- Degree time, First Burglary and in the Second fied remained for a there but Degree, Payne him, in the District Court of that Davis asked her to leave with County, might pick CRF- some up money Case Nos. CRF-81-244 and order that at Following 81-247. employer’s returned a verdict residence. errand, guilty imprison- Kjelden and and set life returned to the Room, Frick, ment for seven Kjelden the murder conviction and Blue where saw (7) years’ time, imprisonment burglary. pull- had known whom she for some trial, In appellant, Molly ing parking Kjel- Rose same into the lot behind them. Kjelden Accessory approached as an Af- at Frick was convicted den waved and him. Murder, ter the con- into the Fact to and also was Davis went bar. Davis summoned separate proceeding. 1. Davis was and convicted in tried bar, profile her and followed cal revealed to be domi- Tully from the outside, fact, As he came psychologist nated Davis. out backdoor. Frick, approach and strike Tully saw Davis relationship testified their bat. As with a baseball Frick the head “scary.” Both claimed Frick, Kjelden to hit Davis continued they participated the crime out of fear honking began jumped in the car degree for their lives. The first murder *3 headlights in an ef- flashing the horn and charge against Tully was based on a felo- stop the assault. How- fort to mаke Davis predicate ny-murder with the felo- ever, Kjel- the car and told Davis went to being robbery dangerous ny weap- with a he stop flashing lights, the or would den to 1981, 701.7(B). on. O.S. See § “ring returned to her chimes.” Davis in Reversal this case is necessitated Frick, more times and struck him several appel- the trial court’s refusal to deliver the poked He then the bat into with the bat. rеquested joint lants’ instructions on the face, Tully’s and ordered to search defense of duress. The has raised State pockets money. Tully testified Frick’s for support three in theories of its claim that to kill him if he did not Davis threatened requested properly the instructions were cooperate. Tully retrieved from $14.00 First, regarding charge the disallowed. As the men fled the scene Frick’s wallet. degree against appellant murder first Tul- threatening Kjelden, with Davis made com- ly, the State claims that the duress defense bystander. ments to a degree always unavailable for that scene, in Once the car and Second, again concerning homicide. the Davis ordered to drive Frick’s charge, murder the State claims the under- arrivеd, Davis, mobile home. When lying robbery completed by the time hand, in ordered Tul- with baseball bat still and, therefore, Tully joined fray the car,” ly “get your ass out of the and to Third, defense was unavailable. insuffi- burglary assist in the of Frick’s residence. presented cient evidence was Witnesses who saw at the time of applied according as it to this assault, and those defensе witnesses argument. to the State’s evening who saw him that at the Graham Turning claim, to the State’s first apartment, appeared testified that be we observe that our Oklahoma statutes do terrified. familiar nervous and Witnesses availability not foreclose of this defense propensity for with Davis confirmed Davis’ murder, degree to the crime of first do as They also viоlence. jurisdictions.2 the statutes of various other weapons, surrounded himself with normal- we have never removed first and had assaulted vari- baseball degree murder as a class of crime in people, including pregnant ous woman which teenage boy. Kjelden’s psychologi- exclusively prohibited,3 and a this defense is as any 2. For those that statute excludе duress as a Some states disallow the defense to crime offenses, 26(7) punishable § defense to certain serious See Ariz.Rev. death. See Cal.Pen.Code (1978) (homicide (West 18-201(4) Supp.1980); Stat.Ann. 13-412 or serious § Idaho Code § physical injury); (Smith-Hurd (1979); Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-1-708 § Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 7-11 § (murder (1978) degree); (1977); 1972); in the first Ga.Code Mont.Crim.Code 94-3-110 § (West 1984) (murder); 194.010(8) (1979). Ann. 16-3-26 Ind.Code § Nev.Rev.Stat.Stat. § (West 1978); Ann. § 35-41-3-8 Iowa Code Ann. (West 1979) (intentional The relies our decision in Methvin State 704.10 or reckless act § 60 Okl.Cr. 60 P.2d 1062 We causing physical injury); Kan.Stat. § 21-3209 distinguishable (1974) (murder first note that Methvin voluntary manslaughter); (1975) (intentional the instant case. The defendant in Methvin was Ky.Rev.Stat. § 501.090 homi murder, degree 14:18(6) (West 1974) charged aided, cide); with first La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § Clyde (murder); (1980) Barrow and assisted or abetted tit. 17-A § Me.Rev.Stat. (intentional homicide); premeditated knowing Parker in the deаth of Cal Bonnie Mo.Ann. (Vernon 1979) (murder); appellant Campbell. herein Stat. 562.071 Or. § Further, (1979) (murder); felony-murder. the defendant in Rev.Stat. 161.270 Wash.Rev. (1977) (murder actually asleep Code Ann. or man Methvin claimed he § 9A.16.060 slaughter). a car at the time the crime was backseat of suggests. Attorney General Accord- policy underlying common law du- ingly, interpretation our of the duress stat- ress as а defense to crime was based on utes, issue, society’s is one they apply to this person, realization that a when considering impression. appli- evils, first faced with the choice of two should not punished in this accomplishing cation the duress statutes con- for the less- evil, text, er guided by the common and thereby avoiding we are law at the crime of greater passed; magnitude. the time the statute was LaFave and Scott explained have although defining common crime Oklahoma,4 furnishes “one of the most who, One pressure under the of an backgrounds upon analysis reliable which unlawful threat from another human be- objects purposes of a statute can ing (or to harm him to harm a third Sands, be determined.” 2A C. Suther- person), commits what would otherwise Construction, 50.01, land’s Statutory p. be a crime may, under some circumstanc- *4 (3d 1973). See also Traxler v. 268 ed. es, justified doing what he did and State, 231, 815, 96 Okl.Cr. 251 P.2d 829 thus guilty not be of ques- the crime in (1952). tion. ... The rationale of the defense is of our Oklahoma statutes: following classes: crimes, except The defense of duress is All [*] persons [*] those [*] capable belonging [*] defined [*] committing by to the three [*] question. mental capacity to commit the crime in not that an act which violates the literal language he has the mental state which the crime unnerving threat of harm unless he does of the criminal Rather it is defendant, somehow loses his that, faced with the even ‍‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‍though act, 7. Persons who committed the requires, his conduct which violates the charged, made the omission while under language literal of the criminal law is involuntary subjection justified thereby because he has avoided superiors. greater magnitude. harm [******] LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, 374 (1973). fear. actual prohibited act or omission must be an from sion from er son The duress of a [******] involuntary compulsion superior punishment therefore, with a criminal act or omis- which excuses a which exonerates a who has subjection by use of force or committed person arises pow- per- Law: The General History noting less, though may which one must “in order to well described at 102 dislikes most 1972). A This “choice of evils” determines to do.” English (1883). noted American scholar the Criminal Law general Common Law as an ... by prominent authority Accord do principle dislike Part, something Williams, approаch 2 extremely J. ch. 18 escape that, Stephens, he dislikes Criminal England approach has been (2d agrees, “where that he what Ed. on A O.S.1981, 152(7),155, 156. 21 unavoidable, This right series one of the harms is it of statutes has just been amended once to choose the lesser one” furnishes original 1910, since its passage in and that basis American common law rule. was to Hall, remove “coverture” as a defense Principles General J. Criminal (2d under section Law at 422 Ed.1947). committed, gun- Accordingly, simply and first awoke when he heard the duress defense was car, fire. After available, he left the there was no shoot- any language opinion in the re- ing. 60 P.2d at 1065. He had no idea Barrow garding duress as it relates to the offense of attempt anyone. Although

would tо shoot Id. murder was mere dicta. Methvin claimed his actions the crime after Barrow, prompted by testimony fear of O.S.1981, 4. See 21 § 2. concerning the crime itself did not show duress. recognized case,

Accordingly, common law ear Tully’s theory of de applica have no on that duress should fense asserted he was called out of the bar taking of an inno Davis, tiоn to the intentional knowledge without person. cent life the threatened See planning to rob someone. After Davis 5, (1893). Arp Ala. 12 So. 301 senseless, beat victim was forced 299, Nargashian, 26 R.I. See also State v. wielding bloody who was still A. The rationale for denial dying baseball to rob the man. In this killing of this defense to intentional contemplated by the evil Tully—the premised on the that one should risk robbing already mortally injured vic or sacrifice one’s own life rather than take certainly tim—was less than the threatened person. the life of an innocent State v. harm; is, his own death or serious Dissicini, 565, 571, N.J.Super. 316 A.2d bodily injury. Although subsequent 411, (App.Div.1974) 66 N.J. aff'd death of Mr. Frick elevated the offense to (1975) (en banc). A.2d 618 The rationale murder, Tully should not have been de alsо is full accord with the “choice of prived of the duress defense.

evils” for when the harm contem plated by greater than, the defendant is Attorney General next seeks to to, harm, equal ought the threatened “he ruling by argu the trial court’s escape by rather to die himself ‍‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‍than the ment the already crime of murder was com murder of an innocent.” 4 Blackstone’s plete Tully joined fray at the time Commentaries also 1 See Hale P.C. 51. and, therefore, the duress defense was un *5 possibility since the remains argument available. patently This friv constituting that the threat duress will not Appellant olous. was with first out, be carried and the contemplated when degree felony-murder pursuant 21 to O.S. severe, and threatened harm equally 1981, 701.7, predicate felony the as one must the take risk and refuse kill to robbery dangerous weapon. with a 21 O.S. party. innocent third 1981, 791, Robbery danger with a §§ weapon requires ous wrongful taking and

We believe this limitation to the duress carrying away personal the property of defense is restricted to crimes of intention- another, person, by force or fear killing, al аnd felony-murder. not to It is compatible involving dangerous with the the use of a weapon. common policy law State, (Okl.Cr Id. Roulston v. 307 P.2d 861 duress that the defense should attach .1957). In this it is true that force consented, duress, where the defendant employed by prior Tully’s only Davis to commission of the lesser crime crime, according involvement in the killing, and, and not to the to Tul at thе time of However, participation ly’s testimony. his in felony, the lesser claimed he had complete reason to to the through believe his life was forced crime or the life of taking carrying another immediately danger in the from Mr. unless participated. he People money. Frick of the latter’s Merhige, v. 219 The crime was 95, Mich. (1922). 180 complete, allegеs, N.W. 418 as the State See also we Pantano, People v. reject argument. N.Y. 146 N.E. (1925). LaFave and explain Scott that Finally, argues the State the duress properly law recognizes that one is “[t]he appellant, instruction unavailable to either

justified aiding in robbery if he is forced present because insufficient evidence was life; threats to do so to save his support ed to the defense. This Court should not lose the defense because recently most wrote in Broaddrick v. threateners unexpectedly kill in someone State, (Okl.Cr.1985) 706 P.2d 534 that the robbery course of the and thus convert long a mere This robbery into a Court has held that the de- murder.” Id. at 377. entitled, Hitchler, Accord fendant is as a matter of Duress as a Defense Cases, jury gov- Criminal 528-530 have the instructed on the law Va.L.Rev. at erning theory of the case if it finds possible support in evidence. [by “reasonable Kjelden] belief State, (Okl.Cr.1983); v. 665 P.2d [they that danger imminent were] State, (Okl.Cr. v. P.2d Cordray great bodily death [Davis]”, harm from 1954). if the This is even so evidence is Oklahoma Jury Instructions— Uniform discredited. Holt 278 P.2d 855 Criminal, No. was a of fact (Okl.Cr.1956): jury, and should have been resоlved admitting possession While body proper instruction. liquor stamp, Federal [the defendant] We REVERSE and REMAND this case quit liquor that he had busi- swore for a new trial to be conducted in conformi- course, Of may ness. defendant have ty opinion. with this in a of in- perjury committed number testimony. in his it is stances And past

true that the fact convictions BRETT, J., specially concurring. for crime sо weakened defendant’s evi- credibility as to dence it could BUSSEY, J., dissents. jury composed be said that no persons adhering BRETT, oath Judge specially concurring: compelled jurors, a fu- take on decision, I concur in this notwithstanding ture trial could on the basis of the prosecution attempted the fact that the record, present evidence fail to dоwnplay the intimidating coercive and ca- again convict the defendant of the pability of codefendant Jim Davis. ‍‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‍The Still, jury charge here involved. trial, judicial record of his notice of which must be advised of defendant’s to rely upon, Court entitled reflected where there is evidence to of defense person.1 must have been a vicious it, though even such evidence being trial, When Davis prepared is discredited. Deputy inquired, Sheriff shall “What Id. at 536 (Emphasis added). This writer we do with the defendant?” The Sheriff is “[a]ny noted that heavier standard would replied, to have “Shackle the son- usurp obligation the sacred *6 through- was be of-a-bitch.” So he shackled Id. at the exclusive trier of fact.” P.J., (Parks, specially concurring). least, out his trial. At is what the argued record reflected and as was at the In appellants this both testified that person motion for new trial at the conclusion of Davis was a his well known for explosive temper propensity vio- Davis Consequently, ap- trial. there lence. Other witnesses that Davis pears to be little doubt that Davis but weapons, himself surrounded with and had strоngly impressed or those intimidated struck persons, including out various a capabili- They around him. felt he had the pregnant day woman. The before inci- ty carry not to out his threats. It is entire- dent, had attempted Davis to start an alter- in the of this clear record trial whether cation Tully using with the baseball during was shackled testi- according testimony. to defense Defensе mony against At these defendants. least testimony showed Davis told Murphy counsel a made such state- would kill unless assisted during closing argument, ment while crimes, jabbed freshly blood- referring testimony psycholo- ied point, bat at make gist stated, Murphy. referring Dr. He “ring further [Kjelden’s] threatened to Davis, “They people said like this [Davis] psychological chimes.” a crazy things. will freak оut and do That’s profile of Ms. was entered into why Murphy Dr. said he wears [Davis] evidence, she and revealed that into to testi- shackles when he comes court manipulated of, by, and Davis. terrified allegations fy.” Whether or not these raised a (Okl.Cr.1985).

1. Davis v. 709 P.2d Nonetheless, a felony-murder charge, the defense based defense to as de- picted by of duress. the reсord of the defense this trial. O.S.1981, provides: Therefore, § I concur in this decision. committing capable persons are All

crimes, except belonging those

following classes.

[*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] act, Persons who committed

7. charged, the omission while under

make power

involuntary subjection to the superiors. Philip BAILEY, Petitioner, O.S.1981, 155, provides: § involuntary subjection Oklahoma, Appellee. superior person a STATE of a which exonerates charged with a criminal or omission act No. C-85-301. therefor, punishment arisеs from from Appeals Court of Criminal of Oklahoma. O.S.1981, 156, provides: Jan. duress person which excuses a prohib- who a has committed act or ited omission must actual

compulsion by use fear. of force or

Throughout this trial both these de-

fendants testified that fearful of Davis, who

Jim committed the violent act beating the victim to death with a base- Whether or testimony

ball bat. not their question be believed was fact jury to the jury decide. Without

instruction was taken jury. defend- addition to the testimony, replete

ant’s the record is

testimony that Jim strong, Davis was threatening person.

violent and The de-

gree intelligence as asserted *7 prosecution, really irrelevant to capabilities ‍‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‍prosecution of force. The

argued that he intelligent enough was not plan Again, formulate out. carried enough

whether not he intelligent force exercise and fear defend- over the jury

ants was a of fact for the

determine. The was denied

to determine that fact. only unique aspect of this decision impression

lies in first of duress effect defense to felony-murder charge. considering

But after the facts of this case record, carefully

and after reviewing the I

am convinced that duress is an available

Case Details

Case Name: Tully v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
Date Published: Dec 30, 1986
Citation: 730 P.2d 1206
Docket Number: F-82-671
Court Abbreviation: Okla. Crim. App.
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