Tuite v. Corbitt

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the mandate of this court shall issue forthwith.

Order entered the court. Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman and Burke took no part the consideration or decision of this case.

(No. 101054. TUITE, PATRICK A. Appellant, MICHAEL COR BITT et al., Appellees.

Opinion Rehearing December denied filed 2006. March Saucier, Levy, and Brian D. Phillip Paul M. J. Zisook (John Chrtd., Deutsch, Levy & of Engel, Chicago of Hourihane, counsel), appellant. of for L.L.P., Sanders, Block, &

David P. of Jenner Metcalf, R. Jeffrey and Slade O. Grossman Chicago, Gove, Hartson, York, Hogan L.L.E, Gail & of New C. York, appellees. New for Andich, Andich, Island, W of Andich & of Rock

David Reader, for Inc. Chicago amicus curiae Dunn, & E. Funkhouser Liebman Vegosen Damon Ltd., Sun- Dunn, Chicago, Chicago for amicus curiae Times, Inc. Klenk,

James A. Fifer, Samuel Gregory R Naron and Natalie Spears, of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, L.L.E, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Tribune Co. et al. Craven, for amicus curiae Il-

Donald of Springfield, linois Broadcasters Association.

Michael Polelle, for amicus curiae J. of Chicago, AIDA, Inc.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered judgment court, with opinion. Fitzgerald,

Justices Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Freeman concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justice Burke took no part in the decision.

OPINION Plaintiff, Tuite, Patrick A. filed a complaint circuit court County of Cook against defendants, Michael Corbitt, Giancana, Sam and HarperCollins Publishers, se, per alleging claims of defamation false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of certain statements contained in defendants’ book, Double Deal. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2—615 of the Code of Civil (Code) (735 (West 2002)). Procedure ILCS The 5/2 —615 trial granted court defendants’ dismiss, motion to find ing that the disputed statements were of a reasonable innocent construction. The appellate court af firmed the trial court’s judgment. App. 3d 889.

We allowed Tuite’s petition for leave to appeal. 315(a). Ill. 2d R. Tuite contends this court should In the alterna- rule. construction innocent the abandon complaint his dismissal of the tive, Tuite contends in- is no reasonable there because be reversed should decline to We statements. for the nocent rule, find that but innocent construction abandon of dismissal affirming the erred in court appellate inva- light false se and per of defamation claims plaintiffs rule. We of the application on the based privacy sion of the appellate judgments therefore reverse court to the circuit this matter and remand circuit courts proceedings. for further

I. BACKGROUND Deal, a book Double coauthored and Giancana Corbitt in in crime organized experiences Corbitt’s that recounts Deal. Double published HarperCollins area. Chicago discus- included a and Giancana Deal, Corbitt In Double Chicago defending alleged in of Tuite’s involvement sion in 1985. charges criminal Joey Aiuppa against mafia boss Aiuppa’s in involvement description of his Based on alleging per defamation defense, complaint filed a Tuite inflic- and intentional se, privacy, light false invasion of emotional distress. tion a “self- Corbitt is alleged Tuite complaint,

In his criminal, life in crime was whose professional admitted Double Deal mafia.” Chicago the service crime organized nonfiction account to be a purports the book The cover of area. Chicago in the activities Murder, Cor- Unbridled Story Inside it is “The states identi- a Mobster.” Tuite Who Was Cop ruption, the basis Deal as from Double following excerpt fied the of his claims: Outfit, during [Operation]

“Unfortunately for the con- Strawman, tons of evidence FBI had uncovered City. guys Kansas Chicago to the necting the bosses against new case calling the FBI started When they II, clear pretty it was Strawman Chicago’s top bosses were on a roll.

Although put crimp Chicago’s top Strawman II guys, particularly Joey Aiuppa, they figured they first charges. starting could beat the But when then witnesses against them, they lining up began get [sic] worried. Glick, key guy Three of the FBI’s witnesses —Allen who Vegas Chicago; fronted four casinos for Aladena ‘Jimmy Fratianno; the Weasel’ and the former Teamsters president Roy everyone seriously Williams—had concerned. understand, From I they enough bury just what knew everybody about anybody who was the Outfit. out, And no trying it was use to take them Even either. (who if serving [Operation] Lombardo time on Pendorf Leavenworth) (who jail or Spilotro Chicago was in a murder) awaiting job, for trial had available to do been impossible it would been an have task. The more critical witnesses, Roy Williams, heavy like had been under months, security for ever come since the convictions had Operation they virtually down in Pendorf. were So untouch- able. Williams,

Ultimately just Glick, it wouldn’t be the about; worry Weasel the would time by Outfit have to the got way the trial under there guys flipping were right. pretty left and It that Chicago was clear the Outfit going major was told Joey Aiuppa to take hit. Sal me figured going away if get he was for he didn’t some sure representation. Joey better seventy-seven, Aiuppa At was man, an old he die in prison. didn’t want to He was desperate away charges to walk from to those and wanted Tuite, bring attorney represented in Pat an who’d mob past. Aiuppa cases But Sal said had run into a big-shot wall Supposedly, lawyer with Tuite. told Aiuppa he’d need a he’d million-dollar retainer before even walk in door. crazy, might playing

It seem hardball with an Outfit that, reasons; boss like but Tuite had he from his was far stupid. guys reputation He had a not knew that Outfit for attorneys. paying They’d get their off and then leave lawyer bag. any If holding guy made noise about bill, court,’ which, course, his it ‘take me to of no one ever had the to do. balls Aiuppa pals They

So now and his had a dilemma. didn’t money out of kick, defense take their go to on their want go They decided to they do? what did pockets. their own So let their skim town—and now crime-free Vegas Las to —the pay Tuite. trav- and others how Corbitt then describes [The book million in containing Utah, bags $1 picked up duffel eled to an individual bills, bags and delivered $100 got his states, Tuite T understand Chicago. The book night.’] retainer later that case, guys all the were sort Tuite was on the

After all handled. semijubilant. Everybody figured Tuite had it codefendants, a done it was like it was Aiuppa To and his you So can deal, they going acquitted. to be like were all they guilty all found imagine their reaction when were they all sit- January I understand were following —1986. City, ready open ting hotel room in Kansas around their up to arrest champagne, when the feds showed a bottle explanation kind And about Tuite? What them. what I can’t think possibly given could he have for this result? him advancing me—not after of one that would’ve satisfied guess why, And I that’s legal a million bucks for his fees. me, why life of never understood Pat Tuite for the I’ve get figure.” didn’t whacked. Go Tuite that these statements are false. He was alleged attorney not retained he was not Aiuppa, record, participate and he did not file an or appearance Rather, only in the trial. he served consultant did demand or attorneys. Additionally, he Aiuppa’s and did not know- receive a retainer of million cash $1 for his ingly illegally payment receive obtained funds as Further, the statements consulting alleged services. Tuite the falsely imply portion that he use all or a would criminal conduct bribery cash retainer to commit or other and that acquittal to ensure that he “had it all handled” “a deal.” done defamatory per Tuite that the statements are alleged wrongdoing, him they impute se criminal because court, a want of integrity want of as an officer of ethical duties as an in the of his integrity performance attorney, and an inability perform professional his du- ties as a criminal attorney. defense Tuite further alleged that the defendants were negligent publishing or, false alternative, statements in the that the defendants published the statements with knowledge they that were false or with reckless disregard as to their falsity. truth or alleged Tuite that publication of the statements was will- ful and damaged wanton and reputation his as an at- torney and as an officer of the court.

In support of his claim of intentional infliction of distress, emotional Tuite alleged that statements in the book, as well as statements made defendants book, marketing the him caused to fear for his safety and the safety of those around him. Tuite alleged that statements were outrageous extreme and him caused severe emotional distress.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint Code, under section 2—615 of the asserting complaint failed to state a claim of defamation per se because the disputed statements are in- capable of an nocent Additionally, construction. defendants asserted complaint failed light to state a claim of false invasion of privacy because Tuite failed to allege special damages required to support such a claim when statements are not defamatory per se. Defendants further asserted that alleged conduct in the complaint was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous support claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Tuite filed an amended complaint, the al- restating legations of his original complaint attaching a copy of Double Deal as an exhibit. The trial court subsequently granted defendants’ motion to dismiss amended complaint. The disputed trial court found that state- ments defamatory per they were not se because were a reasonable innocent construction. The court also held that Tuite failed to a claim light state of false he did dam- privacy allege special invasion of because Further, ages. sufficiently the statements were not extreme and to a claim of intentional outrageous support court, therefore, infliction of emotional distress. The trial dismissed the amended in its complaint entirety. appeal, argued

On Tuite that the trial court erred his claims of defamation se and false dismissing per light because, context, privacy invasion of when read statements do not permit a reasonable innocent construc- argued tion. Tuite also that his al- complaint adequately leged a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. court,

The appellate justice dissenting with one part, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. App. appellate 891. The court found statements reasonably could be read to indicate that Tuite was hired “better provide representation” and that Aiuppa his required codefendants were pay substantial retainer due to the risk of of their nonpayment legal bills. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 897. The belief acquittal was a “done deal” and the “semijubilant” reaction after hiring Tuite could reasonably be construed to mean that the codefendants had complete faith in Tuite and they were elated at thought of being represented by the best attorney available. 358 Ill. App. ap 3d at 898. The pellate court statements, concluded that considered whole, the context of the book as a were reasonably subject to this innocent construction. 358 Ill. 3d at App. Thus, 898. the appellate court held that the complaint failed to state a claim of defamation se. 358 Ill. per App. 3d at 899. appellate

The court also light held that Tuite’s false invasion of privacy claim was dependent upon the establishment of a claim of defamation se. 358 Ill. per Thus, 3d at App. the failure of Tuite’s defamation per se cause of action resulted the dismissal of his App.

false invasion of claim. 358 Ill. 3d at light privacy appellate disputed 899. The court further held that outrageous sufficiently statements were not extreme a cause of action for intentional infliction support App. emotional distress. 358 Ill. conclu disagreed majority’s

Justice Wolfson with to a reasonable in subject sion that the statements were (Wolfson, J., App. construction. 358 Ill. 3d at 901 nocent in In concurring dissenting part). in and specially part view, is that Tuite message “[t]he Justice Wolfson’s clear case, fix that he was to fix ready paid and able to it, deliver, something did that should and that he end to his life. It takes more premature have caused a apply meaning than a ‘strain’ to an innocent of Olympian propor It takes a fending gyration words. (Wolfson, J., App. specially tion.” 358 Ill. 3d at 901 in dissenting part). Justice Wolf- concurring part of the defamation son would have reversed the dismissal se and false counts and per light privacy invasion of App. 3d at 902 proceedings. remanded for further (Wolfson, J., dissenting specially concurring part in part). appeal. for leave to granted petition

We Tuite’s 315(a). Chicago Tribune Ill. 2d R. We then allowed Sun-Times, Inc., ABC, Inc., WLS Company, Chicago Inc., Television, Inc., Simon & Schus Broadcasting, CBS Reader, Inc., ter, Inc., Crain Communica Chicago Press, Inc., and the Illinois tions, Inc., the Copley to file an amicus curiae brief Broadcasters Association Ill. 2d R. 345. We allowed of defendants. support an amicus curiae brief AIDA, Inc., support to file Tuite. 155 Ill. R. 345.

II. ANALYSIS finding erred in court argues appellate Tuite Deal of a reasonable the statements Double court urges Tuite also innocent construction. replace abandon the innocent construction rule and it with “reasonable construction rule.” Based on these contentions, Tuite seeks reinstatement of his claims of per light privacy. defamation se and false invasion of challenge Tuite does not the dismissal of his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We will first argument consider Tuite’s that the innocent construc- tion rule should be abandoned.

A. The Innocent Construction Rule defamatory A statement if it tends to harm a person’s reputation to the extent that it lowers person eyes community in the or deters others associating person. Technology, from with that Solaia Specialty Publishing LLC v. Co., 221 Ill. 2d (2006). may defamatory per Statements be considered se defamatory per quod. Kolegas Broadcasting or v. Heftel Corp., defamatory A statement is per apparent ifse its character is obvious and injury plaintiffs reputation on may its face and to the presumed. (1986). Carr, Owen v. 273, 113 Ill. 2d 277 In a per quod damage plaintiff’s defamation action, to the reputation presumed. plaintiff is not Rather, the must plead prove special damages Bryson and to recover. v. News Publications, America Inc., 77, 174 Ill. 2d 103 (1996). plaintiff only alleges Here, a claim of defamation per se. categories Illinois,

In there are five of statements (1) defamatory per imputing that are se: statements (2) imputing crime; commission of a statements infection (3) with a loathsome disease; communicable statements imputing inability perform integrity an or want of in (4) performing employment imputing duties; statements ability prejudice person a lack of or that otherwise (5) profession his or her business; or and statements imputing adultery Technology, or fornication. Solaia 221 citing Ill. 2d 579-80, at Van Muller, Horne v. 185 Ill. 2d 502 (1998). into However, if a statement falls

299, even 307 se, per are of words that categories one of the per se reasonably capable if it is be actionable it will not 2d at 90. Bryson, 174 Ill. innocent construction. of an in Illinois originated construction rule The innocent Co., 24 2d 437 in John v. Tribune Ill. obiter dictum from Press, 344, v. 347 Chapski Copley See & v. North American Co. Valentine (1982), citing Life for (1974) (Ward, J., Insurance, Ill. 2d 172 Health J.). Schaefer, Underwood, C.J., and joined by dissenting, John, In this court stated: articles language in defendant’s further believe the

“We the innocent construction plaintiff when is not libelous is to be rule holds that the article consulted. That rule is given their natural a whole and the words read as allegedly libel that words meaning, requires obvious innocently be so must being read ous that are John, of law.” nonactionable as a matter and declared read Ill. decided, court after John was this Twenty years Chapski. rule in construction the innocent reconsidered applied the rule had “been acknowledged We less cases, something but court appellate dozens of and often [citations] uniform fashion completely than a its or concerning application objections vigorous over the law.” to be a fair statement it continues whether application also noted that 92 Ill. 2d at 348. We Chapski, court entirely consistent the rule had been com much critical subject to the rule had been and that recognized 2d at 349. We further mentary. Chapski, of that rule, or a variation the innocent Chapski, a few states. rule, only recognized Wood, N.M. P. 2d (citing Monnin 2d at 349 Co., 406 S.W.2d Star City v. Kansas (1974), Walker 43, (Mo. 386 Crawford, v. 143 Mont. 1966), 44 Steffes 549, Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 138 v. Becker (1963), 842 P.2d Kight, Tribune Co. v. 174 (1956), and Tulsa N.E.2d (1935)). 359, 50 P. 2d350 Okla. early justifications

We observed one for mitigated rule was that it li harshness of strict ability prior that existed in defamation law to Gertz v. Welch,Inc., 323, 789, Robert 418 U.S. 41 L. Ed. 2d 94 S. (1974). strongest Chapski, Ct. 2997 92 Ill. 2d at 350. The comported rule, however, for rationale was that it speech with the constitutional interests of free press and free encouraged daily the robust discussion of af Chapski, citing 350, fairs. 2d Ill. at Dauw Field v. (1979). Enterprises, App. Inc., 67, The primary criticism of the rule was that tendency to strain to find an unnatural innocent mean had a courts ing for a statement when an innocent construction was clearly defamatory meaning unreasonable and a was far probable. Chapski, more at 350-51.

This court concluded that modification of the in “[g]iven nocent construction rule was warranted inequities inconsistencies, and confusion that are now apparent interpretations applications from the of the originally rule protections John, as announced and the broader protect

that now exist to first amendment together availability [citations], interests with privileges [citations].” Chapski, various 92 Ill. 2d 351- court, therefore, 52. This held that: or “[A] written oral statement is be considered context, with the implications words and the therefrom given if, their natural meaning; and obvious con as so strued, reasonably the statement may innocently be interpreted reasonably or interpreted referring be plaintiff someone other than the it cannot be actionable per Chapski, se.” 92 Ill. 2d at 352. preliminary question This is a determination law to court; resolved whether the statement was in fact plaintiff understood to be or to refer to the question jury for the if the initial determination is plaintiff’s Chapski, resolved favor. 92 Ill. 2d at citing Wood, Troman 504 rule

This court addressed the innocent construction Witous, (1989), v. Ill. 2d 232 again Mittelman in general law defamation in observing that “the —and in particular innocent construction rule —has consistency in a morass of case law which spawned Nevertheless, we ago disappeared.” harmony long have Instead, rule. did abandon the innocent construction not not balance reasonable that courts should we clarified a reasonable construction of a statement with innocent Mittelman, 2d at 232. defamatory construction. of an innocent Rather, reasonably statements nondefamatory. interpreted should Mittelman, also held that Ill. 2d at 232. This court se ac per only to construction rule applies the innocent Mittelman, acknowledged at Ill. 2d 232. We tions. rule favors defendants the innocent construction se standard warranted per actions, tougher but found the presumed. Mittel damages are in those cases because man, 2d at 135 Ill. Bryson, court stressed that

Subsequently, remove an reasonable innocent constructions will “[o]nly se category.” per statement from the allegedly defamatory 90, citing Bryson, original.) (Emphasis Cities Com Capital Costello 11; Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at munications, Inc., 2d We further 125 Ill. explained that: rule, courts must the innocent construction applying

“In defamatory natural and obvi allegedly words their give the interpret must therefore meaning. [Citations.] Courts ous they appeared to have allegedly words as they intended to according the idea were been used and defama When a convey [Citation.] reader. the reasonable conveyed, this court clearly intended and meaning was tory defamatory words interpret allegedly will not strain to to hold in order most inoffensive sense mildest and their rule.” innocent construction nonlibellous under the them Ill. 2d at 93. Bryson, 174 require does not rule

Thus, the innocent construction meaning find courts to strain to an unnatural innocent defamatory meaning for statement when a is far more Bryson, reasonable. 174 Ill. at 94. The rule also does espouse require “to courts a naiveté unwarranted Bryson, under the circumstances.” at 94. apparent It is that the innocent construction rule has been clarified on several occasions this court response application. Notably, to difficulties in the rule despite has been retained those difficulties and is now long history established, well a with this state. Tuite’s request that we abandon the innocent rule necessarily implicates principles of stare decisis. expresses policy

The doctrine of stare decisis the by precedent disturbing courts to stand and to avoid points. People Sharpe, settled 481, v. 216 Ill. 2d (2005), quoting Mihelcic, Vitro 76, v. 209 Ill. 2d 81-82 (2004). change This doctrine ensures that law will not erratically, develop principled but will in a and intel ligible Sharpe, quoting fashion. 216 Ill. at 519, Vitro, 2d people at 209 Ill. 2d 81-82. Stare decisis allows rely upon bar of this state to decisions this they lightly court with assurance that will not be over Sharpe, quoting ruled. 519, 216 Ill. 2d at Vitro, 209 Ill. any departure Thus, 2d at 81-82. from stare decisis must justified. specially Sharpe, quoting be 520, 216 Ill. 2d at Vitro, 209 Ill. 2d at 81-82.

Prior decisions this court should not be overruled good compelling Sharpe, absent cause or reasons. 216 Ill. quoting 520, 2d at Vitro, 209 Ill. 2d at 81-82. This court depart precedent merely will from because the court might question have decided if the a otherwise were new Sharpe, quoting 520, one. 216 Ill. 2d Vitro, at at 81-82.A settled rule of law that does not contravene a principle should, statute or therefore, constitutional prejudicial public followed unless serious detriment to likely Sharpe, interests is to result. Ill. 520, 2d at Vitro, depart cause quoting at 81-82. Good governing from decisis also exists when decisions stare or reasoned. badly Sharpe, are unworkable are 122, Jones, 207 Ill. 2d People citing should abandon the in- argues Tuite court First, nocent construction rule for several reasons. Tuite has in most other rejected asserts that the rule been there is no sound reason to jurisdictions policy and that argues protections retain it. Tuite also that various rendering the rule unneces- privileges developed have innocent construc- sary. Tuite further contends jury rule eliminates the role improperly tion a statement has a determining whether if Tuite, the trial court finds there meaning. According to statement, a is no reasonable innocent construction for judgment entitled to a plaintiff should then be find reasonably no could jury of law because matter argues that the rule nondefamatory. Tuite also statement applied with the standards to be cannot be reconciled that, Tuite asserts 2—615 motion to dismiss. section the innocent construction contrary section 2— and inferences sur- allegations rule requires factual a light be viewed in most rounding the statement to reasonable in- any to the defendant because favorable if a more accepted even nocent construction must Tuite Lastly, exists. defamatory reasonable construction to Chapski Bryson efforts argues despite that rule, by it to be Illinois misapplied continues clarify courts. this court to arguments, Tuite asks

Based on these adopt rule and the innocent construction abandon in its Tuite asserts place. construction rule” “reasonable major- rule, in a applied that the reasonable construction requir- balance proper by ity jurisdictions, of strikes disputed determine whether the trial court to ing of a construe- reasonably capable is statement

507 reasonably If a defama- tion. the statement of construction, it tory jury decides whether was defamatory. argues intended or understood to be Tuite that the reasonable construction rule insulates judicial system eliminating from frivolous claims without the role of the jury.

In objec this court Chapski, many considered of innocent are tions to the construction rule that now raised Tuite. We acknowledged that the innocent rule, thereof, or a recognized variation only a few states. See 92 Ill. 2d at 349. Chapski, We also considered “the broader protections that now exist protect first amendment interests together [citations] availability with the privileges.” the various Chapski, Ill. 2d at (citing Sullivan, 92 351 New York Times v.Co. 254, 686, (1964), 376 U.S. 11 L. Ed. 2d 84 S. Ct. 710 Gertz Welch, Inc., 323, v. Robert 789, 418 41 L. 2d U.S. Ed. 94 (1974), S. Ct. 2997 Stieg, 205, Colson v. 89 Ill. 2d 209 (1982), Walker, Blair 1 (1976), v. Farnsworth v. Co., (1969), Tribune 43 Ill. 2d 286 v. Hayes Zienfeld Lines, Inc., Freight 41 (1968), Ill. 2d 345 v. Catalano Pechous, 146, (1980), Ill. 167-68 and Restatement (Second) (1977)). §§583 of Torts through We, nevertheless, chose only modify light rule these considerations rather than abandon it. Chapski, at 351-52.

Tuite cites three cases were decided after Chapski in support protections his argument new have rendered the innocent construction rule unneces- sary. Tuite asserts that Co., Milkovich Lorain Journal (1990), U.S. 111 L. Ed. 2d S. Ct. held a defamatory statement factual than must be rather mere hyperbole or unverifiable opinion be actionable. The Supreme Court, however, previously stated in Gertz that expressions opinion are constitutionally protected. The “[bjowever Court asserted that an pernicious opinion 508 seem, not on the

may depend for its correction we juries and on judges competition conscience of but Gertz, 339-40, Ed. 2d other 418 U.S. at 41 L. at ideas.” Milkovich, 805, In clarified 94 S. at 3007. the Court Ct. there artificial opinion that is no distinction between fact, a false assertion of fact can be that opinion. Bryson, if it is terms of an even couched Milkovich, 18-19, 99-100, 2d at at Ill citing U.S. Under Milko 17-18, 2d L. Ed. at S. Ct. at 2705-06. vich, only if constitutionally protected is it a statement actual facts. reasonably stating be construed as cannot Milkovich, Bryson, at 497 U.S. at quoting 174 Ill. 2d Nonetheless, 20, 111 L. Ct. at Ed. at 110 S. 2706. opinion protection the constitutional of statements Technology, in Gertz. See Solaia recognized Gertz for support proposition 2d at 581 (quoting constitutionally as an may protected that statement In Chapski, this court considered expression opinion). Gertz in modifying protections” provided “broader Chapski, Ill. 2d at rule. the innocent construction 351-52. Marketing Kuwik Star & v. Starmark

Tuite also cites Administration, Inc., (1993), 16, 24 for the 156 Ill. 2d protect defamation proposition qualified privileges that liability allegedly defama defendants from even when this court Chapski is But tory statement untrue. availability qualified privileges of various considered rule. modify the innocent deciding Thus, of quali the existence Chapski, a decision to abandon support fied does privileges now. rule addition, plaintiffs Tuite that defamation (1986). protection

1558, 1564 This constitutional was not specifi- Chapski. Tuite, however, in does not considered cally protection explain replaces the function how this by the construction rule. served innocent previously noted, As the innocent construction rule applies only per Mittelman, 135 2d to se actions. Ill. at tougher defendants, While the rule favors the presumed damages is because are standard warranted per Mittelman, se 234. We are actions. not persuaded protections the constitutional privileges by supplant cited Tuite the innocent construc reject argument rule. tion We therefore Tuite’s that the innocent construction rule should be abandoned on this basis. argument

As for Tuite’s that the innocent construc jury’s determining tion rule meaning the eliminates role in the statement, of a this court addressed that claim Chapski. preliminary We held that the determination of whether a is statement reasonable in question nocent construction is a of law be resolved Chapski, court in the the instance. first Ill. 2d at 352. Whether the statement was in fact understood to be defamatory question jury is a for the if the initial plaintiffs Chapski, determination is resolved the favor. Thus, 92 Ill. 2d at 352. the innocent construction rule jury not does eliminate the role of the as Tuite claims. argument provide good compel This ling does not cause or a depart

reason for this court to stare from decisis. We also no observe conflict the innocent between applied rule and standards to a section 2—615 A motion to dismiss. 2—615 section motion to legal sufficiency complaint dismiss attacks the of a based City Chicago Corp., on facial defects. v. Beretta U.S.A. (2004). well-pleaded 351, 213 Ill. 2d All facts and reasonable that can from inferences be drawn those facts accepted Bryson, are as true. at 86. The court allegations

is to in the interpret complaint Mraz, v. Wakulich light plaintiff. most favorable (2003). A 203 Ill. 2d cause of action should 2—615 unless clear that be dismissed under section it is proved pleadings set of under no facts can Topinka, to recover. Canel plaintiff would entitle the In considering a section 2—615 motion to dismiss claim, se must as true per accept defamation the court defen including the facts alleged complaint, not, The publication dant’s of a statement. court interpretation however, accept plaintiffs required se. The per disputed statement is not a fact that can meaning disputed statement Thus, alleged accepted preliminary as true. the be and “is properly question construction of the statement to be the court the first instance.” law resolved Chapski, construing Ill. 2d at In the statement 352. rule, must construction the court under the innocent their natural and allegedly defamatory words “give “as meaning” they appeared obvious and them interpret they to the idea were according to have been used Bryson, convey intended to the reasonable reader.” to contention, Contrary ap Tuite’s 174 Ill. 2d at 93. al construe the factual the rule the court does not plying to the defendant. light most favorable legations Rather, legal question of court determines therefore, We, of the statement. preliminary rule find the innocent construction no conflict between and section 2—615. argument of his support final contention in

Tuite’s abandoned construction rule should be innocent the rule misapplied. Since is that the rule continues to ap- has Bryson, court appellate last clarified any has not identified it in cases. Tuite plied several Bryson claims misapplied that he specific case since appellate this court did find the court rule. We note that applying rule in one erred in the innocent construction Technology,221 See at 582-83. recent case. Solaia finding provide a basis for the rule unwork That does not any subject oc able, however, rule of law is because just years misapplication. Bryson, In decided casional ago, clarify the innocent construction this court chose to abandon rule rather than to abandon it. We will not now the rule as unworkable absent evidence that it has been subject misapplication to more than an occasional follow ing its clarification. sum,

In this court has held that the innocent con struction rule advances the constitutional interests of speech press encourages free and free the robust citing daily Chapski, discussion of affairs. 92 Ill. 2d at App. applies only auw, 78 Ill. The rule D justified per se, claims of defamation and it is due to the presumption damages. Mittelman, A 135 Ill. 2d at 234. plaintiff always application can avoid of the innocent by seeking per quod construction rule to establish a ac Mittelman, tion. 135 Ill. 2d at conclude that 233. We underlying rationale the rule remains valid. Tuite has good compelling not established the cause or reason required depart for this court to from stare decisis. Ac cordingly, reject request we Tuite’s to abandon the in nocent construction rule. Application

B. of the Innocent Construction Rule argues appellate finding Tuite that the court erred in disputed that the statements are of a reasonable previously prelimi noted, innocent construction. As nary allegedly defamatory construction of an statement question Chapski, a is of law. 92 Ill. 2d at 352. Accord ingly, Cole, our review is de 2d novo. Woods Ill. (1998), citing Lakin, Lucas v. (1997). considering allegedlydefamatory

In statements under rule, reemphasize the innocent construction we they appeared courts must the words “as interpret have used and to the idea were according they been Bryson, convey intended to to the reasonable reader.” Ill. 2d at 93. to strain to find required Courts are meaning an unnatural innocent for words when a Bryson, is far more reasonable. meaning Thus, meaning if of a likely at 94. intended not dismiss the defamatory, statement is court should under the innocent construction rule. In plaintiffs claim circumstances, those an innocent necessarily statement would be strained unreason likely meaning defamatory. able because the intended is note that the innocent construction rule does not We also a naiveté under require espouse courts “to unwarranted Bryson, the circumstances.” 174 Ill. 2d at 94. has

Additionally, emphasized this court determining context a statement is critical in its mean Mittelman, Bryson, 93-94; 174 Ill. 2d at 135 Ill. ing. See entirely dif given may convey 2d at 247-48. A statement in different contexts. meanings presented ferent when Thus, requires writing construction rule the innocent John, In 24 Ill. 2d at 442. “to be read as a whole.” determining case, must consider the entire book we See allegedly defamatory context of the statements. Side, Co., Chicago Inc. v. Tribune Flip App. 641, 651 essentially Deal is a series of stories about

Double and their activities. A review of the book figures mafia organized corruption crime and shows its context in those area and Corbitt’s involvement Chicago asserts, story Tuite the book “recounts activities. As judicial including within the story corruption, after in the statements must be viewed system.” disputed The throughout repeatedly described corruption context of the Double Deal. in this corruption focus on overwhelming

Given an in- reasonably given book, these statements cannot asserted In the defendants excerpt, nocent construction. evidence,” FBI and three that “the had uncovered tons bury just about key enough of the witnesses “knew anybody in the Outfit.” Defendants everybody who was “flipping asserted that additional witnesses were left and Chicago Outfit right” pretty “[i]t and was clear that statements, if to take a hit.” These ac- going major was curate, against Aiuppa indicate that the evidence and his extremely strong. codefendants was book, According to the Tuite was then mil paid $1 lion in cash to and his codefendants. represent Aiuppa hired, guys semiju After Tuite “all the were sort of was bilant,” handled,” they believed Tuite “had it all and “it deal, they was like it was a done like were all to be going fact, acquitted.” In and his codefendants Aiuppa were so they confident that would be acquitted spite of compelling guilt they prepar evidence of their were ing to celebrate In waiting while for the verdict. context of this book about crime and widespread corrup tion, naturally these statements indicate that Tuite was expected engage bribery or to secure the payoffs acquittals. agree We with Justice Wolfson that “[t]he clear is that Tuite and fix message ready was able to case, it, paid deliver, that he was to fix and that he did not something premature should have caused a end to (Wolfson, J., his life.” 358 Ill. 3d at App. specially concurring part dissenting part).

Defendants, nonetheless, argue that terms such as “retainer,” “better representation,” money,” “defense “legal fees” in the indicate that Tuite excerpt provide legitimate legal hired to services rather than to pay bribes. Defendants maintain that it is reasonable to on accept the innocent construction that Tuite was hired The use legal disagree. basis of his skills. We isolated of those terms does not control meaning excerpt. significantly The context of the book as a whole Importantly, colors those terms. is not about book hiring lawyer or an complimenting Tuite’s skills as at- torney. The book is a of corruption, series stories about including corruption judicial system. within the It is not reasonable to believe defendants intended convey story about Tuite’s trial skills of given context book as a It is far whole. more reasonable to believe convey story defendants intended to about corruption. they explicitly accused Defendants further that argue Tuite, of criminal people other misconduct the book. however, explicitly bribing was not accused of officials or Defendants, any therefore, other criminal act. contend excerpt capable that is of a reasonable innocent construction. that agree explicitly

We Tuite was not accused of brib- however, ing excerpt. excerpt, officials The facing and his Aiuppa indicates codefendants were virtually pending insurmountable evidence their Nevertheless, criminal trial. after Tuite allegedly paying “skim,” million in from their the criminal illegal cash $1 defendants considered their to be “a done acquittals question naturally deal.” The arises as to how Tuite certainty would ensure with the “tons acquittals despite against Although evidence” the criminal defendants. bribery does not describe as the means explicitly book result, it mention or achieving also does not describe Tuite’s trial skills as the basis for the criminal defendants’ confidence in their Based on the acquittals. wording excerpt along of the with the context of the book whole, reader as a we believe that a reasonable would conclude was intended to allude likely passage most A reason- bribery corruption judicial system. and of the likely delivery able reader would conclude that $1 solely illegally million in cash in obtained funds was part, legitimate legal fees, was, at least in to be but for acquittals. payoffs and to ensure used for bribes simply to believe for a reasonable reader There is no basis compliment implicitly intended to that defendants organized a book about Tuite’s trial skills the middle of corruption. crime and noted, to find an innocent mean

As we will not strain defamatory ing is far more for when a construction words Bryson, that a 174 Ill. 2d at 94. We conclude reasonable. disputed is statements any An far more reasonable than innocent construction. descrip incompatible innocent construction with leading up following hir Tuite’s tion of the events ing, in the remainder of as well as the events chronicled Any the book. innocent construction of these statements Bryson, See would be strained unreasonable. Accordingly, appellate 2d at conclude that the we finding disputed court erred statements a reasonable innocent construction.

Finally, light privacy Tuite’s false invasion of claim upon defamatoryper was based se nature of the state appellate ments. The court held that the failure of per required Tuite’s defamation se claim the dismissal of light App. his false claim. 358 Ill. 3d at 899. Because we per claim, reverse the dismissal of Tuite’s defamation se light it that the dismissal his false of follows of invasion privacy claim must also be reversed.

III. CONCLUSION foregoing judgment reasons, For the we reverse the appellate of the and court and the circuit court remand proceedings this matter court further circuit for opinion. consistent with

Reversed and remanded. and CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS JUSTICE BURKE part in took no the consideration or decision of this case. concurring part FREEMAN, JUSTICE and dis- senting part: agree majority appropriate

I with the that it is dismissing reverse the circuit court’s order the case. However,I would at that a arrive conclusion different majority, respectfully route than the I because dissent portion majority opinion from that reaf- which firms the “innocent construction rule.” strongly

While I in the of believe doctrine stare deci- application proper sis, I do not believe its this case is First, for several reasons. the innocent construction rule my step is, view, out of with the first amendment jurisprudence Supreme of the United States Court. compellingplaintiffs arguments Second, I find I —which do not believe this court ever to have addressed—that inherently the innocent construction rule is The flawed. rejected by overwhelming fact that the rule has been majority jurisdictions an my reinforces belief. This court’s application own inconsistent of the rule also demon- suggests therein, strates the flaws inherent that the question need exists for this court to revisit the place in rule’s continued our case law. my together mind,

To these facts constitute sufficient yield. cause for stare decisis to Stare decisis is a valid and long acknowledged, thumb, useful rule of but as we have Chicago it v. is not an “inexorable command.” Bar Ass’n Elections, Illinois State Board “ensuring] Rather, it end is means to the merely change erratically, but will law will not develop principled intelligible Chicago fashion.” Ass’n, Bar at 510. Prior decisions should (Moehle Chrysler “good be overruled absent cause” (1982)), Corp., good 299, 2d but cause Motors 93 Ill. 304 prior question proves to be exists when the decision badly (People Sharpe, or reasoned v. unworkable (2005), citing People 481, Jones, 122, 207 Ill. 2d 2d 520 v.

517 (2003)). noted, does it do violence Nor, have we the court decision which prior decisis to overrule stare See disavowing inception. People since its has been quietly (2000) (“ 312, ‘explicitly over Mitchell, v. change in the not an “erratic” ruling prior decision] is [a case], case every years [that In since eighteen law. has [it], today’s majority opinion, including interpreting what explicit I make holding. merely would eroded its eighteen for the last implicitly court has done Comm’n, 183 Industrial ”), McMahan v. years’ quoting (1998) J., concurring). 499, (Heiple, specially 2d construc history A of the innocent brief review 1964, rule in initially adopted tion rule is order. We (1962). There, we Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437 in John v. Tribune Press, 92 Ill. dictum(Chapski Copley stated “obiter (1982)) 344, 347-48 articles is not libelous language “the defendant’s the innocent construction rule is consulted. plaintiff when read as a whole That rule holds that the article is to be meaning, given and obvious and the words their natural allegedly libelous that are requires that words non- being innocently read must be so read and declared John, 24 Ill. 2d at 442. actionable as a matter of law.” rule, any adopting did not offer rationale for We made Illinois an outlier despite the fact that we had Comment, In See, The Illinois Doctrine doing e.g., so. One, A 30 U. Chi. L. Minority nocent Construction: (1963). recognized subsequently Commentators Rev. 524 mitigat effect of the rule could have the beneficial in the law of defama liability the doctrine of strict ing (30 538-39), but that doctrine was tion U. Chi. L. Rev. at John, years prior to the years after over abolished Gertz v. citing 92 Ill. 2d at present day. Chapski, Welch, 323, 41 94 S. Inc., 418 U.S. L. Ed. Robert Ct. 2997 John, this court decided years after

Approximately There, persist with we debated whether Chapski. 518

innocent rule. Recognizing that the rule had been applied wildly divergent ways by appel our court, late the strongest argument this court could muster in defense of the innocent construction rule was “that it comports with the constitutional interests of free speech and free press and encourages robust discus daily sion of Chapski, 350, affairs.” 92 Ill. 2d citing Dauw v. Inc., Field Enterprises, App. 67, 78 Ill. 3d 71 (1979). Nevertheless, we in Chapski acknowledged also since John had been decided, there had come general broader protection for first amendment interests. Chapski, Welch, Gertz v. Robert 92 Ill. 2d at (citing 351 Inc., 323, 789, 41 (1974), 418 U.S. L. Ed. 2d 94 S. Ct. 2997 Sullivan, and New York Times v. Co. 254, 376 U.S. 11 L. (1964) 686, Ed. 2d 84 S. Ct. 710 (abolishing doctrine of liability strict private for both and public plaintiffs, respectively)). We recognized also the existence of “vari of free speech. Chapski, 92 Ill. privileges” protective ous Colson v. 2d at 351 (citing Stieg, 205, 89 2d Ill. 209 Pechous, (1982), Catalano v. 146, (1980), 167-68 Walker, Blair v. Farnsworth v. Tribune (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 1 Co., Lines, v. Hayes Freight (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 286 Zeinfeld Inc., 41 (Second) (1968), Ill. 2d 345 and Restatement (1977)). §§583 Torts through 613 We accordingly con cluded that protection sufficiently rule’s was less compelling modify that we could the rule as announced John clarify context,

“a or written oral statement is to be considered in with the implications given words and the therefrom their if, construed, meaning; natural and obvious as so the state- may reasonably innocently ment interpreted be or reason- ably interpreted referring to someone other than the per se. This plaintiff it preliminary cannot be actionable properly question determination is of law to be resolved instance; the court in the first publication whether the fact understood to be or to refer to the plaintiff question jury is a for the should the initial determination be plaintiff.” resolved favor

519 Wood, Ill. 2d citing Troman v. 62 92 Ill. 2d at Chapski, (1975). 184, 189 Chapski times since the rule numerous applied We have See, e.g., it. So modified explicitly never since but have Co., 221 Ill. Publishing Specialty LLC v. Technology, laia Publications, Inc., (2006); America Bryson 2d v. News 558 v. Broadcast 77, 90, (1996); Kolegas 2d Ill. Heftel Witous, (1992); v. 2d Mittelman 154 Ill. ing Corp., Cities Com (1989); Capital Costello we, munications, Nor have Inc., to the any challenge expressly addressed Chapski, since rule, as far I am aware. so yield must I stare decisis

The first reason that believe rule is out is innocent construction in this case that the precedent Court Supreme of with United States step protec the first amendment’s involving defamation and say It that speech. tion of free is outdated. That is 2d at daily (Chapski, of affairs” “robust discussion 350) has passé, Supreme has become but as the Court inter long only free is not the societal recognized, speech were, “If this Court est at issue in defamation actions. it ago that long publishers would have embraced the view enjoy and indefeasible and broadcasters an unconditional Gertz, from for defamation.” 418 U.S. immunity liability 806, 341, Rather, 41 L. Ed. 2d S. at 3007. at at 94 Ct. with the individual’s interest interest tension good his name false maintaining against Gertz, 341, 806, 41 L. 2d at hood. 418 U.S. at Ed. S. Thus, simple Ct. fact the innocent at 3008. (see free 224 Ill. 2d at speech construction rule favors 350) 511, is not sufficient citing 2d at Chapski, it. prefer reason to has

Moreover, jurisprudence as first amendment has evolved, Supreme provided the United States Court speech to free which great protection deal additional Chapski. the time of or Sullivan did not exist at John course, landmark cases defamation were, Gertz Chapski. law which were decided after but John before They away liability did with the doctrine strict actions, defamation and we took them into account when Chapski. Chapski, we modified the rule in See signifi But the Court has announced numerous Chapski, plaintiff cant decisions since as notes in his brief instance, to this court. For the Court has ruled that speech public when the at issue concerns a matter importance, plaintiff prove on burden is (rather speech being false than truth an affirmative prove) defense which the defendant must raise and even plaintiff public figure. Philadelphia when the is not Newspapers, Hepps, 776, Inc. v. 767, 475 U.S. 89 Ed. L. (1986). 783, 792, 1558, 2d 106 S. Ct. The Court has recovery any speech erected an absolute bar to for which “reasonably interpreted stating cannot have been public figure. Magazine, actual facts” about a Hustler Falwell, 46, 50, Inc. v. 41, 48, 485 U.S. L. 99 Ed. majority recognizes, 876, And, S. Ct. as the Co., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 497 U.S. 111 Ed. L. (1990), yet wrought change S. 110 Ct. 2695 another There, defamation law. the Court disavowedthe state “[hjowever pernicious opinion may ment in Gertz that an depend seem, we for its not on correction the conscience judges juries competition of and on but the of other (see Gertz, 339-40, 805, ideas” 418 at 41 U.S. L. Ed. 2d at 3007) 94 at S. Ct. as mere “dictum” which was exemption “intended create wholesale defamation ” anything might ‘opinion.’ for be labeled Milko vich, U.S. at 111 L. at 110 at 497 Ed. 2d S. Ct. question Rather, clarified, Milkovich the is whether “provable respect the false,” statement is as at least with speech involving public on matters of concern a media Milkovich, 19-20, defendant. U.S. at 111 L. 497 Ed. 2d 18, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. comprehensive

A on dissertation defamation law scope partial beyond dis- of the is well since 1964 cursory apparent from the above even But what is sent. play survey in into of factors come is that a number against rights speech balancing the free concerns against turns on The calculus defamation. individual public figure, plaintiff is a the such variables whether media, and the is a member of the defendant whether subject degree public the al- matter of interest in the of Although legedly defamatory speech some of Chapski at issue. permutations had been settled at time these decided, not all had. apparent con is that the innocent What is further distinctions. We rule is to all of above struction blind applied is a member of the rule when the defendant have (trade (Solaia Technology, 2d 221 Ill. the media (national magazine)) magazine); Bryson, 2d 77 174 Ill. (Mittel private individual the defendant is a when (member man, of directors of 2d board firm)). equal plaintiffs The law rule is force when (Catalano plaintiffs public figures Pechous, 83 Ill. are (1980) aldermen)) (city plaintiff is a when (Bryson, (private private individual Illinois)). living in a town in southern individual small any attempt my case evince Nor does review our law degree public interest to take into account wholly subject speech The at issue. rule is matter of complex balance to the context-sensitive insensitive speech public’s and the between the interest free good name, in his unsullied false individual’s interest see, rule far as I can the innocent construction hood. So nothing side on the more than a thumb on scale everyper is out of case. It se defamation defendant step inherent defamation the delicate balances with to over sufficient reason law and this alone constitutes notwithstanding. it, rule stare decisis depart My finding stare from basis for cause second decisis deals with very operation of the innocent construction rule. it only step Not is out of with defama- tion generally sledgehammer law scalpel where a is —a called intrinsically for —it is logically and inconsis- flawed tent with our general standards applicable at stage dismissal of lawsuits. The majority purports to ad- dress concerns, these but I believe it falls short. argues terms,

Plaintiff that by its the innocent construction rule away does with the role of the jury, he rule, is correct. According to the stage, the dismissal the court must whether, question answer threshold of as a of law, matter a can statement read reasonably be If yes i.e., innocently. the statement can answer is — be read innocently case never a goes jury. Only if —the i.e., cannot reasonably answer the statement no— innocently is, be read proceed. the case That a —does jury only will be allowed to decide whether statement actually innocent or if the defamatory court has already decided as matter law the statement reasonably cannot be read innocently. Chapski, jury finding at 352. of a No favor defendant should be stand, allowed to given get for the case to to the jury, already the court have must found a matter of law that the statement in reasonably cannot be read nocently. brief,

As plaintiff notes his commentators have described this flaw in the rule for after Shortly decades. Chapski, commentators noted: primary

“The flaw the innocent construction rule is illogical determining its method for statements are which to be nonactionable as a matter of law and which to be are jury. John, applied allegedly sent to a Under the rule as being innocently words read must judge so read and declared nonactionable as a Therefore, only matter of law. those statements which incapable any court determines are innocent construc- jury tion to be are sent for a determination defamatory. to be Under they were understood whether in- that no however, judge if a determines procedure, exists, nothing left the is for there nocent construction not in theory, though apparently jury to In determine. plaintiff should then be entitled practice, the actual judge Alternatively, of the should judgment as a matter law. judgment judgment or to enter a directed compelled the notwithstanding the if the issue is submitted to verdict L. Malone & R. jury jury determines otherwise.” and the Smolla, in Illinois Colson The Future after of Defamation Press, Inc., 32 DePaul L. Stieg Chapski Copley and v. (1983). Rev. prior Chapski: just

The same fact was observed jury in Illinois on the he a trial “[T]here should never reasonably For, are if the words nature of the words. meaning, judge the trial should dismiss capable of innocent only kind of case will be situation the case. The other reasonably capable any are innocent which the words Therefore, judg judge enter meaning. the trial should words, meaning on the plaintiff, ment for the at least by find jury no definition could ever because reasonable Polelle, “In the to be innocent.” M. The Guilt the words Law, 1 nocent Construction Rule” Illinois Defamation Ill. L. Rev. N. U.

Indeed, making have been same commentators John: observation since [the literally applied, rule]

“If innocent construction would jury practically seem from the determina- eliminate If defamatory ambiguous language. tion of quality construction, the words are of an innocent If in- defendant entitled directed verdict. there is no to a publica- from the nocent construction that can be derived defamatory tion there is no as to its question then fact character, it declared as a mat- should be question way ter of Either would be no to be law. there jury.” L. at 531. submitted to the 30 U. Chi. Rev. Smolla, §4.22,

See also R. Law of Defamation (1999) (noting 4—38.8 the innocent rule, internally contradictory, confusing, “which is often biased in favor of defen- significantly and on the whole dants, produced results, has some bizarre and has come criticism”). in for substantial majority The suggests that we objec answered this tion in Chapski. See 224 Ill. 2d I at 509. respectfully disagree. In Chapski professed we never to address the argument away rule did with jury’s role. It is not the argument clear case, even raised despite objection having been voiced commenta tors since the rule’s inception. contrary, To the the only argument against the rule which acknowledged we Chapski it, was that when applying courts failed to interpret reasonably. statements 92 Ill. 2d at Chapski, Moreover, 350-51. if the argument even was raised in Chapski rejected silentio, response sub is that now, then, a majority as of this court to failed come to grips objection. say with the heart of the To the case goes jury to the if it been has not is technically dismissed true, point objection but the of the once is that a case has survived dismissal under the innocent construction rule there is nothing jury decide, the to because left for the already court must have ruled matter as a of law that it would be unreasonable to the interpret statements defamatory. as but anything Plaintiff also argues that the rule is inconsistent with the standards we apply otherwise at the dismissal stage. Again, plaintiffs point is well-taken. As the majority cor rectly summarizes, stage at the dismissal “[A] well- and pleaded facts reasonable that can inferences be drawn those accepted Moreover, from facts are as true.” interpret “[t]he court is to the allegations the the complaint light plaintiff,” most favorable the the dismissing only cause of action if “it is clear that no proved set of facts can be under the pleadings would entitle the to recover.” 224 Ill. 2d 509-10. The plaintiff majority reasons that the innocent rule is with principles although consistent these because “the alleged accept in the true facts must the court required complaint,” not, however, to ac “is the court disputed interpretation plaintiffs cept of the state the meaning disputed defamatory per se. The ment as alleged accepted that can and is not a fact be statement original.) (Emphasis 2d at as true.” “ allegedly ‘give[s] Rather, the court meaning’ interprets and their natural and obvious words according they appeared to have been used them ‘as convey they to the reason idea intended to to the were ” Bryson, quoting Ill. 224 Ill. 2d at able reader.’ 2d at 93. ordinarily applicable at of the rules

This recitation pursuant stage in to the dismissal and what occurs me nocent construction rule seems to sufficient incompatibility plaintiff demonstrate the to which directs agree majority I that it be our attention. with would interpretation inappropriate plaintiffs of a to treat as a assumed true. statement fact which must be to be meaning However,if the of a is not a “fact” to statement “alleged,” at a then how is trial court arrive Clearly, regarding meaning? conclusion statement’s interpret inferring statement, its the court must meaning from it was And the context which made. any majority regarding thus, cites, doubt rules meaning plaintiffs the statement’s should be resolved (“All well-pleaded 2d at facts favor. See 509-10 reasonable that can be drawn from those inferences [Citation.] accepted The to facts are as true. court is allegations complaint light interpret in in the the the added)). plaintiff’ (emphases But most favorable to the preference rule, no is the under innocent sup given interpretation for that the statement which contrary, any plaintiffs complaint. ports doubt To the meaning in resolved the the statement’s is about defen interpretation of if the defendant’s dant’s favor because reasonable, the statement is the case is dismissed. is This not an appropriate standard the dismissal stage.

To it the say way, another innocent construction rule play comes into when there are ways two reasonable which interpreted, a statement could be one of is which situation, and one of such a defamatory which not. In required the court is to dismiss the action rather than al- go the case to lowing jury. clearly to the This is different actions, which, than all other civil at the dismissal if stage, ways there are a two reasonable to resolve factual one dispute, favoring plaintiff and the other favor- defendant, ing dismiss, the court must motion deny the to case to sending jury the the resolve the factual dispute. The that majority’s statement the rule does not a require court to “construe factual allegations the the light is, technically most favorable to again, the defendant” true the A argument. but misses thrust of the court does favor, not have to draw in the inferences defendant’s rule, according because to the innocent construction the case entire must be decided in a defendant’s favor as is even reason- matter if position of law the defendant’s able. point except Plaintiffs is that all defama- cases tion, is, the at the dismissal Is it question stage reason- ably possible will able to his plaintiff prove so, defamation, case? If the case In proceed. must contrast, question is, reasonably possible Is it so, fail? If plaintiff’s case could the case must be plaintiff having op- dismissed without ever portunity put jury peers. his case a his before contrast,

By construction rule suffers reasonable Application none of these defects. reasonable requires stage construction rule court at the dismissal any way to determine whether there is reasonable interpret the statement manner. If the statement can be so reasonably interpreted, case proceeds, must determine if the jury ultimately

527 defamatory. Only if it is not actually statement was defama interpret the statement as reasonably possible 506-07; also 2d at see the case dismissed. Ill. tory is 419, Co., N.E.2d v. Gannett James N.Y.2d (1976). rule This 837-38, 871, 874 386 N.Y.S.2d the applicable rules with our normal comports jury for the stage, question and leaves dismissal jury. actually go if the case does decide flaws in the rule I that these inherent believe despite to abandon it another sufficient reason constitute 519; Jones, 2d at Sharpe, stare decisis. See Ill. ex (good prior 2d at 134 cause to overrule decision badly or decision is unworkable prior ists when reasoned). I indication this court has ever see no that did certainly deficiencies in the rule. We considered these John, in dictum adopted do so where we rule no nor did do so analysis, in one with we paragraph Chapski, only challenge where the we addressed was courts applying interpreted fact that rule statements rule. unreasonably, any applying nor in other decision badly illogical, The rule is reasoned and should alone, let fact away done with for this reason alone the evolving badly step that it is also out of with defamation jurisprudence. and first amendment rule is Another virtue of the reasonable construction the vast jurisdictions. that it is majority followed it is simply The Restatement and Dobbs both state are judge’s function to determine whether the words defamatory, jury and the being understood as actually defamatory. they determines whether were (Second) §614, (1977); 2 D. of Torts at 311 Restatement (2001). Dobbs, §404, men- Torts at 1131 Neither even A leading says another treatise approach. tions “every adopted by reasonable construction rule has been Smolla, Illinois.” jurisdiction in United save R. States §4.21, But see at 4—38.5 Law of Defamation (3d Sack, R on §2.4.14, Sack Defamation at 2—62-2—63 2004) (innocent ed. rev. rule the law not only in and, Illinois but also in “Ohio perhaps, Mis Montana”). souri, Mexico, New jurisdictions, Some York, such as New appear always to have followed the James, e.g., (see, reasonable construction rule 40 N.Y.2d 419, 837-38, at N.E.2d 874), at 386 at N.Y.S.2d while others, California, such as once followed the innocent rule but construction abandoned it in favor of the reason (MacLeod Publishing v. Tribune able construction rule Co., (1959)). 536, 2d Cal. 343 P. 2d36 necessarily

I uniqueness would not find our alone be I precedent. sufficient reason to abandon our prior rule, believe it no vice to fast hold to a well-reasoned jurisdictions case, even if do agree. other But in this I Illinois follows is not well rule reasoned, believe the its rejection by almost universal our sister states tends to support view. that I

Finally, note that innocent construction rule has fraught been with its inconsistency inception. since Our Chapski provides modification of the rule one this, Moreover, example despite of course. this court’s Chapski express holding statement there our John, “modified” the rule we as announced have been Chapski modify about inconsistent whether did fact Bryson, 2d e.g., Compare, the rule. at 93 (paren John), Chapski as thetically characterizing “modifying” with Anderson v. 399, Dorpel, Vanden (1996) (“ is hardly Chapski ‘it tenable that an prior unreasonable. In a short, innocent construction could reasonable innocent always construction was the mandate of John v. Tribune Co. and was in the applied numerous ” defamation cases which are John’s progeny’ (emphases & Bank v. in original)), Savings Harris Trust quoting Phillips, Yet App. ap another parent inconsistency be observed the instant may within holding majority approvingly in Mit cites case. The differing constructions do not “balance” that we telman citing 224 Ill. 2d at See at issue. of the statement applying rule in 232. Yet Mittelman, 135 Ill. “conclude[s] majority this case any innocent than reasonable is far more added.) (Emphasis 224 Ill. 2d at 515. construction.” adopted, in dic- rule was innocent construction The liability a strict defamation was tum, at a time when speaker. protection for the action, little with cause of entirely liability only been strict then, not has Since increasingly repudiated, has become defamation law but parties taking complex, of both the status into account speech But at issue. the nature of as involved well unchanged, remained rule has the innocent construction layer protection simple no for defendants blanket Moreover, even if the law matter the circumstance. what inception changed, been has from its had not the rule general logically rules our and inconsistent with flawed repudiated concerning It has been motions to dismiss. country. nearly jurisdictions all, in the all, other or past, the rule in the Further, court has had to amend inconsistently. apply all these For and continues to it should case, I that stare decisis reasons, in this believe long yield, rule should and the innocent construction scrap heap consigned rightful place in the to its last be respectfully history. Accordingly, legal I dissent Illinois majority opinion. portion from this agree reached However, I with the result adopt majority. construc- if the reasonable For we were to is reason- advocate,I that it rule, as I would conclude tion ably interpret possible in a at issue the statements ap- according that rule the fashion. Thus propriate to reverse of this case would be resolution proceedings, the same result further remand for application through majority of the innocent its reaches construction rule. I Accordingly, concur in the majority’s result.

(No. 101902.

(No. 102227. SAMOUR, INC., al., et Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF

ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant. CORPORATION —MASHNI al., et THE Appellants, v. BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO al., et Appellees.

Opinion January Rehearing denied filed 2007. March In notes seeking is false when defamatory speech prove must media for damages speech defendant against Hepps, Inc. v. Newspapers, Philadelphia concern. public 776-77, 783, 793, S. Ct. 89 L. Ed. 475 U.S. 767.

Case Details

Case Name: Tuite v. Corbitt

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Dec 21, 2006

Citation: 866 N.E.2d 114

Docket Number: 101054 Rel

Court Abbreviation: Ill.