Terrie TUGWELL
v.
STATE FARM INS. CO. & Zurich Ins. Co.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
*196 Joseph L. Waitz, Waitz & Downer, Houma, Milton O'Neal Walsh, Baton Rouge, for applicant.
Richard G. Creed, Jr., Mathews, Atkinson, Guglielmo, Marks & Day, Baton Rouge, for respondent.
COLE, Justice.
THE ISSUE
The issue presented in this case is whether a signed rejection of uninsured motorist coverage in an umbrella insurance policy meets the statutory and jurisprudential requirеments for a rejection where the application form did not offer the option of selecting lower limits and failed to inform the insured of this option.
THE FACTS
On July 31, 1983, Jimmy Thompson applied to State Farm for a "personal liability umbrella" insurance policy with a liability limit of $1,000,000. In a section of the application titled REJECTION OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE, Thompson's signature appears below the following statement: "In keeping with the provisions of the laws of my state, I have been offered the opportunity to purchase Uninsured Motorists coverage, and I hereby reject Uninsured Motorists coverage as a part of this application."
On April 4, 1987, plaintiff was a guest passenger in a 1985 Toyota owned by Jimmy Thompson which collided with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The Toyota was covered under a primary automobile insurance policy with UM coverage of $100,000 and the excess umbrella policy mentioned above with liability coverage of $1 million. Both рolicies were with State Farm. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, urging the umbrella policy provided $1 million in UM coverage. State Farm filed a cross motion for summary judgment asserting UM coverage had been validly waived for the umbrella poliсy and thus State Farm only provided $100,000 in UM coverage under the automobile insurance policy. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and granted State Farm's motion, holding State Farm's liability was limited to $100,000 in UM coverage. The court of apрeal affirmed.[1] Plaintiff applied to this court and writs were granted.[2] We now reverse.
THE LAW
At all times relevant to this case, LA.REV.STAT. § 22:1406(D)(1)(a) required uninsured motorist (UM) coverage "in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy." However, such UM coverage was not required "where any insured named in the policy [rejеcted] in *197 writing the coverage or select[ed] lower limits." The statute did not specify how a rejection or selection of lower limits was to be effected. This court has held a valid rejection or selection of lower limits must be in writing аnd signed by the named insured or his legal representative. Henson v. Safeco Insurance Companies,
Scope of Review
Although plаintiff in her supplemental and amending petition generally alleged "there [did] not appear to be a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage," plaintiff did not raise the specific argument that the initial rejection was imрroper until her application to this court. However, this should not deter us from making a decision on this issue where the evidence in the record is sufficient to do so. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 2164 states in part: "The appellate cоurt shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal." Further, the Official Revision Comment to the article states the purpose of the article is:
to give the appellate court complete freedom to do justice on the record irrespective of whether a particular legal point or theory was made, argued, or passed on by the court below.
Summary Judgment
Appellate courts should review the granting оf a summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors,
Because defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the court of appeal dеcision which affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The initial rejection of UM coverage signed by Thompson does not meet the statutory and jurisprudential requirements for a rejection to be effective.
Standard of Review/Burden of Proof
The object of the UM legislation is to promote full recovery for innocent automobile accident victims by making uninsured motorist coverage available for their benefit. Hoefly v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,
Rejection of UM Coverage
This court in Roger,
Illustrative of this approach is Uhrich v. National Fire Insurance Co.,
This court has repeatedly reaffirmed the rule that a dоcument, which fails to offer UM coverage in amounts lower than the liability coverage, does not satisfy the requirements mandated by the UM statute. This "meaningful selection" rule is well-reasoned, since an insured must be given a meaningful selectiоn from which to choose if the UM statute is to be followed. Otherwise, an insured who desires lower limits of UM coverage would be forced to reject UM coverage simply because the UM insurance form fails to comply with the statute.
....
... If аn insurer is going to avail itself of the statutory exception, it must show that the insured initially had the option of selecting lower UM limits. Anything less fails to satisfy the requirements of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D).
Uhrich,
The court went on to find a rejection was invalid where the application form offered only two options, full UM coverage, or a rejection of UM coverage, and did not contain a blank wherein the insured could have requested limits lower than the full liability coverage.
We agree with the Uhrich interpretation of the statute. The UM statute provides that UM coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits is automatic unless such coverage is completely rejected or the lower limits are selected. The statute thus provides the insured with three options: UM сoverage equal to bodily injury limits in the policy, UM coverage lower than those limits, or no UM coverage. A rejection on a form that prohibits the insured from choosing limits below liability coverage or which automatically choоses a certain lower amount for the insured, does not meet the statutory requirements because it forecloses options available to the insured by law. In this case, the Umbrella Liability Policy application form only provided a space for the insured to reject coverage completely. There was no space provided in which he could choose limits lower than the liability coverage. Therefore, it fails to meet the requiremеnts of the statute.[4]
We would note that although we agree with the third circuit's interpretation of the statute in Uhrich, we disagree with its approach in Bertrand v. Shelter General Insurance Co.,
Implicit in the statute's requirement that the insurer make available to the insured the option of selecting lower limits is the idea that the insured be made aware of that option. Uhrich's requirement thаt the insured be given the option of selecting lower limits would be empty protection indeed if the insurer were not also required to make sure the insured is informed of such an option. An insured cannot exercise an option he does not know exists. This can be accomplished in several ways. For example, the insurer can require the insured to acknowledge in writing he has been informed of the options; or, the application itself can be set up in such a way through the use of blanks and boxes that it is apparent to the reasonable person that he has the option of selecting any lower limit he chooses.[6]
Applicability to Umbrella Policies
On November 4, 1983 in Southern American Insurance v. Dobson,
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, AND REMANDED.
NOTES
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3] But see Henson,
[4] Since this case deals with the validity of a total rejection of UM coverage and not a selection of lower limits, we will only address the jurisprudence in the former area. However, we note thаt the requirement that a choice of limits be made available to the insured also applies in determining whether a selection of lower limits is valid. See, e.g., Guilbeau v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co.,
[5] See also Guilbeau v. Gabriel,
[6] Bertrand noted there is such a duty to inform where the validity of a selection of lower limits is at issuе. It is illogical to hold the same duty does not apply where a rejection is involved, because the very reason the insured may have rejected UM coverage is that he did not know of his option to select lower limits. There аre other cases which imply the duty to inform applies not only to a selection of lower limits but also to a rejection of UM coverage. See Breaux v. Government Emp. Ins. Co.,
