Lore Tuff sought a divorce from Dennis Tuff on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and extreme mental and physical cruelty. The trial court granted each a divorce from the other. Lore appealed from the judgment of divorce entered by the district court of Ward County. We reverse that portion of the judgment relating to the division of property and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Lore and Dennis were married in Germany on February 18,1956. They have two children, both of whom were of legal age at the time of the divorce. Dennis was in the military service of the United States and was stationed in Germany at the time of the marriage. Subsequent to the marriage Dennis returned to the United States and Lore joined him shortly thereafter. Dennis farmed for a few years and ownеd 1,200 acres of farmland at the time of the divorce. However, after he farmed for a few years Dennis became an electrician. That was his occupation at the time of the divorсe and the farmland acquired over the years is rented to other persons.
The trial court ordered judgment of divorce and, with respect to the property of the parties, directed thаt all personal property in the possession of the parties remain in their possession and that Lore receive a cash settlement of $200,000 with $50,000 payable 30 days after entry of judgment and $15,000 payable on December 1 of each year beginning with 1982 and ending in 1991. No interest on the payments was awarded. The trial court ordered that Dennis receive as his share the following property:
“All remaining property, real or personal, owned by the parties, including the home in Rugby, North Dakota, and the remaining furnishings therein, Lake Me- *423 tigoshe property and the furnishings therein, farm real estate, electrical business property, grain, vehicles, accounts, etc., subject to all debts of the parties revealed at trial, less one-half (½) of the civil judgment debt and the attorney’s fees and cоsts pertaining to the same outstanding against Mrs. Tuff, not to exceed the sum of $11,650. In other words, the parties shall each pay one-half (½) of the civil judgment and costs pertaining thereto against Mrs. Tuff. The defendant’s liability to be limited to $11,650.”
The trial further directed that neither party receive attorney fees, costs, or alimony.
Lore contends that under all the facts and circumstances the division of prоperty was not equitable; that the trial court abused its discretion and was in error in its division of property and in its refusal to grant her alimony.
We have said many times that in order to determine matters of alimony and property division the trial court must make findings of fact to be reviewed pursuant to Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Williams,
The trial court in this instance did not find the specific value of the property owned by the parties although the findings of fact indicate that each party obtained the opiniоn of an expert appraiser of the real estate; that it was stipulated at the time of trial that the trial court could consider the written appraisal submitted to the trial court by each of the experts; and that the parties would waive cross-examination of each of the parties. The parties also submitted a signed document stating their respective opinions of thе values of the property owned and accumulated during the marriage as well as a statement of the liabilities of the parties for the use and benefit of the trial court.
A review of that exhibit indicates that Lore valued the property at $648,894.47 and Dennis at $609,998.47. Lore, however, contends that the exhibit does not reflect all the assets of the couple although she did sign the exhibit. Because Lоre received a fixed amount of the assets, i.e., $200,000, 1 the total amount of the assets of the parties is significant in determining whether or not there was an equitable division between the parties.
In Williams, supra, we reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded for additional findings, stating;
“Although, on its face, the property distribution described above appears exceedingly disproportionatе in favor of Warren, we are unable to state that because one party to a divorce receives the bulk of the marital property a clearly erroneous determination hаs been made. Proper application of the Ruff-Fischer *424 guidelines could conceivably lead to such a result. However, we have expressly pointed out in the past that the Ruff-Fischer guidelines do not сome into play until one important determination has been made. In Hoge, supra [281 N.W.2d 557 (N.D.1979) ], we stated that where, as in the present case, sufficient evidence has been admitted from which the court can detеrmine the net worth of the parties’ real and personal property, the court must make that determination before proceeding to the application of the other Ruff-Fischer guidelines. 2 ... We beliеve the distribution of property made by the trial court was clearly erroneous because it is not possible to make an equitable distribution of anything until a determination has been made as to what it is that is being distributed.”302 N.W.2d at 759-760 .
See also Urlaub v. Urlaub,325 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.1982).
Here, as in
Williams,
we are unable to determine the gross or net amount of the assets of the parties. More important, although the trial court’s findings state that it took into consideration the
Ruff-Fischer
guidelines, the findings of fact and conclusions of law leave us with no indication of the rationale of the trial court in distributing the property; i.e., was it based on needs of the parties, fault of the parties, health of the parties, etc.? We have previously indicated that findings of fact are adequate when they provide us with a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision. See, e.g.,
Clement v. Clement,
Although we conclude that the findings of fact with respect to determination of the value of the property and with respect to the basis of the trial court’s decision in dividing the property are not adequate to enable us to determine whether or not a mistake has been made, we believe an additional comment is necessary with respect to the award in this instance should it again become the subject of an appeal.
If we were to assume that a lump-sum award of $200,000 to Lore was equitable, we would, nevertheless, be concerned about the manner of payment. The award was obviously a form of property division rather than spousal support because the trial court specifically indicated it was not awarding alimony to either party. See
Urlaub, supra; Eberhart v. Eberhart,
The judgment of the district court is affirmed with respect to the decree of divorce. That portion of the judgment concerned with distribution of property is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this оpinion. Lore is awarded costs on appeal.
Notes
. Lore also received the personal property in her possession at the time of the judgment of divorce. Shе valued the property at $1,905; as might be expected, Dennis valued that property at $3,239. Dennis received the personal property in his possession at the time of the judgment of divorce аnd he valued that at $2,930; as might be expected, Lore valued it at $5,640. No finding of value was made with respect to the property in the possession of the parties. However, the personal property held by the parties appears to be less significant when compared to the values the parties placed upon the real property they owned.
. In a footnote to this statement in
Williams
we referred to this court’s decision in
Nastrom v. Nastrom,