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Tucson v. Farrington
240 N.W.2d 464
Mich.
1976
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*1 TUCSON v FARRINGTON (Calendar 10). Argued Docket No. 56276. November No. April Rehearing Decided denied 396 Mich 992. brought complaint Plaintiffs Charles and Jean Tucson specific performance an realty for the sale of against Farrington. judgment defendants Morris and Hazel A equitable requested for the relief was entered the St. Clair Court, Streeter, Circuit Halford I. J. The Court of J. H. Gillis, Deneweth, JJ., P. and Holbrook and affirmed but (Docket 17038). judgment modified certain No. appeal. Defendants Held: parties’ agreement The written memorandum of the is insuf- compel performance. ficient under the statute of frauds to its general As a rule a term of credit is an essential term of a land, contract for the sale of and it must he stated with certainty in the written memorandum. The payments agreed upon, on its face shows that deferred but pay- fails to state with reasonable ment, the schedule and interval of and the fixed payments. amount of There was no evidence of circumstances at the time the was made which the might omitted deferred be filled in and use of concerning negotiations subsequent evidence to the date of the agreement to fill in those terms was erroneous. Kavanagh concurred, Justice with whom Chief Justice would affirm the Court of decision for the reasons opinion. stated Reversed and remanded. (1974) reversed. References for Points in Headnotes 2d, 72 Am Jur Statute of

[1-4] Frauds 354. § Necessity sufficiency of statement of consideration in contract or memorandum of sale of under statute of frauds. 23 ALR2d 164.

Opinion op the Court op Memorandum—Sufficiency Frauds, Statute —Sale Land — Payment —Deferred Terms. general rule, As a a term of credit is an essential term of a *2 land; contract for the credit must sale of be stated with certainty in the written memorandum of the con- tract and a memorandum of a land contract which lacks the precise payment, down the schedule and interval of deferred payments payments and the fixed amount of the is insufficient (MCL 26.908). 566.108; under the statute of frauds MSA op -Memorandum—Sufficiency Frauds, 2. Statute of —Sale Land — Payment —Deferred Terms. writing A is not a insufficient as memorandum of a contract for

the sale of land of under the statute frauds for failure to state with reasonable the time and terms of (because unless, presumed) a cash sale is from the itself, appears agreed that deferred (MCL 26.908). 566.108;MSA Memorandum—Sufficiency Frauds, Statute of —Sale of Land — —Parol Evidence. parties’ negotiations subsequent

Use of evidence of the to a agreement written memorandum of an for the sale of land to supply essential which were omitted erroneous; only from it is evidence of circumstances writing may supplement the time of the be used to its terms to principle show what contract was at that time under the of evidentiary supplementation. Dissenting Opinion Kavanagh, C. Sufficiency Evidentiary Frauds, Statute of — of Memorandum — Supplementation. option agreement sufficiently satisfy

An was deñnite to the stat- question specified ute of frauds where the memorandum in the purchase price, location and amount of the the approximate payment, period years amount of the down made, rate; over which the was to be and the interest equity by using principle evidentiary supple- a court of mentation can fill out the details of the amount of the schedule, and the time for trans- possession defeating public policy fer of without of the state prevent frauds. Farrington James Rubiner Arthur for Charles Rubiner and plaintiffs. (Eu-

Bush, Henderson, Black & Bankson Luce, counsel) Black, for defendants. F. gene J. Plaintiffs Tucson sued defendants Fitzgerald, specific performance. Based on for l,1 trial court found that an plaintiffs’ exhibit the sale of defendants’ for enforceable judgment equi farm existed and entered at 53 The Court requested. table relief (1974), agreed Mich 218 NW2d but modified certain remedy appropriate, was reverse, We judgment. terms2 of the trial court’s sufficiently 1 is not having determined that exhibit of frauds3 to complete justify under the statute specific performance. *3 signed Farring and the by

Exhibit was drafted 13, 1970, Mr. tons on June at which time 44, "June 1970” MAY "TO WHOM IT CONCERN: WIFE HAZEL AGREE TO SELL "MORRIS S. FARRINGTON AND PROPERTY AT 2276 WADHAMS ROAD TO CHARLES TUCSON AND WIFE DESCRIBEDAS FOLLOWS: "Sl/2 of NW1/4 EX N 900' of Wl/2 THEREOF ALSO THAT PART N G.T.R.R. & 81.56 A OF Nl/2 SW1/2 LYING OF R-W CONT. SEC ($50,000). fifty R16E 11 T6N 81.56 A for the sum of thousand dollars down, Approximately paid period one third the balance to be over a years EXPIRE interest. THIS OPTION TO IN DAYS. 7% (100.00) paid dollars to at time of One hundred said amount to be applied purchase price. on Farrington S. "Morris "Hazel Farrington —9823336” The amount of down the amounts and terms of deferred possession. and the date of 566.108; pertinent part MSA 26.908 reads in follows: 3 MCLA as "Every leasing longer period year, or for contract for the for a than 1 lands, void, lands, any any in unless the sale of the signed by some or interest shall be contract, writing, made, in or some note or memorandum thereof be by party by or whom the lease or sale is to be writing”. person lawfully thereunto him authorized in delivered check for An to them his addi $100. Farringtons tional to the on paid July was $400 11, 1970. If operative These are the facts. they do enforceable specifically evidence a for the sale of the other facts record set realty, forth than below4 evidence little more five months 23, 1970, contemplation closing On June of this sale to Tucsons, Farringtons completed purchase of a new residence 11, July Farringtons in Port Huron. On Mr. Tucson informed the having financing "[a]pproximately he was down”, trouble one-third they agreed orally to reduce the down to $10,000. again 25, July July The Tucsons claimed 22 and on that on Mr. $10,000 money payable Tucson showed defendants a order to the Tucsons, negotiate and offered this to instrument to defendants Farringtons deny having execution of a land contract. The ever been any negotiable They shown exhibit a instrument. testified that Mr. Tucson did savings pass negotia- account book on several occasions until down, they ultimately they tions get August broke and that he told them that would money parties agreed orally their when out. The moved on possession. 22 as a date for transfer of 17, August orOn about Messrs. Tucson and met at the Farringtons’ attorney. office of the presented A draft of a land contract was attorney prior to Mr. Tucson who wished to consult his to 20, August attorney execution. On the Tucsons’ wrote to defendants’ attorney suggesting request- various modifications to the contract and ing certain information. Farringtons they premises The testified that vacated the farm on 21, August purchased. They sometime later when occupied they and moved residence in Port Huron which had they further testified that moved back to the farm they discovered that the Tucsons had not premises August on August attorney plaintiffs’ attorney, On defendants’ wrote agreeing of suggested correspondence to one of the modifications in the August expressing regarding language permit- but reservations ting assignment of the contract without the seller’s consent. No correspondence attorneys further was had between the until October meanwhile, during September, In the sometime the month of presented Tucsons went to the defendants’ farm and to them a land signed by contract the Tucsons which modified various terms of Farringtons’ originally-proposed particular, contract. In the contract permitted assignment offered consent of the seller. the Tucsons would have without the *4 7, Farringtons’ attorney, having response On October not had a 24, August plaintiffs’ to attorney requesting his letter of wrote to brought up 2, negotiations. to date on the status of On November plaintiffs’ attorney responded by writing directly to the defendants threatening suit unless the sale were closed within one week. On 173 Tucson v Opinion of the Court signing to the of negotiations subsequent exhibit either to settle attempts parties by 1— or writing, undetermined to modify in

left in form. put written those which had been face, parties 1 that reveals On its exhibit payments, but lacks orally agreed to deferred the schedule and inter and the fixed amount of val deferred ***5 rule, a general As a term of payments.* those of the contract is an essential term for the credit land, and it must be stated sale in the memorandum of such a written required case law that Michigan contract.6 Early in a case specified terms be even where it concerned that was conceded all purchase price was to be made balance rigors The delivery of the deed.7 statute relaxed, in Michigan, so that like gradually jurisdictions,8 writing most did need to state the time or terms of when the appeared transaction to be a cash sale.9 4, attorney responded by writing November sons’ defendants’ to the Tuc- stating parties agreement, attorney, that the had never reached willing plaintiffs’ deposit that his clients were to return and to negotiations, continue an but that his clients had been inconvenienced unnecessary change put in residence and didn’t want to be through procedure again. needlessly changes in Substantial originally-offered rejected by plaintiffs through proposed. contract were These modifications were attorney their on November 9. Plaintiffs 14, complaint their on December filed possession, although agree to fix the The fails time of we day age parties entering that in with the Court of this intend, evidence, contrary into a land contract transfer of contract. the absence of possession within a reasonable time after execution of the (3d Williston, ed), 575, pp seq. 74 et § Contracts (1883). Stormont, 636; Gault v NW Necessity sufficiency Annotation: of statement of considera- memorandum tion in contract or of sale of under statute of frauds, See, also, 2d, 189-203. 23 ALR2d 72 Am Jur Statute of Frauds, 353, seq. pp 875 et § Smith, Where, Mull See NW 183 *5 169 396 Mich it said that a Today, safely be is may insufficient for failure under the statute to state unless, time and terms of from the writing itself, appears that deferred payments Miller, Duke v agreed upon. See Mich 540, 543; (1959), 94 NW2d 819 where this Court controlling the unanimously adopted opinion as Goldberg Mitchell, Mr. Justice Butzel (1947). 281, 285-290; Mich However, 28 NW2d 118 Duke, Goldberg and per even when the writing on its face evidences deferred it must state reasonable the substance of the terms.10

The Court on Wozniak v relying Kuszinski, 431; (1958), Mich 90 NW2d 456 resorted to the principle evidentiary supplemen tation to fill in the details which we find fatally Wozniak, absent from exhibit 1. In evidence of .circumstances at the time that the writing was made was admitted for the purpose of supple menting a description of the premises.11 In the case bar, there is no evidence of circumstances exist ing at the time that exhibit 1 was made which the unsettled deferred payment might terms Indeed, filled in. plaintiffs Tucson testified that parties’ oral understanding were no more specific than as written in exhibit 1. The however, intended, it was conceded that a cash sale was not omission disputed payment Jerkatis, terms was fatal. McCrea v (1948). 309; Mich 31 NW2d 63 Plaintiffs maintain that the deferred rule has been Goslin, 372; (1963). eroded Goslin v 120 NW2d 242 We note, however, that there was no indication on the face of the Goslin receipts Furthermore, that deferred were intended. on its facts, appears convincing part-perform- Goslin to have been case of ance sufficient to remove the statute. from the strictures of the respect, holding Garvey In this was not novel. See v Park- hurst, 368; (1901), Ballard, 86 NW 802 and Cramer v Mich Tucson v Dissenting Opinion by

courts below gathered judicially imposed parties’ from offers counteroffers during made of negotiations the course subsequent parties If writing. This was error. had a contract as of the date of exhibit that writing is insufficient under the statute to compel its performance.

The Court of Appeals is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court entry judg- ment dismissing complaint upon payment by defendants in deposit, received plus $500 interest on that amount at the rate applicable to judgments. may Defendants tax costs.

Williams, Coleman, Lindemer, JJ., concur- Fitzgerald, red J.

Ryan, J., part took no in the decision of this case.

Levin, J. (dissenting). would affirm the decision I Court of for the reasons stated in the opinion of that Court. Tucson v Farrington, Mich

Kavanagh, C. concurred with

Case Details

Case Name: Tucson v. Farrington
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 1, 1976
Citation: 240 N.W.2d 464
Docket Number: 56276, (Calendar No. 10)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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