43 A. 369 | R.I. | 1899
The only question involved in this case is whether the Common Pleas Division erred in refusing to charge the Rhode Island College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts as garnishee. We do not think it did. Said college is *318
a State institution; the title to the land, buildings, and other property is in the State; and the board of managers, although made a corporation by virtue of Pub. Laws R.I. cap. 1078, passed May 19, 1892, is but the agent of the State to carry out the purposes of the General Assembly in connection with the establishment and maintenance of the college. See Pub. Laws R.I. cap. 706, passed March 23, 1888. Probably the main object in creating the charter was to enable the board to more conveniently discharge their duties. See In re The Agricultural Funds,
The disclosure made by the garnishee shows that on the 5th day of May, 1898, the General Assembly passed a resolution appropriating the sum of $11,500 for the erection of certain buildings on the college grounds, said sum to be expended under the direction of the board of managers of said college; that thereupon a contract was entered into between said board and the defendant to do a part of the work and furnish a part of the materials in connection with the erection of said buildings; that, in pursuance of said contract and the work performed and materials furnished by the defendant, there was due to him from the State of Rhode Island, at the time of the service of the writ in this case, $2,522.77, and no more; and that there was none of the personal estate of the defendant in the hands and possession of said college at the time of said service, except as above stated. The resolution appropriating said money, which is made part of the return, provides that it is to be expended under the direction of said board, and authorizes the State auditor to draw his order on the general treasurer from time to time for the payment of the same, upon proper vouchers approved by the board. It is thus made to appear that there was no money in the hands or possession of the garnishee at the time the writ was served upon it, and that it was only acting as the agent of the State, as aforesaid, in the doing of the work in question. *319
But the plaintiff contends that whether the board was acting as agent of the State or not is immaterial, as it made a contract as principal with the defendant, in its own name under seal, without any reference to any agency; and that in such case the agent, so contracting, is alone responsible, while the principal, though known, cannot be held. In support of this proposition he relies on City of Providence v. Miller,
Petition for new trial denied.