14 N.W.2d 767 | Minn. | 1944
Relator owned approximately 640 acres of land, 70 of which were under cultivation and the remainder in pasture. About three acres were used for pens for the foxes and mink. He also kept 50 head of cattle, some milch cows and young stock, four horses, and about 200 sheep, together with farming tools and equipment. When respondent was employed there was no definite agreement as to the duration of his employment, and there is disagreement now between the parties as to the duties he was to perform. Relator contends that he employed respondent to repair the farm buildings and dig a basement, and that apart from occasionally watering the mink he had no duties with reference to their care. Respondent insists that his principal employment consisted in helping to feed, water, generally care for, and finally assist in the pelting of the animals; that on the day of his injury he was directed to "go down and get ready to start grinding" the horse meat for their food; that he started the grinding machine, caught his left hand in the machine, and suffered the loss of four fingers. Relator denies giving such an order and insists that he cautioned respondent to stay away from the machine.
On this appeal, relator contends that respondent's employment was that of a farm laborer and that any duties he performed in connection with the care of the foxes and mink were incidental and did not operate to change the character of such employment; that relator's fox and mink business was an undivided part of his general farming operations and, as such, came within the exemptions of the workmen's compensation act; that, in any event, respondent disobeyed instructions and at the time of his injury was outside the sphere of his employment and forfeited any benefits to which he might otherwise have been entitled under the act.
1. Relator strongly urges that respondent was employed as a farm laborer to repair farm buildings, and, while occasionally he may have directed respondent to water the mink, that whatever work respondent did in connection with the raising of mink and *475
foxes was incidental and did not operate to change the general character of his employment as a farm laborer. He asserts further that the fact that he was injured while grinding food for the animals was not significant in determining the character of his employment. Neither the task on which a workman is engaged at the time of injury nor the place where it is being performed is determinative of whether he is a farm laborer. Peterson v. Farmers State Bank,
"So also a farm laborer does not step out of his own part while doing carpenter work for his farmer employer in the repair of farm buildings. Neither does the carpenter who comes onto the farm for the job of carpentry and nothing more. One continues a farm laborer and the other does not become one."
Therefore, if respondent was employed principally to assist in the fox and mink business and that was the main character of his employment, he did not "step out of character" by doing the incidental work on the farm itself or the carpentry work on the farm buildings.
It may be conceded that testimony adduced in behalf of relator would have justified a finding that respondent was employed as a laborer on the farm and spent the greater part of his time in connection with that employment. However, there was testimony in direct conflict with this contention justifying the determination of the commission as stated in its memorandum:
"* * * Here the employe spent the greater portion of his time in furthering his employer's interests in the operation of the 'fur farm' and was injured while working in this business enterprise."
Whether respondent was employed as a farm laborer or as a laborer in the fox and mink business was a fact question for the commission to determine. Schroepfer v. Hudson,
2. Having reached the conclusion that the evidence sustains the finding of the commission that respondent was employed primarily as a workman in connection with relator's business of raising foxes and mink, we come to a consideration of whether such activity constituted farming within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act, Minn. St. 1941, §
In 1936, relator brought his foundation stock of 50 breeders of foxes and mink from Canada to his farm near Detroit Lakes. Since that date his stock has increased to the extent that in the 1941 season he raised between 900 and 1,000 animals. It appears that relator's two sons and all three of his employes, except Martin Jensen, devoted their full time to the care of the animals either by way of watering, feeding, or cleaning their cages, or preparing their food, and, finally, pelting. One Glenn Sander, a part-time employe, also devoted his time to their general care. Jensen was engaged primarily to take care of the barn and farm stock. None of the food for the foxes and mink was produced upon relator's farm. It appears that from a modest beginning he had increased his business to a sizable proportion, that he had acquired the necessary machinery for grinding the food, and was making plans to build a cold storage plant in connection with that business.
Relator calls attention to the amount of farm machinery and the number of cows, sheep, and horses on his farm in support of his contention that he was engaged in farming. It may be conceded that he was extensively engaged in farming, but it also appears that, in addition to farming, relator carried on a separate and distinct business in raising foxes and mink. The rule is settled that:
"A person may engage in different kinds of business, some of which are within the workmen's compensation act and some of which are not. The employes who are employed in business within the act are, in virtue of such employment, within the coverage of *478
the act. By the same token, those who are employed in a business not within the act are not covered." Sehroepfer v. Hudson,
To the same effect are Hebranson v. Fairmont Creamery,
Relator quotes from and relies upon Minn. St. 1941, §
A consideration of the legislative history of the pertinent provisions of the social security act above referred to and subsequent decisions interpreting them does not support such a contention. *479
In Christgau v. Woodlawn Cemetery Assn.
"The federal statute as originally enacted, and the state statutes which copied it, do not define the term 'agricultural labor.' The term 'agricultural labor' was not by any means a new one. The workmen's compensation acts of various states contained provisions excluding 'agricultural employments' and 'farm labor.' These terms have been used as practically synonymous."
We there also approved the generally accepted definition of "agricultural labor" or "farm labor."
"* * * The definition in Webster's International Dictionary that 'agriculture is the art or science of cultivating the ground, especially in fields or in large quantities, including the preservation of the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing, feeding and management of live stock; till-age; husbandry; farming,' is generally accepted. The terms include all farm work and work incidental thereto. 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Law (2 ed.) § 31."
The federal social security act was passed in 1935 (Act of August 14, 1935, c. 531, Title II, § 210 [b] [1],
"The argument is staked on the proposition that the amendment simply defined the term 'agricultural labor' as congress intended it in the 1935 act and that it did not change the law. * * * The amendment discloses an intention to continue the statute in part and to change it in part. There was not only clarification, but change of meaning."
This identical question arose in Cedarburg Fox Farms, Inc. v. Industrial Comm.
Since the courts have interpreted the term "agricultural labor" as used in the original unemployment compensation act as not including the raising of fur-bearing animals, there is even less reason for attempting to read such an exemption into the provisions of the workmen's compensation act. While there are, no doubt, valid reasons for extending the provisions of the federal social security act, a salutary purpose of which was to bring relief and security to the unemployed, these reasons do not prevail in the same degree as a ground for extending the exemptions found in the workmen's compensation act, which has for its aim the protection of all persons engaged in any occupation entailing hazards or risks. The raising of fur-bearing animals on an extensive scale is a business requiring the use of machines and equipment in a way that is much akin to an industry. As the use of mechanical apparatus increases, the hazards and risks of injury to the employe increase proportionately. To determine that such employes are not within the act would be to acknowledge the existence of working conditions clearly hazardous to these employes and at the same time deny to them the benefits for which the act was primarily designed and enacted. Although it is the policy of the legislature to exempt farm labor from the workmen's compensation act, we should not extend that policy by such a broad interpretation of the term as to include independent and separate commercial enterprises clearly not intended to be *482
included within the meaning of "farm labor." Hebranson v. Fairmoat Creamery,
3. Relator asserts that respondent violated an instruction limiting his sphere of employment and that therefore the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Violations of orders or directions do not always defeat compensation. Olson v. Robinson, Straus Co.
We do not overlook the fact that relator had the benefit of the testimony of a witness in support of his contention that such instructions *483
were given. Opposed to this was only the denial of respondent himself. The issue might have been decided the other way; but we cannot, as a court of review, weigh the evidence. Where there is conflict in the testimony, as here, the finding of the commission cannot be disturbed. Schroepfer v. Hudson,
Respondent is allowed $100 attorneys' fees in this court.
Affirmed.