MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 8, 1979, plaintiff filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Case Number 79-993400. On January 16, 1979, defendants removed this case to this Court invoking 28 U.S.C., Sections 1441, 1443, and 1446.
Plaintiff, a taxpayer residing in the Cleveland School District, seeks a temporary and permanent injunction against the sale of land owned by defendants at public auction on January 9 and 10, 1979 on the grounds that the appraisal of the value of the real estate is inadequate and that the defendants have unlawfully included in its notice of public auction a clause reserving “the right to refuse to transfer title to any purchaser or nominee hereof if the intended use of the property will frustrate, impede, or conflict with the desegregation of the schools in the Cleveland City School District.” Plaintiff complains that “unless the Court sets aside the proposed sale, . said parcels will sell for an inadequate price and/or be subject to continued restriction and control by the seller, for which Plaintiff and all others in her class have no adequate remedy at law.”
Before considering any of the substantive or procedural questions in this case, the Court must examine the propriety of its jurisdiction on removal. Because the Court believes that removal is not justified in this case, the Court must act sua sponte to order the remand of this case to state court.
Plaintiff brings a taxpayer action against the local school board seeking to prevent the sale of property at an allegedly inadequate price. The grounds for the claim are an allegedly inadequate appraisal of the land and inclusion of an allegedly unlawful restrictive clause in the notice of sale. It is apparent on the face of the claim that it involves solely questions of state law. Defendants may raise a defense based on federal law, but it is well-established that the existence of a federal law defense does not create federal question jurisdiction.
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley,
Removal is also not proper under 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) or (2). Since defendants do not demonstrate that “a right under any *689 law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States” would be “denied” or cannot be “enforce[d]” in state court, defendants fail to meet the standards of 28 U.S.C. 1443(1).
Defendants can remove this action under 28 U.S.C. 1443(2) only if plaintiff contests an “act [done by defendants] under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.” The Supreme Court has ruled, after an extensive examination of the legislative history of the removal statutes, that the privilege of removal under 28 U.S.C. 1443(2) extends only to “federal officers and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights.”
Greenwood v. Peacock,
Several courts have held that defendant school boards could invoke 28 U.S.C. 1443(2) where plaintiffs sought to prevent by suit in state court the implementation of a school desegregation plan ordered by a federal court.
Bohlander
v.
Independent School District No. 1, Tulsa County,
The case at bar is akin to
Greenwood v. Peacock, supra,
and must be distinguished from the above school cases. Though defendants are subject to the orders of this Court issued in
Reed v. Rhodes,
this Court did not order defendants to sell the real estate in question. Nor did this Court direct the defendants to obtain the appraisals at issue or to include the challenged restrictive covenant.
1
Defendants undertook these actions of their own volition, albeit as a response to this Court’s orders in
Reed v. Rhodes.
Defendants, like the defendants in
Greenwood v. Peacock,
are doing only what they believe must be done to abide by their constitutional obligations. The fact that this Court enjoined defendants from further acts of racial discrimination or racial segregation,
Reeds
v.
Rhodes,
Not all actions by a school board under court order to desegregate are subject to the protection offered by the removal statutes. Since federal court desegregation orders must necessarily be pervasive in scope, most actions of the school board will affect or impact on the desegregation order in some way. A lax standard for removal
*690
would permit a federal court to oust the state courts of jurisdiction in most suits brought against a school board during the pendency of a desegregation order. The Supreme Court asked in
Greenwood
v.
Peacock, supra,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT this case be, and hereby is, remanded to the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff’s motion to increase bond be, and hereby is, denied.
Notes
. On February 6, 1979, this Court ordered the Cleveland City Board of Education to report to the Court on the Board’s intended use of the funds from the land sales. This order, which issued after the fact of the land sales, can be construed in no manner that would allow defendants to use the removal statute.
. This is also not a case in which the issues at bar are so intertwined with the desegregation orders of this Court that they cannot be held now to be separate without further hearings. See Grenchik v. Mande!, supra.