98 Mass. 101 | Mass. | 1867
1. The facts proved at the trial were amply sufficient to warrant the finding that presentment for acceptance and notice of nonpayment had been waived. The defendants knew that the bill would not be paid at maturity, and so informed the plaintiffs; and the plaintiffs had the right to rely upon the information so received and omit a useless ceremony which could be of no benefit to themselves or to the defendants. Brett v. Levett, 13 East, 213. Barker v. Parker, 6 Pick. 80 Spencer v. Harvey, 17 Wend. 489.
3. The question whether the defendants are liable upon the face of the bill requires more consideration. The difficulty is not in ascertaining the general principles which must govern cases of this nature, but in applying them to the different forms and shades of expression in particular instruments. In order to exempt an agent from liability upon an instrument executed by him within the scope of his agency, he must not only name his principal, but he must express by some form of words that the writing is the act of the principal, though done by the hand of the agent. If he expresses this, the principal is bound, and the agent is not. But a mere description of the general relation or office which the person signing the paper holds to another person or to a corporation, without indicating that the particular signature is made in the execution of the office and agency, is not sufficient to charge' the principal or to exempt the agent from personal liability. Amid the great variety of language which may be used by merchants in haste or thoughtlessness, ignorant or unmindful of legal rules, or not anticipating the importance of holding one party rather than the other responsible, it must often happen that cases fall very near the dividing line; and, in order to maintain uniformity of decision, it is necessary for the court to refer to the cases already adjudicated, especially within its own jurisdiction.
The authority which at first sight seems most strongly to support the position of the defendants is that of Ballou v Talbot, 16 Mass. 461, in which a note signed “ Joseph Talbot, agent for David Perry,” was held not to bind Talbot personally That case has since been recognized and followed in this Com
On the other hand, in Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cowen, 31, a note signed by two persons, with the addition “ Trustees of Union Religious Society, Phelps,” (who were a legal corporation,) was held to bind the signers personally; and in Barker v. Mechanic Insurance Co. 3 Wend. 94, a note signed “John Franklin, President of the Mechanic Fire Insurance Company,” was held on demurrer not to be the note of the company, although alleged to have been made within the authority of the president and the scope of the legitimate business of the corporation; the court saying: “In this case, there is an averment that the president was lawfully authorized; but it does not appear that he acted under that authority; he does not say that he signs for the company; he describes himself as president of the company, but to conclude the company by his acts he should have contracted in their name, or at least on their behalf.” The variation between the words “ for ” and “ of ” seems at first view slight; but in the connection in which they are used in signatures of this kind the difference is substantial. “ Agent of ” or “ president of” a corporation named simpiy designates a personal relation
This case is not distinguishable from those just stated. It differs from Ballou v. Talbot, in omitting the word l£ for,” (the inly evidence, contained in the note there sued on, that it was made in behalf of the principal,) leaving the words “ Agts. Pis