550 N.E.2d 544 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1989
Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing this action and raises a single assignment of error as follows:
"The court below erred in holding Mr. Ferguson not entitled to immunity under Revised Code §
Plaintiff originally filed an action against Thomas E. Ferguson, the State Auditor, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that he coerced plaintiff into a sexual relationship with him and also into engaging in improper fund-raising for him. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of these alleged acts. The Cuyahoga County court dismissed plaintiff's complaint purportedly because of the enactment of R.C.
On June 14, 1988, plaintiff filed this instant action against both the state and Ferguson in the Court of Claims. Ferguson was dismissed as a defendant because the state is the only proper defendant in the Court of Claims pursuant to R.C.
"* * * [I]f Mr. Ferguson committed the acts set forth in the complaint and affidavit, such conduct was obviously outside the scope of his employment and thus he is not entitled to immunity under the wording of R.C.
For these reasons, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiff's action.
By R.C.
"A civil action against a state officer or employee that alleges that the *11
officer's or employee's conduct was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's employment or official responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court ofclaims, which has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine,initially, whether the officer or employee is entitled to civilimmunity under section
This provision in effect requires a determination that the state is free of liability for the alleged conduct prior to the filing of an individual action against an employee or officer of the state. However, unless this statute be interpreted to be applicable only when there is some allegation that the act is at least remotely related to the employee's or officer's scope of employment, illogical results could follow. It is absurd to contend that this statute would apply to a set of facts where there is no possible way to construe the employee's or officer's conduct as being related to his employment.
For example, if an employee of the state, who is on vacation and acting completely and unquestionably outside the scope of his employment, negligently causes injury to another individual, it would be completely illogical to require that individual to file first in the Court of Claims to determine if the state may be liable. Under that situation, there could not be an allegation that the state would even be potentially liable.
Thus, R.C.
"Ferguson inflicted emotional distress upon me in that he intimidated me, importuned me and imposed upon me to engage in an intimate sexual relationship with him which began sometime in 1982 and continued until the last sexual intimacy in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on Thursday, June 6, 1985. I was at his beck and call. Whenever he wanted a sexual encounter with me he would contact me and demand that I meet him for sex. He promoted mebecause of this sexual relationship and he had this compellinghold on me to do his political fund raising." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff's allegations that her promotions were connected with the alleged sexual relationship are sufficient to warrant the applicability of R.C.
Furthermore, although R.C.
Having established that R.C.
In order for a prior judgment to be binding on an individual as to estop that person from relitigating an issue arising out of the previous action, mutuality of parties is required. Specifically, in Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983),
"In Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a requisite to collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. As a general principle, collateral estoppel operates only where all of the parties to the present proceeding were bound by the prior judgment. A judgment, in order to preclude either party from relitigating an issue, must be preclusive upon both. A prior judgment estops a party, or a person in privity with him, from subsequently relitigating the identical issue raised in the prior action. (Paragraph two of the syllabus in Whitehead v. Genl. Tel.Co. of Ohio,
In other words, only a person who is bound by a judgment is precluded from relitigating an issue. Therefore, if Ferguson were bound by the judgment of the Court of Claims, he would be precluded from relitigating the issue of his civil immunity.
Judgments are binding only upon those individuals who are parties or in privity with a party to the original action. As the court reasoned in Whitehead v. General Tel. Co. (1969),
"In our opinion, the existing Ohio requirement that there be an identity of parties or their privies is founded upon the sound principle that all persons are entitled to their day in court. The doctrine of res judicata is a necessary judicial development involving considerations of finality and multiplicity, but it should not be permitted to encroach upon fundamental and imperative rights. * * *"
However, a determination that Ferguson is not entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C.
Furthermore, even if privity could be shown between Ferguson and the state, applying this judgment to him would deny Ferguson his constitutionally protected right to have a jury determine his immunity. Section
In Torpey v. State (1978),
"* * * Collateral estoppel, based on the trial court's findings in favor of the state, will not apply to the jury trial against the individuals since the effect thereof would be to deny appellee his jury trial as to these matters."
In other words, if the decision of the Court of Claims that an employee or officer of the state acted manifestly outside the scope of his employment is binding upon him, then the effect of that judgment would be to deny that employer or officer and the plaintiff the right to a jury trial.
Although R.C.
The effect of R.C.
Having determined that the decision of the Court of Claims is binding only as to liability of the state, we turn to the state's contention that the procedure used by that court was incorrect. However, as the court held in the syllabus of Ohio ContractCarriers Assn., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1942),
"Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from. Appeals are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract questions, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant."
The appellant must show that its rights have been adversely affected by the trial court's judgment in order for him to be an aggrieved party and for an appeal to lie.
The state is not an aggrieved party because it was dismissed as a potentially liable party by the Court of Claims. No rights of the state have been adversely affected because it is not possible now that it will be liable. Even though there may have been a *14 technical error in the manner in which the Court of Claims reached its determination, the state is not in a position to complain because it has been dismissed as a party; the state is not prejudiced by the claimed error. Accordingly, the assignment of error is not well-taken, and we are unable to find just cause for this appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, the state's assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Ohio Court of Claims is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG and BRYANT, JJ., concur.