ILoKE, J.

On tbe bearing it was made to appear tbat plaintiffs, “Board of Trustees for tbe Normal Scbool in Elizabeth City, N. 0.,” bad been tbe owners of a piece of property in said city, under a deed conveying same to “tbem and tbeir successors, to tbeir use in fee simple forever, for permanent scbool purposes for freedmen and children, irrespective of color, etc.,” and a school for coloréd people bad been conducted for some years on said property by P. W. Moore, a member of plaintiff board and its secretary; tbat tbe building being insufficient and having become very much dilapidated, it became necessary to have same restored and repaired, and, there being no funds available for tbe purpose, P. W. Moore, trustee and secretary, applied for aid to tbe State Board of Education through its local board of managers in Elizabeth City. Tbe Board of Education stated tbat they were not authorized to advance money for tbe permanent improvement of property unless tbe title was in tbe State, and thereupon P. W. Moore, having consulted with bis associates, they, in August, 1905, executed tbe deed in question, intrusted same for delivery to P. W. Moore, and be delivered it to defendants. Thereupon tbe defendants entered into possession; *466 expended amount of $1,000 in repairing and improving property, and had a school for the colored race conducted thereon for six or seven years, when, the buildings having 'again, become inadequate, the Board of Education procured about 23 acres of land, just out of the city limits, erected suitable buildings thereon, at a cost of $32,000 or more, and are conducting a normal school for the colored race upon the latter property, in all respects satisfactory, so far as the evidence shows.

The board then advertised the old lot and building for sale, the proceeds to be used in part payment of the expense of the present enterprise, when this action was instituted, as stated, to prevent the sale and to set aside the deed on the ground of fraudulent representations on the part of P. W. Moore by which his cotrustees were induced to sign the deed.

It is not claimed or suggested that there was any fraud on the part of the State Board of Education or its board of local managers or any one of them, or knowledge or notice of any facts tending to establish such fraud; but there was evidence offered on part of plaintiffs that some of them could neither read nor write, and that they were induced to execute said deed in its present form by representations of Moore, at the time, that the instrument was, in effect, a lease passing the property to the defendants only so long as a school for the colored race was being conducted thereon; and it is insisted for plaintiffs that Moore was acting in this matter for defendants, and that their title, so acquired, may be impeached by reason of his misconduct.

It is a well recognized principle with us that one may not acquire and hold property by the fraud of his agent and avoid responsibility for the agent’s acts (Sprunt v. May, 156 N. C., 388, and authorities cited) ; and, in restricted instances, it seems the position is allowed to prevail in cases of double agency when good faith is clearly shown and both principals are fully aware of the circumstances. Mechero, on Agency, sec. 67; Tiffany on Agency, p. 418. But, on careful consideration of the facts in evidence, the Court is of opinion that there is no testimony worthy of consideration by the jury that, in procuring the deed, *467 P, W. Moore acted as agent of defendants within the meaning of the principle referred to. The testimony tends to show that this entire effort was to procure the benefits of a colored normal school for the inhabitants of Elizabeth City and its vicinity, and that has been accomplished. At an expenditure of $32,000, and more, the State has established such a school near the limits of the city, and the same, as stated, is properly placed and is being satisfactorily conducted. And while Mr. Lamb, a member of the local board of managers, testifies, in effect, that as he understood, the witness Moore was acting for both boards, a perusal of his and the entire testimony makes it clear that, so far as these defendants were concerned, Moore was only acting for them, if at all, in a ministerial capacity, that is, to bring them the deed when it was executed, and that defendants throughout dealt with him and intended to deal with him only as a grantor in the deed and coowner of the property with the plaintiffs, and, in our opinion, the only inference permissible from this evidence is that, in procuring the execution of the deed in question and as to defendants, the grantor, Moore, must be considered the agent of his cotrustees, and they having executed the deed in its present form and intrusted it to him for delivery, the defendants being entirely ignorant of any fraud or misrepresentations, the ease calls rather for application of the principle that “Whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it.” Bowers v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 604 and 607; Rollins v. Ebbs, 138 N. C., 140; R. R. v. Kitchen, 91 N. C., 39; Dair v. United States, 83 U. S., 1; Butler v. U. S., 88 U. S., 272.

On the record as now presented we think the motion of non-suit by defendants should have been sustained, and it is so ordered.

Eeversed.