42 Minn. 503 | Minn. | 1890
From 1866 to 1877, there existed at or near Norway Lake, in what is now the county of Kandiyohi, in this state, an incorporated religious congregation called the “Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation.” In 1877 the persons composing this congregation divided by consent into two congregations, each of which' then became duly incorporated under the statute, one by the name of the “Trustees of the East Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Church of Kandiyohi County, Minnesota,” and the other by the name of the “Trustees of the West Norway Lake Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway Lake, County of Kandiyohi, and State of Minnesota. ” These two corporations still continue, and they are the plaintiffs in this action. The two corporations acquired as tenants in common, apparently soon after their incorporation, certain real estate, including that in controversy. They appear to have employed one common pastor, and to have used the real estate in controversy as a parsonage. It does not appear that in the deed conveying the real estate to the two corporations there was expressed any trust or use for which the property was to be held.
About 1885, differences of opinion upon certain matters of doctrine had arisen and existed, and still exist, among the members of each of the two congregations. It appears that those holding one set of opinions on these matters of difference, in each of the congregations, were a considerable majority of the congregation. Such majority in each, claiming to be the congregation, held meetings from time to time, which they claimed to be legal meetings of the congregation, and which were so, unless they had ceased to be members of the congregations by reason of the opinions they held upon the matters of
The minority trustees have intervened in the action, asking that it be' dismissed; that they and their associates be adjudged to be the rightful congregations of East and West Norway Lake; and that the title to the offices of trustees, as between them and the majority trustees, be determined in their favor. They seek, indeed, to turn this, a simple action in ejectment, into a proceeding, in the nature of quo warranto, to test the title to a corporate office. This, of course, cannot be done. If there was no other reason why it cannot, this would be conclusive — that the opposing claimants to the offices, the majority trustees, are not parties to the action.
But while the question of title to the office cannot be directly and authoritatively determined, so as to oust the intruders and put the
The defendant argues that as the minority trustees are defacto officers, and as they are in possession, an action to put the rightful trustees in possession will not lie until in a proper proceeding, as by quo warranto, the right to the office is first determined. But, first, the minority trustees are not in possession of the land. If Halvorson is rightfully in, his possession is that of the corporations. He is not, whether rightfully or wrongfully in, possessing the land as the tenant or agent of the persons who put him in. The minority trustees could not, in their own names, maintain an action to recover the premises from him. And, secondly, to determine that they are de facto trustees, it will be necessary to determine the point on which their claim to be legal trustees depends. To make one a de facto officer, it is not enough that he claims to be an officer, or that some people think him an officer, or that he assumes to act as such. He must be acting as an officer under color of having been rightfully elected or appointed. Now, unless it be true that the minorities constituted the congregations, and that their meetings were meetings of the congregations, then there was no semblance of an election by the congregations, the bodies entitled to elect. Take the case of a congregation composed of 1,000 members, of whom 40 or 50 should get together, assume to excommunicate the others or declare them no longer members, and assert themselves to be the congregation, and proceed to elect officers. That would have no color of an election by the congregation of 1,000 members, nor by any body having a right
The defendant claims that the minorities were the lawful congregations because, as he asserts, the majorities had departed from the true doctrines, adherence to which was, according to the constitution of the two (local) churches, the bond that was to hold the congregations together, and had adopted views of doctrine which, according to such constitutions, were heretical; and that they thereupon, ipso facto, ceased to be members of the congregations; and that that left the minorities, who adhered to the true doctrines, the only members of the congregations, — the only bodies or persons who had any rights in the property held by the corporations for the use and benefit of the legal congregations, or any rights in the government of the corporations.
Civil courts take up matters of religious doctrines with extreme reluctance. They never do so — it is beyond their province to do so — . for the purpose of determining the abstract truth or falsity of any religious doctrine; and they never consider them at all except where civil rights, rights of property or contract respecting the holding, control, use, or enjoyment of property, are dependent on them. Thus, where by contract the right to hold, control, use, or enjoy property depends upon an adherence to, or teaching of, a religious doctrine, the civil courts will examine what, as a matter of fact, the doctrine is, and whether, as a matter of fact, this or that person adheres to or
Where a number of persons associate to form a religious congregation, to acquire property for its use, and incorporate for the more convenient holding and control of the property, the constitution or body of rules which they adopt to prescribe who shall be members of the corporation, and entitled to a share in the control of it, is the contract by which they are bound. The right to a share in the government of a corporation is a civil right, which the law will protect, and the courts will therefore determine who are members of the corporation. And where, as is usually the case with local church organizations, and as is the case here, all the adult male members of the religious body, the congregation, and no others, are members of the corporation, so that when one becomes a member of the religious body he becomes a member of the corporation, and when he ceases to be a member of the religious body he ceases to be a member of the corporation, and has no further rights in it and in the property owned by it, the court, to determine on the civil right claimed, — that to be a member of the corporation, — must determine on membership in the religious body, the congregation. And it must determine this by the rules which the congregation has adopted for its membership. If the rules make adherence to particular doctrines a condition of mem
The synod, and the congregations sending delegates to it, are merely
But to return to the constitution (by-laws) of these congregations. While adherence to the doctrines adopted by them may be considered as conditions of becoming or remaining a member, it is not so with any new matter of doctrine that may arise, or with any honest interpretation of the statements of former doctrines. We infer from the by-laws that such come within the disclaimer in section 19, and belong, not to the congregations, but to the individual conscience of each member, so that it was not intended that any member should be responsible to the congregation for his views upon them. A civil court, therefore, could not determine that by adopting any particular opinion of such new doctrine or such interpretation a member, ipso facto, ceases to be a member of the congregation, so as to lose his rights in the corporation.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. A motion for a reargument of this ease was denied April 1, 1890.