65 N.H. 473 | Superior Court of New Hampshire | 1817
— By the charter of 1769 a corporation is created, by the name of “The Trustees of Dartmouth College.” The charter recites, that much expense and great labour had been bestowed, in erecting and supporting a charity school, which had become highly useful; and that individuals, as well in England as in this country, were disposed to make donations, for its enlarge
The first act (of 27th of June 1816) makes the twelve trustees, under the charter, and nine individuals, to be appointed by the Governour and Council, a corporation, by the name of “ the trustees of Dartmouth University;” and transfers to them all '■'•the property, rights, powers, liberties and privileges” of the old corporation, with power to establish new colleges and an Institute; — subject to the controul of a board, of twenty-five overseers, to be appointed by the Governour and Council.
The second act makes provision for obviating certain difficulties, which had occurred in attempting to execute the first. And the last act authorizes the defendant, who was the Plaintiffs’ treasurer, to retain and hold for a certain time, all their property against their will; and subjects them to heavy penalties, should they impede or hinder the execution of the acts.
Under colour of these acts, the defendant claims to hold the property mentioned in the declaration.
The question is whether the acts are obligatory, and binding on the plaintiffs; they never having accepted or assented to them.
By the necessary construction of these acts, the old corporation is abolished, if they are valid; and a new one established. The first act does, in fact, create a new corporation; and transfers to it all the property and privileges of the old. The old corporation can, in no sense, be said to continue, when its property and privileges, of every kind, are thus taken away, and transferred to another corporation. The trustees and overseers of Dartmouth University constitute a corporation, if the acts are effectual for any purpose; and that corporation is, essentially, different, from the corporation of the trustees of Dartmouth College, as established by the charter.
The two corporations are different in their corporate names; in the natural persons that compose them; in the form and manner
In the first act it is provided, that “ they (i. e. the new trustees) and their successors, in that capacity, as hereby constituted, shall respectively forever have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy all the powers, authorities, rights, property, liberties, privileges and immunities, which have hitherto been possessed, enjoyed and used by the trustees of Dartmouth College; — except so far as the same may be varied or limited by the provisions of this act. And they shall have power (among other things) to organize colleges in the Univex-sity; to establish an Institute, and elect fellows and members thereof; — and to arrange, invest and employ the funds of the University.” What other or more appropriate language could have been used, if the old trustees had surrendered their charter, and the legislature had intended to establish a new institution, to supply the place, and enjoy all the property and privileges of the old corporation ? In an act for that purpose, terms could not have been used more significant and appropriate, than those contained in this act. They are in substance, that the corporation, as hereby established, shall have and enjoy all the property and riglits, which have hitherto been held and enjoyed by the old corporation ; —except so far as the same may be varied or limited by this act.
It is true, the act purports to include the old trustees, in the new corporation, but they have not accepted the act, nor consented to become members of the new corporation, and consequently they are not members. For they can neither be compelled to become members of the new corporation, against their will; nor to exercise new powers, or submit to new restrictions, in the old corporation. It was neither expected, nor desired that the old trustees should unite with the new ones. The intexition doubtless was, in this indirect way to abolish the old corporation, and get rid of the trustees. The manner, in which the injury was inflicted, does not lessen the grievance.
But if it should be held, that the old corporation is not, absolutely, abolished, it could avail nothing, in support of the validity of the acts. For the legislature is no more competent to change,
Before the passing of the acts, the plaintiffs were sole owners of all the property, acquired under their charter, and were, alone, entitled to exercise all the privileges, granted by it. By the acts, others are admitted, • against their will, to become joint owners with them, of the property, and to a joint participation, of all the privileges. This forcible intrusion, under pretence of joint ownership, violates the plaintiffs’ rights, as essentially, as would an entire ouster.
The whole organization of the corporation is changed. — Instead of one board, consisting of twelve members, there are two boards, —one of twenty one members, — the other of twenty five. By the charter, the trustees had the right of making all suitable regulations, for the institution, subject to no appeal. By the acts, all the votes, and doings of the trustees may be negatived by the overseers; in whose appointment, the corporation has no agency.
Not only are new trustees forced in, to participate with the old ones, but new trusts, and new duties are created. — An Institute and new colleges are to be established, and the funds, acquired under the charter, may be applied to their establishment and support.
The President of the College, a member of the old corporation, held his office and salary, dependent on the twelve trustees alone. The tenure of his office is changed, and he is now dependent on others, who have already attempted to remove him.
If the legislature can, at pleasure, make such alterations and changes, in the rights and privileges of the Plaintiffs, it may take them away entirely. If a part may be destroyed or taken away by one act, the rest may, by an other. The same power, that can do one, can do the other.
I shall contend for the Plaintiffs that these acts are not obligatory : ...
... I. Because they are not within the general scope of legislative power:
II. Because they violate certain provisions of the constitution of this State, restraining the legislative power:
III. Because they violate the constitution of the United States:
On the first point, the attempt will be to show, that the legislature would not have been competent to pass these acts, and make
Numerous instances have occurred, where it has been the duty of the courts of law, in this state, as well as in most other states of the union, to examine into the legality of the doings of their respective legislatures. And the cases, in which the courts have been obliged to declare legislative acts unconstitutional and void, are vastly more numerous, than judging from the theory of our governments, was to have been expected. As the constitutions-attempt to define, with exactness, the powers granted to each department of government, it might have been expected, had not experience shown the contrary, that each department would have carefully confined itself, within its prescribed limits.
The celebrated maxim that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be kept separate and distinct,, and be vested in different departments, was well understood, and duly appreciated, at the time of forming the constitution of this state ; and is recognized and adopted in the 37th article of the bill of rights. The due observance of this principle, according to the opinion of tbe most celebrated statesmen, and political writers, is. essential to the preservation of a free government. “ There can be no liberty, where tbe legislative and executive powers are united in tbe same person, or body of magistracy: ” or, “ if tlie power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers ”
In compliance witb this fundamental principle of all free governments, our constitution has erected tbe three departments, and given to each its proper powers.
The chief labour and difficulty has always been, to keep the legislative power, within its limits: and to protect the other departments from its encroachments. The legislature is too numerous to-be restrained by considerations of individual responsibility. Confident in its influence with the people, it acts with a boldness and intrepidity, of which the other departments are incapable. This is the united opinion of the most able judges, after a critical examination of the course and tendency of our governments. “ The legislative department is every where, extending the sphere of its activity,, and drawing all power'into its impetuous vortex.” “It is against, the enterprizing ambition of this department, that the people ought.
Legislative bodies seem to consider themselves as representing, exclusively, the sovereignty of the people, and as having the right to exercise any power, tliat they may deem expedient, unless specially prohibited. It is often gravely contended, that the legislature, thus representing the people, is superior to the other branches of the government, and that it may, of right, exert a general controuling power over them.. Such a doctrine is entirely inconsistent with that vital principle of all free governments, that the three great powers should be kept separate and independent.
This axiom requires, that each department should confine itself to the powers granted to it, and not interfere with, nor exercise those, granted to the other departments. No interference whatever ought to be permitted, except vibre there is, by the constitution, a plain delegation of power; as in the instance of the qualified negative, of the acts of the legislature, by the Governour. The different departments are co-ordinate, independent, and equally the depositaries of sovereign power. Each has what was 'delegated to it, by the people, the great source of all power, and neither has more. Each of the three powers is, in its nature, sovereign, within its proper sphere of action. Within the limits, prescribed for it, the judiciary department is as substantially sovereign, as the legislative is within its limits. And the Courts of justice have as much right, to enact and promulgate new laws, as the legislature has to decide private controversies.. For there is no more ground for a pretence, that power is ■ given, by the constitution, either directly, or by inference, to the legislature to decide on matters of private right, than that power is given to the Courts, to enact general statutes. And one department, whenever it shall attempt to act, beyond the limits of its authority, is entitled to no more obedience or respect, than an other would be, when making a similar attempt.
The Constitution of this State, and that of the United States, apparently jealous of the encroaching tendency of the legislative power, have not only defined it, with caution and exactness, but have also, in many instances, where from former experience, the greatest danger was apprehended, guarded it with special prohibitions. But these “ parchment barriers ” will have little effect, unless carefully guarded, and firmly defended by the judicia^. The powers are divided, and granted to separáte and independent
That the Courts of law, not only have the right, but are bound to entertain questions, and decide, on the constitutionality of acts of the legislature, though formerly doubted, seems to be now, almost universally, admitted. But an erroneous opinion still prevails, to a considerable extent, that the courts, in the discharge of this great and important duty, ought to act, not only with more than ordinary deliberation, but even with a degree of cautions timidity. The idea is, that these are dangerous subjects for Courts, and that they ought not to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional, unless they come to their conclusion, with absolute certainty, like that of mathematical demonstration ; and where the reasons are so manifest, that none can doubt. A Court of law, when examining the doings of a co-ordinate branch of the government, will always treat it, with great decorum. This is proper in itself, and necessary to preserve an harmonious understanding, between independent departments. So also, it ought to be, after the most careful deliberation only, that a proceeding of such co-ordinate branch should be pronounced void. Because the result is always important. But the examination is to be pursued with firmness, and the final decision, as in other cases, must be according to the unbiased dictate of the understanding.
An act of the legislature must, necessarily, have the sanction of the opinion of a majority, of a numerous body of men. It cannot therefore be supposed, that the reasons, against the validity of such an act, will ordinarily be so plain and obvious, as to leave no manner of doubt. To require then, that Courts shall abstain, from declaring acts of the legislature invalid, while a scruple of doubt remains, is nothing less, than to demand a surrender of their jurisdiction in this particular; in the due exercise of which consists the chief, if not only efficient security, for the great and fundamental principle of our free governments. Experience shows, that legislatures are in the constant habit, 'of exerting their power to its utmost extent. They intentionally act up to the very verge of their authority: and are seldom restrained by doubts or timidity. If the Courts, fearing a conflict, adopt a course directly opposite, by abandoning their jurisdiction, and retiring, whenever a plausible ground of doubt can be suggested, the time cannot be distaiit, when the legislative department “will draw all power into its impetuous vortex.”
The constitution of this State gives to the Legislature all legislative power, and no other, that has any relation to the matter, under consideration. If therefore the passing of the acts, in question, be not within the general scope of the legislative power, they cannot be valid.
The security of private rights is the only valuable and important advantage, which a free government has over a despotick one. If the rights of individuals must be liable to be violated by despotick power, it, matters not, whether that power rests in the hands of one, or many. Numbers impose no restraint, and afford no security. Experience has shown, where all the powers of government have been united, that their being exercised by a numerous assembly, has afforded to private rights, no security against the grossest acts of violence and injustice.
The Legislature can make laws, by which private rights may become forfeited. But the Courts of justice are alone competent to adjudge and declare the forfeiture. While the legislative and judicial powers are kept separate, it can never be competent for the legislature, under any pretence whatever, to take property from one, and give it to another, or in any way infringe private rights. Were that permitted, all questions of private right might be speedily determined by legislative.orders and decrees; and there would be no occasion for Courts of law.
The deciding on matters of private right appertains, plainly and manifestly, to the judiciary department. It constitutes the chief labour of Courts of justice. As then one department cannot exercise the powers belonging to another, it follows, that the legislature cannot, rightfully, assume any part of this jurisdiction, thus, belonging to the judiciary department. The province of the legislature is to provide laws, and that of the Courts to decide rights, according to the laws. Were the Courts to assume the power of' making the laws, by which they are to decide, their judgments, would be arbitrary. Because, in making the laws, they could have no other rule than their own discretion. So when the legislature,.
The general principle may be safely asserted, that no vested right whatever can bo devested, and taken away from one, and transferred to another, by force of a legislative act, and without the agency of a Court of justice. This principle is clearly established, in the case of Vanhorne vs. Dorsance. 2 Dal. 304. A vested right is a right, acquired and possessed according to existing laws. Mr. Justice Ashurst calls it “ a legal right, properly vested in a third person, or an interest legally vested”
If then legal rights, vested in individuals, cannot be taken away, or infringed by legislative acts, the next enquiry is whether the Plaintiffs have any such rights, which can be affected by the acts; in question.
The Plaintiffs claim to have legal rights, both in their corporate, and individual capacities. In their corporate capacity, they claim the franchise of being, and continuing to be, a corporation, and the right to possess and enjoy all the privileges, granted and assured to them, by their charter; and among others, the right to the property, acquired under it. In their individual capacities,
That many corporations have legal rights, and which of course cannot be abolished or infringed by the Legislature, cannot be doubted. It will not, as is believed be contended, that the Legislature can abolish incorporated Banks and insurance companies, and dispose, of their property, at pleasure. Such corporations clearly have vested rights, with which the legislature cannot interfere.
There are corporations of different kinds, and with different incidents, which are all very exactly defined by law. To ascertain what are the rights of the corporation, under consideration, it must be seen, to what species or class of corporations, it belongs, and what are the incidents, and rights of that species or class.
The only division of corporations, material to the present enquiry, is that of civil and eleemosynary.
Civil corporations are constituted for the purpose of government; or for the encouragement, of trade, and commerce, or such like purposes
The general division of a state into counties and towns, as is done in this,'and the other states of New-England, creates corporations of a peculiar kind, having a few only of the ordinary incidents of corporations. In this State, the corporate privileges of towns, with few exceptions, are conferred and limited by general laws, extending equally to all. A town, like a county, may be established without the consent of the inhabitants, who may be compelled, against their wills, to become members of the corporation. In this, there is nothing unjust or arbitrary, as a like provision extends to all the inhabitants of the state, who must be members of some town, and County Corporation. Although the privileges of such corporations may, in a certain degree be subject to legislative controul, it by no means follows, that the legislature can, rightfully, take from any such corporation its property, and transfer it to another.
Somewhat similar to these, are incorporated cities, where all within certain limits, are included, and made members of the corporation. But where there is a special grant of peculiar privileges, the legislative power to new-model, or controul them, if admitted at all, must be with great limitation. The legislature
An eleemosynary corporation is always for charitable purposes. Its design is, to secure the applications of donations to charitable uses, according to the directions of the donors. It has no concern with the civil government of the State, either general, or local; nor in the promotion of commerce, or any other branch of business, which are the objects of civil corporations. It originates in private bounty, and its privileges are granted, for the purpose of perpetuating, and securing the application of the bounty, to the objects intended. And it is always a private, in contradistinction to publick corporations. All hospitals are eleemosynary and private corporations; and with them incorporated Colleges and Schools are always classed
Hospitals and colleges or schools are always classed together, and alone constitute eleemosynary corporations. Professor Wooddeson says, “all eleemosynary corporations may I believe bo included, under the name of hospitals, colleges or schools; in respect of visitation there seems no discrimination between Colleges and Hospitals ”
A striking mark of distinction, between civil and eleemosynary corporations, is, that the former is not, and the latter is subject to visitation. There can be no private visitors of civil corporations. Their disputes are determined, and the performance of their duties enforced, in courts of law. But all eleemosynary corporations have visitors, whoso right and duty it is, to enforce the due observance of the regulations of the institution. To all colleges and schools for the purpose of instruction, visitation is a necessary incident, as it is also to Hospitals. This is laid down as an acknowledged principle, by all elementary writers, and appears to
“When governours are appointed, to superintend a charity, they are in all cases visitors of the objects of the charity ; when the application of the revenues is not immediately entrusted to them, they are also visitors, as to the application of the revenues; and the Court of chancery has no jurisdiction over them; but when the management of, and application of the revenues is immediately entrusted to them, then as to these they are subject to the controul of that Court”
According to well established principles then, there can be no doubt, to which class of corporations, the one in question belongs. It is clearly an eleemosynary corporation, and of consequence, a private corporation. It may be safely asserted, that not even the semblance of an authority can be produced to support a contrary opinion. It differs from civil and publick corporations, in all those particulars, which are supposed to* give the legislature a right, to interfere in their concerns.
This being a private corporation, the plaintiffs have legal rights, and interests, which cannot be taken away or infringed, at the discretion of the legislature. The" rights of private corporations are entitled to the same protection as the rights of individuals. A corporation is created for the purpose of securing and perpetuating rights. It is admitted that corporate rights must originate, in a grant from the state; they are nevertheless legal rights. It is not pretended, that the legislature can resume its grants, to an individual, of either property or privileges. What better right has it, to resume its grants, to a private corporation, established to administer private charity? It is-true, the expectation of pub-lick benefit was the inducement, to create the corporation. And in the present case that expectation has not been disappointed. The funds have been duly applied to the objects designed, or if not, that duty can be enforced, by the Courts of Justice. The expectation of publick benefit is always the inducement, for erecting corporations of every kind. Of course, if they answer the ends, for which they are established, the state derives advantages from them. But it does not follow, that all their property and privileges are held in trust for the publick, and that the legislature may dispose of them, among the other publick property, at pleasure. The state is entitled, to all the benefits and advantages, stipulated for, in the grant of incorporation, and to nothing more. The state has an interest, that the property and privileges of an individual should be used, in such a manner as to be beneficial to the
An eleemosynary corporation is the means, devised by the policy of the law, to secure the fulfilment of the will of a charitable donor. The corporation is nothing more, than the means used to obtain an object; and can the law be justly charged, with the absurdity of converting the means, it has thus devised into an engine to defeat the object? Who would found an eleemosynary corporation, or give it property, for the purpose of securing it, for a special charitable use, knowing, that he thereby, subjected his property to any use, that a legislature, under the influence of momentary passion, or prejudice, might prefer? Very different is the protection, which the law affords to property, given to charitable uses, which it guards, at all points, with the most vigilant caution. It will- carry into effect devises and conveyances, for charitable uses, under circumstances, which would render them void, if for any other purpose.
The circumstance, that this state has made donations to the corporation, does not alter its nature, nor lessen or destroy the plaintiffs’ rights. The state, like other donors, gave on such conditions, as it pleased; and like other donors, it can enforce the fulfilment of the conditions. The state of Vermont also made donations, and would thereby seem to have as much power, on that ground, to interfere with the concerns of the corporation, as this state has. In the case of Terrett & al. vs. Taylor, & al. where the attempt was, by a legislative act, to take away the property of the episcopal churches, in Virginia, and apply it to other uses, Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says, “Had the property thus acquired, been originally granted by the State, or the King, there might have been some colour, and it ivould have been but a colour, for such an extraordinary pretension"
It is impossible, without disregarding all established principles and authorities, on this subject, to consider a private eleemosynary corporation, a publick trust, and its members, publick officers of the state, and therefore incapable of having any rights, of the character of private lights.
In most eleemosynary corporations, the objects of the charity, that is those who are individually to receive the benefit of it, are •admitted and constituted members of the corporation. In a hospital, incorporated on that plan, the poor and sick to enjoy the benefit of the charity, must be admitted members of the corporation. Can they be said, to hold the property and privileges of the corporation, in trust for the publick, and to be all publick officers of the state ? It has never been supposed, that the rights of a corporation so con
It is admitted, the plaintiffs are trustees of the revenues of the corporation, and bound to apply them to the objects intended to be provided for, and that this, trust may be enforced against them. But this is a private, not a publick trust. So also the corporate privileges are held in trust, partly for individual members of the corporation, but chiefly for those, who, though not members, are to receive the ultimate benefit of the charity. But although the plaintiffs hold the property and privileges in trust, they are still the legal owners, and have all the legal rights thereto appertaining. When a trustee asserts, in a Court of law, his right to property, conveyed to him in trust, it is surely no sufficient answer, to tell him the property is designed for the use and benefit of others, and that he individually suffers no injury, and therefore is entitled to no remedy. The chief design, of conveying property in trust, is to constitute the trustee a legal protector of it; because the cestui que trust is generally incompetent. A benefit to the trustee personally is hot designed.
The true principle is, that a trustee, having the legal right, is entitled to all its remedies; and Courts of justice, instead of restraining him, often compel him to exert them. Were the law otherwise, all trust property would lie at the mercy of every invader. The cestui que trust cannot protect it, because not the legal owner; and if the trustee máy not, it is without protection. In no case is the propriety and necessity, of allowing legal protection to property, in the hands of trustees, more apparent, than in that of corporations, like the present, for charitable purposes. For it is most manifest, the charity can, in no other way, be protected. To hold that trustees, on the ground of a supposed want of interest, are’ incompetent to protect the subject matter of the trust, would destroy, not only all charitable corporations, where trustees are introduced, but all trusts whatever.
In corporations, for the promotion of commerce, or the management of mere money concerns, it is not necessary, nor "always the case, that those, who contribute the funds, and participate in the profits, should bé members of the corporation. Persons, having-no interest in the funds, may be members of the' corporation, and hold them in trust'for those who are entitled to the profits. The trustees, in such a corporation, would unquestionably be competent in law, to protect all its rights.
There is then no ground, for raising such an interest in the state, or such a trust for those, to be benefited by the institution, as shall defeat the plaintiffs’ rights. This is a private corporation, and of that kind the most favoured in law. And it has legal rights, if any corporation can have such rights. Any principle, which can be assumed, to deprive this corporation of legal rights, will be equally applicable to every other corporation, of whatso
Corporations must claim all their rights, by virtue of grants from the state; but they are not, for that reason, less secure or inviolable, than similar rights of individuals, derived from the same source. Peculiar privileges, granted by the state to individuals, although intended to promote the publiclc interest, become vested rights, and cannot be resumed. On what ground rests the distinction between these, and similar privileges, granted to private corporations ? There is no secret or implied condition, to a grant, or charter of incorporation, that it may be revoked or annulled by the legislature, whenever it pleases.
The British Parliament can, as it is held, abolish corporations. So it can pass acts of attainder, and of pains and penalties. But neither can be done, by virtue of the ordinary and legitimate legislative power, which belongs to our legislature. According to the theory of the British government, the Parliament is omnipotent. “A corporation may be dissolved by act of Parliament which is boundless, in its operations ”
The attempt was made, by the Bill introduced into Parliament, in the year 1783, by Mr. Fox, for new modelling the charter of the East India Company. The attempt was resisted and defeated. The city of London, in their petition against the bill assert “ that it was not only a high and dangerous violation of the charters of the Company, but a total subversion of all the principles of the law and constitution of that country.” Lord Thurlow termed it “ a most atrocious violation of private property, which cut every Englishman to the bone.” Mr. Pitt opposed it, as being “ a daring violation of the chartered rights of the Company”
But whatever be the extent of this undefined and arbitrary power, of the British Parliament, I trust it will not be contended, that it has descended to our legislature. The taking away of the colonial charters, under colour of that power, is justly classed among the grievous oppressions, which led to our independence. “ Chartered rights ” were then deemed, of too sacred a nature, to be voted away, as the. passions or caprice of a legislature might incline. Will it now be asserted, that the British Parliament or King, or both united, were competent to abolish, or new model the colonial Charters ? If it could be done, by legislative power alone, they might; for they possessed the whole legislative power over that subject matter. 1
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Terrett & al. vs. Taylor & al. before mentioned, it is said, “ The title was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather in their legal agents. It was not in the power of the crown to seize or assume it, nor of the Parliament, unless by the exercise of a' power the most arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, and endured, only because it could not be resisted.” “ The dissolution of the form of government did not involve in it a dissolution of civil rights, or an abolition of the common law, under which the inheritances of every man in the state were held. The State itself succeeded only to the rights of the crown ”
In England the creating of corporations appertains to the King, and he has all the legitimate power, that exists for dissolving them; except what is vested in the judicial Courts
But the King cannot abolish a corporation, or give it a new organization, or alter any of its powers or privileges, without its consent. This is the well established, and acknowledged doctrine of the common law
The remedy for the King, in such case, was a writ of quo warranto: in place of which, in latter times, the information of quo warranto has been used, as being more convenient. “A writ of quo warranto (says Judge Blackstone) is in the nature of a writ of right, for the King against him, who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty; to enquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also, in the case of the non-user, or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or abuse of it.” “ The judgment, on a writ of quo warranto being in the nature of a writ of right, is final and conclusive even against the crown ”
Corporations forfeit their rights, by non user or misuser, and are to be vacated by trial and judgment
As successors to the King, then, the legislature have no power, to pass the acts in question. And it may be safely asserted, that before the change in the form of government, the plaintiffs could not have been rightfully deprived of their property or privileges, without a trial in due course of law. Do they now hold their
We know from experience, that the legislative power is of an encroaching nature. Permit the legislature, in this instance, to abolish a charter of corporate privileges, and there will be no ground left, on which they can be restrained, from abolishing patents or grants of land. . The great principle of security, for' private property, will be destroyed. And let it be remembered that the attempt to vacate legal rights and titles, vested in individuals, has, in fact, been made by the legislatures of more than one of the states, in the Union. The only means of security is to abide by settled principles, and firmly resist the first attempt 'at encroachment. The law affords the same security and protection, for the enjoyment of franchises or privileges, as it does for other rights. An action for a disturbance of a franchise or privilege, is well known in law, and may be as easily maintained, either by an individual, or a corporation, as for any other injury.
As then a grant of privileges, to an individual creates legal rights, which cannot be infringed by legislative acts; and as there is no distinction, known in law, as to the effect of such a grant, when made to an individual, and when made to a private corporation, it follows, that the grant to the plaintiffs created legal rights, that were duly vested, and which of course cannot be infringed by the legislative acts in question. It is of no consequence, as it respects the right, whether the privileges, granted to the plaintiffs by their charter, are valuable, in a pecuniary point of view, or otherwise. They are essentially of the nature of private property, and consequently entitled to protection, like other private property.
The plaintiffs, in their aggregate capacity, are entitled to the franchise of being a corporation, and of enjoying all the privileges contained in their charter, according to its provisions. The President of the College is entitled to the quiet enjoyment of his office, with all the privileges and perquisites incident to it. And so also, the other members of the corporation are, individually, entitled to enjoy their respective privileges. In Miller vs. Spateman,
. . . Besides the right of the President to his office and emoluments, each individual trustee has the privilege of being a member, and of acting according to the provision of the charter, in all matters, relating to the government of the corporation, and in the management of its property, and in the conducting of all its concerns. These privileges, that the members of the corporation hold, in their private capacities, constitute vested rights, which are subject to no controul, but that of the law of the land.
It is not a new doctrine, that in a free government, the legislative power, without any direct and express restriction, is incompetent to abolish, or take away vested lights. It results from the very nature and design of a free government. This is plainly and forcibly asserted by Judge Chase, in delivering his opinion, in the case of Calder vs. Bull. “ The purposes for which men enter into society, will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. An act of the legislature, (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered as a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments, established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded.” “ A law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B. it is against all reason and justice for a people to entrust a legislature with such powers ; and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our state governments amount to a prohibition of such acts of legis
If then a correct view has been taken of the powei-s of the legislature and of the rights of the plaintiffs, it would not have been ■competent for the legislature to pass these acts, if there had been no special restrictions on the legislative power; because they are not within the general scope of that power, and consequently void.
II. There are special restrictions, on the power of the legislature, in the constitution of this state, which these acts violate.
They violate that part of the 15th article of the bill of rights, which provides, “that no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, ■despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put ■out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate; but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” If these acts are'valid, the plaintiffs are deprived of their property, and of the “ immunities and privileges,” granted to them by their charter, by other means, than the judgment of their peers, or the law of the land. The acts of the legislature take away their rights and privilege's, without any trial whatever.
This provision of the Bill of rights was unquestionably designed to restrain the legislature, as well as the other branches of government, from all arbitrary interference with private rights. It was adopted from magna charta, and was justly considered by our forefathers, long before the formation of otir constitution, as constituting the most efficient security of their rights and liberties.
Lord Coke, in his commentary on magna charta, explains the phrase “ by the law of the land ” to mean “ by due course and process of law.” That is, no subject shall be deprived of his property,, immunities, or privileges, but by judgment of his peers, or by due course and process of law. This then surely cannot be done by special act of the legislature, without judgment of peers, and without any process of law. To make his meaning still more plain, if possible,'that Parliament was bound by this provision of magna charta, Lord Coke says, “ against this ancient and fundamental law, and in the face thereof,, I find an act of Parliament made, &c.
It is sufficiently apparent, that Lord Coke understood this provision to extend to, and bind Parliament. Hence his complaint that Parliament had in that instance violated it, by dispensing-with trials according to the law of, the land ; and authorizing, in certain cases, the exaction of forfeitures, on trials by the arbitrary discretion of magistrates. For even that act of Parliament, so justly denounced for its “ horrible oppressions,” did not, like the present acts of our legislature, attempt -to devest, and take away private rights, without any trial at all. The construction of the provision has always been according to Lord Coke’s opinion. It has never been doubted, that Parliament was morally bound by it. But the difficulty in England has been that Parliament, being omnipotent, in all matters of civil institution, is too powerful for the constitution, and cannot be restrained.
The same construction has been uniformly given to this provision, in the Courts of the different states of the Union. The Superior Court of South Carolina, in the case of Bowman vs. Middleton, decided that an act of the colonial legislature of 1712, taking property from one, and vesting it in another, without trial by jury, was void; because it infringed this provision of magna charta, which bound the legislature. They say, “ that the plaintiffs can, claim no title, under the act in question, as it was against common right, as well as against magna charta, to take away the freehold of one man, and vest it in another: and that too to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation, or even a trial, by the jury of the country, to determine the right in question. That the-act was therefore, ipso facto, void. That no length of time could give it validity, being originally founded on erroneous principles ”
This provision of magna charta is introduced into the 5th article ■of the amendments of the constitution of the United States. The terms, in which it is there expressed, show conclusively that it was understood in the same sense, that we contend it always has been understood. They are, that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This is manifestly designed to secure a trial, according to the established laws of the land; and it certainly restrains the legislature, from depriving an individual of his life, liberty, and property, without such trial. The two phrases “ law of the land ” and “ due process of law,” as used in the two constitutions, doubtless have the same meaning. If otherwise, however, the result will be the same. For the legislature of this state is as much bound by this provision, in the constitution of the United States, as they would be, were it contained in our own constitution. If the plaintiffs are deprived of their property by the acts in question, it certainly has not been done by due process of law. The law provides no such summary process, by which individuals may, without trial be deprived of their rights.
Thus has this provision been always understood, as imposing a restraint on the legislative power, from the time it was first introduced into magna charta, down to the present time. It has been incorporated into the constitution of most of the states of the Union, and it is believed, that not a single judge, or commentator, either before, or since it was introduced into our constitution, has attempted to give it a different meaning. The terms used are general, embracing the legislature, equally with the other departments of government; and any reason, which can be assigned, for excepting the legislature from this restraint, may, with equal force, be applied, for excepting either, or both the other departments. Indeed if this provision were not applicable to the legislature, it would be idle and useless. The previous part of this article of the bill of rights, together with others, regulating the manner of trials, are
The greatest if not only effectual, security, against legislative oppression, is, that the law must be general, embracing all under like circumstances, and including the legislators among the rest. An oppressive law, applicable to the whole community, will soon be repealed. But if the legislature, under the influence of prejudice, or passion, to which all bodies of men, however constituted or selected, are occasionally subject, can pass acts, having- the force of laws, to apply to a solitary individual only, he may be destroyed, before publick sympathy can be excited, for his relief. A law, according to any just definition, that ever has, or can be given of it, must be general in its operation. It is a rule of conduct, for all, within the principle it establishes. An act of the legislature, prescribing a particular rule, for the government of one or more individuals, therein named, would not ha.ve the force of law, but would be void
If this construction, which has always hitherto been put on the article of the bill of rights, under consideration, is to be still abided by, it is conclusive in favour of the plaintiffs. Their charter grants them certain “immunities and privileges.” This article provides, in effect, that they shall not be deprived of these “ immunities and privileges,” but by due trial, and according to the well known general laws of the land, which are binding on the whole community. The acts of the legislature, which are made for the purpose of depriving them of their immunities and privileges, without any trial whatever, must therefore be declared to be void.
These acts violate also the 23d article of the bill of rights, which provides that, “retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws therefore should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offences.”
There can be no ground for dispute, as to what constitutes a retrospective law. In the case Calder vs. Bull, Judge Chase says, “ every law, that takes away, or impairs rights, vested agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective”
This article prohibits the passing of retrospective laws of any kind, as well such as affect the rights of property, and individual privileges, as those, made for the punishing crimes. The latter, which are generally called ex post facto laws, and which are no more unjust than the former, have been denounced, by a most respectable authority, as being a more unreasonable, and cruel method of ensnaring people to their ruin, than that adopted, by the worst of the Roman emperors, who wrote his laws in a small character and hung them up on high pillars, to prevent their being read
It is hoped, that it has been already sufficiently shown, that the plaintiffs have vested rights, acquired under existing laws. If so, these acts, which infringe their rights, are retrospective, and void. The plaintiff’s rights were perfect and complete. They were in the full enjoyment of their property and privileges, and by no existing-law, could they have been ousted or molested. If this article does, not protect such rights, it is not easy to perceive what rights are-protected by it.
The 37th article provides, that the three essential powers of government “ ought to be kept, as separate from, and independent-of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as. is consistent with that chain of connection; which binds the wholefabrick of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.” This article has already been noticed, as bearing on the general powers of the legislature. It may also, with propriety, be considered as imposing a special restraint against the legislature’s, exercising judicial power. The limitation, with which this great elementary principle is adopted, does not, in any degree, lessen its-force, in relation to the question under consideration. The bill of rights establishes general principles, by which the constitution of government was formed, and according to which, it is to be construed. The three departments of government are connected together, and in certain particulars, dependent on each other. The-
By the proper construction of this article, each department is restrained, from exercising any of the general powers of another department, except in cases, where it is especially authorized by the constitution. A construction that should leave each department at liberty, to exercise the powers of another, whenever it might deem it expedient, would render the provision of the article useless. Indeed the language admits of no other construction than that before stated. The substance is, that the three powers of government shall be kept, as separate and independent, as is consistent, with the nature of a free government, and the provisions of the constitution. The free government, here meant, is doubtless one, where the rulers have no powers, other than what are delegated to them, by the people. Is it inconsistent with the nature of such a government, or with tke provisions of our constitution, that the legislature should abstain from the exercise of judicial power, in cases where that power is not granted to them, but is granted to another department ? We have already seen, that no free government can exist, without such a restraint on the legislative power.
Under the first point, it was shown, that the general legislative power did not extend, to the devesting of private rights, and that the passing of these acts which take from the plaintiffs their rights, and give them to others, was substantially an exercise of judicial power. That the legislature did not examine witnesses, and hear the parties, before they decided on their rights, shows only the extent of the oppression, and the total incompetency of the legislature to exercise judicial power, in such cases. As then no special authority is given to the legislature, to exercise judicial power, in this or similar cases, the acts violate also this article of the constitution.
III. It is contended that the acts violate the 3 Oth section of the 1st article of the constitution of the United States, which provides that “no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
This comprehensive provision was intended as well to supply the omissions and deficiencies, in the constitutions of the several states, as to afford an additional and uniform security, for private rights throughout the United States
That a grant of land, by a state to an individual, is a contract, within this provision of the constitution, and consequently cannot be annulled, or infringed, by any act of the legislature of the state, has been expressly decided, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Fletcher vs. Peck
So patents for new inventions, grants of tolls, and of all such like rights, conferring immunities and privileges, constitute contracts, within’ the meaning of the constitution of the United States. If there be any question remaining, on this point, it is whether a grant of the privilege of being a corporation differs so essentially from grants of other privileges, as to form an exception, in this respect. No foundation for any such distinction is perceived.
In the case of Terrett vs. Taylor,
That a grant of land, to a private corporation, is as much a contract, as a similar grant to an individual, will hardly be doubted. A corporation is a person in law, capable of contracting; and if such grant, when made to a natural person, constitutes a contract, no reason can be assigned, why it should not, when made, to a corporation.
The legislature of this state has granted certain lands to the corporation, under consideration, which they cannot take away; because the grant constitutes a contract, and is therefore protected, by the constitution of the United States. Would it not be then grossly absurd to hold, that the grant of the franchise, or privilege of being a corporation does not constitute a contract, and consequently, that the legislature may, at pleasure, abolish the corporation ; and then take to themselves not only the lands, they have granted to it, but also all the other property, and privileges of the corporation.
The charter, constituting the plaintiffs a corporation, and granting them certain immunities and privileges, is as complete a contract, as a grant of land to them would have been. It contains all the common, and necessary ingredients, and qualities of a contract executed. It is an agreement of competent parties, on a sufficient consideration.
There can be no doubt that there were competent parties to the contract: the King of one side, and the Trustees named in the charter of the other.
There was also an agreement of parties. The granting of the charter by one party, and the acceptance of it by the other, affords ample evidence of an agreement of the parties. The trustees, by accepting it, agreed to the provisions and stipulations of the charter, as effectually as the King did, by granting it. Unless accepted by the grantees, it could have had no effect or operation. A grant or charter of incorporation, till accepted is a nullity. That acceptance is necessary to give it effect is too well established, to admit of any manner of doubt. “As the intention of the grant of incorporation is to confer some benefit on the grantees, which however may be counterbalanced, by some conditions, with which, it is accompanied, it has become an established rule, that the grant must be accepted, by the voluntary consent of a majority of those, whom it is intended to incorporate, othenvise the grant will be void ”
The acceptance is always averred in pleading, when a right is derived under a charter; and issue may be taken on the fact of acceptance, as is done in the case of the King vs. Pasmore
That the contract was made on a sufficient consideration, or motive, is apparent, from the recital in the charter of the benefits and advantages expected. The trustees, by accepting the charter, completed the contract, and incurred an obligation, which, they say, they have faithfully performed. If they have not, the law affords an ample remedy.
It is impossible to have any just or con’ect idea of a corporation, without considering the creation of it, as resting in a contract. In the case of the King vs. Pasmore, Judge Buller says “ The question referred by the jury, for the opinion of the Court, is whether the letters patent were or were not duly accepted by the persons, to whom they were granted ” “And I do not know how to reason on this point better, than in the manner urged by one of the relators’ council; who considered the grant of incorporation to be a compact between the crown and a certain number of individuals ’’
So a charter of incorporation may be surrendered, and by the surrender, the grantees are released from all obligations arising under'it. Can individuals, in that manner refease themselves, from the obligations imposed on them by a law ?
If then the charter, creating this corporation, must according to
It is not easy to foresee all the consequences, of adopting new and untried principles. It might be worth while to consider, for a moment what is to become of the property of a private corporation, abolished by a legislative act. — The doctrine of the law is, that the lands of a corporation, in case of a dissolution, by whatever means, revert to the grantors. If the old corporation is abolished, w'hat shall prevent the grantors or their heirs from asserting their claims to the lands, -which have been granted it? Their right would, in that event, seem to be unquestionable. Is then another strain to be made, on the principles of the constitution, by taking away from the grantors their right, to the reversion of the lands, for the sake of vesting them, in the new corporation, according to the design of the acts in question ? But it must be remembered, that a part of the landed property of the old corporation, and that not the least valuable, is situated under a jurisdiction, over which the legislature of this state, has no controul. Is it to be expected, that the state of Vermont will, without an effort to assert its rights, permit lands, lying within its own jurisdiction, which it gave to Dartmouth College, for certain uses, to be transferred to another institution, and converted to other uses?
If these acts are held to be valid not only this College, but every other literary and charitable institution must become subject to the varying, and often capricious will, of the legislatures. Their revenues will be blended with the publiek revenues, and liable to be applied to any use, which the emergency of occasions may, in the opinion of the legislatures, require. The liberal and benevolent, when disposed to aid such institutions, can have no security, that their donations will be applied, to the objects intended. A striking instance of this has already occurred. The individual, at whose solicitation, these acts were passed, in a devise of property, for the support of certain professorships, in the newly established University, fearing that some future legislature would apply his donation, to other purposes, has expressly provided, in case these acts shall be-li rendered nugatory, be altered or repealed, unless by the consent, of the new trustees, as now constituted,,” that his devise shall thereby become void; and the property be transferred to other uses. This idle attempt, to restrain the power of a future legislature, so as to prevent its following the example, now set, shows not only the fears, that donations will be misapplied; but also the impossibility of securing them to any certain use, while subject to the arbitrary controul of a legislature.
The attempted innovation would affect the character of our
In the early settlement of New-England, the establishment of Colleges was among the chief cares of the wisest and best men of that period. They have remained to the present time, substantially on the same ancient model; and with scanty means have been eminently useful. The present bold experiment, if carried into effect, will probably terminate in their final destruction.
— The case, presented to the consideration of the Court, is not that of a private corporation, complaining that the legislature had oppressively and without a trial seized on property held to its own use; it is not the case of a private corporation complaining that the legislature had wantonly deprived it of any means of acquiring property, which had, at any time, been granted to it; but it is the case 'of a publick corporation, created expressly —created exclusively for the publick interest, complaining that the legislature, the guardians of that interest, have undertaken, without consent, to alter and amend its charter.
Are the acts to amend the charter, and to enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College, constitutional ? This is the question to be decided by the Court.
The right of the Court to declare those acts of the legislature, which are repugnant to the constitution, to be unconstitutional and void, is not denied. If, for example, the legislature should pass an ex post facto law, making that act a crime, which was innocent at the time of its being done, it would be not only right, but the duty of the Court to pronounce it void. When the constitution prohibits the passing of particular laws, and the legislature does pass them, the safety of the people requires, that the Court should interpose and prevent their operation. While it is agreed, that the Court has power to declare every act of, the legislature,, which violates the constitution, to be unconstitutional and void; it must also be agreed, that it is a power, which ought never to be exercised, but with the greatest caution. It is important'to the peace and happiness of the community, that the most perfect harmony should exist between the different departments of government. The judicial department should never pronounce an act, deliberately passed by the legislature, to be unconstitutional in a case of a doubtful nature; its repugnancy to the constitution
I shall attempt, in the first place, to show, that the Corporation of Dartmouth College was a publick corporation. Tf it was, no doubt can be entertained, as to the right of the General Court to alter and amend its charter; in such a manner as, in their judgment, would best promote the publick welfare.
Whether this corporation was publick or private, is not to be determined by considering, whether it was founded or endowed by the bounty of the government or by that of an individual. — It is said by Lord Hardwicke, that “it is the extensiveness of the objects to be benefited, that constitutes a charity a publick or a private one”
As the» end, for which private corporations are established, is the benefit of individuals; and as all the rights, privileges, and franchises, conferred on them, are granted with this view; individuals have always a direct, a beneficial interest in the property held by such .corporations; an interest which they may transfer to others — which may be taken for their debts — and which, in the event of ,their death, descends to their representatives. But as the end, for which this corporation- was erected, was to promote the welfare of the whole community; as all its rights, privileges, and franchises were granted for this purpose, neither the corpora-tors themselves, nor any other individuals had any beneficial interest in the property held by the corporation ; they had no interest that could be transferred to others ; none that could be taken for-their debts; none that could descend to their representatives in case of their death. The corporation was a mere instrument to effect the important publick purposes, for which it was instituted.
A. publick corporation, by force of the term, whether it has the government or an individual for its founder, must mean a corporation erected for the publielc benefit.
It appears from the charter, that the corporation of Dartmouth College was established for the express, the avowed purpose of promoting the welfare of a whole Province. It was an instrument, formed to attain objects, in which no individual had a particular interest, but in which the community had a deep one. It was vested with power to hold property in trust for the publick, but it could hold none for the use of the corporators. It was clothed with various powers, capacities, and franchises, all of which were to be exercised for the benefit of the publick, but not one of them for the advantage of its own members, or of any individuals whatever. In short, it was created — it existed only for publick purposes. If a corporation of this description be not a publick one, then, in my opinion, no publick corporation ever did, or ever can exist.
If this corporation was a publick one, the right of the General Court to alter and amend its charter must be clear. All English writers who treat of corporations, agree, that they may be dissolved by an act of the government
The limits of parishes have been frequently altered. Particular individuals with their estates in one parish have been disaunexed and annexed to another, thereby constituting a poll parish. This, as the Supreme Court in Massachusetts say, in the case of Colburn against JSllis al.
If this corporation was a private one, I shall contend that the legislature had a right to alter its charter, so far as the publick good required.
In this country the supreme object, for which government was instituted, was to secure the happiness of the people. To effect an end so important, the interest of individuals and of corporations must yield to that of the publick. On this principle, the legislatature often take the property of individuals, when the publick good requires it; they often deprive individuals of some of then-natural rights, when the exercise of them would prove detrimental. Why may they not, with equal right, take the property of corporations, when the publick welfare demands it? Why may they not, with equal 'propriety, deprive corporations of some of their rights and privileges, when the exercise of them would produce mischief to the Commonwealth ? Does the law guard the property of corporations, with more vigilance, than that of individuals ? Are the rights of the former more sacred than those of the latter? Shall we see, with approbation, the property and rights of individuals taken, when the good of society requires it, and shall we regard it as sacrilege, to take, under any circumstances, the property or the rights of corporations? The law does not protect the property or the rights and privileges of corporations, with more solicitude, than those of individuals. Neither law nor justice regards the rights and privileges of the latter, as less sacred than those of the former. Suppose .the lands of a private corporation are wanted for a fortification or an arsenal, may they not be taken? Suppose they are wanted for a highway or for any important publick purpose, may they not be taken? Without a power in the government to take the property and the rights of private corporations, as well as those of individuals, its operations would often be obstructed, and the safety of society might be endangered.— When the property of private corporations is required by the good of the community ; when the exercise of their rights proves injurious to society; to deny to the legislature the power of taking their property and of limiting or depriving them of their rights, is to depart from that principle, which has been mentioned, and which is the foundation of every free government: it is to sacrifice “the good of the many to that of the few ” — the interest of the publick to that of every little corporation.
The legislatures of many of the states, perhaps of all of them, have taken from private corporations some of their rights and privileges, when the welfare of the community has required it. In this state it has often been done. — The New-Hampshire Bank made some of its bills payable in Philadelphia. The Genex-al Court passed an act, declaring that after a certaiix day “ It should be unlawful for any Banking company in this state, by themselves,
The General Court have not only imposed new duties on Banks, but have added heavy penalties, to enforce the performance of them. By an act, passed in June 1814, the Directors of the several Banks in this state are obliged to make returns of the situation of their respective Banks, annually, to the Governour and Council; and in case of neglect or refusal, the Banks are subjected to a penalty of one thousand dollars.
The General Court of Massachusetts passed a law, by which all the Banks within the Commonwealth were subjected to a penalty of two per cent, a month, on the amount of those of their bills, which should not be paid, when presented for payment. An action was commenced against the Penobscot Bank to recover the amount of certain bills, presented for payment, but which were not paid; and also to recover two per cent, a month on that amount. It was contended on the part of the Bank, that the law was unconstitutional. But the Court recognized the authority of the legislature to make it. It was, say the Court, “ A duty incumbent
It would be easy to multiply instances, in which the legislature of this state, and those of other states, have limited the powers and taken the rights of private corporations, when required by the welfare of the community.
While I contend that the General Court has power, to take the property, the rights, and privileges of private corporations, I agree that it is a power, which ought never to be exercised, but for the strongest and most important reasons. It will, however, be at once perceived, that the reasons, which require such extreme caution on the part of the legislature, with respect to private corporations, do not exist in this case. The interest of the legislature is not the same with that of private corporations; their interests are always separate and distinct, and may sometimes be opposite. The legislature may pass a law, which, by depriving such corporations of their rights and privileges, does them an essential injury; while it does no injury whatever to the legislature. But no law can be made, to alter the charter of Dartmouth College, that will not produce as much mischief to the legislature that make it, if the law prove injurious at all, as to the members of the corporation. In this case, therefore, there can be no danger that the legislature will ever abuse their power.
It is alleged that these acts violate the constitution of the United States. When a charter of incorporation is granted, there is always, it is said, an implied contract on the part of the government, that the charter shall not be altered without the consent of the corporation; that the constitution of the United States provides, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; that to alter the charter of a corporation without consent would impair the obligation of a contract, into which the government had entered, and would, consequently, be a violation of the constitution.
The idea, that when a charter of incorporation is granted, there is an implied contract on the part of government, that the charter shall never be altered without consent, is wholly unfounded — it is visionary. In what cases does the law imply a contract? In those cases and in those only, in which reason and justice are so strongly in favour of it, that the law. presumes the contract has been made. Does reason or does justice say, that the interests of a
If there be such a contract, as is alleged, that the legislature shall never alter the charter of this corporation without its consent, with whom was that contract made? With the King of Great Britain. It will not be pretended, that the King had more power to restrain the .legislature by his contract from making such an alteration, than one legislature has to restrain by its contract all succeeding legislatures. If it were possible for the General Court to be so forgetful of their duty, so regardless of the welfare of their constituents, as to make an express contract of such a nature as the one said to exist in this case, it would be unconstitutional and void; because it-would contravene a principle, which is the very basis of our government. No legislature has power to agree, that the interests of a corporation shall be preferred to those of the publick. One legislature has no authority to agree with a corporation, that no succeeding legislature shall take its property, its rights, or its privileges, although the taking of them may be loudly demanded by the good of the community. The legislature have no more power to make a contract with a corporation, that it shall be forever exempt from all legislative controul, than they have to make such an one with an individual.
If a charter of incorporation be a contract, it certainly is not such a contract, as comes within the spirit and meaning of that article in the constitution, that has been mentioned. In order to determine this, it will only be necessary to enquire, what was the design of this article ? What were the evils that it was intended to prevent ? Before the formation of the general government, the legislatures of several of the states passed tender acts, instalment laws, &c. Where individuals had made contracts to pay debts in specie, laws were enacted, enabling them to pay in depreciated paper; a, tender of such paper discharged the debts. In some of the states, laws were passed providing, that if debtors should tender to their creditors any articles of personal property, and the
I am aware, that the Supreme Court of the United States has decided, that contracts, made by a state as well as those made by individuals, are within the meaning of this article. But the cases, in which they have so decided, bear no analogy to the present. The case of Fletcher against Peck
If, when a charter of incorporation is granted, any alteration of it, without the consent of the corporation, impairs the obligation of a contract within the meaning of the constitution of the United
“A constitution is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people.” It is the solemn expression of their will. Their intention should always guide in its construction. If Courts should extend its operation beyond that intention, they would substitute their own will, in the place of the will of the people. They might in this way, convert a wise and salutary provision in the constitution, into an instrument of injustice and oppression.
In order to ascertain the true meaning of this article then, we should always keep in view the intention of the people — the particular evils contemplated by them, and against which they designed to guard. This is the polar-star, that should direct us in its construction. Without this rule to guide us, such an extended interpretation may be given to this provision, as to despoil the state legislatures of most of their powers. They may be left, indeed, with the empty name of sovereign, but with scarcely an attribute of sovereignty. If this rule be disregarded, the time may come, and that time may not be distant, when it will be denied that the state legislatures have power to pass any law for the limitation of actions founded on contracts. It might be contended, that they have no authority to pass such a limitation act, with far more plausibility, than that they have no authority to alter the charter of a corporation. It might be said, that a limitation act violates the constitution of the United States, because it not only impairs, but destroys the obligation of contracts. It is suggested, that there is a distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation; that the remedy may be modified, as the legislature may think proper, without impairing the obligation of the contract. Precarious indeed is the right of the state legislatures to
It is further said, that a limitation act does not take away the remedy of the creditor, but only establishes, that certain circumstances shall be evidence that the contract has been performed. This suggestion is as unfounded as the other. Courts of law say expressly, that the debt exists notwithstanding the statute of limitations, but that the creditor is deprived bjr it of his remedy
In order that the estates of deceased persons may be settled, in a reasonable time, the legislatures of the different states have enacted laws, that creditors, who do not exhibit their claims against such estates, within limited periods, shall be barred from recovering them. These laws impair the obligation of contracts. They furnish no evidence, that the contracts have been performed, but merely take away the remedy of those creditors, who neglect to exhibit their claims.
The legislatures of the different states are constantly making laws on the subject of contracts. The welfare of the people requires them to exercise this power. The laws, thus passed by them, frequently affect existing contracts, and impair their obligation. But these laws must all be regarded, as repugnant to this provision in the constitution, unless its construction be limited by considering the intention of the people; the particular evils they had in view, and which it was their design to prevent.
This charter, it is said, is a grant; but it is only a grant of powers for publick purposes. The trustees were publick agents. If the legislature should, by an act or resolve, appoint a number
It is remarked by Judge Johnson in the case of Fletcher vs. Peck, that the state legislatures pass laws, impairing the obligation of contracts; yet, that these laws appear to be within the most correct limits of legislative powers, and certainly could not have been intended to be affected by this constitutional provision. If there be any contracts, the obligation of which may be impaired by laws made by a state, without violating this provision, the present is unquestionably of the number. — It may be safely affirmed, that this article in the constitution was never intended to restrain the state legislatures from passing laws, impairing the obligation of any contracts, except those where the interests of the contracting parties were entirely separate and distinct; so that a law might be passed by the legislature of a state, which would operate in favour of one of the parties to the contract, while it operated injuriously and oppressively toward the other. But no such evil can possibly exist in this ease. Here, the government and the trustees have no separate, no distinct interests to guard — their interests are precisely the same. The purposes of this incorporation were the spreading of Christianity and the diffusion of knowledge among the people. The legislature have as much concern in these important purposes, and in the prosperity of the corporation itself, as the mean of obtaining them, as the trustees themselves. No ill-judged law, altering the charter of this corporation — and doing it an injury, can do more mischief to the trustees, than to the legislature that make it. How, in such a case, could restrictions, on the legislatures of the states be contemplated? The people had all the security, that could be required or afforded. Constitutiops written on parchment or on paper may be disregarded; oaths may be forgotten; responsibility to constituents may prove insufficient to restrain legislators from abusing their power; but, when the interests of legislators are united with those of the objects of their laws ; when bad laws will produce as much injury
It is objected, that these acts are repugnant to that article in our bill of rights, which declares, “that no subject shall be.arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.” The trustees complain that they have been deprived of their property. But what property was this article intended to protect ? It was unquestionably that property, in which a man has a direct, a beneficial interest; property which he holds to his own use; and for which he is entitled to a compensation, when taken from him. If the property, held by the trustees, has been taken from them, which is denied, they had no beneficial interest in it; they did not hold it to their own use: they were entitled to no compensation for its loss. Have these acts made the trustees poorer than they were ? This cannot be pretended, without accusing them of a breach of .trust — of appropriating to their own use property belonging to the publick. I entertain too high a respect for the character of the trustees to suggest or to believe this. Will the trustees avow, that they believe themselves to be entitled to a compensation for this property ? I am confident they will not. So far then, as respects the taking of property, they complain where no injury has been sustained. — But how far does this article protect property, in which a man has a beneficial interest ? So far, that it cannot be taken from him, but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Surely, if the property of a corporation or of an individual be taken by an act of the legislature, it is taken by a law of the land. Every government has power to take private property, when required by the publick good. This power is clearly recognized by the twelfth article in our bill of rights. It is there said, “That no part of a man’s property shall be taken from him or applied to publick uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people.” It has been the practice of the General Court, ever since the adoption of the constitution, to pass laws to authorize the taking of private property for the purpose of making highways, turnpike roads, canals, &c. and their right to do it has been uniformly recognized by our courts of law.
But it is said, that the General Court has no power to authorize the taking of a man’s property by a private act; that it can be done only by public, standing laws, which must operate equally on all the citizens of the state. This is extremely incorrect. The act to regulate the extinguishing of fires, passed in April 1781,
It is objected, that these acts are retrospective, because they deprived the trustees of vested rights, and are, therefore, void. Hules are often adopted in relation to government, which appear plausible in theory and are indeed true to a certain extent, but Avhich can never be carried into effect, according to the terms, in which they are expressed. No political axiom is more frequently repeated than this, that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government must be kept separate and distinct. Yet the states, that have adopted this maxim in its most extensive terms, have blended, in some degree, the authorities of these different departments. They have given to the governour, a qualified negative on the legislature, which is an exorcise of legislative power: they have made the senate a court for the trial of impeachments, which is an exercise of judicial authority. They have even vested in the legislature the executive power of pardoning offences
A citizen of Massachusetts conveyed to his four sons certain lands in equal portions in fee simple. Three days after the. conveyance, the General Court of that Commonwealth made a law, by which it was enacted that all estates, which had been or which should be conveyed to two or more persons, should be deemed to be tenancies in common, unless it should be manifestly the intention of the alienor, that they should be jointenancies. The Supreme Court said, it was unnecessary to decide whether the words óf the conveyance created a jointenancy or a tenancy in common, because the statute had a retrospective effect, comprehended the conveyance, and made it a tenancy in common
All laws dividing towns; or altei'ing their limits; or altering the limits of parishes, deprive them of vested rights. The laws passed in this state, forbidding banks to issue bills payable at a future day — to order — or subject to any conditions — or payable at any other place than at the banks, whence they were issued, deprive them of vested rights. So also do those laws, passed by different states, that prohibit their issuing bills under certain denominations. Such laws are retrospective, but they are allowed to be constitutional.
It is alleged, that no vested right can be devested out of one and vested in another, without' the intervention of a court of justice. This position is not correct. — By a law made in February 1791,
These acts are alleged to be unconstitutional, because they
But what are the rights that have been taken from the trustees ? They have been deprived, it is said, of their right of visitation. That right never belonged to them. The Court have been told, that this College was a private charity; that Doctor Wheelock was its founder and visitor; and that he transferred his right of visitation to the trustees. It is believed, that not one of these positions is well founded.
This was not a private, but a publick charity. In order to determine to which class it belonged, we are not to consider, whether it was founded by the government or by an individual. The government may be the founder of a private charity; and an individual of a publick one. The rule, by which this is to be determined, was considered and established by Lord Hardwioke in the case of the Attorney General vs. Pearce
Suppose this was a private charity, who was its founder? It has been asserted that Dr. Wheelock was the founder, but the assertion is supported by no evidence. It is incumbent on the trustees to prove that he founded it, if they claim the right of visitation under him. It is not intended to detract from the merit of Dr. Wheelock by denying that he founded this charity. He is entitled to the highest praise, for his extraordinary exertions in procuring donations from various persons, in Europe and in this country, for the establishment of the College. The charter, probably in consequence of these exertions, calls him the founder. But this does not make him so. “ The first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and he who gives them is in law the founder ”
If Dr. Wheelock was the founder and visitor of the College, he did not transfer to the trustees the right of visitation. There are no words in the charter making them visitors. It is agreed, that no particular form of words was necessary to make them visitors, but there must be some words clearly showing that this was his intention. Where certain persons are appointed trustees or governoitrs, they are not necessarily visitors
It is alleged, that these acts have deprived the corporation of Dartmouth College of the franchise of subsisting as a corporate body; that they have destroyed it and created a new corporation in its place. Nothing can be more unfounded. It is true, the name of the corporation has been changed, b.ut that does not destroy it, nor affect its rights, its privileges, or its duties. The name of a corporation, like that of an individual, is a mere accident ; it is not of its essence. “ Where an alteration is made in the
It is urged, that to make any addition to the number of trustees was improper, because it was the intention of the donors, that the property given by them should be managed by twelve trustees and no more. This is not true, because the principal donations were made before it was known of what number the corporation would consist. When a man gives property for a particular object, he intends that it shall be applied to that object, but it is a matter of no importance to him, whether the application be made by twelve •trustees or by twenty.
The trustees allege, that the General Court attempted to compel them to act under an amended charter; and that they had no power to do it. Many cases have been cited on this point, but they only show, that the King cannot compel corporations to accept or act under amended charters, not that Parliament cannot compel them. The authority of Parliament, as every one knows, is much more extensive than that of the King. The King cannot grant to a corporation exclusive privileges, Parliament may; the King cannot dissolve a corporation, Parliament possesses the power. — Corporations in this state have frequently been compelled to act under amended charters. The cases of Pembroke, Strathain, and Newmarket, that have been mentioned, are examples, indeed this is always the case, where the limits of towns or parishes are altered. Banks, likewise, in the several instances that have been named, have been compelled to act under amended charters. But it is not true, that the General Court attempted to compel the trustees to act under an amended charter; they gave them permission to do it, but did not attempt to compel them.
It is objected, that these acts are repugnant to the thirty-seventh article in the bill of rights; whiph declares, that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government shall be kept separate and distinct. In passing these acts, it is said, that the General Court exercised judicial powers. It is not very easy to perceive, liow the alteration of the charter of a College is an exer
The case of Terrett & al. vs. Taylor & al.
In order to form a correct opinion of the justice of the complaint, made by the trustees, in relation to the taking of property given to the use of the institution, we should be careful not to confound the corporation with the members composing it. The law regards them as separate and distinct. The legal title to property, granted to a corporation does not vest in the corporators, but in the corporation itself, which is made capable of holding it as an individual. In whom was the legal title to this property before the passing of these acts? In the corporation of Dartmouth College. In whom is the legal titl.e now? In the same corporation existing under a different name. The legal title was in the corporation, while the beneficial. interest was in the publick. The trustees have not been deprived of tbe privilege of being members of the corporation. By these acts they were considered as mem
It has been repeatedly said, that if the trustees had conducted improperly, an information should have been filed, and their charter declared forfeited by the judgment of a court of law. Whether the General Court were induced to alter this charter, on account of any abuses of which the trustees had been guilty, is not now to be considered. It was sufficient that, in their judgment, it might be so amended, as to be better adapted to the end, for which it was formed. Abuses, however, might have taken place, by which no forfeiture would have been incurred. To file an information in the case of a private corporation may be proper; but, to do it, in the case of a publick corporation, like that of Dartmouth College, would be in the highest degree imprudent. Suppose the trustees had been guilty of great abuses of their trust, an information had been filed, and their charter had been declared forfeited, what would have been the consequence ? Would the trustees have lost any thing ? Not a cent. The publick, and not the trustees, would have been the sufferers. The publick would have lost all the benefit of the property, that had been given to promote the objects of the corporation. When the charter of a corporation is declared forfeited by the judgment of a court of law, the property given to it reverts to the donor or his heirs
It has been stated, that if the General Court can alter this charter, the corporation holds it at their mere will and pleasure. This is one side of the picture, let us view the other. If the Genera] Court cannot alter it, then the corporation may hold it in defiance of all human power. If this corporation was erected for the purpose of advancing the publick interest, there is a peculiar propriety in having its charter subject to the will of those, who are the guardians of that interest. This is far more proper than that a corporation, created entirely for the publick good, should hold its charter, as fixed and unalterable as the decrees of fate, although the publick good may loudly demand its amendment.
The legislature, it is urged, may abuse their power, and may, by an improper interference, discourage donations. But is there no danger that the corporation will discourage donations, by an abuse of its trust, if it may. claim to be independent of the legislature ? If it really possesses those rights and privileges, which are said by counsel to belong to it, donors can have no reasonable security that their bounty will not be misapplied.
In the first place, we are told, that the corporation is placed beyond the controul of the legislature. They have no authority
The counsel on the other side have expressed an opinion, that the legislature are a very improper body to superintend literary institutions. The people, when they formed their constitution, thought otherwise. By that instrument they declare “ That it shall be the duty of legislators, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and publick schools.” The people did not expect, that this would be done by donations merely, but by wise and salutary laws. It' is feared, that the legislature, under pretence of aiding these institutions, will deprive them of their property, or their most valuable rights and privileges. But no such danger is to be apprehended. If the property of a literary institution should be seized by the legislature, and appropriated to a use, different from that, for which it was designed; or if any oppressive laws should be passed, injuring and retarding its growth, there would be an universal burst of indignation throughout the state. Any legislature that should act in this manner would be considered as unworthy of confidence, and would lose their offices. The members of the legislature know this. Our frequent elections make them feel their dependence on the people, and keep them faithful to their duty. Most of them have children or friends to be educated at the seminary; they must, therefore, feel the strongest wishes for its prosperity. The interest of the legislature, as well as that of the publick, will become sentinels over the rights and' privileges of the corporation, and will protect them.
That a corporation, created for the sole purpose of promoting the publick interest, may be altered in such a manner as the pub-lick interest requires, is a principle as obvious to common sense as any that can be imagined.
When the important purposes, for which this corporation was erected, are taken into view, as well as the duty of the legislature in relation to them, no doubt can be entertained of their right to alter and amend the charter.
Civil government, like every other work of man, must be imperfect: the aids of religion are necessary to remedy its defects. Whatever may be the form of government adopted by a people, without morality they cannot be happy, But so feeble is the influence of laws and of political institutions on the morals of mankind, that no nation can be expected, without religion, to practice the duties which morality enjoins. It is justly remarked, that the duties of charity, benevolence, gratitude, and, indeed, all our duties of imperfect obligation, without the aids of religion, would remain undischarged. Human laws cannot enforce their performance. It is religion alone that, by meliorating the temper and dispositions of the heart, can lead to the discharge of these duties, so important to the happiness of society. It is this alone, that can prevent the commission of those secret offences, which human tribunals cannot know, and which, of course, they cannot punish. But these effects are not to be expected from those absurd systems of religion, that so long prevailed in the world; which allowed their votaries to indulge in licentiousness, and to trample every principle of morality under foot; which afforded a justification of every vice “by the example of some god.” Nor are they to be expected from those false and absurd systems that still prevail; which substitute trifling, superstitious observances in the place of genuine piety and moral
— The question to be discussed is whether, on the facts stated, the acts of the legislature of this state of the 27th of June, 18th and 26th of December 1816, are‘valid in law and binding on the trustees of Dartmouth College without their assent. I freely admit, that this is a question of mere constitutional right, and that it is not sufficient that the plaintiffs satisfy the court that those acts are impolitick, inexpedient and such as have no tendency “ to amend or improve the corporation of Dartmouth College.” To me, indeed, it appears, that the constitution of this literary seminary is made worse, not better, by these legislative provisions;
The ground taken by the defendants counsel on the former argument, and now, renders it necessary, in the first place to enquire, whether the acts in question, essentially alter the charter of 1769 ; or whether the alterations are to be regarded as immaterial.
Were it not for the suggestions which have fallen from the bench, at different times in the course of the argument, I should have thought, that on this part of our case, two opinions could hardly have been entertained.
The change of name is not in itself a matter of much consequence. But it is believed that this business of baptizing anew, individuals or corporate bodies, against their wills, by legislative acts, has not been usual.
But passing from the names of the two corporations let us look into their constitutions as settled by the charter and by the legislative acts.
As it respects the members, the charter declares their number shall be twelve and no more; the acts provide that the number shall be twenty-one. This is important. The trustees are not officers of the corporation but constituent members; the integral parts of the corporate body. Encreasing or diminishing these essentially alters the constitution of the corporation
The trustees named in the charter were appointed chiefly if not entirely, (according to the established usage in such cases)
By the charter all the powers of the corporation are vested in the twelve trustees. By the acts not only nine new members are added, but a board of overseers is constituted, consisting of twenty-five members appointed by the governour and council, with a negative, on all the important acts of the trustees: — and vacancies, in this latter body, are to be filled up, in all future time, by the governour and council; that is, this branch of the college government is perpetuated, not in the mode prescribed by the charter, by the government of the college, but by the government of the state.
The power to maintain perpetual succession, that is of electing members in the room of such as go off, is said to be necessarily and inseparably incident to a corporation:
As it respects the funds or corporate property, this was held by the twelve trustees chosen under the charter, clothed with the trusts declared in that instrument in strict conformity with the will of the donors. The acts transfer it to the trustees “ as consti
New powers are also conferred; and, what is much more material, new and different uses and trusts are created and declared: they (the new trustees) “have power to organize colleges in the university; to establish an institute and elect fellows and members thereof : to arrange, invest and employ the funds of the university,” which the same acts had just taken from the college. It will hardly be pretended that the trustees had authority to do any of these things ; if not, it seems to follow, that they alter and vary the original end and purpose of the institution
In exercising these powers, privileges and immunities and applying the funds, the new trustees are in most cases, subject to the controul of a .board of overseers, entirely the creature of the state. The acts in question farther give the governour and council the power, and make it their duty, “ to inspect the doings and proceedings of the corporation and of all the officers of the university whenever they deem it expedient; and to report their doings to the legislature — that they, I suppose, according to the memorial presented by the late president of the college — containing a “ surrender of all his official, civil and political rights,”
It is not apprehended that the acts are more catholic on the score of “ perfect freedom of religious opinion ” than the charter. The former indeed go a step farther, in making it compulsory on the trustees to accept donations, “ for the endowment of professorships of any sect, of the protestant Christian religion.” How far this provision, which has the merit of being entirely new, may contribute to advance the science of theology as a branch of academical instruction is not for me to conjecture. Experiments of this sort, professorships “ of all and any opinions ” had better, perhaps, have been first made in the new institute, a term broad enough to comprehend any thing and every thing. It seems a problem not yet solved, which is better — to have professorships “ of no particular religion; ” — “ of all sects in religion,” wrangling it out in the best way they can in the same seminary; — or professorships “of no religion.” The old way was to have professors of divinity leaving it to the trustees to elect.
The charter gave the trustees the power to appoint a treasurer and clerk, or secretary, and to remove them at pleasure. The defendant had been appointed to both these offices; but was removed from both and another appointed before the acts of
The same act, as a convenient mode of settling the question now before the court, (and the legislature were not then ignorant, that the old trustees had, by a solemn declaration refused their assent to the acts) subjected them, and the officers of the college, those appointed before as well as those appointed after the 27th of June 1816, to heavy penalties should they presume to exercise their offices, except under the new acts which they considered as unconstitutional and void. Their “ freedom of opinion ” consisted in the right of resigning — of surrendering, in humble imitation of their late president, their official rights, leaving it to the governour and council to appoint others in their room ; — or of becoming members of the new corporation against the dictates of their conscience — or of continuing to exercise the offices they then held, and as they believed constitutionally' held, at the hazard of incurring the threatened penalty.
Such was the enlightened policy and liberal views of the framers of these acts.
After this brief review of the constitution of this seminary as provided by the charter, arid by the acts in question, it can hardly be matter of surprise, that the independent members of the old board refused any connection with the new. None but independent members would have ventured on this course. But I confess it does seem strange to me, that any advocate should now be found, gravely to contend, that the acts have made no essential change in the corporation as constituted by the charter. They have changed the name, the number of members, the manner of their appointment, and of maintaining a perpetual succession; have created a board of overseers, chosen and to be perpetuated by the state, have divested the corporation of the property given it by the founders and other donors — have altered the uses for which it was given, and applied it to new uses and trusts: — have appointed an officer for the corporation and invested him with power to hold their property against their will. They have made a new constitution for this seminary.
It semes to make a necessary part of the defence- to this suit, that Dartmouth College has passed away — has no longer even a name to live. Its powers and all its property have been given to another corporate body, who are the real defendants. If the new corporation come in the place of the old, then the old no longer exists. If they exist for any purpose and with any rights, one would think, the new corporation have little interest in denying them their charter, common seal, and records : and yet the new corporation claim the right of converting these to their own use.— It is certainly true, that the old corporation has not been dissolved
I shall contend that, by the constitution of this state, these acts are not binding on the plaintiffs without their assent; — and that they violate the constitution of the United States.
To maintain these positions, it is not necessary that I should satisfy the court that all their provisions are unconstitutional. It is sufficient that any of them are so. The doctrine is well established,
Before we can determine, as to the validity of these acts it will be necessary to ascertain tlie true nature of tbis corporation, and to what class it belongs. Clearly, the legislature have more power over-some corporations than over others.
Corporations differ from each other in their constitution, powers, and objects or purposes of the association. But some things are incident to them all. A number of persons, I speak of corporations aggregate, are invested with a political character and personality,
But we have civil corporations, which bear a closer resemblance to those existing at common law, than the corporate bodies (if they may be so called) which have been just mentioned. I allude to our corporations for carrying on the business of banking — insurance — for making canals — turnpike roads — erecting bridges, &c. These are created for special purposes, which are*supposed to be beneficial to the state, and advantageous to the individual members, but which no way relate to the general rights or duties of citizens; or to the civil government of the state. In the case of a bank, for example, the members agree to raise from their private property a joint stock — they procure an act of incorporation, to enable them to manage this property more beneficially than could otherwise be done. When incorporated, the owners of this stock acquire new and distinct powers and privileges, in relation to this object: — these privileges are special, peculiar to the members, different from those enjoyed by the other citizens. — As the stock after the association and before the incorporation was private property, so it remains private property after the incorporation ; and the franchise or privilege of managing it as a corporate body, is peculiar to the stockholders, and of course is private property. This is therefore in every sense a private civil corporation. The corporation can claim and exercise this corporate franchise against the state, and that, on the score of compact, as long as it performs the conditions on which it was granted: — and it is the province of the courts of justice to judge between the corporation and the state, whether, these conditions have been performed or broken. The corporate property and the members of the corporation will of course be subject to the legislative, executive and judicial controul of tlie state as to every thing not relinquished by the state; or granted to the corporation by the charter. The legislature cannot infringe the grant they have made; they cannot re-create or organize anew the corporation, at their pleasure.
It may sometimes be a matter of difficulty to determine, how far the power of legislation may be extended in such cases. But it may be safely affirmed in general terms, that it cannot touch private corporate property or corporate rights, any more than it could the private property, or private rights of a natural person ;
Eleemosynary corporations are such as are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free alms, or bounty of the founder of them, to such persons as he has directed(
A corporation without any funds can hardly be called 'an eleemosynary corporation ; because there are no alms — free bounty— to be distributed.
When a number of individuals create a fund out of their private property to carry on any business for their advantage ; and procure an act of incorporation, the better to effectuate the object in view, this is not an eleemosynary, but a civil corporation. But if the same individuals should devote this fund to a charitable use, to heal the sick, educate the ignorant, or to improve the moral condition of their fellow men, and obtain an act, or charter, erecting them into an hospital, or free school; this would be a charitable institution, and the owners would, by tbe incorporation, acquire a new faculty, or power for the management, and application of this property to the use designated by them. Their right, as individuals, to ' the property thus dedicated would cease, and become vested in the same persons in their new character. The effect of the incorporation would be, to unite several wills into one will; and several persons into one artificial person, capable in law to hold, manage and apply this fund. So far the operation is the same in this, as in the case of a civil corporation. The difference is in the circumstance of the appropriation of this property to charitable uses — this appropriation is made by the individuals and not by the artificial person; so that the latter merely takes and holds, in an artificial capacity, what they before held, as natural persons, and to the same uses. Formerly, as individuals, they held the property dedicated to charitable uses; — now, they, in their corporate character, hold it to the same uses, and the law will enforce the perpetual execution of the uses.
The utility of the corporate character is manifest. It is the means of perpetuating' the appropriation, and of consolidating several wills into one. This creature of the law was provided, not for creating property, or devoting it to charity; but of enabling individuals to live forever, and to be always, of the same charitable mind. The powers conferred by the charter, or tacitly annexed by law, are just such as are wanted. They are to it, what the consti
In the case of civil corporations tbey are visitable by the judicial courts; that is, subject to the general and common laws of the land. There is no private person who can justly claim the right to correct their misbehavior, and decide their controversies
In early times tbe objects of the charity were generally incorporated. An individual gave property enough to maintain a certain number of instructors and students, and to procure the bnildings, books and accommodations necessary for tbe purpose of education. Without an incorporation it is obvious, that the institution could hardly be expected to outlive tbe generous individual wbo bestowed the property. There must be laws and regulations too, adapted to this little community. The corporation may be capable in law of holding tbe funds ; but there must be persons to manage and distribute them, and to interpret and execute the laws of the institution. As long as the donor or founder lives, he is himself the most proper person for these purposes: and accordingly, though the legal property was by bis consent transferred to the corporate body; yet tbe law vested these powers in him; or rather he is supposed not to have parted with these powers by the donation to a charitable use. Tbey remain in him. He lias of “ common right ” the very reasonable power to see that the property is rightly employed
These considerations, and such as these, satisfactorily account for the office of visitor, and show, that the right of visitation was created of necessity by the common law
We have seen the origin of visitatorial power and the necessity for a visitor. His powers and duties are well stated in the celebrated case of Philips and Bury
Where the king founds a college, this right of visitation very properly belongs to him
But all eleemosynary corporations are not constituted, in England, precisely in the manner which has been stated. Instead of incorporating the objects of the charity- — the persons who are to receive the benefit of it — trustees are sometimes incorporated, who are to dispose of it according to the will of the founder; that is, for the uses he has declared
At the first settlement of this country, few individuals were rich enough to found a college or any other charitable institution, alone: — And the law of visitation by the heir of the founder did not suit our law of descent. Accordingly, in our corporations of the eleemosynary kind, trustees are incorporated, and to them is committed both the funds and the visitatorial power. These trustees, by whatever name they are called, are generally the principal, and most respectable donors. It never occurred to our wise
From the nature of a charity constituted in this way it is manifest, that a visitor, as distinct from the trustees or governors, is not wanted: — “A visitor does not in such case arise by implication, but the trustees have that power”
In all this good, I had almost said divine, work of charity, it may be thought that I have taken too little notice of the king as acting for the nation. I do consider the real efficient parties to be, first of all, the founder or donors; then, in a case like this, the objects of their bounty — the persons to be educated as they come in succession on the stage. I consider the incorporation of trustees, as giving to them the legal and equitable property in the funds destined to the charity; and the charter as affording the most perfect evidence of the mind and will of the donor, that they should during life, that is forever, possess and exercise all his rights and powers as founder and visitor. At the same time I admit there must be another party, in the transaction; and that there can be no incorporation without the consent of the king or supreme power of the state. He may, if he pleases, leave individuals to administer their own charitable funds in tlieir own way, with no other means of continuing the property, than by endless conveyances from one to another; and no other power, of government over the institution, than what reason and a sense of moral obligation may supply. — If it were an object to discourage education, a disposition sometimes imputed to kings, he would undoubtedly take this course. I admit also that he has the power, and that it is his duty when applied to for a charter, to judge of the utility of the particular design in hand, and to make the best bargain he can with the charitable donors respecting tbe establishment. — Undoubtedly the terms of tire charter are matter of compact between these parties: — the general views of both must be the same, but each may judge for itself, as to tbe details.
In ancient times, these charters were very laconic, as mucb so, as the acts incorporating some of our towns.
I have been tbus particular, in stating my ideas of the nature of publick and private civil corporations, and the nature of charitable institutions in general, and of the rights and powers of tbe founder and of visitors in particular, from a belief, that it is all important to a correct decision of this cause: — without this we shall never
■ Let us now examine the constitution of Dartmouth College.
Its original funds arose altogether from the donations of individuals : principally obtained through the agency of Dr. Eleazer Wheelock. In no sense, and in no way can it be said, that they originated with the king or the publick. Not a Cent of money, or an acre of land was given by the province or any publick body, till long after the college went into operation. Who, that has the smallest acquaintance with the law of eleemosynary corporations, can read the charter and not perceive, that this corporation was considered by its framers, as eleemosynary ?
It speaks of the funds as private from beginning to end; — Dr. Eleazer Wheelock as the agent in procuring them; — treats him as the founder; — as requesting the charter; — suggesting its various provisions and nominating the trustees: — who can read it and then say, that this was not just what he would have it to be. It is just what the law says it ought to be; the creature of the founder or donors.
I have already said, and I repeat it, that in my poor judgment, it is an excellent one, and does great honour to the head and heart of its author.
The college was erected, and the trustees made a body politick with certain powers and privileges, particularly that of perpetuating themselves, to effectuate the charitable design of its donors. The incorporation, and, in this form, was a mean to that end.
Throughout the whole charter the corporation is treated as a private one, and as a party grantee, standing in the place and stead of the donors. In what part of this instrument do we find any evidence of a transfer of the property to the king or the publick ? It seems not a little absurd to talk of the grant of the privilege and power of managing the property, and governing the institution granted by the king to certain persons, having the power to perpetuate themselves, as powers and privileges granted, in any sense, to the king or the public. ' Suppose it had been intimated at the time of granting the charter that its effect and operation would be, to pass the property, and place it beyond the controul of the corporation: — that the king or his successors, even the republick, if its existence had been then foreseen, might, whenever they chose, become the governours of the institution, instead of Dr. Eleazer Wheelock, and the rest of the trustees ? there might indeed have been a college created — on paper; but it would have been like your university with its eighteen professorships, without professors— with its many colleges, its institutes and fellows, without funds, and without that confidence which, is able to procure them;—
'This charter gives the donors all the security, which a charter can give, that they shall have the administration of those funds-forever. They are vested in trustees “to be expended in the education and instruction of youth of the Indian tribes, in this land, and also of English youth, and any others.” All the powers, franchises, and immunities usually bestowed on colleges are granted,, and in terms irrevocably granted, to the trustees, named in the instrument.
The law then of eleemosynary corporations, so constituted in England, or in this country, the common law is the law of this-corporation. Whatever any charitable institution can claim to-hold, as to their property, offices, and corporate franchises against the king, the state, and all the world, this corporation can claim and hold. We are now in a court of law : and I need not say, that I speak of our legal rights. What arbitrary power can do, or attempt to do, is not the question : but can the legislature, by a legislative act change the constitution of this seminary, and new model it at their pleasure ? I contend they have no such power : because this is private property, both as it respects the funds, and the corporate franchises. Our opponents contend that this is, what they are pleased to call a publick corporation, created exclusively for the publick interest; and to make sure work of it, that even if the corporation be a private one, the legislature had the right of making the alterations they have made. I do not understand the defendant’s counsel as denying that there are in this country eleemosynary corporations. Nothing can be clearer than that Dartmouth College was of that description.
There are two respects, indeed in which charitable corporations, may, in a certain sense, be considered as publick or private. 1. The property may arise, and the endowment be made, by the king, in which case it is an institution of “royal foundation.” If the state found a college and endow it out of state property, this would, in respect of the foundation, be “ a publick institution.” And we freely admit, that where the state are the patrons of a college, they may justly claim the superintendence and government of it. Where the endowment is by an individual or individuals, in the same sense the institution is a private one. It will not be pretended that Dartmouth College, in this sense, is a publick institution. Though the state have given lands they were not the real founders. They were not the first benefactors, who, and who only, are considered as founders. These grants imply that the college was founded; and they are made on such terms
The number of the objects of the charity may affect the remedy to enforce the execution of a trust; but we deny that it all .affects the right of patronage; — the rights and powers of the founder or donors; or the visitatorial power. Property given in trust for an individual, or a small number of persons, is usually given to private trustees, who never become incorporated. They hold and manage it as private persons: and chancery compels the execution of the trust. When property is given to uses, it passes to cestui que use. There may be cases in this country, where the same thing would take place, in the 'case of property given in trust. There are also cases, where chancery cbmpels a conveyance of the legal estate to cestui que trust. But where the objects of the charity are not designated by the donor, devisor, or testator, but are to be selected by the trustees, at their discretion, chancery does not take the legal or equitable property from the trustee; but, leaving them in the exercise of the power and discretion bestowed, and confided in them, by the donor, &c.'superintends the execution of the trust — corrects all abuses, and sees that the beneficial uses are not disappointed.
But it is proper that we should confine our attention at present to the cases of charities incorporated. In the sense of “ extensiveness ” most eleemosynary corporations, and all colleges, whether the endowment were by the publick, or by private persons, are publick. The objects are many, and to be selected by the corporation, its governours or visitors. It is to be managed in an institution or society; — small, when - compared with the whole state, but large when compared with the objects of limited and special trusts, created in deeds, wills, &c. and where executors, or particular persons, are to execute them. It is manifest that such institutions, as colleges, must be managed by some disinterested and discreet person or persons. Hence originated corporations— the powers of founders, donors — the office and duty of visitor, &c. Now where are the cases, authorities or even dicta to be found, showing, that the “extensiveness” of .the charity affects the right of donors, founders, or trustees'supplying their places? — that if the charity is extensive, the right of patronage is lost; the king is patron, and may govern the institution, and visit it as a private founder does, and new-model its constitution at his pleasure? Where do we find a division of eleemosynary corporations into publick and private, and a different law for each? It seems incum
The opinion of lord Hardwicke, in the attorney general against Pierce
But what will our opponents do with lord Hardwicke’s case, of a devise to the poor of a parish, or a sum to bp disposed of among poor house-keepers ? — These are publick charities. Does the administration of these belong to the king or the state ? — -and can the legislature interfere in the superintendence and management of the funds, or in the selection of the objects ? The same remark would apply to lands given to a town for the use of the ministry or schools. Can the legislature change the trustees without the consent of the town, that is, of those, in whom the donor or testator has placed both the funds and his confidence ? Have the legislature the same supervision of these funds, as they have of publick money, publick officers, and the public property of the state ?
Philips and Bury was the case of a college. It was founded by a private, person (William Stapleton). The rector and fellows were made a body-politick; — and by the founder’s statutes, the bishop of Exeter and his successors were constituted visitors. The
C. J. Holt and the House of Lords were just as ignorant of this doctrine — of eleemosynary corporations devoted to publieh uses, being publieh corporations, and so subject to no visitation, but merely to the common law of the land, and in the court of king’s bench, — where, and where only, according to this doctrine, all misbehaviour of colleges must be enquired into, and redressed, and all their controversies decided. On the contrary, they held “ that the visitor’s authority was by the common law” — “ the founder having reposed in him so entire a confidence that he will administer justice impartially” — and in the government of the institution faithfully execute his intentions — “ that his determinations are final,” arid, under the circumstances of that case, “ examinable in no other court whatsoever”
O. J. Holt, in the same case
In another report of the same case
It has been stated here, and elsewhere, that acts of incorporation, ■of a similar nature to the present, have been frequently amended, and changed by the legislature; — for example, the boundaries of towns altered, — towns divided, &c.
If I am correct in what I have stated of the nature of our towns and other civil corporations for government, — such as regard the publick policy of the country, — the administration of justice,
But it has been much insisted on, that this corporation is a pub-lick one, and its funds, franchises and immunities have become publick, and so subject to legislative controul, — because the pub-lick, and not any particular individuals — whether trustees or others, — have exclusively the whole beneficial interest; and the legislature are the guardians of that interest; — The trustees are mere publick agents, and removable at pleasure, &c.
This claim of right seems to be founded, on the greatness of the gift. An individual bestows a sum, the income to be dispensed in charity, among some few individuals. This is a limited charity and the publick have no claim. But he enlarges the fund as his love for his fellow-men enlarges, — provides for a proportionate increase of the objects to participate in his bounty, — and to make the charity perpetual procures an artificial being to be created, with the right and power of dispensing it forever, according to his mind and will. — This operates as a transfer of the property to the state; and is a virtual repeal of the powers and privileges granted by law to him as patron and founder.
The state it is thought have a right to say to this generous individual, “ you intended this for us and and not for yourself: — why do you complain that we choose to manage it in our own way ? We know better what we want, and what will benefit us than you
This beneficial interest in the state, which is every thing, (if any thing like what is claimed,) — how is it to be enforced ? when violated, what is the remedy? — Would an action lie in the name of the state, against the corporation, to recover the college lands? And as to the government of the institution, could the state confer a degree in the arts ? (I admit their competence to judge of the qualifications of the candidates) — could they appoint, or remove, an officer of the college ? We admit the right of the judiciary to enforce the trusts, as far as courts have ever gone, or ought to go. But this concession avails the defendant nothing. Has the state no way of enforcing its rights but -by its legislative acts ? This proves that it has no such claim in law or justice. Every legal or equitable right has its remedy.
When the state asserts its claims to disputed rights by legislative acts, it is an admission that its claims will not bear examination.
Is it pretended that the state has the same estate and interest in the college lands and funds, as in the medical house ?
But the truth is, the right now claimed for the state, is a late discovery. Did the state of Vermont understand that this state made any such claim, when they (Vermont) made the liberal grant of lands, mentioned in the statement? Were those lands-granted for the exclusive benefit of New-Hampshire ? What act of this state, before 1816, asserts, or hints at, any such claim ?
In the act of 1789 granting lands to the college, the preamble states, “ that the institution had been and would be useful to mankind in general, and this state in particular,” the grant is, “ to the Trustees of Dartmouth College their successors and assigns forever, for the benefit of said college; ” — not for the benefit of New-Hampshire. It is well known, that colleges are intended, (and always are so administered) to be open to all; — no regard is had to state lines. Conditions were annexed to the grant, implying that without such conditions, the disposal of the avails of the grant was entirely with the trustees; — “that in the expenditure, and application of this, and all grants made by the state, the supreme executive magistrate and council should be incorporated with the trustees.” — -The grant of 1807 contains similar conditions, and declares a particular use, or trust in relation to the avails:— appropriating them “wholly and exclusively'''’ to assist the education of the indigent youth of this state. This was hardly generous as it respects Vermont. But the legislature had a right with respect to their own to be selfish. The trustees, in relation to the avails of this grant, are to be “responsible and subject to the direction of the legislature, for the faithful discharge of their trust relative thereto.” These conditions, the state had a right to annex to their grants, and when the grants were accepted, the conditions were binding on the trustees. But do not they clearly shew the sense of the legislature, as to their controul, — or rather want of controul, over the other funds, and the college government ?
This claim, in behalf of the legislature to pass the acts in question is just as destitute of matter of fact to support it, as, on the assumption of the fact, it is, of just reasoning, and of the authority of precedents.
The donations which constituted the college funds, the charter informs us, were made for the purpose of “christianizing the Indians,” and they were so applied for some time: afterwards additions were made to that object, and to “promote learning among the English,” and “be a means to supply a great number of churches with a learned, and orthodox ministry.” It appears then, that Dartmouth College was erected for the “ education and instruction of youth of the Indian tribes, in this land,” in all parts of learning, necessary for civilizing and christianizing the savages; and also of English youth and any others.” What interest then, had the province of New-Hampshire, in this institution, except, that it was located within its limits ?
Suppose the trustees, immediately after the founding of the college, had made an ordinance or law, (they had power to make such, as might tend to the good and wholesome government of the college, and to the publick benefit of the same, not excluding any person from free and equal liberty and advantage of education, on
What is the nature of the interest vested in the state ? The benefit of having a college erected within its borders: — This benefit would have been nearly, or quite- as great, if the location had been, on the western, instead of the eastern, bank of Connecticut river. Let it be admitted, that the people of this state derive a benefit from the college; what title does this confer ? Is there not-always a benefit accruing to the publick, from the useful employment of the faculties, and property of individuals ? Here the benefit is too extensive for the purpose of the defendants argument. If the legislature are guardians of any interest, it is that of the Indians in this land, and of the English youth. Who constituted them guardians of all these? — not the authors of this charity.- The legislature appointed themselves guardians. The truth is, the legal and equitable property is in the trustees, to be applied to Indians and others, in their discretion — in the.manner usual in colleges; — subject.to the controul and superintendence of the judicial courts. The donors might have established a college for the exclusive benefit of this province; but they did not. It is sufficient to say, their views were altogether different. And so have been the views of all men in this state till now.
But it is said the annulling of the college charter works no injury to the trustees. It is-a sufficient answer to say, that it hinders and prevents them from answering the end of their creation ; the end of their political being. — It takes from them the power of administering the property entrusted to them by the donors, whose representatives they are, according to their declared instructions. The rights of the trustees and visitors and governors have been stated and need not be here repeated. ■ Sitting in the chair of the founder, they have all the rights he -had. These rights are infringed, and they are hindered from performing their duties. They . are deprived of that controul over the property, and that power of inspecting and governing the institution which the law has wisely said, remains with the donors. The munificent Dr. Phillips, late of this place (Exeter), gave all his estate which was large, to charitable uses. He liberally endowed the academy here, which bear’s his name, for the education of youth; having no regard to town, or state lines, in the selection of objects. He procured a charter from the state, constituting himself, and his nominees
I know it has been objected to us, that our doctrine places this institution beyond all controul; — takes away all security, that the beneficial uses intended by the contributors and donors, will be enjoyed ; — is at variance with the just claims of the state, to cherish, and protect the interests of literature.
If these objections were founded in fact, it would go far to shew, that what I have stated, as the doctrine of the common law, cannot be correct, — or if it be the English common law, it is repealed by the revolution, and our free constitution, and of course is no longer binding.here. But how are the facts. We are so far from denying the right of the legislature, “to spread the advantages of education, through the various parts of the state; — to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and publick schools; — to encourage private and publick institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of the arts and sciences,” — that we hold these to be among its most important duties; — all of which are violated, by the acts in question : — These duties we believe to have been at all times, too much neglected, and by none more, than by the legislature of 1816, who in words, acknowledge their obligation and importance.
The legislature may erect an university, consisting of as many colleges as they please; and endow the institution and govern it in their own way: But are not at liberty to cherish the interests of literature, “by destroying or altering those erected, for the purpose, and endowed by munificent individuals. We hold, that the power here claimed for, and exercised by, the legislature, would effectually discourage, and prevent all charities of a permanent nature, founded by individuals.
We are so far from placing this institution above controul, that we claim for it the protection of the law, against what we consider, as a deadly blow aimed at its existence, by the persons exercising the supreme power of the state. And when, and by whom, has it ever been denied, that the institution, its administrators, property, and rights are all amenable to the law, and proper subjects of judicial enquiry? — that the judicial department of the government which can and ought to protect its rights, and redress its wrongs, is bound to enforce the performance of all its duties. On this subject, we have been explicit from the beginning.
An institution like this, unprotected by the judiciary, could not exist; and uncontrouled by the law, might be a nuisance, instead of a benefit. The charter may be repealed, for causes known to
As it respects the state, and the interest the publick have in all literary establishments, it is for the judiciary to protect these interests, and make them effectual: — to keep this corporation within the limits, prescribed by the charter, and the law of the land. If the trustees put a wrong construction on the charter, the constitution, or law of the state, or make statutes repugnant to these; the courts will correct the procedure; compel it to act up to the design of its founders, and to apply the corporate property forever, to the uses intended by them, and to no other; — to govern the institution according to its fundamental laws — just as the donors themselves would have done — as far as can be collected from their will expressed in the charter, and instruments of donation: to restrain all abuses of trust; — to protect every member, officer and student of the seminary in the enjoyment of his rights and privileges
And where the trustees or governours have, as they have in this case, not only the powers of government, but the legal estate, and are entrusted with the receipt of the rents and profits, it is clear, that with respect to these, they are considered as trustees, and are accountable for all breaches of trust.
Lord Commissioner Ashurst says,
On the subject of judicial controul over literary institutions, I need not be more particular, or refer to the cases. We admit it in the fullest extent to which it has been carried by the current of the authorities.
Respecting the legislative power over eleemosynary corporations, we believe it to be much the same, as that over private persons, and private property. The charter cannot be repealed by a legislative act. Nor can the legislature pass any acts altering the charter, or respecting the internal government or management of the affairs of the corporation, or in any way interfering with its special powers, and privileges, without its consent. But with the assent of the trustees, who represent the founder and donors an imperfect, or inconvenient oi’ganization, may be remedied; and such alterations made in the power of visitation, as it may be presumed the donors themselves would have desired. The act of this state of 1807 granting a tract of land to the college, very improperly restrains the grantees from alienating. This greatly reduces the value of the grant; and on application of the college, may be remedied. And generally, in the case of private corporations, as in the case of private persons, special acts may be passed, when the consent of all parties, having an interest is, obtained.
Experience has shewn, that there is no unwillingness in individuals, or private corporations, to apply for such acts. It is confidently believed, that such applications have been too frequently made. How unfounded then is the charge, that our doctrine places this institution above all controul?
We will now consider the remaining objection — that it gives no security for the enjoyment of the benefits intended; — no security against a total departure from the charitable purposes of the donors.
On this ground we cheerfully meet our .opponents. If the objection is well founded, it will certainly have some tendency to shew, that the law is not quite so wise, as we have represented it to be. The argument ab inconvenienti is a powerful argument to shew what the law is.
One, or ten individuals, (the number is immaterial) propose to dedicate property enough to found and endow a college for education. They fix on their plan. Obtain the sanction of the supreme
They themselves become incorporated, as trustees, to dispense the charity, and govern the institution. The case would be the same, if, by their consent, other persons should be incorporated as trustees. — The trustees have power to perpetuate themselves. The dedication to charity is irrevocable. The law takes the institution under its protection, and secures it all its rights, and compels it to perform all its duties.
Can any better mode be devised of continuing, beyond the limits assigned by the author of nature to the donors’ lives, the same charitable mind and views which was in them? Is not this the general sentiment of mankind ? — Are not our charitable corporations perpetuated in this way? The very liberal and highly respectable founders of the theological institution at Andover,, provided a set of visitors, with power to perpetuate themselves as the best mode of securing forever instruction in theology, in that way, they deemed the most scriptural and correct; — an object with them; and one, which our legislature have deemed every way' proper
Dr. Eleazer Wheelock certainly thought so. He represented, that for “many and weighty reasons,” it was expedient, that his friends should be of the incorporation proposed for Dartmouth College; — and, that as to the trustees in England, “it may be expected, that they will appoint successors in time to come, who will be of the same spirit with themselves; — whereby great good may, and will accrue, many ways, to the institution,” &c.
This expectation was a reasonable one, and has received the sanction of lord Loughborough’s powerful mind
The power of holding the property, applying it, and inspecting and governing the institution, must be lodged somewhere. The parent, anxious for the welfare of his offspring, has devised this, as the best mode of effectuating his intentions, in all time to come. If he has not devised the best mode; — if, confiding the power of filling vacancies to the governour and council of the state would be more likely to secure the appointment of men, of the same spirit with the founder; still the founder has a right to judge for himself, and it is not with a very good grace, that we, claiming the benefit of the bounty, should undertake to be wiser than our benefactor, or quarrel with the terms of his gift.
It is not my intention to call in question the fitness of the legislature for the exercise of the powers confided to them by the constitution. But it is my doctrine, that they have no power to change the constitution of this seminary without its consent, or to exercise any visitatorial power over it. Why should they have this power ? Is it conferred by the clause, which makes it their
If there is any reliance to be placed on the opinions of learned men, fortified by our own experience, no body of men can be imagined every way worse qualified for the exercise of the powers now claimed for the legislature. Some of our most experienced statesmen, while they tell us that this department is much disposed to extend the sphere of its activity, and draw all power into its impetuous vortex, represent it, from its want of capacity for deliberation, — from passion — and from other causes, as exposed to the intrigues of executive magistrates; — its policy as fluctuating
It is not necessary for my present purpose that I should adopt the sentiments quoted in their fullest extent. — But after having made these quotations it is but justice to our legislature, to declare my belief that in exercising their powers, they have been in general, as correct as their neighbours. The evil lies in the nature of the body, and its total unfitness for this work; — and its liability to be drawn in, by interested individuals to act out of its proper sphere.
We have shewn how abuses of trust may be corrected, when the revenues and government are in the hands of the corporation : and, I think, have shewn that in the exercise of the powers now claimed for the legislature, there may be abuses. Let our opponents shew how these can be corrected. — Who shall visit the legislature ? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Philip the Second of Spain, husband of Queen Mary, had a mind to be appointed Regent of England, (all for the good of the English nation no doubt) during the minority of the child of which the queen was supposed to be pregnant;' — and offered to parliament security, to resign the regency, on the child’s coming of age. It was nearly carried in the house of peers, when lord Paget stood up and said, “Pray my lords who shall sue the king’s bond should he happen not to resign.”
If I have succeeded in any degree in my attempts to shew, that Dartmouth College is to be regarded as a private corporation,— its property and franchises private, — subject to the same judicial and legislative controul, as individuals and their property, and to no other; — and that the circumstance of the appropriation of the property to the use of a college, founded and governed like this, no way alters the case; it will not be a difficult task to shew, that the acts in question violate the constitution of the state.
As it respects the charitable fund, the acts take it from the holders without their consent. The 2d article of the bill of rights gave the plaintiffs “the right of acquiring, possessing and protecting ” this fund, and the law gave them the power, and made it their duty to apply it to such uses, as the donors had declared. The 12th article declares that “every member of the community
As it respects the corporate franchises, I contend that these come under the denomination of property. The plaintiffs have an incorporeal property in their membership, franchises, and privileges; These have been wrested from them, and have been bestowed upon others. If this act of violence had been committed by an individual, the plaintiffs by the 14th article of the bill of rights, would have been entitled “to their certain remedy by having recourse to the laws' — to obtain right and justice, conformably to the laws.” But here the injury is done by tlie legislature, under the form of legislative acts, and under colour of law : Bnt this violation of the plaintiffs rights is not the less an injury on that account.
The fifteenth article declares, that “no subject shall be despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges but by the judgment of his peers, or the laiv of the land:" — which surely means in this place the same law which governs subjects in general : and not a statute or law which itself inflicts the injury, and does the act forbidden. Such a doctrine seems absurd. To be deprived of property by the “judgment of one’s peers, or the law of the land,” is the same thing as to be deprived by due process of law.
It is admitted, that the plaintiffs, both as a body politick, and as individual members, like all other corporations, and members, are liable to be deprived of their corporate property, and franchises, for causes known to the law. If these acts ‘of the legislature, are attempted to be justified on the ground of forfeiture incurred by the plaintiffs; —still, they violate the constitution; because the forfeiture without which there can be no deprivation has not been ascertained in some “ due course of law ”
In the case at bar the acts are a legislative sentence of deprivation, accompanied by a writ of seizin, in favour of the university, to put the party into possession of the property; — and a bill of pains and penalties, to put the trustees out of their offices.
If the state suffered an injury by the plaintiffs’ claiming to exercise their corporate franchises; or by their violating their trust, the law was open, equally to the state, as to its citizens.' If this corporation is so constituted, and it’s monarchical tendencies are such, as to disseminate poison among the citizens of our republick, — if this institution be the monster, we have heard of, 'which devours all charities, and converts even charity herself, into stone, the sooner the charter is repealed the better.
I do not admit that complaints of this kind, (if any such have been made) are any thing more than evidence that a “ controversy ” existed between the state, and this learned seminary, concerning “ rights ” and “ property ” claimed by the one, and denied by the other: and does not the 20th article of the bill of rights “secure” to the smaller body, in this controversy, “the right to a trial, by jury?” Does this article only embrace individuals and private corporations, leaving the state the more powerful party, the right of trying their own causes, of obtaining redress for all the injuries done them, not “in due course of law,” but by their own act, finding at once both the fact and the law. I hope the time will never come when such doctrines will be popular. If they ever receive any countenance, in our government, from any of its great departments, it will behove' us in future, to speak more respectfully of other governments, even of that of Turkey, than
Our constitution declares
If there is any thing established by our constitution, it is that the legislative department of our government should abstain from the exercise of judicial power, as every way totally incompetent to the task. It is not merely the 37th article of the bill of rights which prohibits it, — the whole constitution forbids it. Remove the restraint on the legislature to exercise judicial power, and your constitution is not worth what the parchment on which it is enrolled cost
The acts in question violate the 23d article of our bill of rights ; because they take away vested rights, — acquired under existing kiws; — take from one set of men, and give to another. This article says, “ no retrospective laws shall be made, for the decision of civil causes.” These acts were made for the decision of this cause. They decide the plaintiffs’ rights, and if valid, they are conclusive against one party and in favour of the other. Lay them aside, and where is the defence ?
But acts of the legislature have been mentioned, as equally affecting private property, and private corporations, with those in question ; — such as acts restraining banks from issuing notes payable at any other place than the bank from which they issued, &c. &c. T do not feel myself called upon, to vindicate the constitutionality of any act of the legislature, on this occasion. — If unconstitutional acts have been passed, and have been submitted to, it may be some apology, but no defence of the acts in question. But, for my own part, I am not disposed to condemn general acts of legislation, laying down a rule for all banks, as well as for all individuals, as to the form of notes or bills. Individuals are restrained
I cannot give my assent to tbe doctrine, which seems to be contended for by the defendant’s counsel; — that the legislature have a right to alter the charter of a private corporation, whenever the publick good — the welfare of the community, in their opinion requires it: — to deprive it of its rights, for the good of the many. The principle is broad enough for this case. But I deny the principle.
It was the ground taken in the British parliament, in favour of the bill of pains and penalties, respecting the south-sea company, about a century ago. The act took from the company their property, — imprisoned some of the directors, and compelled them to pay certain sums, out of thein private funds. — Could our legislature so deal with our banks which refuse payment, and thereby defraud the publick.
If the principle now contended for be a sound one, it is not easy to see the use of a written constitution, defining and professing to establish private rights; — and then leaving them at tbe .mercy of the legislature. — -Will they be at a loss to find good reason for passing any bill ? — tbe corporation has abused its privileges ; — its constitution, emanated from royalty ; — it is necessary to enlarge and improve its charter, and render the government of the college more dependent on those, who are honoured with the confidence of the people, and of course, well qualified to preside over their literary as well as civil concerns. The charter of Massachusetts was taken away because it was not a good one; — and its powers had been abused. — These acts (it ma}r be said') were not intended “ to destroy, but to reform.” — So said Sir Robert Sawyer on the quo warranto against the city of London,- — -“to prune off those exorbitances of power which the city magistrates had assumed.” It has been asked, shall the good of the many be sacrificed to the few? Has not the state as deep an interest in the prosperity of the college as the trustees ? In the case of the city of London, it was asked, is a corporation once constituted, forever out of the reach of the common law ? — so here, — is this royal charter beyond the controul of the sovereign power of the state, vested in the legislature, — bound to promote the publick good?
The framers of our constitution, and the people who ratified it, seem to have entertained the opinion, that the people in tlieir capacity of sovereign should declare some rights, fix some principles, and place them beyond the controul of any and every department of the government. — Now the doctrine contended for, removes all barriers out of the way of the legislature. If they have-the right to pass all laws ¡mblick and private, general and special, which the publiek good requires, what power has the judiciary to declare any law unconstitutional? Would not this be making the legislature subordinate to the judiciary ? A doctrine which I totally deny. In the same sense, that the publiek good requires, the new modelling of Dartmouth College, it may require all or any part of the private property of any bank or individual. No arguments have been addressed to the court shewing, wherein the publiek good required these acts.' — They stand on the sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro rationevoluntas.
No one can justly charge me with want of respect for British precedents. I consider the respect shewn by parliament, in modern times, to private rights, and the extreme caution with which they are guarded by that assembly, as entitled to the highest praise, and every way worthy of our imitation. — There has been, and still is, much ground of complaint with us on this head. But still parliament may pass many acts, which our legislature are prohibited from passing. It can pass ex post facto latvs, in the worst sense of the term. — Bills of attainder — as often perhaps, condemning the innocent as the guilty, and always attended with confiscation of property, are not forbidden. Is it to be presumed that the parliaments passing such iniquitous bills, did not contain on their rolls the names of many great and good men ? — and that the advocates for these special acts had nothing to say about the publiek yood? Such acts are always defended on the ground that the publiek safety — a much higher consideration than the publiek good —demands the enactment. It is in the exercise of the same authority, that parliament can dissolve all corporations. So it can declare authoritatively what is, and what shall be truth, and what heresy in matters of religion; and can, if it pleases, provide for the purification of religion by burning all heretics. So that Sir Edward Coke, is abundantly justified in saying, that parliament has despotickpower.
Precedents drawn from the English parliament in troublesome times, or any other assembly of legislators or judges in such times, are about as good authority here, at this day, as the decisions in
The defendant’s counsel seem aware that the right claimed for the legislature, to take away the property and privileges of private corporations is liable to be abused; and therefore agree, that it ought never to be exercised but for the strongest and most important reasons. This restriction promises something on paper: but what is its practical utility ? Who shall judge of the weight and importance of the reasons?- — Not the judiciary surely; — and not the party to be affected by the measure. If the legislature judge amiss there .is no remedy.
The mischief here arises from the principle which concedes to the legislature a power altogether indefinite, or in other words, despotick. Is there a government in the world which would hesitate to acknowledge the obligation of such a principle f
But extreme caution in dealing with these plaintiffs seems not to be required, because the interest of the legislature and the trustee's are said to be the same. But I hope it has been satisfactorily shewn, that this is by no means the case. — Have the legislature of New-Hampshire no inducement to apply the funds raised from contributions from without as well as within the state, (it would be invidious to state the proportions accruing from each source) exclusively to our own citizens ? And if they should do so, who shall correct the procedure ?
At present they have contented themselves with taking the property from the men to whom the donors entrusted it, and giving it to a corporate body created by themselves, adding to the uses (I suppose on account of the greatness of the funds) other colleges, an institute, &c. They have not diverted the funds from literature. But what they have done, is an assertion of the right to do what they please with them. I am by no means convinced from any thing which I have heard, that the dependence of the legislature on the people would be a sufficient check to an entire misapplication of the funds. What prevents the people, for example, from preferring the institute proposed, to our old fashioned colleges ? They may, possibly, like it the better for not knowing precisely what it is ; and yet. their ideas on this subject may be as distinct as those of the majority of the legislature.
I know that courts of chancery have a controuling power over all charitable institutions. But our legislature seem to have no disposition to provide for the erection of such courts: and it seems to be intimated that, till we have such, the legislature themselves may rightly exercise chancery powers. I admit they are as well qualified for chancellors as for common law judges.
We have heard it gravely stated,- as a reason for the interference of the legislature in this case, that literary institutions are subject to decay; that the charter of our college was granted
If Dartmouth College has suffered in its constitution from “ decay ” it is certainly not the effect of old age; and as little to be ascribed to the corrupting influence of ease, leisure or wealth.
From the same quarter it has been intimated that much good would result to this seminary and to the publick from governmental. checks on its officers and affairs. I am not a convert to these opinions. As there is no royal road to science so there is no such republican road. The best road is that which has been marked out and trodden by learned men; those who are themselves proficients in science, not sciolists and mere pretenders to learning. And the best reliance for funds is on munificent individuals, men who have wealth to bestow and hearts to bestow it; —to found colleges, and really to improve the literary seminaries we have.
It is the duty of the legislature by all fitting ways and means to encourage such men to give; and the most effectual will be honestly and sacredly to respect the rights, privileges and immunities of the seminaries they" endow. The state should do all she can; but her best gifts to her colleges will always be, not a code of laws but lands or monies. For myself, I do not wish to see the time when the government of this or any other literary institution (always excepting perhaps the institute) shall be closely connected with the government of the state. Changes in the latter, if not desirable, are always to be expected; permanence in the former is every way important. There is besides something in political men generally speaking, which unfits them for the management of an academical institution, orto be useful fellow-workers with instructors of youth. I do not say that such alliance is as bad as that between church and state ; but it is somewhat like it. I had rather see government stand neuter, content itself with seeing fair play between the friends and patrons of learning and its foes, than to take upon itself to prescribe systems of education, elect the professors and officers and regulate the interiour of colleges as its caprice may direct.
It only remains to consider whether the legislative acts in question violate the constitution of the United States. Is the charter a contract within the meaning of that constitution ? If it be, I trust, I need not add any thing to the observations which have been made, showing that its obligation has been impaired.
It has been my endeavour to shew that when property is given to a charity of this kind, the owners, as founders or donors retain
This was a good contract on both sides. The original' donors have no doubt already received their reward. The trustees, till this unlooked for intrusion by the state were enjoying the satisfac
It is too laté for the king to quarrel with the terms. — He never did. No complaint was made till 1816. What claim have the state now to the funds or the controul over the institution, except that they prefer the absolute property to the benefit secured by the charter? — And what sort of title is this, in a court of law or equity? — And what should we think of an individual who should assert it ? The privileges granted were such, and such only, as the experience of centuries had demonstrated to be proper and safe.
Was the king deceived in this grant ? Who practised the deception ; and in what does it consist ?
Does this compact bear any resemblance to that which may be supposed in the formation of a county, town, &c. ? Here, private property is given for certain purposes, and on certain terms and conditions ; and in return, certain franchises are bestowed.
We have seen that our law regards grants of corporate privileges for the holding and managing property from which the publick derive a great benefit as a compact
It is difficult to imagine a reason, why compacts of this sort should not be entitled to the protection of the constitution of the United States. A state may contract
I know it has been said, that the annulling of this charter deprives the plaintiffs of no valuable estate or interest. The whole beneficial use was in the state. In this view the charter is a mere appropriation of the funds by the king, not by the donors, — to the use of a college, which he was pleased to call Dartmouth College; — the charter was the sole act of the king; — there was but one party;— the king, consequently may change it, though drawn up in .solemn form, as men change their last wills though in the name of God amen. — The donors parted with all their property; and Dr. Eleazer Wheelock (from his great love, I suppose, for monarchy,) gave all to his majesty, who was then graciously pleased of his own special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, with these funds to constitute and endow a college; — and for the present place it under the administration of certain persons, as his agents — publick agents
If the state have no legal or equitable estate in these funds and in this charter, its franchises and privileges, then this objection entirely falls to the ground. The truth is the trustees, as a body politick, are the legal and equitable owners of the property and of the franchises conferred by the charter : — as long as they hold and apply the one, and use the other according to law, their property is sacred and ought to be protected from legislative, as well as every other violation.
That the plaintiffs hold the funds for others (certainly, if the state be not those others) no way affects the plaintiffs’ right to claim the benefit of the compact formed by the charter, unimpaired.
I do not think that authorities are needed on this part of our case. In Fletcher vs. Peck
The legislature of New-Hampshire have, in effect, determined that the grant of the privilege to make a canal, &c. is a compact
In New-Jersey vs. Wilson
In Terret vs. Taylor
In Pawlet vs. Clarke
No authorities have been cited which militate with the principles recognized and established by these cases nor any arguments adduced, which seem to require a particular consideration.
Though I do not think the arguments of the defendant’s counsel •sound, yet I have too much respect for those who urged them to adopt the language of lord Coke, in the case of Sutton’s hospi
I am sensible much might be added to illustrate and enforce this and the former heads. But as the court are fully apprized of the general principles on which we contend the acts of the legislature in question are impeached, 1 forbear further detail.
In advocating this cause, I have not for a moment been relieved from a most oppressive sense of its importance, — to the literary institution whose rights have been prostrated, and to all our charitable establishments for the promotion of religion or literature: the cause of one is the cause of all. I might have declined the duty of an advocate: but I have felt myself impelled by a solemn sense of duty, — the duty which every citizen owes his country, to make every exertion in my power to maintain and defend the constitution against all violations, from what quarter soever they may proceed. The plaintiffs have discharged a necessary duty on their part, — that of bringing this cause where relief can be obtained. Nothing remains, but to expect that impartial judgment which the law is bound to pronounce on the facts of the case.
— However arduous may be the duties which devolve upon the defendants’ counsel in this case, I rejoice that we have not here to encounter all those difficulties which, from the publick excitement, appear to have burthened the publick mind.
The hopes, fears and interests of those, who partake of the feelings of the partie’s in this action, may present many difficulties to their coming to a proper decision ; but none of those obstacles lie in the path of the court. — Many circumstances at this moment call us to rejoice, that the breath of faction, whatever tempests it may raise upon the surface, can never disturb the serenity of the atmosphere that surrounds their elevation — that whatever may be others’ feelings and passions, our system of government has given us a tribunal, which in all judicial proceedings may look with perfect unconcern upon “this noisy babel earth, nor feel its giddy whirl.” .
From the course that has been adopted by the defendant in this action, it is perfectly apparent he lias no objection that the plaintiffs should investigate, however informally they may come to it, every part of the ground upon which he stands, for had he felt any want of confidence, he could, without any lack of courtesy, have stopped them in this prosecution at its very threshold. That the name of a corporation may be altered with or without their consent, and by a power much inferior to our legislature, would not be contested even by the most undoubting disciple of .the modern
Should the plaintiffs, on a plea in abatement, have amended their writ and taken the unwelcome name of the amended charter, even then, without a further extension of courtesy by the defendant, their action must have failed; — for whatever be the final decision on the validity of the law, the defendant, detaining the articles sued for as an officer in the discharge of a publick duty under that law, could not be found guilty of a conversion to his own use in this form of action
[The Chief Justice here observed that although inclined to the opinion that this was not the proper form of action, yet he understood that point to be waived by the parties.]
The, defendant, sir, does most cheerfully waive this and every exception in point of form, with a desire to accelerate the plaintiffs’ progress to the temple of justice, believing they will the sooner find there the inscription to themselves of mene telcel upon its walls.- — -The plaintiffs, however, having been thus careless in their process, it may perhaps excite less surprise, should they be found sometimes inaccurate in their principles, and not always infallible in the application of them.
The question is understood to be upon the validity of the acts of the legislature of New-Hampshire of June 27, 1816, entitled “An ' act to amend the charter and enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College ”
The defendant does not introduce to the present discussions the additional act of Dec. 26, 1816
The imperfect manner in which our remarks may be offered in answer to the plaintiffs’ learned counsel, it is hoped, will find a sufficient apology in the disadvantageous circumstances under which we appear. — A recurrence to books, to principles, to reason, could give no very certain indications of the objections to be raised against these acts of the Legislature. Those objections, as we apprehend, resting principally in the subtle ingenuity of the learned counsel could not, by our feeble efforts, have been anticipated. — And since they were but yesterday communicated to the court with the splendor of learning' and depth of logick common
I cannot say that I follow precisely the order or form of their objections to these legislative acts, but believe that their arguments were directed to the support of the following general positions—
That the legislative acts in question are contrary to the principles of natural justice.
That corporations of this nature are independent of legislative control.
That the provisions of these acts violate the constitutions of NewITampshire and of the United States.
This court unquestionably have the power, and cases may exist in which it shall become their duty, to declare acts of the legislature void; but this power or duty by no means demand of them an indiscriminate warfare against all Legislative acts which may or may not be of doubtful expediency. — It is a power evidently not to be exercised for slight reasons, — “Admitting such a power in the judiciary,” says judge Thompson, “ it ought to be exercised with great caution and circumspection ”
Whatever opinion the justices of this court in the character pf legislators might have entertained of the policy or expediency of these acts, sitting as a judicial tribunal, their only enquiry can be whether the legislature, had power to pass such acts, and not as to the wisdom of the exercise of it. — Though were it proper here to enter upon such enquiry, I have no apprehension that the legislature would suffer by the investigation. Notwithstanding the severity of remark which one of the learned counsel has been pleased to indulge upon that part of our system, we have no doubt it will continue to be held in high consideration. And it is believed that the court will not refuse a proper respect to an opinion expressed in the form of a law by the other two branches of government — a law, which to become such, must after due deliberation have passed the house of representatives, have passed the senate, and been approved by the chief executive magistrate of the state. “ With such a weight of prima facie evidence in favor of these laws ” (said judge Thompson in Livingston vs. Van Ingen) “ I should not have the boldness to pronounce them void, without the most clear, satisfactory and'unanswerable reasons
I. The plaintiffs’ first position that the acts in question are contrao’y to the po-inciples of natural justice is certainly a very broad and indefinite one.
“ The ideas of natural justice ” (says a learned judge)
He asks no aid for injustice—no protection by acts of the legislature, unless they are equitable in principles as well as legal in their operation. As an investigation, however, of the expediency and propriety of the legislature’s passing the particular acts,,in question would open a wide field for discussion, which would at once manifest the irrelevancy of such an enquiry before a judicial tribunal, we shall forbear to dwell upon, or even to notice the facts and circumstances which not only justified but deonanded the passing of the acts in question; and shall consider that point to be settled by the acts themselves, unless upon the face of them some-thin!? aimear to rebut that strone vo'ima facie evidence.
In support of their first position, the plaintiff’s counsel say that these acts of the legislature destroy the old, create a new coiporation and traoisfer to it the property of the former.
Here we protest against imputing to the acts of the legislature any consequences which result from the plaintiffs’ opposition to and violation of those acts. If by opposing they have forfeited any office or place they held by the law, let not the law be made accountable for the effect of their transgressions. As well might the tenants of our State Prison reproach the statute book for the consequences of their crimes.
The title and preamble of the acts certainly do not exhibit proofs of any such design as the plaintiffs impute to them ; but to enlarge and improve the charter of this institution; and in the opinion of the legislature, who in this case can have no other interest than that of the publick, to render it more extensively useful. The object here announced is certainly a laudable one, and no doubt, we shall be able to shew, is within the power and duty of the legislature. The first section of the act of June 27 changes the name from College to University, — increases the number of trustees from twelve to twenty-one; their authority is more detailed, but not extended to any object beyond that of the original design of the institution, nor are the funds diverted to any new purpose. By the second section a board of overseers is constituted. The third, fourth, and fifth section prescribe some additional duties to the offices of president &c. The sixth section provides for the appointment of the additional trustees and for filling the vacancies, until a meeting of the board, by the governour and council. The other parts of this and the two subsequent sections extend merely to the meetings, inspection of the records, oath of allegiance and freedom of religious opinions. The first section of the act of Dec. 18, provides for calling a meeting of the trustees in consequence of a quorum not having assembled at the annual meeting and for filling of vacancies which had happened since that time. The second section provides that nine may form a quorum for business &c., and the third enacts that the trustees shall make and subscribe the oath of office.
In which of these sections then, have the plaintiffs discovered all this mischief ? Is it that which abolishes the oath of allegiance to the king of Great-Britain, and substitutes an oath to support the constitution of the United States? or the section which, conformably to that constitution, guarantees freedom of religious opinion ? If any of their number were born subjects of the king of Great-Britain, and adhere to the doctrine that a subject cannot expatriate himself, then may they insist at least in argument, that the principles of natural justice are violated in compelling them to swear against the allegiance to which nature had bound them.
How have these acts destroyed the corporation? Is it destroyed by the change of name ? What hecatombs then are annually sacrificed by legislative acts, passed for the alteration of names. — But that the corporation with a new name remains the same in all its rights, duties and privileges is most incontrovertibly settled in the cases of Colchester vs. Seaber
Has the addition to the number of corporators abolished the-corporation, or in the language of the plaintiffs “ confiscated their property?” As this point must be more particularly noticed in our consideration of the private rights claimed by the plaintiffs under their constitutional objections, we shall leave it for the present upon the opinion of the court cited from the 3 Term Rep. 241 — which supports this power as exercised by the Crown alone, and that too in a case where the corporators had personal interest in the corporate property. Lord Kenyon observed “ by the new charter, the king did not consider the old corporation dissolved to all purposes, but he granted those rights to a new set of men, and superadded such other powers as he deemed necessary,” to which justice Ashurst adds “as to there being here a dissent of a majority of the old members I lay no stress upon it.” And as though this case had been before him, he observes “ here the members of the old corporation have no injury or injustice to complain of, for they are all included in the new charter of incorporation, and if any of them do not become members of the new corporation but refuse to accept, it is their own fault. — But at any rate, whether they refuse or accept it does not affect the right of the Crown.” In the case of Colchester vs. Seaber before cited, when it was urged that the new charter had created a distinct corporation from the old one, lord Mansfield said, that “ without an express authority so strong as not to be gotten over with, we ought not to determine a case so much against reason.” In this case it is apparent there was no intention of the legislature to create a new corporation or to destroy the old one- — -and we apprehend no point can be settled by decided cases unless this is, that the old corporation is not destroyed or a new one created by the change of name or addition to the number of corporators. — It of course becomes unnecessary here to follow the plaintiffs’ counsel in the great latitude of remark upon the consequences of these acts, predicated upon the assumption that they dissolve the old and create a new independent corporation. — An assumption unsupported by fact or law.
II. But, say the plaintiffs, corporations of this nature are independent of legislative controul. — And any interference, however harmless in itself is illegal.
Let us a moment look at the nature of corporations, and of legislative powers with reference to them and the general practice upon this subject. What is the charm or magick in the word corporation, that all other moral and civil liabilities and duties should be merged in the privileges of its members ? Does it result from the form or solemnity of their origin ? Speaking of the duties of individuals as members of civil societies, Kyd observes
Other corporations we may observe, which are established principally for publick purposes, but in which individuals as members may have a beneficial interest, but no estate of inheritance. Such are the incorporations of school districts, parishes, towns, cities and counties, where as members or inhabitants they may have corporate property or privileges, such as benefits from the corporate funds,' rights of common, &c.
In another division may be included those corporations for the appropriation of alms to purposes of a private nature; as to the poor of a particular parish, &c. The interest exists here in individuals, but usually not in the corporators who hold it in trust for those to whom it is appointed.
In a still more comprehensive class, may be embraced those corporations which are purely of a publish nature. The commonwealth may name individuals as corporators to perpetuate a corporate succession, the better to carry into effect objects of publick importance, and with no design to grant emoluments, or exclusive personal privileges to the individuals. If individuals acquire by such publick acts any personal advantage it must like other privileges incidental to publick laws yield to such modification as their principal design requires. Such are the universities in England, and institutions of a similar nature in this country. They are of a civil nature as they directly affect the welfare and prosperity of government, and as was observed in the argument of Phillips vs. Bury
But whatever interest the publick may have in- such institutions, and whatever necessity may exist for their reform and improve
It may here be generally observed, that unless the legislative power can remedy defects in the original charter establishing such institutions, no remedy can be applied; for whatever authority the courts of chancery or King’s bench can exercise, must be confined to the existing statutes, and can make no provision to guard against evils in future or to secure advantages not already provided for
In speaking of legislative power without reference to the restrictions of our constitution (which we shall presently consider) we could not have expected to hear the plaintiffs attempt upon English principles to support the position that it is inadequate to the correction or amendment of existing laws or charters. The undisputed text book of the English law in its comments upon the legislative .power of Great-Britain is in this language: — “ It hath sovereign and uncontroulable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil or military, maritime or criminal.” — “All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of laws are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal
It may be my misfortune not to have better understood the object of that part of the gentleman’s argument in which he dwelt with so much eloquence upon the weakness and wickedness of our legislature. Whether it were intended to prove that no legislative power exists in our government or to shew the impropriety of that power being exercised by our general court, the force of it was equally lost upon my unbelief. — Our legislature (said the gentlemen) are illiterate, are ignorant, and “he cannot tell whether their language is of the English or Indian tongue.” — “ They are subject to passions and may be influenced by intrigue.”' — ■“ Majorities are always wrong.” — If these things be so, it is to be regretted that all the candour and reason of that part of the gentleman’s argument should be lost upon a tribunal who have not power peaceably to change our form of government, and who probably cannot be persuaded to recommend rebellion. But from such gloomy reflections let us have a moment’s relief in a specimen of that logiclc by which these misdemeanours are proved upon the legislature. “ if ” (said the gentleman) “certain individuals without authority had taken possession of the college buildings, they would have been guilty of trespass.' — The legislature passed an act, in the execution of which they became authorized to take possession; therefore the legislature are trespassers, &c. — Had a similar mode of reasoning been
Again for the task he has assigned to us — After admitting that the king of Great Britain possesses much power, and saying that parliament is omnipotent, it is asserted that our defence cannot be supported but by shewing that our legislature possesses more power than king and parliament both. Now whatever might be the gentleman’s doubts as to the national language of our legislature it is believed the legislature would be at no loss for the national character of such reasoning.
But we shall be content with that portion of parliamentary power which may be left to our legislature after abating from ■ it all the resti’ictions of the constitution. For “ an act of parliament is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. It hath power to bind every subject in the land and the dominions thereunto belonging, nay, even the king himself, if particularly named therein
Such was the gentleman’s idea of their propensity to abuse power, that he could find for .them no parallel on earth, but he has gone to the court of Pandemonium for illustration. Had the legislature committed all the outrages charged upon them, without such resort to heat his imagination, might not his memory have supplied him a reference of more recent authority ? — Might he not have pointed to a tribunal to which even Rhadamanthus would have surrendered his robe and seal.
The legislature forsooth so subject to “ passion ” and “ intrigue ” are to be denied jurisdiction over this corporation that the supreme controul of it may be vested in some half dozen trustees, whom, it must be taken for granted, no passions can ever move — no intrigue ever influence!
That the legislative power is amply sufficient for much greater things than ours has attempted in this case is not only true in theory but that it has long been exercised in practice we will shew by a series of cases both in Great Britain and the colonies. By the English doctrine so far are corporations of any kind from being above the legislative power, that they can be dissolved at
This power was ever considered safely entrusted to parliament as the guardians of the community, whose interests as individuals or corporators were there represented. — -A reason which could not apply to an extension of the same authority to the crown. — Nor is it pretended that the ting can in all cases exercise the same jurisdiction.
What then is to be inferred from the authorities cited by the plaintiffs to shew that the crown has not the power, which we say the legislature has. Suppose they had produced the same number of, authorities to prove that the crier of your honours’ court does not possess such power! — We might perhaps be disposed to say he would not be less suitable than “his majesty” to exercise it — but by no means to suppose it disproved any position we have attempted to support. As it is not our intention to rely upon any parliamentary precedent, where our constitution shall be found to have abridged the legislative power, so we at once disclaim the application of precedents to shew the want of such authority in the crown — a power some of the prerogatives of which are possessed by our legislature, but which in itself is totally destitute of the authority with which-the legislature are entrusted as the representatives of the people.
When the nation was dissatisfied with the operations of the land bank and south-sea scheme, no difficulty existed for want of power in parliament to take away their charters and even make the members individually liable for bills
In this country too our provincial assemblies exercised the same power and often changed the whole organization of such institutions. — An act was passed in Connecticut in 1723 without petition or consent of the corporation “For the more full and complete establishment of Yale College, and for enlarging its powers and privileges’’ By this act the number of trustees was enlarged, new offices created, and new regulations made with regard to the number which should constitute a quorum
By an order of the general court of the province of Massachusetts, 1673, an addition was made to the members of the corporation of Harvard College, against the yvill of the corporation
The plaintiffs however choose not to rest the validity of these acts upon general legislative power, but say, that whatever right the parliament of Great-Britain or the provincial assemblies before our revolution might have had, to have passed the acts in question, that our legislature now has, not that power by the provisions of our constitution; and therefore in the third place—
.III. They are contrary to the constitutions of NewSampshire, and of the United States.
As founder and visitor of eleemosynary corporations where no visitor is expressly appointed, our legislature succeeds to all the rights of the crown ; “ and ” (says Judge Spencer) “ while acting within the pale of the United States and state constitutions has all the omnipotence of parliament
“ When the people (says chief justice Kent) create a single entire government, thej^ grant at once all the powers of sovereignty. The powers granted are indefinite and incapable of enumeration. Every
Most, if not all the restrictions upon legislative power in our constitutions originated from the previous exercise or abuse of the power having been attended witli evil. — And if we look at our constitutions, advised by the precepts of the learned commentator, for the interpretation of statutes, “ by considering the reason and spirit of them, or the cause which moved the legislature to enact them,”
That it could not have been intended by the framers of the constitution to restrict the legislative power upon this subject we think is apparent from the nature of the institution and its intimate connexion 'with government — as also from the general provisions of the constitution itself.
It is a proper subject of legislation, as a publick civil institution. But the plaintiffs have insisted that “ it is a private eleemosynary
That this-is a private charity has been urged too from the circumstance of its being called a college — That although universities
What are called colleges in the universities in Europe; and by which from the resemblance in name, the learned counsel have attempted to prove this to be a private charity, are mere conditional appropriations of funds for the support of persons of certain descriptions called the masters, fellows and students, subject to the inspection and controul of the individual who makes the appropriátion; and have no more power of conferring degrees, or of doing any other act which a university may do, than our parishes have, which are incorporated for the support of ministers. Although this institution is called by the name of college, still, says the authority before referred to, the design of the institution must determine the extent of its political rights. — And whether the act creating the corporation was a publiek or private act or charter in its terms, could make no difference as it is the extent of the object which makes the corporation a publiek one
What then must have been the plaintiffs’ desperation to have seized as the great point, on which to build so mighty an argument, the circumstances of this institution being called a college, while it differs in fact from a college in every particular of its design, privileges and powers. By predicating their argument upon the technical definition of a college establishment, do they intend to deny, that this institution was erected for the purposes, with the-privileges and powers, and subject to the liabilities of an English university? This corporation, was erected for the promotion of learning — Its officers (says the charter, p. 11) may exercise their authority “ as fully and freely as any like’ officers in any of our universities, colleges or seminaries of learning in our realm of Great-Britain, lawfully may or ought to do.” It also has the power of conferring “any such degree or degrees” &c. “as are usually granted in either of the universities or any other college in our realm of Great Britain,” &c. That this corporation has other objects and duties than mere colleges, which, (says a learned civilian) “ were formally held to be ecclesiastical establishments,”-
As the nature of this institution, so its object and intimate connexion with government require their care and controul. And we are not left to conjecture its objéct — Its charter declares it to be the “ spreading of Christian knowledge ” — and “ that the best means of education may be established in our province of New-Hampshire.” — Had the charter proceeded no further, hopeless as might seem the effort, still the plaintiffs would have had some more plausible pretence than at present, for making a question, whether such be an object of private benefit only, or of publick interest and concern. — But the charter.in the same clause has anticipated the only answer which could be given axid-unequivocally declares it to be “for the benefit of said province.” — Is such a purpose then not within the proper sphere of legislation in a government like ours ? and have the framers of our coxxst-itutioxx so decided ? Devest the subject of the specious garb in which the learning and ingenuity of the counsel have enveloped it, and what other is the naked question presented? — They deny that the legislature has any constitutional right to interfere with the concerns of this institution. — Its. charter declares it to have been established for the purpose of “ spreading Christian knowledge,” and “ that the best meaxxs of education may be established ixx the province of New-Hampshire for the benefit of said province.” What do they then but deny the publick interest ixx these objects? If such a doctrine be introduced by the influence of this institution, then indeed if the government have irot power to reform, they should have to annihilate it. — Nothing less than the solemn formality
But even the broad position assumed by the plaintiffs cannot require of me in the present state of society to discuss, particularly the connexion of the institutions of education with the existence of government — a point so long since settled in every place where such institutions have existed. 1 would rather read to them the preamble of a bill relative to literary institutions, some twenty years since, recommended to the legislature of Virginia by a Jeeeerson, Pendleton and others, “in which” (said an eminent lawyer of that state) “the importance of the subject to the publish is most ably and eloquently announced.”
The communications of every chief magistrate from the origin of our government, have urged its importance upon the national legislature. Examples of practical illustration are found in those sovereigns, who relax the bonds of slavery by disseminating the means of knowledge, — who, as they would shackle their subjects, restrict to individuals the use of those means. Even Alexander of Russia, enlightened by the principles and precepts of Christianity, is adding fresh laurels to the wreath which Europe has bound upon his brow, by traversing his empire in person “ to establish and regulate schools of learning.” Such is the effect, that a distinguished philosopher of Europe has said “ give me so much of the literature of any country, that 1 may dictate their domestick and national songs, and let whoever may enact their laws or wield the sword, I will govern.” — But history silences all speculation upon this subject. The records of tyranny and oppression shew where the means of knowledge were confined to a few. The triumph of liberty, justice and equal rights proclaim the publish care and patronage of education. Institutions for this purpose are in fact to the moral and political Archimedes the “ where to stand ” —the fulcrum by which he would “ move the world.”
The framers of our constitution have not left us to infer their opinion from the nature of the subject only, — but have declared that “ knowledge and learning generally diffused through a community are essential to the preservation of a free government ”—
But, it is further contended should the nature and design of this institution and its connexion with the best interest of the community render it in that view a proper subject of legislation under our constitution,.that still the personal interests of the trustees is such as to give them a right to exclaim aprocul este ” to every power.
This view of the subject will embrace a consideration of those particular clauses of the constitution which have been noticed; but permit me here on this suggestion of personal interest to refer the counsel to the deliberate declaration of their clients, and if the legislature on this point have erred let them not be reproached by these same trustees, who in a memorial to the legislature in 1804,. solemnly averred “ they had no other interest than the members of the legislature themselves.” — And well might they so declare for even trustees in a hospital receiving a lease of a building could set up no such pretence as the present, and (said lord Mansfield) have no more interest in the thing than the crier of a court of common pleas has when he is named as the last voucher in a common recovery
Two very formidable objections to their supporting such a claim at once present themselves — that they possess no such character or office of visitor, — and that the office itself would give them no such personal interest as is contended for. To their claim to such an office the very absurd nature of the pretence would seem to be a sufficient answer. The office of visitor is to correct the abuses and misfeasance of the corporation, or trustees who in this case constitute the corporation. — “ Corporations, being composed of individuals subject to human frailties, are liable as well as private “ persons to deviate from the end of their institution, and for that “ reason the law has provided proper persons to visit, enquire into “ and correct all irregularities that arise in such corporations, &c.
Now lest these trustees should mismanage, misapply or embezzle the funds of this institution, they, as visitors are to examine their own proceedings as trustees, to correct the “ human frailties,” — to see that no fraud is done.” If the law can tolerate so preposterous an idea, let us — “ tell it not in Gath.’ — The reason why pub-lick corporations of this kind are said to have no visitor, is that the superintendence and vigilance over them, is exercised by the sovereign as the guardian of the commonwealth, who alone are interested in the correct management of the property. — And of course this visitatorial power of the legislature, who represent the sovereignty of this state, is not distinguished from its ordinary acts of legislation. “And this” (says sir Wm. Blackstone) “is what I understand to be the meaning of our lawyers when they say that these civil corporations are liable to no visitation, that is, that the law having by immemorial usage, appointed them to be visited and inspected by the king” — &c. “All corporations have their visitors,” &c. “ Those merely civil, by the king, unless they have been endowed by a subject, and derive all their property and subsistence from him ”
As all the power which the king as visitor could exercise over these corporations, resulted from their publick nature and the inter
. But if the plaintiffs are desirous to make a fair estimate of the personal interests to be derived from the office of visitor, had they possessed it, — let us for a moment suppose the honourable board, as trustees, making up their accounts and closing the books, and the honourable board, as visitors, perhaps, by way of distinguishing the capacity in which they act, reversing their wigs, gravely opening the books to set about detecting the frauds, checking the abuses and correcting the “ human frailties ” of the honourable board of trustees. — Let them then be advised of their personal interest by the learned counsel in Rex vs. The Bishop of Ely. In that case where the visitor had the power of appointment to certain offices it is said “ this power of appointment claimed by the visitor is not an interest.” On the ground of interest “ it is not an objection.to a judge that he is a bare trustee.”
However, if their visitatorial power in this institution is only for the purpose of correcting the abuses of the trustees, it is not taken away, and probably will not be less likely to be exercised by an addition to the number.
The general spirit of the constitution appearing to protect these legislative proceedings, we find it necessary to inquire for that particular clause in either constitution which overrules such general construction ; — which expressly denies the exercise of this authority and entitles eight trustees of Dartmouth College, to say to tbe supreme power of the state “ stand thou off ” we are mightier “ than thou.”
Some embarrassment might be anticipated in the attempt to designate such an article or section. — An embarrassment which even the plaintiffs’ counsel seem to have encountered with no great success. For instead of putting their finger upon the page, they in effect have thrown to us the statute book, and left us to discover by conjecture, or accident upon which they most rely in the long catalogue by them cited of the second, twelfth, fifteenth, twentieth, twenty-third, and thirty-seventh articles of the New-Hampshire bill of rights, and tenth section of the first article of the United States constitution. — Unfortunately, however, the difficulty of discovering their application in this case is not entirely removed even by the ingenious argument upon this point. — To read at length the clauses cited, would seem to be a sufficient answer to a suggestion that they support or even countenance any of the plaintiffs’ pretensions.
The twelfth article, with a provision similar to the former, and that every member of the community is bound to contribute his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent, also provides that “ no part of a man’s property shall be taken from him, and applied to publick uses without his own consent or that of the representative body of the people. Nor are the inhabitants of this state eontroulable by any other laws than those to which they or their representative body have given their consent.”
The declaration of independence renders apparent the oppression of the crown and government of Great Britain, in reference to which this provision was adopted. They are there complained against for “ suspending our own legislatures ” and for “ imposing taxes on us without our consent.”
Have the plaintiffs cited this to prove by that clause which guards against appropriating private property to publick uses, that publick property may be used for private purposes ? — That what is expressly appropriated for the benefit of the province of New-Hampshire ” is intended exclusively for the use of eight individu
The fifteenth article provides that “ no subject shall be held to answer for any crime or offence until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally described to him, or be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favourable to himself; to meet witnesses face to face and to be fully heard in his defence by himself and counsel. And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”
When the plaintiffs’ counsel turned to this article, their natural benevolence and sense of justice must have overpowered the suggestions of their professional engagement in this cause, and they could have read it to the court in no other character than as advocates of the late venerable martyr of this institution. Had we appeared to proclaim his injuries, we would have read that article of the bill of rights and the plaintiffs’ memorable record of September 1815. — But we come not, in the language of that clause, “ to hold ” the plaintiffs “ to answer to any crime,” and if otherwise, we would not violate its provisions by “ compelling ” them “ to furnish evidence against themselves.”
Should we for a moment suppose, that the plaintiffs, per fas aut nefas, had acquired some “ property or immunities,” for themselves in this corporation ; and should we further suppose, that they are “ deprived or despoiled” of them by the acts in question, still could it be contended that any clause in that article renders void such act ? — Would it be said that the exception “ but by the law of the land,” was a declaration that such law would be of no validity ? Or shall we be told that the statutes enacted by our legislature are not “ the law of the land?” Elementary writers and courts of justice have given statutes precedence of the unwritten law ; but the reverse of that rule might be well insisted on by those who hold that the will of a few individuals is superior to both. The latter clause of this article is a literal translation from Magna Charta, and I ask them to take an interpretation of it from no less authority than the great oracle of the English law — “ Per legem terree.”— “ That is,” (saith my lord Coke, 2 Inst. 45.) “ by the common law, statute law, or custom of the realm.” — The histpry of magna charta must be too familiar to need at tbis time the introduction of proofs to shew that its provisions were to guard against the arbitrary proceedings of the crown and were not intended as a restraint upon
But the precedents which we have before cited of the proceedings of parliament, in such cases settle all question as to the application of this article to legislative power ; for it is to be recollected that parliament were under all the restraint of this article which our constitution imposes; the same being a provision of magna charta. Those precedents of course confirm the correctness of Coke’s exposition, as do also the proceedings of our own legislatures with regard to highways, turnpike roads, canals, &c. Indeed upon any other construction, not a page in our statute book but is stained with some unconstitutional act.
The next article urged upon the court was the twentieth. This provides that “ in all controversies concerning property and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury and this method of proceeding shall be held sacred, unless in cases arising on the high seas and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the legislatures shall think it necessary hereafter to alter it.” — Surely no difficulty would have existed in judging of the propriety of their appealing to that article had the counsel proceeded one step further and cited the verdict in this cause as proof of their being deprived of the privilege secured by that provision.
The next in order on their list of grievances is the alleged violalation of the twenty-third article, which declares that “ retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws therefore should be made either for the decision of civil causes or for the punishment of offences. These acts invalidate no proceedings — punish no crimes done previous to their date. Had they provided for the punishment of offences committed previous to their being passed, then indeed it would be proper to object. But
The thirty-seventh article closes their chapter upon the New-Hampshire Bill of Rights. This declares that “In the government of this state the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive and judicial ought to be kept as separate from and independent of each other as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connexion that binds the whole fabrick of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union.” — The object of the counsel by introducing this article probably was not to destroy that large portion of his argument which consisted in urging reasons for the repeal of the acts in question, but its effect surely must be to shew the irrelevancy of such reasons when addressed to a tribunal whose duties are “ to be kept separate” from the exercise of legislative power.
Such have been their references to our bill of rights, that the plaintiffs’ counsel must pardon me for sometimes suspecting them of an intention to burlesque their client’s pretensions in this cause.
The tenth section of the first article of the United States constitution cited by the plaintiffs declares among other prohibitions that “ no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
It cannot be necessary at this time to consider the intent or meaning of the words ex post facto law, as it has long since been determined that they refer only to crimes and punishments, and have no bearings upon proceedings of a civil nature
But at last it is insisted that these are “ laws impairing the obligation of contracts.” Finding that the straws they have seized upon in the struggle cannot support their sinking claim, with the eagerness of desperation, they grasp at this shadow of a pretence. Yet it is believed, that section cannot by any force be so distorted as to extend even its shadow to a purpose so oblique and. distant from its original intent. If any interpretation of that clause can be made applicable to the present case, all the benefits surely
Previous to the constitution, it had been practised in different states to pass acts suspending suits on contracts, thereby impairing the obligation of immediate payment. Distinctions had been introduced where foreigners, or persons of different states were parties, &c. And cases existed of making debts, which were all due, payable by future instalments
But how is this corporation a contract ?
Who are the parties ?
Plow are its obligations impaired ?
A contract in its common acceptation, is an agreement between two parties. The agreement presupposes a conference as to its terms, and a consideration for its foundation. There is a mutuality in its stipulations. — These are general principles
The plaintiffs however say, an express contract exists here that they, and they alone shall be trustees of this institution. And why shall not the present sheriff resist the proposed law for a new division of counties on the ground that a contract would be violated by admitting other sheriffs upon his present territory ? By a reference to the charter it will appear, that the corporation was created independent of the trustees; and that they were after-wards appointed in a different clause of the charter. The corporation is in fact so constituted, that had they all died, or all resigned their offices, the corporation would still have existed, and could have been reorganized with perfect security to all its rights and property. — The provision in the charter with regard to the number, was intended as a regulation to limit the board in their appointments, and not with a view to controul the legislature. No sacredness can be attached to that mere regulation, established by the crown, more than to a law under similar circumstances, which, however conclusive in its terms, would yield to the rule “leges posteriores, priores contrarias, abrogante
Who are the parties to all these contracts ? can there be any
The state of New-Hampshire then is the fouhder. — The state of New-Hampsliire is the power creating, and the state of New-Hampshire the only party in interest. All parties to the contract then, have assented to these alterations by the legislature, the representatives of the people and State of New-Hampshire.
As much importance has been given to that point, by an effort, to shew that this is a private institution and that an individual as. founder is party to some contract here, permit me a moment to direct the attention of the court to the fair result from that view of the subject. No such pretence is made for any other individual than the Rev. Eleazer Wheeloek. For the purpose of giving their argument its utmost force, let us suppose their assumed premises in this particular to be correct, that this is a private institution, Dr. E. Wheeloek the founder, and he a party to a contract with the state that no alteration should ever be made in any of the provisions of the charter, but by consent of the lawful visitor.
“The power of visitation exists in the founder and his heirs, which power they may grant and assign over to others,”&c.
We have chosen to consider this question upon the true ground of the publick character of the institution, because we are unwilling to surrender it to the dictation and controul of any individuals and not for the want of a perfect defence in this action even upon the principle of a private charit}r — for so far as it concerns the event of this suit, we might safely tender them an election to consider the institution the one or the other.
But however the direct or express contracts may be, it is contended that these acts violate other collateral and implied agreements. As that incidental to this institution are the establishments of professorships, &c. which may be affected by alterations of the original charter — That they may be so affected and justly too is certainly incident to their nature, for of these establishments Sir William Blackstone observes
Should it however be found that those trustees or any other individuals were holding privileges or offices under the letters patent creating this corporation, which by any possibility could be considered in the nature of contract, and that those individuals in these alterations have not consented by themselves or their representatives ; — Still we contend that in the origin of such contract there must have been reserved to the commonwealth the implied condition of altering, amending, or even revoking it altogether, when in the opinion of the commonwealth its welfare should require it. — For if any personal rights or privileges have accrued to individuals from the establishment of this institution, they must have been incidental to the main design and not the object of its creation. And if the object for which it was created requires amendment in its organization, then the collateral or accidental advantages which a few individuals may possess by its present arrangement cannot be placed above, but must yield to the publick object of the institution. — And this the constitution not only does not deny, but expressly authorizes, and in those same articles referred to by their counsel. A prohibition of the exercise of certain powers, except by the legislature we do not with the plaintiffs understand to be a denial of the right to that branch of government. And in the very case of Terrett vs. Taylor which the counsel have referred to, we find the unequivocal opinion of the supreme court of the United States, that the legislature may rightly exercise the power we contend for. “With respect also to publick corporations” (said the judge who delivered the opinion) “the legislature may have a right to change, modify, enlarge, or restrain them, &c.” — Where the question was upon this article of the constitution, the learned judge observed that “ some of the most necessary and important acts of legislation on the contrary are founded upon the principle that private rights must yield to public exigencies ” — Without the possession of this power the operations of government would often be obstructed and society itself endangered. It is not sufficient to urge that the power may be abused, for such is the nature of all power — such is the tendency of every human institution, and it might as fairly be said that the power of taxation, which is only circumscribed by the discretion of the body by which it is vested, ought not to be granted
Agreeably to the principle we contend for, has been the whole
School districts which have certain corporate powers, the legislature have not only altered at their pleasure, but have even subjected them to the alterations of towns. Selectmen, in whose-hands money is placed by towns for the support of schools, probably would not have thought, before the action, of resorting to the United States constitution for protection against the legislature,
While these acts of the legislature are justified by principle and precedent, I rejoice also that the most distinguished literary institution of the union, by its eminence and prosperity is a striking example of the salutary influence of these principles and precedents. The renowned university of Harvard, which has ever been subject to legislative controul, exhibits an illustrious proof, that the gloomy apprehensions of the plaintiffs in the present case, are altogether imaginary. To say that such seminaries would be in danger from a design in the legislature to defeat their object or effect their destruction, is to suppose an event that can never take place till the iwhole community shall have degenerated to that state of barbarism, when the light of such an institution could do no more than to make “ darkness visible; ” and its existence serve no other purpose than as a monument upon the ruins of all our other civil establishments.
Its dangers are from a very different source. — To avert those dangers, these legislative acts have been passed. — Soon may the opposition to them be disarmed by judicial decision, and Dartmouth arise redeemed from the ruin which has been threatened by an effort to convert to private and personal interests, its pub-lick nature and design.
[“Mr. Webster closed the argument by a reply on the part of the plaintiffs; but as his views of the case are more fully developed in his argument before the supreme court of the United States, it is here omitted.” Farrar’s Report, p. 206. What Farrar reports as the argument of the several counsel was written and furnished by them after the cause was decided at Washington, and is not entirely a verbatim report of what was said by them at the hearing. Case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College against William H. Woodward, by Timothy Farrar, Advertisement; Dartmouth College Causes, by John M. Shirley, pp. 174, 175, 186, 205, 294-298; Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, Vol. I, pp. 303, 305, 307, 311; Life of Daniel Webster, by Ceorge Tielmor Curtis, Vol. I, pp. 167-171; Life and Writings of Rufus Choate, Vol. I, pp. 514-517. Mr. Webster’s argument in the United States
Mb. Webster, for the plaintiffs in error. — The general question is, whether the acts of the 27th of June, and of the 18th and 26 th of December, 1816, are valid and binding on the rights of the plaintiffs, without their acceptance or assent.
The charter of 1769 created and established a corporation, to consist of twelve persons, and no more; to be called the “ Trustees of Dartmouth College. ” The preamble to the charter recites, that it is granted on the application and request of the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock: That Dr. Wheelock, about the year 1754, established a charitjr school, at his own expense, and on his own estate and plantation: That, for several • years, through the assistance of well disposed persons in America, granted at his solicitation, he had clothed, maintained, and educated a number of the native Indians, and employed them afterwards as missionaries and schoolmasters among the savage tribes: That his design promising to be useful, be had constituted the Rev. Mr. Whitaker to be his attorney, with power to solicit contributions, in England, for the further extension and carrying on of his undertaking; and that he had requested the Earl of Dartmouth, Baron Smith, Mr. Thornton, and other gentlemen, to receive such sums as might be contributed, in England, towards supporting his school, and to be trustees thereof, for his charity; which these persons had agreed to do. And thereupon Dr. Wheelock had executed to them a deed of trust, in pursuance to such agreement, between him and them, and for divers good reasons, had referred it to these persons, to determine the place in which the school should be finally established: And to enable them to form a proper decision on' this subject, had laid before them the several offers which had been, made to him by the several governments in America, in order to induce him to settle and establish his school within the limits of such governments for their own emolument, and the incréase of learning in their respective places, as well as for the 'furtherance of his general original design. And in as much as a number of the proprietors of lands in New Hampshire, animated by the example of the governour himself and others, and in consideration that without any impediment to its original design, the school might be enlarged and improved, to promote learning among the English, and to supply ministers to the people of that province, had promised large tracts of land, provided the school should be established in that province, the persons before mentioned, having weighed the reasons in favour of the several places proposed, had given the preference to this province, and these offers; that Dr. Wheelock therefore represented the necessity of a legal incorporation, and proposed that certain
The substance of the facts thus recited, is, that Dr. Wheelock had founded a charity, on funds owned and procured by himself; that he was at that time the sole dispenser and sole administrator, as well as the legal owner of these funds; that he had made his will, devising this property in trust, to continue the existence and uses of the school, and appointed trustees; that,'in this state of things, he had been invited to'fix his school, permanently, in New-Hampshire, and to extend the design of it to the education of the youth of that province; that before he removed his school, or accepted this invitation, which his friends in England had advised him to accept, he applied for a charter, to be granted, not to whomsoever the king or government of the province should please, but to such persons as he named and appointed, viz. the persons whom he had already appointed to be the future trustees of his charity by his will.
The charter, or letters patent, then proceed to create such a corporation, and to appoint twelve persons to constitute it, by the name of the “Trustees of Dartmouth College; ” to have perpetual existence, as such corporation, and with power to hold and dispose of lands and goods, for the use of the College, with all the ordinary powers of corporations. They are in their discretion to apply the funds and property of the college to the support of the president, tutors, ministers, and other officers of the college, and such missionaries and schoolmasters as they may see fit to employ among the Indians. There are to be twelve trustees forever, and no more ; and they are to have the right of filling vacancies oecuring in their own body. The Rev. Mr. Wheelock is declared to be the founder of the college, and is, by the charter, appointed first president, with power to appoint a successor by his last will. All proper powers of government, superintendence, and visitation, are vested in the trustees. They are to appoint and remove all officers at their discretion; to fix their salaries, and assign their duties: and to make all ordinances, orders, and laws for the government of the students. And to the end that the persons who had acted as depositories of the contributions in England, and who had also been contributors themselves, might be satisfied of the good use of their contributions, the president was annually, or when required, to transmit to them an account of the progress of the institution and the disbursements of its funds, so long as they should continue to act in that trust. — These letters patent are to be good and effectual, in law, against the Icing, his heirs and
No funds are given to the college by this charter. A corporate existence and capacity are given to the trustees, with the privileges and immunities which have been mentioned, to enable the founder and his associates the better to manage the funds which they themselves had contributed, and such others as they might afterwards obtain.
After the institution, thus created and constituted, had existed, uninterruptedly and usefully, nearly fifty years, the legislature of New-Hampshire passed the acts in question.
The first act makes the twelve trustees under the charter, and nine other individuals to be appointed by the governour and council, a corporation, by a new name; and to this new corporation transfers all the property, rights, powers, liberties and privileges of the old corporation; with further power to establish new colleges and an institute, and to apply all or any part of the funds to these purposes: subject tp the power and controul of a board of twenty-five overseers, to be appointed by the governour and council.
The second act makes further provisions for executing the objects of the first, and the last act authorizes the defendant, the treasurer of the plaintiffs, to retain and hold their property, against their will'.
If these acts are valid, the old corporation is abolished, and a new one created. The first act does, in fact, if it can have any effect, create a new corporation, and transfer to it all the property and franchises of the old. The two corporations are not the same, in any thing which essentially belongs to the existence of a corporation. They have different names, and -different powers, rights, and duties. Their organization is wholly different. The powers of the corporation are not vested in the same, or similar hands. In one, the trustees are twelve, and no more. In the other, they are twenty-one. In one, the power is in a single board. In the other, it is divided between two boards. Although the act’ professes to include the old trustees in the new corporation, yet that was without their assent, and against their remonstrance ; and no person can be compelled to be a member of such a corporation against his will. It was neither expected nor intended, that they should be members of the new corporation. The act itself treats the old corporation as at an end, and going on the ground that all its functions have ceased, it provides for the first meeting and organization of the new corporation. It expressly provides, also, that the new corporation shall have and hold all the property of the old; a provision which would be quite unnecessary upon any other ground, than that the old corporation was dissolved. But if it could be contended, that the effect of these
The twelve trustees were the sole legal owners of all the property acquired under the charter. By the acts others are admitted, against their will, to be joint owners. The twelve individuals, who are trustees, were possessed of all the franchises and immunities conferred by the charter. — By the acts, nine other trustees, and twenty-jive overseers are admitted against their will, to divide these franchises and immunities with them.
If either as a corporation, or as individuals, they have any legal rights, this forcible intrusion of others violates those rights, as manifestly as an entire and complete ouster and dispossession. These acts alter the whole constitution of the corporation. They affect the rights of the whole body as a corporation, and the rights of the individuals who compose it. They revoke corporate powers and franchises. — They alienate and transfer the property of the college to others. By the charter, the trustees had a right to fill vacancies in their own number. This is now taken away. They were to consist of twelve, and by express provision of no more. This is altered. They and their successors, appointed by themselves, were forever to hold the property. The legislature has found successors for them, before their seats are vacant. The powers and privileges, which the twelve were to exercise exclusively, are now to be exercised by others. By one of the acts, they are subjected to heavy penalties, if they exercise their offices, or any of those powers and privileges granted them by charter, and which they had exercised for jfifty years. They are to be punished for not accepting the new grant, and taking its benefits. This, it must be confessed, is rather a summary mode of settling a question of constitutional right. Not only are new trustees forced into the corporation, but new trusts and uses are created. The college is turned into a university. Power is given to create new colleges, and, to authorize any diversion of the funds, which may be agree-, able to the new boards, sufficient latitude is given by the undefined power of establishing an Institute. To these new colleges, and this Institute, the funds contributed by the founder, Dr. Wheelock, and by the original donors, the Earl of Dartmouth and others, are to be applied, in plain and manifest disregard of the uses to which they were given.
The president, one of the old trustees, had a right to his office, salary, and emoluments, subject to the twelve trustees alone. His title to these is now changed, and he is made accountable to new masters. So also all the professors and tutors. If the legislature can at pleasure make these alterations and changes, in the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs, it may, with equal propriety, abol
It will be contended by the plaintiffs that these acts are not valid and Molding ooi them, without their asseoit. 1. Because they are against common right, and the constitution of New-Hampshire. 2. Because they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
I am aware of the limits which bound the jurisdiction of the court in this case and that on this record nothing can be decided, but the single question, whether these acts are repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Yet it may assist in forming an opinion of their true nature and character, to compare them with these fundamental principles, introduced into the state governments for the purpose of limiting the exercise of the legislative power, and which the constitution of New-Hampshire expresses with great fulness and accuracy.
It is not too much to assert, that the legislature of New-Hampshire would not have been competent to pass the acts in question, and to make them binding on the plaintiffs without their assent, even if there had been, in the constitution of New-Hampshire, or of the United States, no special restriction on their power; because these acts are not the exercise of a power properly legislative
The legislature of New Hampshire has no more power over the rights of the plaintiffs than existed, somewhere, in some department of government, before the revolution. The British parliament could not have annulled or revoked this grant as an act of ordinary legislation. If it had done it at all, it could only have been in virtue of that sovereign power, called omnipotent, which does not belong to any legislature in the United States. The legislature of New-Hampshire has the same power over this charter, which belonged to the king, who granted it; and no more. By the law of England the power to create corporations is a part of the royal prerogative.
Corporate franchises can only be forfeited by trial and judgment
But there are prohibitions in the constitution and bill of rights of New-Hampshire, introduced for the purpose of limiting the legislative power, and protecting the rights and property of the citizens. One prohibition is “ that no person shall be deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”
In the opinion, however, which was given in the court below, it is denied that the trustees under the charter, had any property, immunity, liberty or privilege, in this corporation within the meaning of this prohibition in the bill of rights. It is said that it is a publiclc corporation, and publiclc property. That the trustees have no greater interest in it, than any other individuals. That it is not private property, which they can sell, or transmit to their heirs ; and that therefore they have no interest in it. That their office is a publiclc trust like that of the govern our, or a judge; and that they have no more concern in the property of the college, than the governour in the property of the state, or than the judges in the fines which they impose on the culprits at their bar. That ' it is nothing to them, whether their powers shall be extended or lessened; any more than it is to their honours, whether their jurisdiction shall be enlarged or diminished. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire into the true nature and character of the corporation, which was created by the charter of 1769.
There are divers sorts of corporations; and it may be safely admitted that the legislature has more power over some than others
The' corporation in question is not a civil, although it is a lay corporation. It is an eleemosynary corporation. It is a private charity, originally founded and endowed by an individual, with a charter obtained for it at his request, for the better administration of his charity. “The eleemosynary sort of corporations, are such
The legal signification of a charity is derived chiefly from the statute 48 Eliz. ch. 4. “ Those purposes,” says sir William Grant, “are considered charitable which that statement enumerates ”
The learned Bishop Stillingfleet’s argument in the same cause as a member of the house of lords, when it was there heard, exhibits very clearly the nature of colleges and similar corporations. It is to the following effect. “That this absolute and conclusive power of visitors, is no more than the law hath appointed in other cases, upon commissions of charitable uses: that the common law, and not any ecclesiastical canons, do place the power of visitation in the founder and his heirs, unless he settle it upon others: that although corporations for publick government be subject to the courts of Westminster-IIall, which have no particular, or special visitors; yet corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private persons, are subject to the rule and government of those that erect them; but where the persons to whom the charity is given are not incorporated, there is no such visitatorial power, because the interest of the revenue is not invested in them; but where they are, the right of visitation ai’iseth from the foundation, and the founder may convey it to whom and in what manner he pleases; and, the visitor acts as founder, and by the
“There is nothing better established,” says lord commissioner Eyre, “than that this court does not entertain sa general jurisdiction, or regulate and controul charities established by charter. There the establishment is fixed and determined; and the court has no power to vary it. If the governours established for the regulation of it, are not those who have the management of the
“The foundations of colleges,” says lord Mansfield, “are to be considered in two views, viz. as they are corporations and as they are eleemosynary. As eleemosynary, they are the creatures of the founder; he may delegate his power, either generally or specially; lie may prescribe particular modes and manners, as to the exercise of part of it. If he makes a general visitor, (as by the general words visitator sit) the person so constituted has all incidental power; but he may be restrained as to particular instances. The founder may appoint a special visitor for a particular purpose and no further. The founder may make a general visitor; and yet appoint an inferiour particular power, tobe executed without going to the visitor in the first instance”
In New England, and perhaps throughout the United States, eleemosynary corporations have been generally established in the latter mode; that is, by incorporating governours, or trustees, and vesting in them the right of visitation. Small variations may have heen in some instances adopted; as in the case of Harvard College, where some power of inspection is given to the overseers, but not strictly speaking, a visitatorial power, which still belongs,, it is apprehended to the fellows, or members of the corporation. In general, there are many donors. A charter is obtained, comprising them all, or some of them, and such others as they choose to include, with the right of appointing their successors. They are thus the visitors of their own charity and appoint others, such as they may see fit, to exercise the same office in time to come. All such corporations are private. The case before the court is clearly that of an eleemosynary corporation. It is, in the strictest legal sense a private charity. In King vs. St. Catherine's Hall
As such founder, he had a right of visitation, which he assigned to the trustees, and they received it by his consent and appointment, and held it under the charter
The numerous academies in New-England have been established substantially in the same manner. They hold their property by the same tenure, and no other. Nor has Harvard college
If the doctrine laid down by lord Holt, and the house of lords in Phillips vs. Bury, and recognized and established in all the other cases, be correct, the property of this college was private property; it was vested in the trustees by the charter, and to be administered by them, according to the will of the founder and donors as expressed in the charter. They were also visitors of the charity, in the most ample sense. They had therefore, as they contend, privileges, property, and immunities, within the true meaning of the bill of rights. They had rights, apd still have them, which they can assert against the legislature, as well as against other
Liberties is the term used in magna charta as including franchises, privileges, immunities, and all the rights which belong to that class. Professor Sullivan says, the term signifies the u privileges that some of the subjects, whether single persons or bodies corporate, have above others by the lawful grant of the king; as the chattels of felons or outlaws, and the lands and privileges of corporations ”
The privilege, then, of being a member of a corporation, under a lawful grant, and of exercising the rights and powers of such member, is such a privilege, liberty or franchise, as has been the object of legal protection, and the subject of a legal interest, from the time of magna charta to the present moment. The plaintiffs have such an interest in this corporation, individually, as they could assert and maintain in a court of law, not as agents of the publick, but in their own right. Each trustee has a franchise, and if he be disturbed in the enjoyment of it, he would have redress, on appealing to the law, as promptly as for any other injury. If the other trustees should conspire against any one of them to prevent his equal right and voice in the appointment of a president or professor, or in the passing of any statute or ordinance of the college, he would be entitled to his action, for depriving him of his franchise. It makes no difference, that this property is to be holden and administered, and these franchises exercised for the purpose of diffusing learning. No principle and no case establishes any such distinction. The publick may be benefited by the use of this property. But this does not change the nature of the property, or the rights of the
To contend that the rights of the plaintiffs may be taken away, because they derive from them no pecuniary benefit, or private emolument, or because they cannot be transmitted to their heirs, or would not be assets to pay their debts, is taking an extremely narrow view of the subject. According to this notion, the case would be different, if, in the charter, they had stipulated for a commission on the disbursement of the funds ; and they have ceased to have any interest in the property, because they have undertaken to administer it gratuitously.
It cannot be necessary to say much in refutation of the idea, that there cannot be a legal interest, or ownership, in any thing which does not yield a pecuniary profit; as if the law regarded no rights but the rights of money, and of visible tangible property. Of what nature are all rights of suffrage ? No elector has a particular personal interest; but each has a legal right, to be exercised at his own discretion and it cannot be taken away from him. The exercise of this right directly and very materially affects the publick; much more so than the exercise of the privileges of a trustee of this college. Consequences of the utmost magnitude may sometimes depend on the exercise of the right of suffrage by one or a few electors. Nobody was ever yet heard to contend, however, that on that account the publick might take away the right or impair it. This notion appears to be borrowed froni no better source than the repudiated doctrine of the three judges in the Aylesbury case
Individuals have a right to use their own property for purposes of benevolence, either towards the publick, or towards other indi
That all property, of which the use may be beneficial to the publick, belongs therefore to the publick, is quite a new doctrine. It has no precedent, and is supported by no known principle. Dr. Wheelock might have answered his purposes, in this case, by executing a private deed of trust. — He might have conveyed his property to trustees, for precisely such uses as are described in this charter. Indeed it appears, that he had contemplated the establishing of his school in that manner, and had made his will, and devised the property to the same persons who were afterwards appointed trustees in the charter. Many literary and other charitable institutions are founded in that manner, and the trust is renewed, and conferred on other persons, from time to time, as occasion may require. In such a case, no lawyer would or could say that the legislature might divest the trustees, constituted by deed or wil-1, seize upon the property, and give it to other persons, for other purposes. And does the granting of a charter, which is only done to perpetuate the trust in a more convenient manner make any difference ? Does or can this change the nature of the charity, and turn it into a publick political corporation ? — Happily we are not without authority on this point. It has been considered and adjudged. Lord Hardwicke says, in so many words, “the charter of the crown cannot make a charity more or less publick, but only more permanent than it would otherwise be
The granting of the corporation is but making the trust perpetual, and does not alter the nature of the charity. The very object sought in obtaining such charter, and in giving property to such a corporation, is to make and keep it private property, and to clothe it with all the security and inviolability of private property. The intent is, that there shall be a legal private ownership, and that the legal owners shall maintain and protect the property, for the benefit of those for whose use it was designed. Who ever endowed the publick? Who ever appointed a legislature to administer his charity? Or who ever heard, before, that a gift to a college, or hospital, or an asylum, was, in reality, nothing but a gift to the state.
The state of Vermont is a principal donor to Dartmouth College. The lands given lie in that state. This appears in the special verdict. Is Vermont to be considered as having intended a gift to the state of New-Hampshire in this case; as it has been said is
In University vs. Foy
In Terrett vs. Taylor
It will be for the other side to shew, that the nature of the use, decides the question, whether the legislature has power to resume its grants. It will be for those, who- maintain such a doctrine, to shew the principles and eases upon which it rests. It will be for them also to fix the limits and boundaries of their doctrine, and to shew, what are and what are not, such uses as to give the legislature this power of resumption and revocation. And to furnish an answer to the cases cited, it will be for them further to shew, that a grant for the use and support of religious worship, stands on other ground than a grant for the promotion of piety and learning.
I hope enough has been said to shew, that the trustees possessed vested liberties, privileges, and immunities, under this charter; and that such liberties, privileges and immunities, being once lawfully obtained and vested, are as inviolable as any vested rights of property whatever. — Rights to do certain acts, such, for instance, as
If such be the true nature of the plaintiffs’ interests under this charter, what are the articles in the N ew-Hampshire bill of rights which these acts infringe ?
They infringe the second article; which says, that the citizens of the state have a right to hold and possess property. The plaintiffs had a legal property in this charter; and they had acquired property under it. The acts deprive them of both. They impair and take away the charter; and they appropriate the property to new uses, against their consent. The plaintiffs cannot now hold the property acquired by themselves, and which this article says they have a right to hold.
They infringe the twentieth article. By that article it is declared, that in questions of property, there is a right to trial. The plaintiffs are divested, without trial or judgment.
They infringe the twenty-third article. It is therein declared, that no retrospective laws shall he passed. This article bears directly on the case. These acts must be deemed to be retrospective, within the settled construction of that term. What a retrospective law is, has been decided on the construction of this very article, in the circuit court for the first circuit. The learned judge of that circuit, says, “ every statute which takes away, or impairs, vested rights, acquired under existing laws, must be deemed retrospective”
“It is a principle in the English law,” says chief justice Kent, in the case last cited, “ as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect. Nova constituido futuris formam imponere dehet, et non prceteritis
These acts infringe also the thirty-seventh article of the constitution of New-Hampshire; which says, that the powers of government shall be kept separate. By these acts, the legislature assumes to exercise & judicial power. ■ It declares a forfeiture, and resumes franchises, once granted, without trial or hearing.
If the constitution be not altogether waste paper, it has restrained the power of the legislature, in these particulars. If it has any meaning, it is, that the legislature shall pass no act .directly and manifestly impairing private property and private privileges. It
The fifteenth article has been referred to before. It declares that no one shall be “ deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” Notwithstanding the light in which the learned judges in NewIlampshire viewed the rights of the plaintiffs under the charter, and which has been before adverted to, it is found to be admitted in their opinion, that those rights are privileges within the meaning of this fifteenth article of the bill of rights. Having quoted that article, they say: “ that the right to manage the affairs of this college, is a privilege within the meaning of this clause of the bill of rights, is not to be doubted.” In my humble opinion this surrenders the point. To insist the effect of this admission, however, the learned judges add — “But how a privilege can be protected from the operation of the law of the land by a clause in the constitution, declaring that it shall not be taken away, but by the law of the land, is not very easily understood.” — This answer goes on the ground, that the acts in question are laws of the land, within the meaning of the constitution. If they be so, the argument drawn from this article is fully answered. If they be not so, it being admitted that the plaintiffs’ rights are “privileges,” within the meaning of the article, the argument is not answered, and the article is infringed by the acts. Are then these acts of the legislature, which affect only particular persons and their particular privileges, laws of the land ? Let this question be answered by the text of Blackstone. “And first it (i. e. law) is a rule: not a transient sudden order from a superiour to or concerning a particular person ; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law”
By the law of the land, is most clearly intended, the general law; a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
Such a strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for courts to administer, or for men to live under. The administration of justice would be an. empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees; not to declare the law or to administer the justice of the country. “ Is that the law of the land,” said Mr. Burke, “ upon which, if a man go to Westminster Hall, and ask counsel by what title or tenure he holds his privilege or estate according to the law of the land, he, should be told, that the law of the land is not yet known; that no decision or decree has been made in his case; that when a decree shall be passed, he will then know what the law of the land is? Will this be said to be the law of the land, by any lawyer who has a rag of a gown left upon his back, or a wig with one tie upon his head ? ”
That the power of electing and appointing the officers of this college, is not only a right of the trustees as a corporation, generally, and in the aggregate, but that each individual trustee has also his own individual franchise in such right of election and appointment, is according to the language of all the authorities. Lord Holt says, “it is agreeable to reason and the rules of law, that a franchise should be vested in the corporation aggregate, and yet the benefit of it to redound to the particular members, and to be enjoyed by them in their private capacity. Where the privilege • of election is used by particular persons, it is a particular right, vested in every particular man”
It is also to be considered, that the president and professors of this college have rights to be affected by these acts. Their interest is similar to that of fellows in the English colleges ; because they derive their living, wholly or in part, from the founder’s bounty. The president is one of the trustees, or corporators. The professors are not necessarily members of the corporation; but they are appointed by the trustees, are removable only by them, and have fixed salaries payable out of the general funds of the college. — Both president and professors have freeholds, in
Nothing could have been less expected, in this age, than that there should have been an attempt, by acts of the legislature, to take away these college livings, the inadequate, but the only support of literary men, who have devoted their lives to the instruction of youth. The president and professors were appointed by the twelve trustees. — They were accountable to nobody else and could be removed by nobody else. They accepted their offices on this tenure. Yet the legislature has appointed other persons, with power to remove these officers, and to deprive them of their livings; and those other persons have exercised that power. No description of private property has been regarded as more sacred than college livings. They are the estates and freeholds of a most deserving class of men ; of scholars, who have consented to forego the advantages of professional and publick employments, and to devote themselves to science and literature, and the instruction of youth, in the quiet retreats of academic life. — Whether to dispossess and oust them; to deprive them of their office, and to turn them out of their livings; to do this not by the power of their legal visitors, or governours, but by acts of the legislature; and to do it without forfeiture, and without fault; whether all this be not in the highest degree an indefensible and arbitrary proceeding, is a question, of which there would seem to be but one side fit for a lawyer or a scholar to espouse.
Of all the attempts of James II. to overturn the law, and the rights of his subjects, none was esteemed more arbitrary or tyranieal, than his attack on Magdalen College, Oxford : And, yet, that attempt was nothing but to put out one president and put in another. The president of that college according to the charter and statutes, is to be chosen by the fellows, who are the corpora-tors. There being a vacancy, the king chose to take the appointment out of the hands of the fellows, the legal electors of a president, into his own hands. He therefore sent down his mandate commanding the fellows to admit, for president, a person of his nomination ; and inasmuch as this was directly against the charter and constitution of the college, he was pleased to add a non obstante clause of sufficiently comprehensive import. The fellows were commanded to admit the person mentioned in the mandate, “ any statute, custom or constitution to the contrary notioithstanding, wherewith we are graciously pleased to dispense, in this behalf.” The fellows refused obedience to this mandate, and Dr. Hough, a man of independence and character, was chosen president by the fellows, according to the charter and statutes. The king then assumed the power, in virtue of his prerogative, to send down cer
This measure king James lived to repent, after repentance was too late. When the charter of London was restored and other measures of violence retracted, to avert the impending revolution, the expelled president and fellows of Magdalen college were permitted to resume their rights. It is evident that this was regarded as an arbitrary interference with private property. Yet private property was no otherwise attacked, than as a person was appointed to administer and enjoy the revenues of a college, in a manner and by persons not authorized by the constitution of the college. A majority of the members of the corporation would not comply with the king’s wishes. A minority would. The object was, therefore, to make this minority a majority. To this end the king’s commissioners were directed to interfere in the case, and they united with the two complying fellows, and expelled the rest; and thus effected a change in tbe government of the college. The language in which Mr. Hume, and all other writers, speak of this abortive attempt of oppression, shews that colleges were esteemed to be, as they truly are private corporations, and the property and privileges which belong to them, private property and private privileges. Court lawyers were found to justify the king in dispensing with the laws; that is, in assuming and exercising a legislative authority. But no lawyer, not even a court lawyer, in the reign of king James the second, as far as appears, was found to say that even by this high authority, he could infringe- the franchises of the fellows of a college and take away their livings. Mr. Hume gives
If it could be made to appear, that the trustees and the president and professors held their offices and franchises during the pleasure of the legislature, and that the property holden belonged to the state, then indeed the legislature have done no more than they had a right to do. But this is not so. The charter is a charter of privileges and immunities; and these are holden by the trustees expressly against the state forever.
It is admitted, that the state, by its courts of law can enforce the will of the donor, and compel a faithful execution of the trust. The plaintiffs claim no exemption from legal responsibility. They hold themselves at all times answerable to the law of the land, for their conduct in the trust committed to them. They ask only to hold the property of which they are owners, and the franchises, which belong to them; until they shall be found by due course and process of law, to have forfeited them.
It can make no difference, whether the legislature exercise the power it has assumed, by removing the trustees and the president and professors, directly, and by name, or by appointing others to expel them. The principle is the same, and in point of fact, the result has been the same. If the entire franchise cannot be taken away, neither can it be essentially impaired. If the trustees are legal owners of the property, they are sole owners. If they are visitors, they are sole visitors. No one will be found to say, that if the legislature may do what it has done, it may not do any thing find every thing, which it may choose to do, relative to the property of the corporation, and the privileges of its members and officers. '
If the view which has been taken of this question be at all correct, this was an eleemosynary corporation; a private charity. The property was private property. The trustees were visitors, and their right to hold the charter, administer the funds, and visit and govern the college was a franchise and privilege, solemnly granted to them. The use being publick, in no way diminishes their legal estate in the property, or their title to the franchise. There is no principle, nor any case, which declares that a gift to such a corporation, is a gift to the publick. The acts in question violate property. They take away privileges, immunities, and franchises. They deny to the trustees the protection of the law; and they are retrospective in their operation. In all which respects they are against the constitution of New-Hampshire.
The plaintiffs contend, in the second place, that the acts in question are repugnant to the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution of the United States. The material words of that
The object of these most important provisions in the national constitution has often been' discussed, both here and elsewhere. It is exhibited with great clearness and force by one of the distinguished persons who framed that instrument. “ Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former, are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the state constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers, ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived, if'they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments, as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America, are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the publick councils. They have seen with regret, and with indignation, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators ; and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the link of a long chain of repetitions ; every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding ”
It has already been decided in this court, that a grant is a contract, within the meaning of this provision; and that a grant by a state, is also a contract, as much as the grant of an individual. In Fletcher vs. Fecit
It has also been decided, that a grant by a state before tbe revolution, is as much to be protected as a grant since
This court, then, does not admit the doctrine, that a legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations. If it cannot
In all cases relative to charters, the acceptance of them is uniformly alleged in the pleadings. This shews the general understanding of the law, that they are grants, or contracts ; and that parties are necessary to give them force and validity. In King vs. Dr. Askew,
And because charters of incorporation are of the nature of contracts, they cannot be altered or varied but by consent of the original parties. If a charter be granted by the king, it may be altered by a new charter granted by the king, and accepted by the corporators. But if the first charter be granted by parliament, the consent of parliament must be obtained to any alteration. In King vs. Miller,
There are, in this case, all the essential constituent parts of a contract. There is something to be contracted about, there are parties, and there are plain terms in which the agreement of the parties, on the subject of the contract, is expressed. There are mutual considerations and inducements. The charter recites, that the founder, on his part, has agreed to establish his seminary, in New-Hampshire, and to enlarge it, beyond its original design, among other things, for the benefit of that province: and thereupon a charter is given to him, and his associates designated by himself, promising and assuring to them under the plighted faith of the state, the right of governing the college, and administering its concerns in the manner provided in the charter. There is a complete and perfect grant to them of all the power of superintendence, visitation, and government. Is not this a contract? If lands or money had been granted to him, and his associates for the same purposes, such grant could not be rescinded. And is there any difference in legal contemplation, between a grant of corporate franchises, and a grant of tangible property ? No such difference is recognized in any decided case, nor does it exist in the common apprehension of mankind.
It is therefore contended, that this case falls within the true meaning of this provision of the constitution, as expounded in tile-decisions of this court; that the charter of 1769, is a contract, a stipulation or agreement; mutual in its considerations, express and
A single observation may not be improper on the opinion of the court of New-Hampshire, which has been published. The learned judges, who delivered that opinion, have viewed this question in a very different light, from that in which the plaintiffs have endeavoured to exhibit it. After some general remarks, they assume that this college is a publick corporation; and on this basis their judgment rests. Whether all colleges are not regarded as private, and eleemosynary corporations, by all law writers, and all judicial decisions ; whether this college was not founded by Dr. Wheelock; whether the charter was not granted at his request, the better to execute a trust, which he had already created; whether he and his associates did not become visitors, by the charter; and whether Dartmouth College be not, therefore, in the strictest sense, a private charity, are questions which the learned judges do not appear to have discussed.
It is admitted in that opinion, that if it be a private corporation, its rights stand on the same ground as those of an individual. The great question, therefore, to be decided, is to which class of corporations do colleges thus founded belong? And the plaintiffs have endeavoured to satisfy the court, that according to the well settled principles, and uniform decisions of law, they are private eleemosynary corporations.
Much has heretofore been said on the necessity of admitting such a power in the legislature as has been assumed in this case. Many cases of possible evil have been imagined, which might otherwise be without remedy. Abuses, it is contended, might arise in the management of such institutions, which the ordinary courts of law would be unable to correct.' But this is only another instance of that habit of supposing extreme cases, and then of reasoning from them, which is the constant refuge of those who are obliged to defend a cause, which, upon its merits, is indefensible. It would be sufficient to say, in answer, that it is not pretended, that there was here any such case pf necessity. But a still mor'e satisfactory answer is that the apprehension of danger is groundless, and therefore the whole argument fails. Experience has not taught us that there is danger of great evils or of great inconvenience from this source. Hitherto, neither in our own country nor elsewhere, have such cases of necessity occurred. The judicial establishments of the state are presumed to be competent to prevent abuses and violations of trust, in cases of this kind, as well as in all others. If they be not, they are imperfect, and their amendment would be a most proper subject for legislative wisdom. Under the government and protection of the general laws of the land, these institutions have always been found safe, as well as use
But this argument from necessity, would equally apply in all other cases. — If it be well founded, it would prove, that whenever any inconvenience or evil should be experienced from the restrictions imposed on the legislature by the constitution, these restrictions ought to be disregarded. It is enough to say, that the people have thought otherwise. — They have, most wisely, chosen to take the risk, of occasional inconvenience from the want of power, in order that there might be a settled limit to its exercise, and a permanent security against its abuse. They have imposed prohibitions and restraints; and they have not tendered these altogether vain and nugatory by conferring the power of dispensation. If inconvenience should arise, which the legislature cannot remedy under the power conferred upon it, it is not answerable for such inconvenience. That which it cannot do, within the limits prescribed to it, it cannot do at all. No legislature in this country is able, and may the time never come when it shall be able, to apply to itself the memorable expression of a Roman pontiff; “Licet hoc de juke non possumus, volumus tamen de plenitudine potestatis.”
When the court in North Carolina declared the law of the state, which repealed a grant to its university, unconstitutional and void, the legislature had the candour and the wisdom to repeal the law. This example, so honourable to the state which exhibited it, is most fit to be followed on this occasion. And there is good reason to hope, that a state, which has hitherto been so much distinguished for temperate councils, cautious legislation, and regard to law, will not fail to adopt a course, which will accord with her highest and best interest, and in no .small degree elevate her reputation.
It was for many and obvious reasons most anxiously desired, that the question of the power of the legislature over this charter should have been finally decided in the state court. An earnest hope was entertained that the judges of that court might have viewed the case in the light favourable to the rights of the trustees. That hope has failed. It is here, that those rights are now to be maintained, or they are prostrated forever. Omnia alia perfugia bonorum, subsidia, eonsilia, auxilia, jura ceeiderunt. Quem enim alium appellem? quem obtester ? quem implorem? Nisi hoe loco, nisi apud vos, nisi per vos, judices, salutem nostram, quae spe exigua extremaque pendet, tenuerimus; nihil est prceterea quo eonfugere possimus.
Afterwards at the November term in Grafton county, present all the judges, the opinion of the court was delivered by
This cause, which is trover for sundry
By an act of this state passed June 27, 1816, entitled “An act to amend the charter and enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College,” it is among other things enacted “that the corporation heretofore called and known by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College shall ever hereafter be called and known by the, name of the Trustees of Dartmouth University, and the whole number of said trustees shall be twenty-one, a majority of whom shall form a quorum for the transaction of business, and they and their successors in that capacity as hereby constituted, shall respectively forever have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy all the powers, authorities, rights, property, liberties, privileges and immunities which have hitherto been possessed, enjoyed and used by the Trustees of Dartmouth College.” — “And the governor and council shall by appointment as soon as may be, complete the present board of trustees to the number of twenty-one as provided for by this act, and shall have power also to fill all vacancies that may occur previous to, or during the first meeting of said board of trustees.” By an act of this state passed Dec. 18, 1816, entitled “ An act in addition to and in amendment of an act entitled an act to amend the charter, &c.” it is declared “ that the governor with advice of council is “ authorized to fill all vacancies that have happened, or may happen in the board of said trustees previous to their next annual meeting.”
It is agreed by the parties, that in pursuance of the provisions of these acts, the governor and council “ completed the said board of trustees to the number of twenty-one,” by appointing nine new trustees, who accepted the trust; and that previous to the commencement of this action, at a meeting of the trustees of Dartmouth University held as the law requires, and composed of two of the former trustees of Dartmouth College and the nine new trustees appointed as aforesaid, being a sufficient number to consti
It is also agreed, that nine of the old trustees of Dartmouth College have individually and as far as by law they could, as a corporation, refused to accept the provisions of the acts of June 27, and Dec. 18, 1816, and still claim to be a coi’poration as constituted by the charter of 1769, and to have the same controul over the property which belonged to the College, as they had before these acts were passed. And this action is brought to enforce that claim. If those parts of the acts above mentioned, which authorize the appointment of new trustees, are valid and binding upon the trustees of Dartmouth College, without their consent, this action cannot be maintained: because in that case the corporation must now be considered as composed of twenty-one members, and any claim of a minority of the corporation to controul the affairs of the Institution in opposition to the majority is clearly without any legal foundation. But if on the other hand those acts are to be considered in that respect as unconstitutional and void, then the appointment and all the doings of the new trustees are invalid; the corporation remains as constituted by the charter of 1769; and the plaintiffs must prevail in this action. The decision of the cause must therefore depend upon the question, whether the legislature had a constitutional right to authorize the appointment of new trustees, without the consent of the corporation ?
This cause has been argued on both sides with uncommon learning and ability, and we have witnessed with pleasure and with pride a display of talents and eloquence upon this occasion in the highest degree honourable to the profession of the law in this state. If the counsel of the plaintiffs have failed to convince us that the action can be maintained, it has not been owing to any want of diligence in research, or ingenuity in reasoning, but to a want of solid and substantial grounds on which to rest their arguments.
A complaint that private rights protected by the constitution have been invaded, will at all times deserve and receive the most deliberate consideration of this court-. The cause of an individual whose rights have been infringed by the legislature .in violation of the constitution, becomes at once the cause of all. For if a private right be thus infringed to-day, and that infringement be sanctioned by a judicial decision to-morrow, there will be next day a precedent for the violation of the rights of every man in the community; and so long as that precedent is followed, the constitution will be in fact to a certain extent repealed. An unconstitutional act must always be presumed to have been passed inadvertently or through misapprehension; and it is equally to be presumed that every honest legislator will rejoice when such an act is declared void, and the supremacy of the constitution maintained. But we
In order to determine the question submitted to us, it seems necessary in the first place to ascertain the nature of corporations.— A corporation aggregate is a collection of many individuals united into one body under a special name, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, and having collectively certain faculties, which the individuals have not. A corporation considered as a faculty, is an artificial, invisible body, existing only in contemplation of law: and can neither employ its franchises nor hold its property, for its own benefit. In another view, a corporation- may be considered as a body of individuals having collectively particular faculties and capacities which they can employ for their own benefit, or for the benefit of others, according to the purposes for which their particular faculties and capacities were bestowed. In either view it is apparent, that all beneficial interests both in the franchises and the property of corporations, must be considered as vested in natural persons, either in the people at large, or in individuals; and that with
Private corporations are those which are created for the immediate benefit and advantage of individuals, and their franchises may be considered as privileges conferred on a number of individuals, to be exercised and enjoyed by them in the form of a corporation. These privileges may be given to the corporators for their own benefit, or for the benefit of other individuals. In either case the corporation must be viewed in relation to the franchises as a trustee, and each of those, who are beneficially interested in them, as a cestui que trust. The property of this kind of corporations and the profits arising from the employment of their property and the exercise of their franchises, in fact belongs to individuals. To this class belong all the companies incorporated in this state, for the purpose of making canals, turnpike roads and bridges; also banking, insurance and manufacturing companies, and many others.
. Both the franchises and the property of these corporations exist collectively in all the individuals of whom they are composed; not however as natural persons, but as a body politick, while the beneficial interest in both is vested severally in the several members, according to their respective shares. This interest of each individual is a part of his property. It may be sold and transferred, may, in many cases, be seized and sold upon a fieri facias, and is assets in the. hands of his administrator. This is by no means a new view of this subject. The supreme court of Massachusetts in the case of Gray vs. The Portland Bank
Publiek corporations are those, which are created for publiek purposes, and whose property is devoted to the objects for which they are created. The corporators have no private beneficial interest, either in their franchises or their property. The only private right which individuals can have in them, is the right of being, and of acting as members. Every other right and interest attached to them can only be enjoyed by individuals like the common privileges of free citizens, and the common interest, which all have in the property belonging to the state. Counties, towns, parishes, &c. considered as corporations, clearly fall within this description. A corporation, all of whose franchises are exercised
Whether an incorporated college, founded and endowed by an individual, who had reserved to himself a controul over its affairs as a private visitor, must be viewed as a publick or as a private corporation, it is not necessary now to decide, because it does not appear that Dartmouth College was subject to any private visitation whatever.
Upon looking into the charter of Dartmouth College we find that the king “ being willing to encourage the laudable and charitable design of spreading Christian knowledge among the savages of our American wilderness, and also that the best means of education be established in the province of New-Hampshire, for the benefit of said province ” ordained that there should be a college created in said province by the name of Dartmouth College, “ for the education and instruction of youth of the Indian tribes, in this land, in reading, writing and all parts of learning, which should appear necessary and expedient for civilizing and christianizing children of Pagans, as well as in all liberal arts and sciences, and also of English youth and any othersand that there should be in the said Dartmouth College from thenceforth and forever, a body politick, consisting of trustees of Dartmouth College. He then “ made, ordained, constituted and appointed” twelve individuals to be'trustees of the College, and declared that they and their successors, should forever thereafter be a body corporate, by the name, of the trustees of Dartmouth College; and that said corporation should be “ able, and in law capable for the use of said college, to have, get, acquire, purchase,
In deciding a case like this, where the complaint is that corporate rights have been unconstitutionally infringed, it is the duty of the court to strip off the forms and fictions with which the policy of the law has clothed those rights, and look beyond that intangible creature of the law, the corporation which in form possesses them, to the individuals and to the publick, to whom in reality, they belong, and who alone can be injured by a violation of them. This action, therefore, though inform the complaint of the corporation, must be considered as in substance the complaint of the trustees themselves.
The acts in question can only affect publick or private rights and interests. With regard to the rights and interests which the pub-lick may have in this Institution, — no provision in the constitution of this state, nor of the United States, is recollected, which can protect them from legislative interference. We have been referred to no such provision in the argument. 'The clauses in those constitutions, upon which the plaintiffs’ counsel have relied, were most manifestly, intended to protect private rights only. All pub-lick interests are proper objects of legislation; and it is peculiarly the province of the legislature, to determine by what laws those interests shall be regulated. Nor is the expediency, or the policy of such laws, a subject for judicial decision. The constitution has given to the general court full power and authority to make and ordain all such laws “as they may judge for the benefit and welfare of this state.” Should we assume the power of declaring statutes valid or invalid, according to our opinion of their expediency, it would not be endured for a moment, but would be justly viewed by all, as a wanton usurpation, altogether repugnant to the principles of our government. Nor are these plaintiffs competent to call in question the validity of these laws in a court of justice, on the ground that they are injurious to the publick interests. A law is only the publick will duly expressed. These trustees are the servants of the publick, and the servant is not to resist the will of his master, in a matter that concerns that master alone. If these acts be injurious to the publick interests, the remedy is to be sought in their repeal, not in courts of law. But if these acts infringe private rights, protected by the constitution, whether of the trustees themselves, or of others, whose rights they, from their situation are competent to vindicate, then the plaintiffs have proper grounds, upon which to submit their validity to our decision.
As to those who founded or who have endowed it; no person of this description, who claims any private right, has been pointed out or is known to us. It is not understood that any person claims to be visitor of this college. An absolute donation of land or money to an institution of this kind, creates no private right in it. Besides, if the private rights of founders or donors have been infringed by these acts, it is their business to vindicate their own rights. It is no concern of these plaintiffs. When founders and donors complain, it will be our duty to hear and decide; but we cannot adjudicate upon their rights, till they come judicially before us. It has been strenuously urged to us, in the argument, that these acts will tend to discourage donations, and are therefore impolitick. Be it so. That was a consideration very proper to be weighed by those who made the acts, but is entitled to no weight in this decision.
The officers and students of the college, have, without doubt, private rights in the institution — rights which courts of justice are bound to notice — rights, which, if unjustly infringed, even by the trustees themselves, this court upon a proper application, would feel itself bound to protect. But for any injury done to their rights, they have their own remedy. It would be unjust to prejudge their case on this occasion. They are not parties to this record, and cannot be legally heard in the discussion of this cause. If no form of action given them by law can be conceived; it is because these acts do no injury to their rights.
The real question' then is, do these acts unconstitutionally infringe any private rights of these trustees ? It is said that these acts in fact, attempt to dissolve the old corporation, to create a new one, and to transfer the property of the old corporation to the new; and are therefore void on the principle decided in Territ & al. vs. Taylor
The plaintiffs, in taking this ground, seem not to have adverted to a material distinction, which, certainly exists between the rights and faculties relating to corporations, which can exist only in the corporators, as natural persons, and the corporate rights and faculties, which can exist only in the corporation. The right to the beneficial interest in the corporate property, can only exist in natural persons. But the legal title and ownership in corporate property, can in no case be considered as vested in the several corporators, as natural persons, either jointly or severally, but collectively in all, as one body politick, made capable by the policy of the law, of holding property as an individual. This artificial individual, which is said to be immortal, holds in all cases the legal title. Hence a corporation may maintain trespass against any of its members, who intermeddle with its property without its consent. Hence too, the legal title of a corporation in lands, will not pass by the deed of all its members. This faculty of holding property as an individual, which the policy of the law vests in a body of natural persons, that can be perpetuated by known rules of law, is one of the great ends and uses of an incorporation. But the natural persons who compose this artificial, immortal individual, in which the property is vested, must, in the nature of things, be continually fluctuating and changing; and yet the artificial individual remains in contemplation of law the same. It is therefore clear, that the legal identity of a corporation does not depend- upon its being composed of the same natural persons, and that an addition of new members to a corporation, cannot in itself, make it a new and different corporation. The immortality of a corporation depends upon a continued accession of new members. The mode in which this accession is effected, is immaterial. A few of our corporations are perpetuated by a power of electing new members, placed in the corporations themselves. But most of our publick, and all our private corporations, are perpetuated by mere operation of law, without any corporate act whatever. Nor, by the addition of new members, is any part of the legal title to the corporate property, transferred from the old to the new members. That title remains unaltered in the corporation. The old mem
It has also been contended, that it depends altogether upon contract, whether the old trustees shall become members of the corporation as now organized; that there can be no contract without consent, and that therefore, these acts cannot bind the old trustees without their consent, and must in the nature of things, be invalid. The whole amount pf this argument is this: a statute, which attempts to compel the members of a corporation to become members of that corporation, differently organized, without their consent is invalid; and as these acts make such an attempt, they are therefore invalid. To this there are two decisive answers. 1. Neither of the propositions upon which the conclusion rests is true. 2. Admitting the premises to be correct, the legitimate conclusion to be drawn from them, is wholly irrelevant to the question in this case. In the first place, the proposition that it depends altogether upon contract, whether individuals shall become members of particular corporations, is not universally true; and so far as respects publick corporations, is never true. The legislature has a most unquestionable right, to compel individuals to
But in the second place, admitting the premises to be true, the legitimate conclusion does not bear upon the question in this case. The fair conclusion to be drawn from the premises, is, that these acts, so far as they attempt to compel the old members to become members of the corporation, as now organized, are invalid. But the question here is not, whether the legislature can compel the old trustees to become members of the newly organized corporation, but whether it has a constitutional right to make a new organization of the corporation, by adding new members ? And it is very apparent, that although the legislature may not possess the power to do the one, yet still it may have a constitutional right to do the other. There is a clear distinction between laws binding corporate bodies, and laws attempting to bind individuals to continue members of corporate bodies. Thus the legislature has an undoubted right, at all times, to pass laws binding the whole body
But what is such- a new organization of a corporation as cannot be made, without the consent of the corporators ? If new members cannot be added, can any new duty be imposed upon a corporation ; or can the corporate powers and faculties be in any way limited, without such consent? Our statute of June 21, 1814, (laws 284) makes it the duty of the several incorporated banks, to make a return of the state of their several banks, to the governor and council, annually, in June, under a penalty of $1000. If the doctrine of these plaintiffs be true, may not the stockholders say that they cannot be compelled to be members of corporations, subject to new and different duties, without their consent, and that therefore this act is void ? And may not the same argument be used in regard to the acts of June 11, 1808, and June 17, 1807, which prohibit banks from issuing bills of a certain description? In fact, does not this doctrine amount to a denial of the right to legislate at all, on the subject of corporations, without their consent ?
But, although an artificial individual, capable of holding the legal title to property, may be created by the policy of the law, and a kind of artificial will and judgment as to the management of its concerns, given to it by making the consent of a number of natural persons necessary in all its acts ; yet still this artificial will and judgment is, after all, only the private will and judgment of „natural persons, in some respects limited and restricted. In this point of view, a corporation may be considered as a body of natural, persons, having power and authority vested in them, to manage the corporate concerns in such manner as a majority of a competent number of them may judge and determine to be best calculated to answer the ends of the incorporation. And it has been truly said, by the counsel of the plaintiffs, that by the charter of 1769 exclusive power and authority was given to the twelve trustees to manage the affairs of this corporation in such manner as a majority of any seven or more of them, duly convened for the purpose, might judge most expedient to answer the purposes of the institution; and that the right of the twelve, to exercise that exclusive power and authority is taken away by these acts, and others admitted to share that power and authority with them. Such is, without doubt, the operation of these acts; and it seems to us that this is the whole ground of complaint, which the plaintiffs can have. These acts compel the old trustees to sacrifice no private interest whatever, but merely to admit others to aid them, in the management of the concerns of a publick institution : and if they have no private views to answer, nor private wishes to
But the plaintiffs contend that these acts impair their right to manage the affairs of this institution, in violation of that clause in the fifteenth article in our bill of rights, which declares that “no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” That the right to manage the affairs of this college, is a privilege within the meaning of this clause of the bill of rights, is not to be doubted. But how a privilege can be protected from the operation of a law of the land, by a clause in the constitution declaring that it shall not be taken away, but by the law of the land, is not very easily understood. This clause in our bill of rights, seems to have been taken from the 29th chapter of Magna Charta. “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be out-lawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed, nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.” The origin and history of Magna Charta is familiar to lawyers and politicians. Sullivan in his Lectures, 383-4, says that this chapter is the corner stone of English liberties, made in affirmance of the old common law; and that by the bare reading of it, we may learn the extravagances of king John’s reign, which it was intended to redress. It is evident, from all the commentaries upon it by English writers, that it was intended to limit the powers of the crown, and not-of parliament
We have publick statutes, authorizing the selectmen of towns to take the lands of individuals for highways, and empowering fire-wards “ to pull down, blow up or remove any house or buildings,” when necessary to stop the progress of fire. We have private acts, giving to turnpike corporations authority to take the land of individuals for their roads. Under all these statutes, the property of individuals is often taken without their consent; and yet it seems never to have been doubted that those statutes were “ the law of the land,” within the meaning of the constitution. By the statute of December 24, 1805, entitled, “ an act respecting idle persons,” judges of probate are authorized, in certain cases, to appoint guardians of idle persons, and thereby take from them all controul over both their real and personal estate. This act has beeu in our statute book nearly twelve years, as a part of “the law of the land,” and no one has ever called its validity in question. By an act of December 11, 1804
But it is said, that the charter of 1769 is a contract, the validity of which is impaired by these acts, in violation of that clause in the tenth section of the first article of the constitution of the United States, which declares that “ No state shall pass any law, impairing the obligation of contracts.” It has probably never yet been decided, that a charter of this kind is a contract within the meaning of the constitution of the United States. None of the cases cited, were like the present. In the case of Fletcher vs. Peck,
This clause, in the constitution of the United States, was obviously intended to protect private rights of property, and embraces all contracts relating to private property, whether executed or executory, and whether between individuals, between states, or between states and individuals. The word “ contracts ” must however be taken, in its common and ordinary acceptation, as an actual agreement between parties, by which something is granted or stipulated, immediately for the benefit of the actual parties. But this clause was not intended to limit the power of the states, in relation to their own publick officers and servants, or to their own civil institutions, and must not be construed to embrace contracts,
I have looked into this case with all the attention, of which I am capable, and with a most painful anxiety to discover the true principles, upon which it ought to be decided. No man prizes more highly than I do, the literary institutions of our country, or would go farther to maintain their just rights and privileges. But
I am aware that this power in the hands of the legislature may, like every other power, at times be unwisely exercised; but where can it be more securely lodged ? If those, whom the people annually elect to manage their publick affairs, cannot be trusted, who can? The people have most emphatically enjoined it in the constitution, as a duty upon “ the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of the government, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences and all seminaries and publick schools.” And those interests will be cherished, both 'by the legislature and the people so long as there is virtue enough left to maintain the rest of our institutions. Whenever the people and their rulers shall become corrupt enough to wage war with the sciences and liberal arts, we may be assured that the time will have arrived, when all our institutions, our laws, our liberties must pass away,— when all that can be dear to freemen, or that can make their country dear to them, must be lost, and when a government and institutions must be established, of a very different character from those under which it is our pride and happiness to live.
In forming my opinion in this case, however, I have given no weight to any considerations of expediency. I think the legislature had a clear constitutional right to pass the laws in question. My opinion may be incorrect, and our judgment erroneous, but it is the best opinion, which upon the most mature consideration, I have been able to form. It is certainly, to me, a subject of much consolation, to know that if wo have erred, our mistakes can be corrected, and be prevented from working any ultimate injustice. If the plaintiffs think themselves aggrieved by our decision, they can carry the cause to another tribunal, where it can be re-examined, and our judgment be reversed, or affirmed, as the law of the case may seem to that tribunal to require.
Let judgment be entered for the defendant.
Montesq. spirit of Laws, B. 11. C. 6. 1 Vol. 181.
47th No. of Federalist.
48th No. of Federalist.
49th No. of Federalist.
Jefferson’s notes on Virginia, 195.
Jefferson’s notes on Virginia, page 195.
King vs. Amory, 2. T. R. 569. — 3 Dal. 391.
Fletcher vs. Peck, 6. Cranch 135.
State of New-Jersey vs. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164.
1 Wood. 482.
1 Black. 471,-1 Kyd 25.
1 Wood. 474.
Phillips vs. Bury, 1 Lord Ray. 5. — 1 Burr. 200.-1 Black. 482.
2 Kyd 195.
9 Crancli 49.
1 Black. 484.
Parliamentary Register 1783, 4.
9 Cranch 50.
1 Black. 3. 472.
King vs. Amory, 2 T. R. 515. King vs. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 240. King vs Vice-Chancellor of Cam. 3 Burr. 16. 56.
2 Black. 37.-2 T. R. 509.
3 Black. 202. 3. 2 Ins. 282.
Thing vs. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 244.—9 Cranch 51.
3 Burr. 1050. — 3 T. R. 240. 246.
3 Black. 263.
1 Saund. 344.
3 Hatsell’s precedents, 221.
Walter vs. Hanger. Moore. 882.—Brooks Abr. Corporation, 85.
3 Dall. 383.
Stat. 11, Hen. 7.
2 Inst. 51.
1 Bay. 252.
2 Bay. 59.
Little vs. Frost, 3 Mass. R. 117.
Holden vs. James, 11 Mass. Rep. 396.
3 Dall. 391.
Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7 John. R. 477.
1 Black. 46.
44 No. of Fed.
6 Cranch 87.
7 Cranch 164.
1 Kyd 65.
Rex vs. Vice Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1656. — Newling vs. Francis, 3 Term R. 197. — King vs. Pasmore, 3 Term R. 240. — Ellis vs. Marshall, 2 Mass. R. 269.
3 T. R. 200.
Ibid.
1 Black. 45.
3 Term R. 245.
2 Atkyns. 89.
1 Black. Com. 485. — 2 Kyd on Corporations, 447.
8) 1 Yol. 228.
State Laws, 283.
State Laws, 283.
Mass. Laws, 884.
9 Mass. Rep. 360.
1 Saunder’s Rep. 283. a 2. — 2 Saun. 63. c. — .—2 Peere Williams 375. 4 Gwil. Bac. 484.-5 Burr. 2630.
See 47th Number of tlie Federalist, by Mr. Madison.
1 State Laws, 385.
2 Atkyns 89.
8 Salk. 102.
1 Black. Com. 480.
2 P. Williams 327.-2 Kyd 188. 189. 194.
2 Kyd 188.
12 Mass. Rep. 587.
2 Kyd 232.
2 Kyd 510.
2 Kyd on Corporations 196.
10 Co. 28.
2 Bro. C. C. 662.—12 Mod. 232. anon.
13 Vez. Jr. 530. Atty. Gen vs. Dixie.
1 Blac. 475.-2 Blac. 37.
2 Vez, Jr. 42.-2 Bro. C. C. 062.
See Documents relative to Dart. Coll, published by Leg. 1816, p. 6.
1 Blac. 485.
See Documents relative to Dart. Coll. pub. by Leg. 1816, p. 7.
3 Burr. 1647. 1663. — 4 Burr. 2199. — 1 D. & E. 581. 8. 9.
1 Wo. 471. — 3 Blac. 467.
1 Wo. 474, — 1 Blac. 475.
1 Wo. 473 — 1 Blac. 470.
2 D. & E. 352.-4 D. & E. 244.
1 Blac. 471.
1 Blac. 468.
3) 1 Blac. 479.
1 Blac. 481. — 1 Ld. Ray. 8.
2 D. & E. 332.
1 Blac. 482.
2 D. & E. 352.
1 Blac. 483. — 1 Ld. Ray. 8.-2 D. & E. 353.
1 Ld. Bay. 5.-4 Mod. 106. — 2 D. & E. 346.
4 D. & E. 293.-2 Vez. Jr. 619.
2 D. & E. 329. 346. 358. — 1 Vez. Senr. 462. 475.-2 G. Bac. 29. 310.— Co. Litt. 96. § 136. — 2 Vez. Jr. 42. 620-5. — 1 Cranch 165. 6. — 1 Blac. 484. n. 14. — 2 P. W’ms. 325.-4 D. & E. 233.
1 Blac. 482.
1 Blac. 481.
0) 2 D. & E. 352.
1 Vez. Senr. 472. by Lord Hardwicke.
1 Vez. Senr. 472.-2 D. & E. 352. 8. — 10 Co. 23.
1 Vez. Senr. 472. — 10 Co. 23.
C. J. Holt, 12 Mod. 232.
“That Tremontaine be called Boston:” — And, that “Vinnicunnet be called Hampton,” &c.
2 Atk. 87.
1 Blac. 480. 3. — 1 L. Ray. 5.-2 D. & E. 346.-2 Kyd on Corp. 179. — See also 2 D. & E. 290-345.
1 L. Ray. 8.
2 D. & E. 352.
'35) 4 D. & 45. 244.
36) 1 L. Ray 8.
9 Cranch 52.
See act 22d June 1809«
1 Wo. 479.
2 Wo. 479.
2 Vez. Jr. 49.
See 2 P. W’ms. 326. — Duke char, uses 69. 684. — 2 Atk. 165. — 2 Vez. Jr. 49. S. 0. — 4 Bro. C. C. 167.
1 Wo. 479-483. — 1 Blao. 480-4.
2 Ves. Senr. 551.
2 Ves. Senr. 551.
See act of 27 June 1816, Sect. 8.
See 2 Vez. Jr. 619, &c. Ex parte Wrangham.
4 D. & E. 243. — 2 Vez. Jr. 619. Ex parte Wrangham.
Mr. Madison, Federalist No. 48.
Federalist No. 44.
Coop. Just. 430.
Reference is made to an act wliicli tlie compiler of tire index to tire laws was asliamed to insert.
See objections of tlie “ Council of Revision ” of Nevv-York (23d March 1798,) to an act of tlie assembly repealing tlie grant to Jolm Fitch of tlie “ sole riglit and advantage of making and employing tlie steamboat, &c.
N. H. Laws, Ed. 1815, p. 67 — 73.
7 Johns. 505.
Art. 35
See 1 Wheat. 329. — 3 Dall. 388. — 2 Cranch. 276. 7. — 11 Mass. Rep. 402. —Coll, of Protests made in the House of Lords (1661) p. 7. 8.
R. H. Laws, Ed. 1815, p. 82.
See 8 Mass. Rep. 445.
Seo acts of 6th Feby. 1789, and 19tli June 1794, N. H. Laws, edn. 1815, p. 07.73. — ante. p. 147, — and see also N. H. Turnpike acts — Bank acts, &c.
6 Cranoli 137.
Cranch 87.
62) See ante, p. 147.
63) 7 Cranch 164.
64) 9 Cranch 43.
65) 9 Cranch 292.
10 Co. 29.
3 Bur. 1780. — 3 Term Rep. 240.
1 Bos. & Pul. 40. — 3 Salk. 102. — 1 L. Ray. 30. Bac. Abr. Corp. E. Com. Dig. Franch. F. 1. — 1 Rol. 512.
2 Mass. Rep.
N. H. Laws, June Sess. 1816. p. 48.
N. H. Laws, Nov. Sess. 1816. p. 74.
N. H. Laws, Nov. Sess. 1816. p. 94.
9 Johns. Rep. 504.
3 Dal. Rep. 399.
9 Johns, Rep. 504.
Ibid. (10) Ibid.
5 Mass. Rep. 58-4. (11) 5 Mass. Rep. 584.
3 Dal. Rep. 399. (12) 3 Dal. Rep. 399.
1 Blk. Com. 91. (13) 1 Blk. Com. 91.
3 Bur. 1870.
3 Term Rep. 240.
1 Saund. 344,
3 Lev. 237 — 8.
1 Lutw. 508.
1 Kvd on Corp.
Ibid 2.
Ibid.
Haven vs. Rochester.— Strafford Supr. Ju. Co. Sept. T. 1814.
1 Kyd on Corp. 18.
Ibid 14.
Ibid 15.
4 Mod. Rep. 117.
1 Blk. Comm. 481. — Bac. Ch. E. — 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 662.
1 Blk. Comm. 166.
1 Blk. Comm. 186.
2 Kyd. on Corp. 447 — 1 Blk. Comm. 470. — Bac. Abr. Corp. A.
5 Bus. Mod. Eu. 14.
Bac. Abr. Stat. F. 18.
1 Tm. W. M. 181.
2 Term. Rep. 533. — 8 Term. Rep. 430. — Doug. Rep. 637.
4 Term Rep. 236-7 — 244.—2 Term Rep. 318.
4 Mod. Rep. 233.
2 Doug. Summary 183.
1 Hutch. Hist. 159.
9 Johns. Rep. 127.
7 Johns. Rep. 492.
9 Johns. Rep. 574.
1. Blk. Com. 01.
N. 11. Const. 5.
Ibid. 7.
1 Blk. Com. 471. — 2 Bro. Civ. Law 153. 156.
Bac. Cli. Us. — 2 Atk. 87. — 10 Co. Rep. 101. Bac. Abr. Stat.
2 Bro. Civ. Law 156.
2 Bro. Civ. Law. 152.
2 Bro. Civ. Law 152 — 3 note.
Ibid.
N. H. Const, p. 20.
2 Bur. 1064.
1 Blk. Com. 480.
2 Bro. Civ. Law. 155.
1 Blk. Com. 481.
Ibid.
1) 2 Bro. Civ. Law. 156.
2 Term Rep. 318. — 12 Mod. Rep. 686. — Doug. 139. — Bul. N. P. 284.
Mayo vs. Wilson, Ches. Co. May term, 1817.
Vide their Mem. to Legis. 1808.
3 Dal. Rep. 396.
Adams vs. Story, 6 Am. Law. Jour. 474 — Fed. No. 44. — 1 Black. Com. Tuck. N. 312.
9 Mass. Rep. 360.
1 Com. on Cont. 2. — 2 Blk. Com. 443. — 5 East. Rep. 116.
8 MAss. Rep. 448.
9 John. Rep. 541.
6 Cranch Rep. 87.
7 Cranch Rep. 164.
9 Cranch Rep. 43.
.(71) 9 Cranch Rep. 292.
9 Cranch Rep. 43.
2 Bro. Giv. Law 15G.
1 Com. 471.
3 Dal. Rep. 400.
12 Mass. Rep. 445.
N. H. Stat. June 1816.
6 Mass. Rep. 307 — 9.—2 Do. 125. — 9 Do. 363. 153. — 8 Do. 471 2. Gall. Rep.
2 Mass. Rep. 146.
10 Mass. Rep. 389, and Justice Story’s opinion U. S. vs. Bainbridge, Cir. Co. Mass. May term 1816.
Calder et ux. v. Bull, 3d Dallas 386.
Annual Regr. 1784, p. 160. — Parlia. Regr. 1783. — Mr. Burke’s Speech on Mr. Fox’s E. I. Bill. Burke’s Works — 2 Vol. p. 414. 417. 467. 468. 486.
1 Black. 472, 473.
3 Burr. 1650.
3 T. R. 244. King vs. Pasmore.
King vs. Vice Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1656. 3 T. R. 240.— Lord Kenyon.
Cl) Idem 1661, and King vs. Pasmore, ubi supra.
Ellis vs. Marshall, 2 Mass. Rep. 277. 1 Kyd. on corporations 65 6.
1 Wooddeson 474. 1 Black. 467.
1 Black. 471.
1 Ves. 537.
9 Ves. Jun. 405.
1 Wood. 474.
1 Black. 471.
2 Term Rep. 350-1.
1 Black. 4S0.
1 Lord Bay. 9.
See Appendix No. 3. 1 Burn's Eccles. Law 443.
2 Eonb. 205 — 6.
1 Ves. 472. Green vs. Rutherford, per Lord Hardwicke.
Attorney General vs. Foundling hospital. 2 Ves. Junr. 47. Vide also 2 Kyd on Corporations, 195. Cooper’s Equity Pleading, 292.
St. John’s College, Cambridge vs. Tedington. 1 Burr. 200.
Attorney General vs. Middleton, 2 Ves. 328.
Green vs. Rutherford, ubi supra. St. John’s College vs. Todington, ubi supra. — Vide Appendix No. 4.
4 Term Rep. 233.
Black, ubi supra. .
Tide Appendix No. 5.
Tide Appendix No. 6.
2 Black. Com. 37.
Bull. 41st Lect.
Phillips vs. Bury. — Green vs. Rutherforth, ubi supra. — Tide also 2 Black. 21.
Ashby vs. White, 2 Lord Ray. 938.
2 Atk. 87. Attorney General vs. Pearce.
2 Haywood’s Rep.
9 Crancli 43.
9 Crancli 292.
3 Dal. 394.
2 Gal. 103. Society vs. Wheeler.
0) 7 Johnson's Rep. 477.
Bracton Lib. 4. fol. 228. 2nd Inst. 292.
Dig. 50.17. 75. •
Elements of the Civil Law 168.
Cod. 1. 14. 7.
Perezii Praelect. Ii. t.
Prteleet Juris Civ. vol. 2. 545.
1 Black. Coin. 44.
Coke 2 In. 46.
2 Lord Ray. 952.
Tide a full account of tliis case in state trials, 4 Edn. 4 Vol. page 262.
44th No. of the Fed. by Mr. Madison.
6 Cranch SI.
New Jersey vs. Wilson. 7. Cranch 104.
Burr. 1656.
3 Term. Rep. 240.
Vide also 1 Kyd on Cor. 65.
4 Burr. 2200.
6 Term. Rep. 277.
Vide also 2 Brown, Ch. Rep. 662. Ex parte, Bolton school.
The docket entries in the case are,—
May Term, 1817. “ Jus. Woodbury doth not sit.”
November Term, 1817. “HonaM° Judge Woodbury does not sitinthis case.” The official report, 1 N. H. Ill, makes no mention of Judge Woodbury’s not sitting in the case, while Farrar, as above reprinted, and other jrablieations of
3 Mass. Rep. 379.
9 Crancli 43.
3 Durnford and East 244.
N. H. Laws, 184.
Laws 241.
Sullivan’s Lectures 383-408. 2 Institute 45. 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 423.
1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 485.
Laws 51.
7 Cranch 104.
1 Gallison 177. — 5 Cranch 281. — And Lewis vs. Foster, Cheshire, May 1817.
12 Mass. Rep. 443.
6 Cranch 185.