Trump Village Apartments One Owner v. New York State Division of Housing & Community RenewalTrump Village Apartments One Owner v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner is the owner of a building located at 2940 Ocean Parkway in Brooklyn, which has 433 rent-regulated apartments. In January 2006, the petitioner filed an application with the respondent, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (hereinafter the DHCR), to convert the property to individual electric metering and to terminate the inclusion of the cost of electricity in the rent of the tenants at the property. On June 30, 2006, the Rent Administrator (hereinafter the RA) granted the petitioner‘s application. As a result, the DHCR was required to reduce the tenants’ rent pursuant to
In June 2008, Michael Knee, a tenant in the building, and an organization named Concerned Tenants For Equitable Submetering commenced a
In a determination dated May 3, 2011, the RA determined that the June 30, 2006, determination should be modified to apply the revised rent reduction schedules set forth in update No. 1 to the tenants at the property. The RA rejected the petitioner‘s contention that the Supreme Court intended to exclude all of the tenants, with the exception of Michael Knee, when it amended the caption. The petitioner filed a PAR. In a determination dated January 10, 2013, the Deputy Commissioner of the DHCR denied the PAR and confirmed the RA‘s determination. The petitioner subsequently commenced the instant
Contrary to the petitioner‘s contention, the judgment dated November 14, 2008, remitting the matter to the DHCR “for issuance of a new determination applying the most recent Operational Bulletin,” was a final judgment, not an order, and was appealable as of right (see CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. v Cuomo, 27 NY3d 1034, 1036-1037 [2016]; cf. Matter of DeJesus v Roberts, 296 AD2d 307, 310 [2002]). While it is true that “[n]o appeal lies as of right from an order in an article 78 proceeding [remitting] a matter to an agency for further nonministerial proceedings” (Matter of Clermont Tenants Assn. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 73 AD3d 658, 658 [2010]), here, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the DHCR to make a specified finding, and divested the DHCR of any discretion in its redetermination (see Matter of Mid-Is. Hosp. v Wyman, 15 NY2d 374, 379-380 [1965]; Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145, 146 [2005]; cf. Matter of Arbor Hill Partners v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 156 AD2d 896, 898 [1989]). Since the petitioner did not appeal from the judgment dated November 14, 2008, its contentions concerning the determinations made in that judgment are not properly before this Court (see Matter of Tekiara F. [Gayle A.E.], 116 AD3d 852, 853 [2014]; Matter of Braden Food & Drink, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 72 AD3d 956, 957 [2010]).
In addition, the Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioner was collaterally estopped from attempting to relitigate, in the instant
The only issue presented on this appeal is whether the Supreme Court properly concluded that the January 10, 2013, determination of the Deputy Commissioner of the DHCR was neither arbitrary and capricious, nor without a rational basis in the record and a reasonable basis in law (see
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding (see Matter of 9215 Realty, LLC v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 136 AD3d 925, 925-926 [2016]; Matter of Kripalani v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 126 AD3d 904, 905-906 [2015]; Matter of Watson v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal [N.Y.S.D.H.C.R.], 109 AD3d at 834). Chambers, J.P., Dickerson, Miller and Connolly, JJ., concur.