{¶ 2} Appellant returned to the Girard Municipal Court, Case No. 2004 CVI 691, and filed a pro se motion for relief from the original November 3, 2004 decision, claiming newly discovered evidence. The municipal court struck appellant's motion and instructed her not to file further pleadings. Appellant appealed to this court, Case No. 2006-T-0063. On December 31, 2007, this court reversed and remanded the case on the grounds that striking the motion for relief from judgment was procedurally in error. Kamofel v. Girard Police Dept., 11th Dist. No. 2006-T-0063,
{¶ 3} On March 11, 2008, appellee filed a complaint to declare appellant a vexatious litigator and for relief under R.C.
{¶ 4} On April 30, 2008, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this court, which we dismissed. Kamofel v. Girard PoliceDept., 11th Dist. Nos. 2008-T-0043 and 2008-T-0048,
{¶ 5} On August 28, 2008, appellant filed a pro se motion for summary judgment. On September 4, 2008, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in opposition to appellant's motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2008, appellant filed a pro se memorandum in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to its October 6, 2008 judgment entry, the trial court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment, granted appellee's motion for summary *4 judgment, and declared appellant a vexatious litigator.2 It is from that judgment that appellant filed the present appeal in which she asserts the following assignments of error for our review:
{¶ 7} "[1.] The trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for indigency status.
{¶ 8} "[2.] A reevaluation is needed to see if summary judgment was properly granted.
{¶ 9} "[3.] Appellant was denied her state constitutional right under Section
{¶ 10} For ease of discussion, we will address appellant's assignments of error out of order.
{¶ 11} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and declaring her a vexatious litigator.
{¶ 12} "This court reviews de novo a trial court's order granting summary judgment." Hudspath v. Cafaro Co., 11th Dist. No. 2004-A-0073,
{¶ 13} "Since summary judgment denies the party his or her `day in court' it is not to be viewed lightly as docket control or as a `little trial.' The jurisprudence of summary judgment standards has placed burdens on both the moving and the nonmoving party. In Dresher v.Burt [(1996),
{¶ 14} "The court in Dresher went on to say that paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991),
{¶ 15} "The Supreme Court in Dresher went on to hold that whenneither the moving nor nonmoving party provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no material facts in dispute, the moving party is not entitled a judgment as a matter of law as the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, `and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim. Id. at 276. (Emphasis added.)'" Id. at ¶ 42.
{¶ 16} "Vexatious conduct" is the conduct of a party in a civil action that "obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action," "is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," or "is imposed solely for delay." R.C.
{¶ 17} In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, although she may have had a good faith basis for filing the original August 18, 2004 pro se complaint in the Girard Municipal Court, she learned at trial that a medical malpractice claim must fail without expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care and a breach of that standard of care. See Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976),
{¶ 18} In opposing appellee's motion for summary judgment, appellant failed to present any evidence of the type listed in Civ. R. 56(C) to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Appellant's baseless claim and conduct against appellee clearly falls within the legal definition of vexatious conduct. As such, the trial court properly declared her a vexatious litigator.
{¶ 19} Appellant's second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 20} In her third assignment of error, appellant alleges that she was denied her constitutional rights.
{¶ 21} Under Section
{¶ 22} The Supreme Court of Ohio in Mayer determined that "R.C.
{¶ 23} In the instant matter, appellant has not been denied any constitutional rights.
{¶ 24} Appellant's third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 25} In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for indigency status.
{¶ 26} "The determination of indigence * * * `is typically granted liberally in order to preserve the due process rights of litigants and guarantee an access to judicial process and representation.' Evans v.Evans, [10th Dist.] Nos. 04AP-816 04AP-1208,
{¶ 27} In the case sub judice, it does not appear from the record that a filing fee of $43.00 was prohibitive or in any way prevented appellant from pursuing her claims. There is no evidence which would demonstrate that the fee was unreasonable or unduly burdensome to appellant. Due to appellant's history of filing pleading after pleading with no legal basis, the trial court did not err by not granting appellant indigency status, as there is no right to indigency status in a civil appeal. See, e.g., Jackson v. Herron, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-045,
{¶ 28} Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's assignments of error are not well-taken. The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concur.