24 N.M. 339 | N.M. | 1918
OPINION OP THE COURT.
The above cases were tried together and upon the same evidence in the district court, by agreement; and, as the same identical questions are involved in both appeals, they will be considered together here. In each case the appellees here, plaintiffs below, filed a suit in replevin in the district court. The action in each case was commenced by the filing of a complaint and affidavit in replevin by the appelles in' the office of the clerk of the district court for Lincoln county. The affidavits in replevin filed were in the exact words of thei form prescribed by section 4355, Code T’915. Appellant appeared in each case and filed a plea in abatement in which he set, forth that the affidavits in replevin failed to allege any value to the property sought to be recovered and asked that the actions be dismissed because not based upon a lawful affidavit as required by the statute. The pleas in abatement were stricken from the files upon motion by counsel for appellees. f Appellant then demurred to the complaints upon the ground that the complaint in each case was defective in that it failed to state tbe value of tbe property described and sought to be replevied. Tbe demurrer was overruled and appellant answered. Tbe case being at issue was tried by tbe court without a jury.
Tbe possession of 1& bead of calves was involved in the Arnwine case and 8 bead of calves in tbe Trujillo Case. In the Arnwine Case the court decreed that ap-pellees in that case were entitled to tbe possession of 19 bead of calves; that appellant should return said calves, in default of which be should pay to appellees $665, and judgment for this sum was entered against the sureties on tbe forthcoming bond. A similar judgment was entered in tbe other case for tbe return of 8 head of calves or the sum of $280. To review these judgments these appeals are prosecuted.
The suit having been filed in the district court which had jurisdiction of the action regardless of the amount involved, it was not necessary to allege in the complaint the value of the goods. Where such a suit is filed before a justice of the peace where the jurisdiction of such officer is limited by section 3252, Code 1915, such allegation would be essential. The statute does not require the value of the goods to be stated in the complaint, and even though the value had been alleged in the complaint it would have served no useful purpose as neither party would, upon the trial, be bound by such stated value, nor would the officer taking the bond be warranted in acting upon the value so alleged. There are cases which hold that it is essential that the complaint should state the value of the goods, but these cases evidently arose under statutes which so require. The following cases and authorities hold that the value need not be alleged in the complaint. Blake v. Darling, 116 Mass. 300; Litchman v. Potter, 116 Mass. 371; Pomeroy v. Trimper, 8 Allen (Mass.) 398, 85 Am. Dec. 714; Root v. Woodruff, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 418; Britton v. Morss, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 469.
It is lastly urged that the judgment entered is contrary to the law and the evidence. The evidence fully supports the judgment of the court and was warranted by the law.
The judgment in each case will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered.