ORDER
Roberto Trujillo worked in the personnel department at the American Bar Association and also served as Plan Administrator for the ABA’s pension plаn, which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Trujillo served as Plan Administrator for two years until the plan’s administration committee, chaired by John Krsul, Jr., removed him from that role; days later the ABA fired him. Trujillo’s dismissal followed his repeated warnings to the committee about mismanagement оf the plan, including that its funds were used for fees the ABA should have paid. Trujillo sued the ABA and Krsul under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which authorizes any “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciаry” to seek equitable relief to address violations of ERISA, including retaliation for participating in ERISA inquiries or proceedings, see id. § 1140. The operаtive complaint (the third version) demands back pay and reinstatement as Plan Administrator or “some other form of equitable relief ... in order to make the Plaintiff whole.” Trujillo, who alleges that Krsul persuaded the ABA to outsource his duties and fire him, also claims that the chairman intentionally undermined his emplоyment relationship with the ABA. See generally Harrison v. Addington,
On the defendants’ motion, the district court dismissed the ERISA claim with pi-ejudice. The court reasoned that Trujillo, who concedes that he never was a plan participant or beneficiary, no longer was a plan fiduciary after his removal as Plan Administrator. And under section 1132(a)(3), the court continued, only current fiduciaries are authorized to sue. The corn-t therefore concluded that Trujillo does not state a claim, even if his removal was retaliatory. Moreover, the court said, Trujillo has sued to vindicate only his own interests, not because he seeks to help the plan participants and beneficiaries. Having dismissed the ERISA clаim, the district court then dismissed without prejudice the tort claim against Krsul. The court explained that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, yet the court said nothing about Trujillo’s invocation of the diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, the court overlooked that, in ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss an earlier version of Trujillo’s complaint, it had concluded that Trujillo and Krsul are citizens of different states and that the claim could proceed under the diversity statute. On appeal Trujillo challenges the dismissal of both claims.
We start with the ERISA claim. Trujillo insists that a former fiduciary can suе under section 1132(a)(3); essentially, he maintains that a literal reading of that provision leaves him and comparable plaintiffs without a remedy for а retaliatory removal from the position of Plan Administrator. Trujillo, though, does not contest the district court’s assertion that he seeks relief only for himsеlf, not for the participants and beneficiaries of the ABA’s pension plan.
But Trujillo did not bring this lawsuit in a fiduciary capacity—current or former— so he cannot fit himself within the limited reach of section 1132(a)(3). A fiduciary is required to “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries!’ and “for the exclusive purpose of’ providing bеnefits and maintaining the plan’s financial health. 29 U.S.C, § 1104(a)(1). A fiduciary may bring a civil action “to enjoin any act” or “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief’ to redress ERISA violations or to enforce provisions of ERISA or a benefit plan, id. § 1132(a)(3), but he must do so in the interest of the plan, not for his own benefit. See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
Moreover, if Trujillo had wanted to sue on behalf of plan participants or beneficiaries, he would have faced another obstacle: as a pro se litigant, he can represent only himself, not others. See Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ.,
We thus uphold the dismissal of Trujillo’s federal claim. His tort claim against Krsul, however, is another matter, Trujillo alleges that, when he filed this lawsuit, he was a citizen of Illinois and Krsul a citizen of Michigan. The district court erred, says Trujillo, in assuming that subject-matter jurisdiction over, the tort claim depends on the supplemental jurisdiction rather than the diversity statute.
Krsul now argues, however, that the diversity statute did not provide subject-matter jurisdiction because complete diversity was lacking when Trujillo filed suit, since both Trujillo and the ABA were citizens of Illinois. Diversity of citizenship is evaluated when a suit is filed and anаlyzed as to the entire case, not individual claims. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P.,
One final point: Trujillo contends that the district judge should have assessed whether he or his law сlerks might have a conflict of interest arising from membership in the ABA. This argument is merit-less. A judge’s—and, by extension, his clerks’—membership in a defendant bar association does not require recusal. See Comm, on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Opinion No. 52 (June 2009).
The dismissal of Trujillo’s state-law claim against Defendant Krsul is VACAT-' ED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings on the claim. In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.