On July 4, 1949, thе plaintiff’s intestate was the victim of an automobile accident in the Province of Quebec and sustainеd injuries from which she died there on the same day. The plaintiff administratrix asserts that the accident was causеd by the negligence of the defendant Pierre Gagne, who she asserts was the agent or servant of the defendant Rose Anna Gagne, and she seeks to recover in this single action for the death and for conscious suffer *465 ing and expenses, both against the defendant Pierre Gagne and against the defendant Rose Anna Gagnе. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229, § 6, as appearing in St. 1949, c. 427, § 5; c. 231, § 4A, as inserted by St. 1943, c. 350, § 1.
Demurrers of the two defendants to the original declaration were sustained for a matter of detail not now material, with leave to move to amend within ten dаys, but when, within that time, the plaintiff did move to amend without changing the general character of the action, the motion was denied. The plaintiff excepted to the order denying her motion to amend and also attеmpted to appeal from the order. The appeal will not lie because the order denying thе motion to amend was not an “order decisive of the case founded upon matter of law apрarent on the record.” G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 96.
Means
v.
Leveroni,
Even though the leave to amend was, in a general sense, an exercise of the court’s discretion in favor of rather than against amendment, that action did not exhaust the power of the сourt over the subject of amendment. When the amendment was actually presented it still remained for the court to determine whether such an amendment as was presented ought to be allowed.
Massachusetts Gasoline & Oil Co.
v.
Go-Gas Co.
All substantive rights of action growing out of the injury
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and death of the plaintiff’s intestate necessarily have their origin in the law of the place where the wrong was done. This principle is well settled both as to actions for injuries and as to actions for death.
Levy
v.
Steiger,
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada gives a right of recovery to the сonsort and the ascendant and descendant relatives of a person who dies in consequencе of injury by the commission of an offence or a quasi offence. The right appears to be persоnal to those coming within the description of persons entitled to it. There is nothing to suggest that the right belongs to, оr can be sued upon by, an administrator. Article 596 provides for the succession by
*467
law or by will of the propеrty and transmissible rights of a deceased person. There appears to be no provision for the survivаl after death of a right of action for physical injury, pain, or suffering before death. In the comparatively recent case of
Smith
v.
Pelletier,
72 Queb. K. B. 664, the court treated art. 1056 of the code as giving a cause of action for the death to the widow and the ascendants and descendants and to them only. The court said that this right did not include the recovery of indemnity for such losses as medical and hospital expenses, which the cоurt said do not result from the death, and the right to recover for which against the wrongdoer was part of the еstate of the deceased at the moment of death. The court further said that damages of a purеly personal nature such as bodily injury or physical suffering come to an end with the death of the sufferer and аre not transmissible in nature as part of his estate. The result is that an administrator cannot maintain an actiоn for death, and no one after the death can maintain an action for consious suffering. A similar view of the death statute of Quebec was taken in
Johnson
v.
Phoenix Bridge Co.
Appeal dismissed.
Exceptions overruled.