Thе circuit court granted A1 Cannon Jr.’s (“Respondent”) motion for summary judgment and Tracy O. Trousdell (“Appellant”) appeals.
Factual/Procedural Background
Appellant was employed as a highway patrolman for the South Carolina Department of Public Safety. On October 16, 1998, Appellant attempted to pull over a speeding vehicle by turning on his blue lights, wig-wags, and emergency flashers. The offending driver did not pull over аnd a chase ensued. As he approached the North Charleston city limits, Appellant advised his dispatcher to notify the North Charleston Police Department of the pursuit, but did not request аny assistance. Although Appellant did not request it, officers from the North Charleston police department and from the Charleston County Sheriffs Department joined in the chase behind Appеllant.
At some point, the offending vehicle began slowing down and eventually came to a complete stop. Before Appellant’s cruiser reached a complete stop, the Sheriffs Department’s cruiser, driven by Deputy William J. Collins, hit Appellant from behind. Appellant suffered injuries as a result.
Appellant received workers’ compensation benefits, including an award of permanent disability, and is no longer employed as a highway patrolman. Appellant sued the Charleston County Sheriffs Department (amended to A1 Cannon, Jr., in his capacity as Sheriff). Rеspondent moved for summary judgment and Appellant moved for partial summary judgment. Special Circuit Court Judge Roger M. Young granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s motiоn for partial summary judgment.
Appellant appeals the following issue:
Did the trial judge err in granting summary judgment for Respondent on grounds that the Fireman’s Rule 1 barred Appellant’s suit?
Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in finding that South Carolina recognizes the Fireman’s Rule, аnd that it applied to bar Appellant’s suit. We agree.
In determining whether summary judgment is proper, this Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club,
This Court has considered the viability of the Fireman’s Rule in South Carolina very recently. In
Jeffery Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc., and Incendere, Inc., 349
S.C. 567,
Does the Fireman’s Rule bar an emergency professional, such as a firefighter, police officer, or public safety officer, who is injured as a result of performing his or her duties, from recovering tort based damages from the party whоse negligence caused the injury-causing event?
Justice Pleicones, writing for the majority, expressed the holding as follows:
South Carolina has never recognized the firefighter’s rule, and we find it is not part of this state’s common law. (citations omitted). In our view, the tort law of this state adequately addresses negligence claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries inсurred by firefighters and police officers during the discharge of their duties. We are not persuaded by any of those courts that recognize the firefighter’s rule. The more sound public policy — аnd the one we adopt — is to decline to promulgate a rule singling out police officers and firefighters for discriminatory treatment.
It then follows that the fireman’s rule is still good law in South Carolina despite the adoption of the comparativе negligence system which bars assumption of the risk as a complete defense. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the fireman’s rule does not preclude the plaintiff in this casе from recovering for his injuries because he assumed the risks which caused his own negligence to exceed that of the defendant. If that were the theoretical basis it would be a jury’s duty to assеss the degree of fault. Rather, the fireman’s rule precludes the plaintiff from recovering in this case because he cannot show, as a matter of law, that the defendant owed him a duty of care. Sinсe the defendant’s duty of care was only to the general public, he does not owe a duty of care to his fellow officers, and thus cannot be found negligent as a matter of law.
(citations omitted). In finding that Respondent did not owe a duty to Appellant, the trial judge cited several cases addressing the “public duty rule” for support.
4
The parties did not
In
Arthurs v. Aiken County,
this Court considered the public duty rule and its interplay with the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”).
5
Appellаnt in this case did not allege a violation of a statutory duty as the basis for his negligence claim. Rather, Appellant’s allegations centered around violation of duties of care сreated by the common law, such as exercising reasonable caution. Generally, the public duty rule is invoked in cases where the duty is created by statute and would not otherwise exist.
See Arthurs
(allеging breach of duty created by criminal domestic violence statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 16-25-10 to 80 (Supp.1994));
Tanner v. Florence County Treasurer,
Although the trial judge did not address whether Respondent was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act in his order, we note that it would not bar Appellant’s suit. The Tort Claims Act abrogated South Carolina’s sovereign immunity, making this state’s governmental entities liable for their torts “in the same manner and to the same extent as ... private individual[s] ..., subject to the limitations upon liability and damagеs, contained herein.” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-40. Section 15-78-60 contains specific exceptions to the waiver of immunity, and the circumstances presented in this case are not included. 6 Appellant’s action against Respondent does not fall within any of the listed exemptions. Therefore, Respondent is not immune from suit.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we hold the Fireman’s Rule is not recognized in South Carolina, and, therefore, that the trial court erred in finding it barred Respondent’s suit. Accordingly, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment for Respondent and REMAND for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
Notes
. The Fireman’s Rule is referred to interchangeably as the Firefighter’s Rule or the Rescuer’s Rule.
. Minnich was employed by the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC”) as a public sаfety officer. Minnich routinely assisted in loading medical waste onto a tractor trailer owned by Med-Waste, Inc. parked at MUSC, and was injured one day when he had to jump inside the truck to prevent it from rolling into a public street.
. Further, many jurisdictions that recognize the Fireman’s Rule would find it does
not
apply under the circumstances presented in this case where the injuries were not cаused by the negligence that necessitated the presence of the police officer (the fleeing suspect), but by an intervening negligent act.
E.g. Garcia v. City of South Tucson,
. The trial judge cited
Arthurs
and the following cases in a footnote, but never mentioned the public duty rule explicitly in his order:
Tanner v. Florence Co. Treasurer, et. al.,
. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et. seq. (Supp.2001). This Act defines the parameters of tort liability for governmental agencies in South Carolina.
. Appellant points out that section 15-78-60(19) excludes activities of the South Carolina National Guard while engaged in training on duty, but limits that exemption to activities other than vehicular accidents. The National Guard does not have immunity from suit for vehicular accidents occurring during active training duty. If the General Assembly intended to create immunity for police officers for their vehicular accidents, it would have made an exemption from liability for them. The public policy concerns presented by the Amicus Curiae, therefore, may be best addressed by the General Assembly.