515 S.W.2d 67 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1974
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismissing appellant’s amended petition on the grounds that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse.
Where a petition is. attacked by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim the facts alleged are taken to be true and the pleader is entitled to all favorable inferences fairly deducible therefrom; if the facts pleaded and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, looked at
With the foregoing rule in mind, we turn now to a consideration of the amended petition in this case, which alleges that the plaintiff, a 17 year old,
The Juvenile Code of this State imposes upon officers of the Juvenile Court statutory duties once the child has been taken into custody. (1) The parent, legal custodian or guardian of the child must be notified as soon as possible — Sec. 211.131(2); (2) the person taking the child into custody shall, unless it is impracticable, undesirable, or has been otherwise ordered by the court, return the child to his parent, guardian or legal custodian on the promise of such person to bring the child to court, if necessary, at a stated time or at such times as the court may direct — Sec. 211.141(1); (3) if the child is not released to his parents, guardian or legal custodian, he may be detained “only on order of the court specifying the reason for detention,” — Sec. 211.141(2); (4) the parent, guardian or legal custodian of-the child shall be notified
A petition seeking damages for false imprisonment must allege “ultimate facts” which, if proven, show (1) detention or restraint (2) against plaintiff’s will and (3) without legal justification. Warren v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670, 672 [1] (Mo.1969); Parrott v. Reis, 441 S.W.2d 390, 392 [2] (Mo.App.1969). In argument before this court, defendants contend that since the plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon specified violations of the Juvenile Code, more specifically Sec. 211.141 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., it was essential that he allege that there was a parent, guardian or legal custodian to whom he could have been surrendered or released. They further contend that by alleging in his petition that he was a violator of the Juvenile Code “by robbery and runaway from Missouri Hills” he pleaded himself out of court. The thrust of this argument, more fully developed in respondent’s brief, is that since Missouri Hills is a facility of the St. Louis Juvenile Court operated by the Division of Children’s Services of the City of St. Louis, and a Juvenile is not placed at Missouri Hills unless by order of the Presiding Judge of the St. Louis Juvenile Court following an adjudication that the juvenile comes within the provisions of Sec. 211.031 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., plaintiff was a ward of they:ourt and once having been so adjudicated, the court had the power to retain jurisdiction over him until he became 21 years of age. They further contend that Sec. 211.141 applies to juveniles brought to the attention of the juvenile authorities concerning whom the court has made no initial jurisdictional determination. They attempt to back-date his prior difficulties which brought plaintiff before the Juvenile Court as probable cause for his being taken into custody on this occasion. They do not deny that the court did not issue an order for detention beyond the 24 hour limit, but state, nonetheless, that appellant’s detention was lawful and reasonable in light of the provisions and purposes of the juvenile code. Because plaintiff-appellant is a minor, the defendants argue that something more is involved than in the false imprisonment of an adult. They argue that, unlike an adult, a juvenile does not have “the unequivocal right to be free in the community under his own auspices” and that the laws concerning juveniles grants them a “conditional liberty” qualified by the obligation to remain in the custody of the appropriate parent or lawful guardian.
Respondents cite not a single case in support of their position, nor has our research led us to one. We know of no such requirement as they espouse for a false imprisonment action of a child. If, as we deduce, the defense of these defendants is that the plaintiff was, at the time he was taken into custody by the detectives, a ward of the Court and these sections of the statutes upon which he relies were not applicable, that would be a matter for defense, not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As we view plaintiff’s amended petition, he does not aver as a fact that he was a runaway from Missouri Hills. He merely alleges that to be what the detectives contended when they took him into custody and delivered him to the defendant, Sirinek. If, as he further alleged, a petition filed by the Chief Deputy Juvenile Officer on June 18, 1970, alleging that he came within the provisions of Sec. 211.031 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., was dismissed for lack of evidence — and we must, at this stage, assume it to be a fact — on or about August 21, 1970, after he had been
A petition alleging that “On February 5, 1951, in Farmington, Missouri, the defendant unlawfully, maliciously and with intent to injure, falsely imprisoned the plaintiffs in the county jail for 24 hours by force, without reasonable cause, right, or authority, and against the will of plaintiffs” was held to state a claim for false imprisonment for which relief could be granted. Pogue v. Smallen, 285 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Mo.1956).
All we are holding in this case is that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition for false imprisonment for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We reverse and remand.
. Tlie parties shall be referred to as plaintiff and defendant or defendants, the position they were in at the trial level.
. May 30, 1970, was a Sunday.