Danny Trotman v. State of Maryland
No. 8
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
October 18, 2019
Barbera, C.J.; McDonald; Watts; Hotten; Getty; Booth; Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
September Term, 2019; Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 115236022; Argued: September 9, 2019; Opinion by Watts, J.
PROSPECTIVE JURORS WITH DISABILITIES – AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT –
It is equally well-established that “[a] citizen may not be excluded from jury service due to color, disability, economic status, national origin, race, religion, or sex.”
This case involves the unfortunate circumstance that in a courthouse in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a staircase with twenty-five steps was the only way to reach the jury room that accompanied the courtroom that was used for the trial in this case. We must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in excusing for cause four prospective jurors who said that they would have difficulty using1 or were unable to use stairs.
The State, Respondent, charged Sergeant Danny Trotman, Petitioner, a correctional officer of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, with second-degree assault, conspiracy to commit second-degree assault, and misconduct in office. At the start of trial, before the jury panel entered the courtroom, four prospective jurors disclosed to the Jury Commissioner’s Office that they would either have difficulty using or be unable to use stairs, and the Jury Commissioner’s Office gave that information to the circuit court. The circuit court separately called each of the four prospective jurors to the bench. In each instance, first, the circuit court expressly confirmed that the prospective juror was unable to use stairs; then, the circuit court informed the prospective juror that a staircase with twenty-five steps was the only way to reach the jury room. Ultimately, the circuit court excused the four prospective jurors for cause and directed them to return to the jury assembly room to be available for participation as jurors in another trial. Trotman’s counsel objected to the circuit court excusing the four prospective jurors for cause and requested that the circuit court conduct the trial in another courtroom. The circuit court responded that no other courtroom was available, and trial proceeded in the assigned courtroom. The jury found Trotman guilty of two charges. Trotman appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Trotman filed a petition
Before us, Trotman contends that the circuit court erred in excusing for cause the four prospective jurors who indicated that they were unable to use stairs. Trotman argues that the circuit court failed to properly exercise its discretion to excuse for cause the four prospective jurors at issue, as it failed to consider potential options for accommodating them. The State responds that, although prospective jurors with disabilities cannot be excluded from jury service across the board, on a case-by-case basis, a trial court may excuse a prospective juror with a disability if the disability would interfere with the performance of the prospective juror’s duties.
Guided by the Americans with Disabilities Act, Maryland statutes that govern jury service, and relevant case law, we hold that a trial court may not summarily excuse for cause prospective jurors with disabilities; instead, a trial court may excuse a prospective juror for cause on a disability-related ground if no reasonable accommodation is possible, and, at that particular trial, the particular disability would prevent the prospective juror from providing satisfactory jury service. Applying our holding to this case’s circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause the four prospective jurors who indicated they would be unable to use the stairs to the jury room.
BACKGROUND
Jury Selection
On the first day of trial, shortly after the jury panel entered the courtroom, during a bench conference, the circuit court stated:
[Juror 3762] is unable to use stairs. So she can’t be on this jury because there are [twenty-five step]s to the jury room. So I’m going to strike her for cause. . . . [M]aybe I [had] better check with these [prospective jurors] to make sure [that] they’re telling the truth. . . . [Juror] 408 also says [that s]he can’t do stairs. . . . I’m not going to strike. I’m going to talk to them. . . . [Juror] 624 also says [that] she can’t do stairs.
After the circuit court called roll, the following exchanges occurred:
THE COURT: May I see Juror [] 376 at the bench with [c]ounsel?
* * *
THE COURT: [Juror 376], I understand from the Jury Commissioner’s Office that you have difficulty doing stairs, is that correct?
[JUROR 376]: Yes.
THE COURT: There are [twenty-five] steps to the jury room, so I’m going to excuse you from serving on this jury because you’re unable to do the stairs. Okay?
[JUROR 376]: Okay.
THE COURT: So you should go back to the jury assembly room now.
[JUROR 376]: Okay. Now, in the future, I don’t feel that I -- I have the ability to -- I know that you don’t want to discriminate against me --
THE COURT: Correct.
[JUROR 376]: But I feel that[,] in serving on the jury[,] you need to use your visual cues as well as, you know, the evidence and everything --
THE COURT: Well, and you would let the [j]udge know that. Not every person who’s blind feels that way.
[JUROR 376]: Okay.
[JUROR 376]: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: You can go back now to [the jury assembly room], where you were at.
[JUROR 376]: Where I was at?
THE COURT: Where you were at.
[JUROR 376]: Thank you.
THE COURT: May I see Juror [] 408[,] please?
* * *
THE COURT: [Juror 408], you told the Jury [Commissioner’s] Office that you were unable to do [stair]s. There are [twenty-five] steps to the jury room in this courtroom. Will you be able to do those?
[JUROR 408]: I have hard time going across the street.
THE COURT: No? Okay. Well, for that reason[ --] there are courtrooms that are on the same level, but this is not one of them. So I’m going to excuse you and ask you to go back to the jury assembly room.
[JUROR 408]: Okay. All right. Thank you.
THE COURT: May I see Juror [] 624?
* * *
THE COURT: I understand that you’re unable to do steps, is that correct?
[JUROR 624]: Yes.
THE COURT: There’s [twenty-five] steps to the jury room in this courtroom, so are you telling me that you don’t think you can do [twenty-five] steps?
[JUROR 624]: No. Do you have[ --] is there an elevator? I can do that.
THE COURT: We don’t have an elevator. You [would] have to walk up and down the steps. Up and down the steps.
[JUROR 624]: No. No.
THE COURT: So I’m going to excuse you from serving on this jury. All right?
[JUROR 624]: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: So you’re excused now. They do have courtrooms on the same level, so there are no steps involved.
[JUROR 624]: Okay.
THE COURT: So you may be selected for one of them, so you’re free to go back.
[JUROR 624]: Okay. Okay. Thank you.
* * *
THE COURT: May see Juror [] 404?
* * *
THE COURT: [Juror 404], you told the [J]ury [C]ommissioner[’s Office] that you couldn’t serve on this jury because you couldn’t go up and down stairs, is that correct?
[JUROR 404]: Umm --
THE COURT: I’ve got [twenty-five step]s. Could you go up and down [twenty-five step]s?
[JUROR 404]: No.
THE COURT: Okay. I’m going to excuse you then.
[JUROR 404]: Okay.
THE COURT: You can report back to the [j]ury [a]ssembly [r]oom now.
[JUROR 404]: Thank you.
After the circuit court finished questioning individual prospective jurors about their responses to the voir dire questions that the circuit court asked of the jury panel, the following exchange occurred:
[TROTMAN’S COUNSEL]: I’d like to make motion on the stairs, particularly [Juror 624,3 who] said that [she] would
THE COURT: And how would you have suggested [that] I accommodate her?
[TROTMAN’S COUNSEL]: That we go to another courtroom, on behalf of [] Trotman, who’s on trial here, for him to have fundamentally fair trial as a [d]efendant[,] versus the need to have steps in particular courtroom[. T]hat’s reason they’re going to get struck when they’re randomly picked [prospective] jurors. That’s my objection.
THE COURT: Okay. Unfortunately[,] in the Baltimore City Circuit Court[,] every single courtroom is being used. I, as a senior judge,4 fill up the empty courtroom[,] Judge [Sylvester] Cox’s courtroom, which is what we’re in. He’s assigned to juvenile[. T]hat’s why we’re here. It’s the only
courtroom that’s available. So you’[v]e made your record. (Emphasis added).
State’s Witnesses’ Trial Testimony, Verdicts, and Sentences
Although the evidence adduced at trial is not dispositive of the issue that is before this Court, we provide a summary of the evidence for completeness. At trial, as a witness for the State, David Gilmore testified that, on December 2, 2014, while he was working as a correctional officer at Baltimore Central Booking & Intake Center, he was told that five inmates needed to be moved. Gilmore went to the area where the five inmates were, and was told that one of them, Eric Wise, was refusing to move. Six or seven correctional officers were in the area of Wise’s cell. One of them, a Sergeant Thompson, approached the door to Wise’s cell, spoke to him, and then struck him. According to Gilmore, Wise came “running, crawling out of [his] cell[.]” Two officers pushed Wise down and told him to get on his stomach. Wise broke away from the two officers and headed toward an exit. At that point, Trotman, who was standing near the exit, slapped Wise, who turned and went in a different direction. Sergeant Thomas struck Wise’s back, and Wise got on his stomach and was handcuffed.
As a witness for the State, Wise testified that, on December 2, 2014, while he was an inmate at Baltimore Central Booking & Intake Center, he was told that he needed to be moved. When Wise asked why, Sergeant Thomas hit him. Other correctional officers entered Wise’s cell. Wise tried to run, and some of the correctional officers tried to hold him down. Wise pulled away from the correctional officers and got out of his cell. Wise testified that he was hit in the jaw, not slapped, but he could not tell who hit him. Wise was taken to the infirmary and then to the University of Maryland Medical Center. Wise underwent surgery for a broken jaw, and multiple screws were placed in his jaw, which was wired shut.
Detective-Sergeant Christian Boodhoo of the Internal Investigative Division of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services testified for the State that the Department’s policy requires correctional officers to “use the minimal amount of force reasonably necessary to accomplish [a] mission.”5 According to Detective-Sergeant Boodhoo, an open-hand slap to the face, or a punch to the face, was
The jury found Trotman guilty of second-degree assault and misconduct in office, and not guilty of conspiracy to commit second-degree assault. The circuit court sentenced Trotman to ninety suspended days of imprisonment, eighteen months of probation, and 200 hours of community service for second-degree assault, and sixty suspended days of imprisonment and eighteen concurrent months of probation for misconduct in office.
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
Trotman appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in excusing for cause the four prospective jurors who said that they could not use stairs. See Danny Trotman v. State, No. 2331, Sept. Term, 2016, 2019 WL 290022, at *21, *11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 15, 2019). The Court of Special Appeals explained:
The [circuit court] judge, a retired and specially assigned veteran of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, drew upon her current and historical knowledge of the courthouse. . . . [W]hen [Trotman’s] counsel suggested that another courtroom might possibly be able to accommodate the physical disabilities of [the four prospective] jurors[ at issue], the [circuit court] judge explained that Trotman’s trial had been assigned to her, along with the courtroom [that was] usually occupied by [another circuit court] judge who was temporarily sitting in juvenile court, and, according to the [circuit court] judge, there was no other courtroom available for Trotman’s two-day trial. When the [circuit court] judge provided that explanation at trial, [Trotman’s] counsel did not dispute the lack of alternative courtrooms or challenge the adequacy of the [circuit court judge]’s investigation into alternative accommodations. Nor did [Trotman’s counsel] suggest any of the alternative jury deliberation scenarios [that were] set forth in Trotman’s [] brief. In the absence of any evidence in the record that there was another courtroom available, the [circuit court judge]’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
Id. at *15-16 (cleaned up).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Trotman petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising three issues. This Court granted the petition, limited to the issue that pertained to the circuit court excusing for cause the four prospective jurors who said that they were unable to use stairs. See Trotman v. State, 463 Md. 526, 206 A.3d 315 (2019).
DISCUSSION
The Parties’ Contentions
Trotman contends that the circuit court erred in striking for cause the prospective jurors who indicated that they were unable to traverse stairs. Trotman notes that
Trotman acknowledges that, even if a prospective juror is not disqualified under
The State responds that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excusing for cause the four prospective jurors at issue. The State agrees with Trotman that a prospective juror with a disability is not automatically disqualified, but may be excused for cause in the exercise of a trial court’s discretion. The State contends that a trial court may excuse a prospective juror on a disability-related ground where, for practical reasons, the disability would prevent the prospective juror from rendering satisfactory jury service. In other words, the State argues that, although prospective jurors with disabilities cannot be excluded from jury service across the board, on an individual basis, a trial court may excuse a prospective juror on a disability-related ground if the disability would interfere with the performance of the prospective juror’s duties.
The State asserts that a trial court may determine whether an accommodation for a prospective juror with a disability would be reasonable. The State maintains that the circuit court considered Trotman’s counsel’s proposed accommodation—namely, using another courtroom—and found, as a matter of fact, that there were not any available. The State contends that it is reasonable to infer that another circuit court judge or court personnel informed the circuit court judge in this case that the courtroom to which she was assigned was the only courtroom available. The State argues that it was proper for the circuit court to take into account the time and effort to investigate the possibility of switching courtrooms, and then to move everyone involved—specifically, the circuit court judge, Trotman, his counsel, the prosecutor, the bailiff, the courtroom clerk, the law clerk, and the prospective jurors—to another courtroom.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s excusal of a prospective juror for cause. Cf. Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 299, 825 A.2d 1008, 1017 (2003).
Maryland and Federal Statutes
(a) Requirements. — Notwithstanding [CJ] § 8-102[], an individual qualifies for jury service for a county only if the individual:
(1) Is an adult as of the day selected as a prospective juror;
(2) Is a citizen of the United States; and
(3) Resides in the county as of the day sworn as a juror.
(b) Disqualifying factors. — Notwithstanding [CJ § 8-103](a) [] and subject to the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, an individual is not qualified for jury service if the individual: (1) Cannot comprehend spoken English or speak English;
(2) Cannot comprehend written English, read English, or write English proficiently enough to complete a juror qualification form satisfactorily;
(3) Has a disability that, as documented by a health care provider’s certification, prevents the individual from providing satisfactory jury service;
(4) Has been convicted, in a federal or State court of record, of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months and received a sentence of imprisonment for more than 6 months; or
(5) Has a charge pending, in a federal or State court of record, for a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months.6
(c) Conviction. — An individual qualifies for jury service notwithstanding a disqualifying conviction under [CJ § 8-103](b)(4) [] if the individual is pardoned.
In turn,
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford [] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations[.]
The Supreme Court’s Case Law
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), the Supreme Court held “that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory [strike]s at the defendant’s trial.” In that case, the defendant was African-American; the prosecutor peremptorily struck all four African-American prospective jurors; and, only white jurors were seated. See id. at 82-83. The defendant’s counsel moved to discharge the jury on the ground that the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes violated the defendant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.7 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The trial court denied the motion to discharge. See id. The defendant was convicted, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. See id. at 83-84.
The United States
The Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test for a Batson challenge that is based on race. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination by “show[ing] that he [or she] is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory [strike]s to remove from the [jury panel] members of the defendant’s race.” Id. at 96 (citation omitted). Second, “the burden shifts to the [prosecutor] to come forward with a [race-]neutral explanation for” peremptorily striking prospective jurors who are the same race as the defendant. Id. at 97. Third, the trial court must “determine [whether] the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court decided Batson in 1986, which was four years before Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. See Pub. L. 101-336 (July 26, 1990). Four years later, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994), the Supreme Court held that, during jury selection, “the Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender[.]” The Supreme Court did not mention people with disabilities in Batson or J.E.B.
Seven years after deciding J.E.B., in Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001), an employment discrimination case, the Supreme Court held that
States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for [people with disabilities], so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational. . . . If special accommodations for [people with disabilities] are to be required, they have to come from positive law[,] and not through the Equal Protection Clause.
(Footnote omitted).
Three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004), the Supreme Court held that, “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,”
Congress enacted [
42 U.S.C. § 12132 ] against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of [S]tate services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. For example, . . . a
number of States have prohibited and continue to prohibit persons with disabilities from engaging in activities such as . . . serving as jurors.
Id. at 524 (footnote omitted). That said, the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of when it is a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act for a trial court to excuse a prospective juror on a disability-related ground.
Other Courts’ Case Law
In United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a trial court did not violate a defendant’s right to due process by allowing a prosecutor to peremptorily strike a prospective juror who had multiple sclerosis. In that case, during voir dire, the trial court asked whether any prospective juror “had a condition, such as dyslexia or being hard of hearing, of which the [trial] court should be aware so that accommodation could be arranged.” Id. at 872. In response, the only African-American prospective juror “stated that she had multiple sclerosis and that she was on medication to control it, but that she might have trouble [with] stairs and staying awake.” Id. (footnote omitted). The prosecutor peremptorily struck the prospective juror. See id. The trial court asked the prosecutor “for a race-neutral reason for the [peremptory] strike.” Id. The prosecutor responded that the reason for the peremptory strike was that the prospective juror was “‘on medication, and that sleep may be a problem for her with her multiple sclerosis.’” Id. (footnote omitted). Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the peremptory strike and excused the prospective juror. See id. The defendant was convicted, and appealed. See id.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. See id. at 876. The Seventh Circuit concluded that people with disabilities “are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class[,]” and that, accordingly, the rational-basis test, rather than strict scrutiny, applied.8 See id. The Seventh Circuit explained: “Unlike race or gender, the broad category of ‘disability’ is not ‘unrelated to [a person’s] fitness as a juror.” Id. at 875 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87). The Seventh Circuit stated:
Unlike race or gender, disability may legitimately affect a person’s ability to serve as a juror. For example, [] potential jurors [with disabilities] who would be unable to understand testimony at trial[,] or who would suffer pain or hardship from spending hours each day sitting in a courtroom[,] are properly excused from service for cause.
Harris, 197 F.3d at 875. Addressing Harris’s facts, the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of the prospective juror on disability-related grounds “did not violate the equal protection rights of either” the defendant or the prospective juror. Id. at 876. The Seventh Circuit explained:
If the [prosecutor] had [peremptorily] struck [the prospective juror] because of an irrational animosity toward or fear of [people with disabilities], this
would not be a legitimate reason for excluding her from the jury. However, the [prosecutor peremptorily] struck [the prospective juror] because [the prosecutor’s] stated concern, accepted by the [trial] court, was that she would become drowsy and would not be able to pay attention during the trial. This is a legitimate concern that is rationally related to the provision of a fair trial for [the defendant].
Id. (citations omitted).
In United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Batson “does not . . . prohibit peremptory strikes on the basis of obesity.” In that case, the defendant’s counsel raised a Batson challenge and alleged that three prospective jurors whom the prosecutor had peremptorily struck were obese. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d at 423. The defendant’s counsel also claimed that he was obese, though “he acknowledged that the defendant was not.” Id. The trial court rejected the Batson challenge, and the defendant was convicted and appealed. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d at 423. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that, although people who are obese are protected from discrimination under the
In People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. 1990), the Court of Appeals of New York held that a trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was deaf. In that case, one of the prospective jurors could read, write, and speak English, but could not hear; “[a]lthough he [was] able to read lips, he was assisted during jury selection by a court-appointed sign language interpreter.” Id. The defendant moved to strike the prospective juror for cause, contending that his deafness “would prevent him from judging the witnesses’ credibility[,] and that the interpreter’s presence in the jury room would inhibit deliberations and violate the confidentiality of the deliberative process.” Id. at 261. The trial court denied the motion to strike for cause. See id. The defendant peremptorily struck the prospective juror, and used up the rest of his peremptory strikes. See id. The defendant was convicted, and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed. See id. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed as well, concluding that the prospective juror would have been able to discharge his duties as a juror, and that the sign language interpreter’s presence during deliberations would not have interfered with the defendant’s rights. See id. at 260, 262-63.
In People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713, 713 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993), the Criminal Court of the City of New York supplemented an oral ruling in which it allowed a juror with vision impairments to continue serving on the jury. In that case, the juror’s vision impairments were “not discovered until the second day of trial.” Id. At that time, the juror “disclosed that she had a detached retina in one eye[,] and had limited vision in her other eye.” Id. The juror explained that, from where she was sitting in the jury box, “she could see only the outline[s] of the witnesses’ faces, but could not see all the details of their facial expressions.” Id. at 713-14. She also disclosed that it was “difficult, if not impossible, for her to read standard size print”; but, she had “special reading glasses [that] made it easier for her to read enlarged print.” Id. at 714.
At trial, the Court noted that the
The Court explained that it “was not obligated to disqualify [the juror] merely because the [defendant] introduced some photographs at trial.” Id. at 715. The photographs purportedly showed bruises on the defendant’s face, and were offered to corroborate the defendant’s testimony that the victim had assaulted the defendant. See id.
The Court determined that, although it was likely that the juror could not see the photographs clearly, she “had sufficient information to enable her to evaluate the plausibility of the witnesses’ testimony” because the Court described the photographs to the juror, and because “the defendant testified in great detail about the many indignities, slights[,] and abuses [that] she claimed the [government’s] witnesses had committed against her[.]” Id. at 715-16. The Court explained:
It is difficult to imagine a trial in which absolutely no documents, diagrams, police reports, photographs or physical evidence are introduced. If this court were to hold that [the juror] was disqualified simply because a few documents and a few photographs were presented, it would, in effect, be concluding
that there were almost no cases on which [jurors with vision impairments] or [] jurors [who are blind] could sit. Such a ruling would violate the spirit and intent of the [ Americans with Disabilities Act ]. . . . Rather, the question is whether the court could accommodate the juror by [orally] describing the evidence or by any other means, and whether the evidence is so crucial that the juror’s inability to see it denied the defendant a fair trial. In this case, the [C]ourt finds that the defendant was not denied due process[,] and adheres to its oral ruling permitting [the juror] to [continue] sit[ting] on the jury.
In Donelson v. Fritz, 70 P.3d 539, 544-45 (Colo. App. 2002), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a trial court did not err in rejecting a plaintiff’s Batson challenge9 where the defendant peremptorily struck two prospective jurors with disabilities. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries that resulted from a car accident. See Donelson, 70 P.3d at 541. The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were painful and permanent, and required him to reduce his personal and work-related activities. See id. at 543. During voir dire, the defendant’s counsel peremptorily struck a prospective juror who had “disabling rheumatoid arthritis[,]” as well as a prospective juror who had “a hip condition.” Id. at 543-44. The plaintiff’s counsel raised a Batson challenge on the ground that the defendant’s counsel was discriminating against prospective jurors with disabilities. See Donelson, 70 P.3d at 543-44. The defendant’s counsel responded that the prospective juror who had disabling rheumatoid arthritis could have difficulty sitting through long days of trial and could “be sympathetic to plaintiff’s claims of back pain and impairment[,]” and that the prospective juror who had a hip condition could have difficulty concentrating at trial. Id. at 544. The trial court rejected the Batson challenge, “expressing some uncertainty [about] whether Batson had been extended to persons with disabilities, [and] conclud[ing] that it was not improper, in a case dealing with a person with [a] disability and chronic pain, to exclude people with similar conditions.” Donelson, 70 P.3d at 544. The jury found in the defendant’s favor, and the plaintiff appealed. See id. at 541.
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. See id. The Court held that, “assum[ing] that the physical conditions from which [the prospective] jurors suffered constituted disabilities within the meaning of the [
Analysis
Here, guided by the
But, Maryland and federal statutes protect prospective jurors from disability discrimination. Specifically,
Under the
Just as there are multiple types of disabilities, there are multiple examples of reasonable accommodations for prospective jurors. In Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 260, where a court-appointed sign language interpreter assisted a prospective juror who was deaf, New York’s highest court concluded “that the prospective juror’s deafness did not render him incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the duties of a juror.” (Cleaned up). And, in Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14, the Criminal Court of the City of New York made multiple reasonable accommodations for a juror with vision impairments, including reading into the record all documents that the Court admitted into evidence.
The takeaway is that, generally, the
When determining whether it is permissible to excuse for cause a prospective juror on a disability-related ground, a trial court must engage in an individualized, case- and disability-specific inquiry. Multiple cases provide examples of such an inquiry. In addition to the above-discussed cases of Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 260, and Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14, there is Falkenstein, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 818, in which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held that a trial court did not err in allowing a prosecutor to peremptorily strike a prospective juror who was hard of hearing, where the prosecutor noted that “the inflections of [the] defendant’s voice on the audiotapes were significant to the [government]’s case.” And, in Donelson, 70 P.3d at 541, 543-44, where a plaintiff sued a defendant for injuries that resulted from
Applying relevant statutes and case law to this case’s circumstances, we have no trouble concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause the four prospective jurors who indicated that they were unable to use stairs. Indeed, the record reflects that the circuit court acted appropriately and respectfully throughout its interactions with the four prospective jurors.
Although the Maryland Judiciary is moving toward having courthouses that are entirely accessible, the record establishes that a staircase with twenty-five steps was the only way to reach the jury room that accompanied the courtroom that was used for the trial in this case. The circuit court expressly noted that there was no elevator to the jury room. The record makes clear that, before the jury panel entered the courtroom, the four prospective jurors at issue disclosed to the Jury Commissioner’s Office that they were unable to use stairs, and the Jury Commissioner’s Office made the circuit court aware of that information. The circuit court separately called each of the four prospective jurors to the bench. In each instance, first, the circuit court expressly confirmed that the prospective juror was unable to use stairs; then, the circuit court informed the prospective juror that a staircase with twenty-five steps was the only way to reach the jury room; and, finally, the circuit court excused the prospective juror and directed the prospective juror to return to the jury assembly room. The circuit court respected the prospective jurors’ privacy by speaking with each one individually at the bench and refraining from asking what their respective medical conditions were, or otherwise inquiring into why the prospective jurors were unable to traverse stairs.
At no time did the circuit court state or imply that any of the four prospective jurors could never be seated as jurors in any given trial. To the contrary, in interacting with each of the four prospective jurors, the circuit court clearly contemplated that the prospective juror could be seated as a juror at another trial. The circuit court told Juror 376 that it would “excuse [her] from serving on this jury[,]” and advised her that, if she became part of another jury panel, she should inform the other circuit court judge “if there[ was] any other reason why [she] shouldn’t serve as [a] jur[or].” The circuit court told Juror 408: “[T]here are courtrooms that are on the same level[ as their jury rooms], but this is not one of them.” The circuit court stated to Juror 624: “I’m going to excuse you from serving on this jury. . . . They do have courtrooms on the same level[ as their jury rooms], so there are no steps involved. . . . So you may be selected for
After the circuit court excused for cause the four prospective jurors at issue, Trotman’s counsel objected and noted that one of them had indicated that she could serve as a juror if there were an elevator to the jury room. The circuit court asked Trotman’s counsel: “[H]ow would you have suggested [that] I accommodate her?” Trotman’s counsel responded: “That we go to another courtroom[.]” The circuit court explained that, “in the Baltimore City Circuit Court[,] every single courtroom is being used. I, as a senior judge, fill up the empty courtroom”; and that the designated courtroom was available for the trial only because the circuit court judge who usually presided in that courtroom had been assigned to juvenile court.
Significantly, the circuit court’s statement that, “in the Baltimore City Circuit Court[,] every single courtroom [was] being used” constitutes a finding of fact. An appellate court cannot set aside a trial court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. See Givens v. State, 459 Md. 694, 711, 188 A.3d 903, 913 (2018). Here, absolutely nothing in the record indicates that, contrary to the circuit court’s finding, another courtroom was available. The circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court’s actions were in complete accord with our holding that a trial court may not summarily excuse for cause prospective jurors with disabilities, and that a trial court may excuse a prospective juror for cause on a disability-related ground if no reasonable accommodation is possible, and, at that particular trial, the particular disability would prevent the prospective juror from providing satisfactory jury service. It is undisputed that, to reach the jury room, the jurors would have been required to walk up twenty-five steps. Each of the four prospective jurors at issue indicated that he or she was unable to do so. In this particular case, the four prospective jurors’ inability to use stairs prevented them “from providing satisfactory jury service[.]”
Trotman takes issue with the circuit court’s conclusion that no other courtroom was available. Trotman contends that the circuit court should have either contacted the administrative judge or assignment office, or another circuit court judge, or dispatched a law clerk, to determine whether any other courtrooms, jury rooms or conference rooms were available. Trotman’s contention is premised on speculation that another courtroom might have been available, and that the circuit court did not have sufficient information to conclude that no accommodation could be made for the jurors who could not use stairs. We disagree. As noted by the Court of Special Appeals, this was “a retired and specially assigned veteran of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, [who] drew upon her current and historical knowledge of the courthouse” to find that this was the courtroom that had been assigned to her and that there was no other courtroom available. Trotman, 2019 WL 290022, at *15.
Although, theoretically, the circuit court could have conducted voir dire while court personnel made such inquiries, the circuit court could not have begun seating a jury, and allowing peremptory strikes, without first confirming whether it needed to excuse for cause the four prospective jurors at issue on the ground that they said that they were unable to traverse stairs. As a practical matter, whether the Circuit
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.
Notes
Meanwhile, a “quasi-suspect class” is a group of people who are subject to a “quasi-suspect classification”—that is, “[a] statutory classification based on gender or legitimacy, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny under” the Equal Protection Clause. Quasi-Suspect Classification, Black’s Law Dictionary. In turn, to survive intermediate scrutiny, a quasi-suspect “classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.” Intermediate Scrutiny, Black’s Law Dictionary.
If a statute does not involve a suspect classification or a quasi-suspect classification, then the statute is subject to the “rational-basis test,” under which a “court will uphold a [statute] if it bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate governmental objective.” Rational-Basis Test, Black’s Law Dictionary.