GRANT TROJA v. CRYSTA PLEATMAN
APPEAL NO. C-150746
TRIAL NO. A-1307690
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
August 10, 2016
[Cite as Troja v. Pleatman, 2016-Ohio-5294.]
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 10, 2016
Santen and Hughes, L.P.A., Charles Reynolds and Alison King, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Paul Croushore, for Defendant-Appellant,
James F. Brockman, for former Third-Party Defendants Sibcy Cline and Nat Comisar.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Crysta Pleatman appeals the trial court’s judgment finding her in indirect criminal contempt for sending emails to opposing counsel, parties, and witnesses in violation of the trial court’s no-contact order. Pleatman argues the trial court erred by holding her in indirect criminal contempt without affording her notice and an opportunity to respond in violation of
Facts Giving Rise to the Contempt Proceeding
{¶2} On January 19, 2015, plaintiff-appellee Grant Troja and former third-party defendants, Sibcy Cline, Inc., and its employee, Nat Comisar, filed a joint motion for sanctions against Pleatman. The motion was based in part on Pleatman’s repeated offensive emails to the parties, their counsel, and to the material witnesses in the case. Following a three-day hearing, the trial court determined on May 28, 2015, that the emails were frivolous and granted Troja and Sibcy Cline monetary sanctions against Pleatman and her husband. That same day, the court ordered Pleatman to stop sending harassing emails to these parties, their counsel, and to the witnesses in the case. The trial court addressed Pleatman directly stating, “You don’t send e-mails. You have an attorney. Your attorney handles all of that. Stop it. You do it again, sanctions will be that you’re going to jail. So no e-mails about this case to anyone involved in your case except to your attorney. Understood?” Pleatman responded, “Understood.”
{¶3} On August 28, 2015, Troja and Sibcy Cline filed a joint motion to show cause why Pleatman should not be held in contempt for her failure to comply with the trial court’s no-contact order dated May 28, 2015, or in the alternative for monetary
{¶4} On September 7, 2015, Pleatman filed a “memoranda contra to the contempt motion.” On November 6, 2015, the trial court entered an order nunc pro tunc to May 28, 2015, which provided, “After hearing testimony and argument from counsel, the Court hereby orders Dr. Stephen Pleatman and Crysta Pleatman to cease contact with anyone involved in the instant case except for their attorney.” That same day, the trial court entered an order requiring the Pleatmans to attend a show-cause hearing on November 23, 2015.
{¶5} On November 10, 2015, Troja filed a notice that subpoenas had been personally served on the Pleatmans, informing them of the November 23, 2015 hearing. On November 17, 2015, Pleatman filed an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court based on her concern that the trial court judge was biased against her and had violated her First Amendment rights by threatening to impose jail time on her for sending emails to opposing counsel and other parties and their counsel. On November 25, 2015, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor denied the affidavit of disqualification on the basis that the record did not demonstrate any bias or prejudice by the trial court judge and that other remedies remained available to Pleatman, including an appeal from the challenged rulings. See In re Disqualification of Luebbers, 145 Ohio St.3d 1226, 2015-Ohio-5671, 48 N.E.3d 568, ¶ 2 and 5.
{¶7} On December 14, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on a number of pending motions, including the contempt motion. The Pleatmans appeared at the hearing with both civil and criminal counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Crysta Pleatman in indirect criminal contempt and sentenced her to five days in the Hamilton County Justice Center.
{¶8} On December 14, 2015, Pleatman’s counsel filed a peremptory writ of procedendo with this court. We granted the writ and ordered the trial court to journalize a judgment entry or to release Pleatman from jail. The parties subsequently appeared before the trial court, which journalized an entry sentencing Pleatman to five days in jail. At that time, Pleatman’s counsel made an oral motion to stay Pleatman’s sentence pending appeal, which the trial court denied. Pleatman then moved this court for a stay of her sentence, which we granted. Pleatman was released from jail on December 16, 2015.
Notice and Opportunity to Respond
{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Pleatman asserts that “the trial court erred to the prejudice of Ms. Pleatman when it found her in indirect criminal contempt without notice and an opportunity to be heard and violated Crim.R. 32 in every respect.”
{¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “contempt of court” as the disobedience of a court’s order. See Denovcheck v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). “It is conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect or which tends to embarrass, impede, or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.” Id. at 15. The court’s power to punish contumacious conduct is both inherent and statutory. Id.;
{¶12} Contempt is further classified as direct or indirect. A direct contempt is “misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice.” See
{¶14} Pleatman argues that the trial court violated
{¶15} Pleatman first contends that the trial court failed to issue a written charge before holding her in contempt. But the trial court did not initiate the contempt proceedings against Pleatman—Troja, Sibcy Cline, and Comisar did. Their joint motion to show cause, which was filed with the clerk of courts, was sufficient to constitute a charge of contempt under
{¶16} Pleatman, moreover, had direct notice that a violation of the no-contact order could be punished by a jail sentence because the trial court had
{¶17} Pleatman next argues that the trial court failed to give her an opportunity to address the court regarding the contempt matter. But the record reflects that the trial court had previously held a hearing on the original motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct where witnesses had testified regarding Pleatman’s emails, and the trial court had issued its verbal warning to Pleatman. Counsel attached to their contempt motion affidavits authenticating Pleatman’s emails. Pleatman filed a memorandum opposing the contempt motion. Contrary to Pleatman’s assertions, the record reflects that both Pleatman’s criminal and civil counsel were given the opportunity to address the court and to present evidence at the hearing on the contempt motion. They simply declined to do so, preferring to rest on the legal arguments in their memorandum. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court failed to afford Pleatman the opportunity to be heard on the contempt motion.
First Amendment Rights
{¶19} In her second assignment of error, Pleatman argues that the trial court violated her First Amendment right to free speech when it held her in contempt of court for sending emails to opposing parties and witnesses in the case in violation of the court’s oral and written no-contact order.
{¶20} The trial court held Pleatman in contempt not for the content of her email messages, but for her actions in sending them. In finding Pleatman guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court stated that Pleatman had sent five emails to seven people and that she had admitted in her own pleadings and the responses to the motions that these emails were frivolous and irrelevant to the material issues in the case. Pleatman does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding that her emails were frivolous and irrelevant to the litigation, and that they
{¶21} A trial court has the inherent power to do all things necessary to the administration of justice and to protect its own powers, process, and the rights of those who invoke its process. State ex rel. Pfeiffer v. Common Pleas Court, 13 Ohio St.2d 133, 235 N.E.2d 232 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus. Indeed, several Ohio appellate courts “have held that these inherent powers include the ability to limit a particular litigant’s access to the courts or to prevent further or additional filings in a specific case.” Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 115 Ohio App.3d 755, 759, 686 N.E.2d 320 (12th Dist.1996). Thus, the ability to address and prohibit frivolous litigation practices is an essential part of the inherent power of the courts to control and protect the integrity of their own processes. Id. at 759.
{¶22} Here, the trial court was within its authority to control the litigation and the conduct of the litigants before it by enforcing the no-contact order. See State v. Baumgartner, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-06-046, 2008-Ohio-971, ¶ 98-100. Pleatman, moreover, was represented by counsel throughout this matter, and her counsel remained free to make the arguments deemed necessary to represent her interests and claims in the litigation. As a result, we overrule the second assignment of error. Having found neither of Pleatman’s assignments of error meritorious, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
HENDON and STAUTBERG, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.