118 Mass. 164 | Mass. | 1875
Lead Opinion
The statutes, by which “houses of religious worship ” “ when owned by a religious society, or held in trust for the use of religious organizations ” are exempted from taxation, have been uniformly assumed or construed to exempt the land upon which such houses are erected. Gen. Sts. e. 11, § 5. St. 1865, c. 206. Lowell Meeting-house v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538. The purpose of the statute is to relieve such organizations from the burden of taxation upon property devoted to public uses. And as the land upon which the building stands is essential to the existence of the structure, it is fairly to be presumed that it was the intention of the Legislature to include it in the provisions of the statute by the phrase “houses of religious worship.”
It is not essential that the property thus exempt should be actually used, or should be in a condition to be actually used, for purposes of religious worship. Such a construction would exclude from the benefits of the statute all unfinished houses of worship, and all which by accident or want of repair had become temporarily unfit for use, or the use of which had for any reason been temporarily suspended. The occupation for religious purposes, which the statute contemplates, does not require the actual completion of the structure. And such occupation continues, notwithstanding temporary interruptions in its use.
By a clause in the statute, which is part of the same sentence which secures this exemption, it is provided that “ portions of such houses, appropriated for purposes other than religious worship, shall be taxed at the value thereof to the owners of the houses.” And this would seem to imply that it is the appropriation of the property or any part of it to the sacred uses contera» p'Lted which secures the exemption.
It is not necessary in this case to define at what stage in the erection of a building the property becomes a house of religious worship, or to say that land only may, under some circumstances, be exempt from taxation, although no building has been actually begun upon it. For a majority of. the court are of opinion that real estate held by a religious society, not more than sufficient in extent to meet its reasonable requirements in this respect, and devoted by such society in good faith to the erection of a church edifice; upon which the work of erection already commenced is prosecuted without unreasonable delay; and being all the real estate which is so held, is entitled to the exemption given by the statute. And this upon the facts agreed disposes of this case.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I am unable to agree with my associates in the result to which they have come in this case, or in the reasoning of the opinion by which that result is reached.
The words of the statute, under which this exemption is claimed, are specific and precise. To secure the exemption, the property must be shown to come fairly within the terms of the description adopted by the statute. These are “ houses of religious worship.” The description includes two essential ideas: first, that of a building or structure capable of containing and covering or sheltering human occupants; second, that it is adapted in its construction, or appropriated in its use to the purposes of religious worship. Both must concur to meet the conditions of exemption. This has been repeatedly held in respect of exemptions from attachment. Buckingham v. Billings, 13 Mass. 82. Howard v. Williams, 2 Pick. 80. Davlin v. Stone, 4 Cush. 359.
It is not enough that articles of property are held and intended and necessary for purposes which the statutes of exemption were intended to promote" or protect; they must also correspond with the description by which the exemption is conferred. Danforth v. Woodward, 10 Pick. 423.
The exemption then must rest upon the ground that when the house of religious worship shall have been built upen the land, the land as well as the house will be exempt under the designation contained in the statute. It may be conceded that this would be so ; just as, in case of deeds, the grant of a mill or a house, by that designation only, would carry by implication the land under and around it which is necessary for its enjoyment. ■ But in that case the description is applied to its proper corresponding subject matter ; and, when so applied, it includes the land as an incident to the building, or rather, as necessary to give effect to the grant of the building, and therefore, by intendment of law, passing with it. Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Met. 448, 455. Forbush v. Lombard, 13 Met. 109. Johnsons. Rayner, 6 Gray, 107,110. Esty v. Currier, 98 Mass. 500. But when the principal thing does not exist, the incident, or that which would have been incident if the principal thing had existed, has never been held to be carried by force merely of the terms of such a description. Accordingly it has been held that in leases of buildings or parts of buildings, although a right or interest in the land passes as incident thereto, yet that right ceases upon destruction of the building, unless secured by something in the terms of the lease other than the designation of its subject matter as a building or part of a building. Stockwell v. Hunter, supra. Shawmut National Bank v. Boston, ante, 125. Rogers v. Snow, ante, 118.
The third clause of exemption, in the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 5, under which the case of New England Hospital v. Boston arose, differs essentially from this. That clause exempts property of any and every description, if occupied for the purposes for which such institutions were incorporated. The court decided that by the term 16 occupied” nothing more was intended than that the land should be held or possessed for the purpose indicated; which was in ac - cordance with the previous decision in Massachusetts General Hospital v. Somerville, 101 Mass. 319. Under that clause, the whole question depended upon the purpose for which the land waa
