47 Minn. 389 | Minn. | 1891
One Jacob Trimbo, the father of these parties, owned a farm of 266 acres, upon which he resided until his decease, the 80 acres upon which the dwelling-house was situated being his ' homestead. Having been taken quite ill in November, 1885, he made a will; but shortly afterwards, having concluded that it was better to divide his property among his children during his lifetime, so as to save the cost and trouble of administration, he destroyed the will, and about December 1st executed two deeds, (his wife, Ellen, joining,) one to defendant, conveying 160 acres of the land, including the homestead 80, and the other to another son, Henry, conveying the balance of the farm. Each of these deeds was subject to the payment by the grantee, to other children of the grantors, of certain sums of money, which were made specific liens on the land. As part of the same transaction, the grantees executed a joint agreement, in consideration of these conveyances, to provide suitable support to the grantors during-their natural lives. This agreement they have fully performed. Jacob Trimbo died in January, 1886, and his wife in August, 1888. There is no claim here of any fraud or undue influence. So far as appears, the execution of these deeds, which disposed of the land in the same way as the will had done, was wholly the voluntary and unsolicited act of the old man, the reason assigned by him for disposing of his farm in this way being that these two sons, especially Michael, “had stayed at home all the timeevi-dently meaning that they had remained and helped him on the farm, while the others had gone out for themselves. The plaintiff, as one of the heirs-at-law, brought actions against this defendant and his brother Henry, to have these deeds set aside on the ground of the
If the finding of fact as to the mental incapacity of the wife was warranted by the evidence, the somewhat novel state of facts might present some interesting legal questions. But a perusal of the evidence satisfies us that it did not justify the finding. As has been already remarked, there is no element of fraud, overreaching, or undue influence in the case. Neither is there anything tending to show that the disposition of the property made by these conveyances was not a reasonable, natural, and proper one to be made. The ground of attack on the deed is purely and solely the mental incapacity of the wife to execute a deed at all.
There is nothing better settled in the law than that, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, (which, when present, introduce other principles of decision,) mere weakness of intellect, resulting from sickness or old age, is no ground for setting aside an executed contract, provided the contracting party was capable of understanding, in a reasonable manner, the nature of the particular affair in which he participated. The rule as to the measure of the grantor’s capacity in such a case is simply that he must have enough to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of what he is doing. Moreover, the burden of proof is upon the party assailing the act to show the incapacity at the time it was done. The evidence of incapacity proffered must relate to the time of the factum, either directly or when taken in connection with other evidence in the case. In other words, when the incapacity is not continuous, and the act is reasonable and proper in itself, and hence not furnishing any intrinsic evidence of incapacity, the burden is on the party assailing the contract to show the incapacity at the time it was executed.
Tested by these rules, the evidence in this case is conspicuously feeble. There is nothing in it tending to prove insanity in the ordinary and popular sense. Taken at its strongest the most that could
Order reversed.