Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Falcon Drilling Co.Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Falcon Drilling Co.
This аppeal presents the question of whether the appellee is entitled to a maritime hen for its supply boat services it provided to an offshore drilling vessel. We agree with the district court that appellee is entitled to a hen. We therefore affirm.
In October 1992, Century Offshore Management Cоrporation (Century) entered into a “Daywork Drilling Contract” (Contract) with Falcon Drilling Company (Falcon) which provided in part for Century’s use of the drilling vessel, FALRIG 18. The FALRIG 18 was owned by Falrig Offshore Limited (Falrig) and operated by Falcon. The contract, in addition to providing for Century’s use of the FALRIG 18, included passages defining the responsibilities of the two parties while the vessel was engaged in prospecting for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Century agreed to pay Falcon $15,000 per day for the use of the vessel with crew. Century personnel, however, provided general supervision to the crew, such as directing the vessel where tо prospect for oil. The contract also delineated the necessary equipment and supplies each party was obliged to provide for the operation of the vessel. For example, Century was required to provide drinking water for the crew, fuel for the drilling vessel, and the materiаls essential for drilling operations such as pipe casing and drilling fluids. Century was also required to provide vessels to transport the equipment and suppliеs to the FALRIG 18 in the Gulf of Mexico.
Century contracted with appellee Trico Marine Operators Inc. (Trico) to furnish supply boats to transport supplies and equipment to the FALRIG 18 while she was diall-ing in the Gulf of Mexico. Trico provided either the MTV JAMES RIVER or the M/V BIG HORN RIVER under a time charter to Century to perform these sеrvices. These vessels transported equipment and supplies to sustain the crew of the FALRIG 18 and support the vessels’s drilling activities. Trico billed Century for the service of the JAMES RIVER and BIG HORN RIVER. Century owed Trico for these services when Century filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. In addition to asserting a claim in Century’s bankruptcy proceeding, Trico asserted an in rem claim against the FALRIG 18. Falcon challenged Trico’s right to a maritime lien on the vessel. The district court overruled Falcon’s objection and recognized Trico’s maritime lien. This appeal followed.
II.
A.
Under the Maritime Lien Act (the “Act”), a person prоviding necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner (l) has a maritime lien on the vessel; (2) may bring a civil action
in rem
to enforce the lien; and (8) is not required to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel.
In order to determine whether Trico is entitled to a maritime lien for its supply boat services that it provided to the FALRIG 18, we must resolve two questions: (l) whether Century was аuthorized by the owner of the FALRIG 18 to engage the services of Trico’s supply vessels; and, (2) if so, whether the services Trico provided were “necessаries” within the meaning of the Act.
B.
As indicated above, the Act provides that a “charterer” is presumed to have authority to procure necessаries for a vessel. We first consider therefore whether Century is a “charterer” of the FALRIG 18 within the meaning of the Act.
The Act does not define “charterer.” This сourt, however, has described a charter as “an arrangement where one person (the ‘charterer’) becomes entitled to the use of thе whole of a vessel belonging to another (the ‘owner’).”
1
Our definition is consistent with that of the leading commentators. See e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty & Maritime Law
§ 11-1 at 169 (2d Ed.l994)(defining a charter party as a “spe
Under the terms of the Contract, Falrig, through Falcon, prоvided the drilling vessel FALRIG 18 together with the crew and equipment to Century at an operating rate of $15,000 per day. Falcon agreed to furnish the rig for the drilling of onе well and granted an option to Century for the use of the rig for drilling an additional well. In
Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
Fаlrig argues that Century cannot be characterized as a “charterer” for purposes of the Act because Falcon’s arrangement with Century is neither a time, voyage, nor bareboat charter. We do not address the merits of this argument, however, because the Act attaches no significanсe to the specific type of charter agreement entered into by the parties. As indicated above, the Act simply provides that a “charterer” is presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for the vessel. Century, by contracting to use a vessel, FALRIG 18, belonging to another, sаtisfies the definition of a charterer; as a result, Century is presumed under the Act to have authority to procure necessaries for the FALRIG 18. 2
C.
We turn now to the question of whether the supply boat services provided by Trico were “necessaries” under the Act. As stated above, those supplies included drinking wаter and food for the crew as well as drilling equipment and supplies to support the drilling activities conducted by the vessel. The Act gives an illustrative list of gоods and services that are necessaries, including “repairs, supplies, towage, ... or any other necessaries, to any vessel....”
We agree with the district court that Trieo’s services of transporting the supplies and equipment which were essential to sustain the crew and operations aboard the FALRIG 18 were necessaries. See
Equilease,
III.
In sum, we conclude that Century was a charterer of the FALRIG 18 and thus had presumed authority under the Maritime Lien Act to procure nеcessaries for the vessel. We also conclude that Trico’s supply boat services were necessaries under the Act. We therefore hold that Trico is entitled to a lien on the FALRIG 18 for these services under
AFFIRMED.