154 Iowa 280 | Iowa | 1912
The plaintiff owns certain lots in Marshalltown which he uses as a market garden, and upon which, at the time im question (August 15, 1907), he had planted and was bringing to maturity crops of cabbage, celery, and tomatoes, to be marketed in Marshalltown. Some of this produce was substantially matured, and the remainder still in a growing condition. The defendant’s railway runs along or near t'he south side of the garden, and the natural drainage of -the premises is to the south or southeast, down the course of a draw or swale. Prior to the summer of 1907, the defendant had maintained a bridge or opening at -the crossing of said diraw, thus affording escape for the drainage, until a short time before the injury complained of, when, as is alleged, defendant shortened the opening under said bridge, and still further obstructed said passage by ditching or dumping therein a car load of clay and other rubbish. It is further alleged that by reason of such obstructions in the course of said drainage the flood and surface waters were dammed up and set back over said garden to a considerable depth, injuring and destroying the crops growing therein, for all of which he asks to recover damages.
The defendant denies the charge of negligence on its part. It further pleads that since this action was begun the railway has been placed in the possession and control of receivers, by virtue of an order entered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota,
The issue was triad to a jury, and verdict returned for plaintiff, assessing his damages at $490, and judgment being entered thereon the defendant -appeals.
The case was before us on a former appeal (see Tretter v. Railroad Co., 147 Iowa, 375), anld a judgment for plaintiff reversed because of -an error in -the trial court’s instruction on the measure of damages. The instructions given upon the same subject on the second trial are again challenged by the defendant.
It is to be admitted that these propositions 'are not stated with the fullness or clearness which is desirable and the court failed to indicate, by a disjunctive word or other direct statement, that these rales were to he understood as alternatives, 'and -that -if one was applied by the jury the other should he disregarded; hut such, we think, was the force and effect of 'the instructions when considered together, and 'assuming, -as wc must, that the jurors were men of average intelligence, understanding, and experience, we are disposed to think they must have so understood it. There was therefore uo reversible error in this part of the charge.
Under our system of procedure, the court’s instructions must be reduced to writing, and if trials are not to be unduly prolonged -the" preparation of these instructions must be attended to while the trial and the arguments of counsel are in progress, subject at every moment to the interruption's and distractions incident 'to maintaining an orderly course of judicial business .and ruling upon the question's raised by counsel. Under such circumstances, it would bo unreasonable to expect or demand that the court shall state rules of law with the technical exactness which we look for in the text-books, or the'fineness of differentiation observed in judicial precedents. Indeed, such niceties of statement would tend to defeat the very purpose for which instructions are given. The jurors of to-day are not lawyers, and an excess of instruction is more apt to confuse than to enlighten their judgments; but, as a rule, they are men of intelligence, endowed with the “saving grace of common sense,” and slight inaccuracies in the statement of a general rule of law are not likely to lead them astray, if the general tenor -and effect of the court’s charge be not clearly erroneous.
Some other instructions, by which exceptions are taken, were rather loosely drawn; but we find no reversible error in them. The issues were simple, the testimony was the subject of but little dispute, and the verdict was not in excess of damages which, under the evidence, might have been found against the defendant upon any of the theories advanced by counsel as to the true measure of damages. We
It is algo argued that there was no evidence to justify certain instructions, or to show that labor and expense had been incurred in producing or maturing and marketing the crop. These points were substantially identical with those made upon a similar record on th'e former appeal, and were held not well taken. Even ¡as an original proposition, we find the evidence sufficient to go to the juiry on the several questions involved in the rulings and instructions.
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.