*1 drafters of the Illinois statute were careful to craft the distinguish statute to prime between “the concern” of legislation, selling sex, private, business of noncommercial acts. 720 ILCS (Smith-Hurd Ann. Committee at 5/11 — Comments — reasons, For the foregoing judgment of the circuit court of Peoria is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McDADE SCHMIDT, JJ. concur. al., ROSE M. Plaintiffs-Appellants, TRENT et v. THE OF OFFICE THE al., CORONER OF PEORIA Defendants-Appellees. COUNTY et Third District No. 3 — 03—0206 Opinion Rehearing July June filed denied 2004. *2 Clark, Flint, Michigan, appellants. for Rose M. Trent and James both of (Donald Toohill, Lyons, Attorney, Assistant Kevin W of Peoria J. State’s counsel), Attorney, appellees. for State’s opinion
JUSTICE of the court: SCHMIDT delivered the Trent, Clark, plaintiffs, Rose M. James C. Trent and James complaint filed a se our of Information Act pro state’s Freedom (the (5 2002)) Act) defendants, seq. against et 140/1 Heinz, his of- County the office of the coroner of Peoria and Daniel plaintiffs attempting capacity County ficial as Peoria coroner. C.N., The trial court to obtain medical records of a deceased minor. are not to receive plaintiffs ruled entitled C.N.’s On trial court erred in appeal, plaintiffs argue from disclosure under ruling the records seek are 140/7(l)(b) (West 2002)) though even the Act mother, acquired signed from the deceased child’s have Katrina Harden. We affirm.
BACKGROUND currently incarcer- Plaintiff James Trent and Katrina Harden are (DOC). both Department They ated in the Illinois were Corrections murdering C.N., years at the time of her convicted who was four old 20, agreed testify July guilty death on 1996. Harden and pled agreement not to seek the against exchange Trent for State’s Trent, James to this penalty. appealed People Trent court (2000). 437, Ill. App. 3d N.E.2d ap- facts stated in that peal set forth brutal murder of four-year-old this child. While James Trent and Harden living together, they repeatedly struck belt, with a metal spatula pole. and a metal Trauma from this severe beating caused C.N.’sdeath. remaining plaintiffs, Clark, Rose Trent and James filed vari- requests
ous under the in an attempt to obtain C.N.’s medical 15, records. On April 1999, Rose County went to Peoria orally requested inspect copy various documents related to C.N.’s death. Rose asserted that her for request the docu- ments was pursuant to the Act. Initially, coroner’s office denied Rose’s request. 4, 2000,
On May Rose a written for request submitted the docu- Accompanying ments under the Act. written was a request authorization from Harden directing the coroner’s office to release May to Rose. On the Peoria coroner request denied Rose’s writing. 15, 2000,
On November James Trent sent a for request similar documents to the coroner’s office. On November that request was denied. 26, 2002,
On January James Clark request submitted a written request accompanied by documents the Act. This also was 4, 2002, Katrina February authorization from Harden. On *3 request Clark’s was denied.
The plaintiffs their regarding exhausted administrative remedies Then, 2003, requests. January 2, their plaintiffs on the filed their complaint seeking declaratory injunctive and relief under the Act. Among documents, plaintiffs sought other the (1) (2) Center; Francis Hospital. from Saint Medical and Methodist 17, They The defendants filed on January their answer contend that C.N.’smedical records are not to disclosure under the Act.
Eventually, the the of supplied with some requested, the had not the documents but decedent’s medical At the the hearing complaint, the on trial court stated that the exempt the medical records were from disclosure under Act. that Katrina Harden by court commented the authorization “might all, request directly if at for the apply, to a these records hospitals.” appeal. Plaintiffs
ANALYSIS ruling they the trial erred plaintiffs argue court under the Act. not entitled to disclosure of medical records
279 the Act and other Il- portions to of interpret are called We statute, interpreting a we axiomatic that when linois statutes. It is legislature when it the intent of the give ascertain and effect to must Co., 401, Ill. 2d Light Heck v. Illinois 152 enacted the statute. Central (1992). of itself 939, language 941 the statute 405, 604 N.E.2d Welch, intent. Kirwan v. indication of the drafters’ provides best (1989). 165, 348, 349 Where the 2d 549 N.E.2d 133 Ill. give must unambiguous, and a court review it of a statute clear exceptions, limitations or conditions written, reading effect as without Co., Ill. America, 186 2d Davis v. Toshiba Machine into statute. (1999). 184-85, interpretation Because 710 N.E.2d law, Depart- is de novo. Branson question statute is our review (1995). 247, 254, 2d Revenue, ment 168 Ill. 659 N.E.2d Act, any make to body Under “Each available public records, otherwise inspection public except for all copying 140/3(a) (West 2002). provided in [the] Section 7 Act.” “ records, forms, writings, reports, records’ means all let- ‘Public *** ters, memoranda, books, documentary all other papers, materials, having having being used, prepared, been been or received, body.” possessed public or'under control 140/2(c) “(1) following inspection copying: shall be
(b) that, disclosed, clearly Information if constitute a would personal privacy, unwarranted invasion of unless the disclosure in writing by subjects the individual consented 140/7(l)(b) (West 2002). information.” 5 ILCS case, parties In this do not coroner’s office dispute “public “public is a C.N.’s medical records are body” the Act. records,” Act, used, as defined because the records were received, possessed and under the control of the defendants. There is an dispute also no individual’s medical records “ that, disclosed, clearly [information constitute if constitute a would 140/7(1)(b) personal privacy.” unwarranted invasion 2002). An within this squarely exemp individual’s medical records fall documents, clearly the disclosure of which would constitute Therefore, privacy. invasion of the issue is unwarranted murderer, decedent’s whether mother, require happened be the is sufficient also decedent’s *4 below, hold it disclosure under the Act. For the reasons set forth we not. 7(l)(b) under
Documents otherwise from disclosure section writing may only by if to in released “the disclosure is consented 140/7(1)(b) (West subjects the individual of the information.” ILCS 2002). subject
The “individual sought the information” provision was The Act makes no for a written consent to be party submitted a third in the event the of the information is deceased. plain language of the Act only permits disclosure of privileged information with the written consent “the individual (West 140/7(1)(b) 2002). subjects the information.” Here, possess C.N., do not written consent from which neces sary release medical records under the will an Act. We not read exception into the Act into it grafting language from the Code regarding physician-patient Civil Procedure privilege provi release sions.
Plaintiffs cite section of the 8 — 802 Code Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 (West 2002)) ILCS suggest this allows 5/8 — 802 them to obtain light C.N.’s medical records in authoriza tion acquired disagree. have from C.N.’smother. We
Section governs physician-patient 8 — 802 Code privilege. It states: or physician surgeon permitted any
“No shall be to disclose may acquired information he or she have attending any patient *** *** except only expressed patient, with the consent or in death[,] case of her person [a] his or authorized to sue for (West personal injury ***.” 735 ILCS 5/8 — 802 authority We aware of no that allows a mother convicted of murdering injuries. her child sue for that child’s
Only personal representative may bring of a an ac decedent Wrongful A Death Act. 740 ILCS 180/2 who person felony may appointed has been convicted of neither be (755 3(a) 2002)) guardian of a estate nor child’s 5/11— named administrator of an estate of a decedent who dies intestate (755 (West 2002)). ILCS 5/9— 1
We also 2 — 6 of Probate Act of 1975 find relevance (West 2002)), commonly slayer as the known statute. 5/2 — 6 part: It provides, relevant causing intentionally
“§ A 2—6. Person any causes the of another not unjustifiably receive benefit, death, property, or other reason whether interest tenant, survivor, heir, appointee or legatee, beneficiary,joint benefit, any or other capacity property, other and whether registration, passes pursuant any interest form of title testamen- renunciation, instrument, intestacy, tary nontestamentary benefit, or property, other interest other circumstance. The *5 died causing the death before person as if pass degree murder of first ***. A convicted decedent to conclusively presumed of the is degree second murder decedent intentionally unjustifiably purposes have caused the death (West 2002). of ILCS this Section.” 755 5/2 — 6 is signed by C.N.’s mother invalid We find the authorization legal basis of C.N.’s medical records. provides no for. disclosure first law, As a of Katrina Harden convicted of matter once was decedent, to have conclusively presumed she degree murder was and, therefore, receiving caused the of forever barred benefit, estate. “any property, or other interest” C.N.’s 755 predeceasing is Legally, Katrina Harden viewed 5/2 — 6 daughter. her right property has no receive legal
Because Katrina Harden to guardian be of appointed or benefit from C.N.’s estate and she cannot estate, are not valid under Code as C.N.’s releases she not, law, “person she is as a matter of a authorized to sue for injury” on C.N.’s behalf. that, of provisions
It is clear even under the broader Code, hospital not be release physician would authorized to C.N.’s medical records on the authorization of Katrina Harden. Therefore, Act, as graft even if we to the Code onto the Any this plaintiffs suggest, help would be no to their case. authoriza- Katrina Harden of no effect as it relates to C.N.’s Harden, plaintiffs, help seek to have with the to one her murderers at State- sent convicted Penitentiary. indignities upon four-year-old ville visited little girl life not be her her perpetuated against will after recently
We believe the comments made Seventh discussing Circuit the federal Freedom of Information Act (West 1996)) (FOIA) equally applicable § U.S.C.A. to our Freedom of Information Act. Circuit noted: Seventh goal: contemplates policy FOIA a noble it broad “The has government purpose documents to serve the ‘basic disclosure functioning of a ensuring citizenry, an informed vital way, FOIA’s society.’ [Citation.] Stated another democratic be purpose guarantee central ‘that the Government’s activities eye public scrutiny, that information opened sharp not private to be in the warehouse happens about citizens original.) (Emphasis [Citation.]” disclosed.’ Government so Comm’n, F.3d Lakin Law Firm v. Federal Trade (7th Cir.
CONCLUSION circuit court of Peoria is affirmed. Affirmed.
SLATER, J., concurs. HOLDRIDGE, PRESIDING JUSTICE specially concurring: I agree holding with the office of the coroner was not obligated to disclose the it medical records obtained from the attend ing physicians who rendered medical treatment at St. Francis Medical However, Center and Hospital Methodist not agree Peoria. I do with 7(1)(b) the majority’s reliance of the Illinois Freedom of (FOIA) (5 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002)) Information Act to establish privacy right extending of an individual beyond death. I am *6 convinced that the majority’s upon privacy reliance such a interest the is misplaced deceased as there no or statutory common law right beyond of privacy surviving See National Archives & Favish, Records Administration U.S. 158 L. Ed. 2d (2004) (holding S. Ct. privacy under the federal FOIA that no right decedent; rather, postdeath privacy survives rests with the surviving family). Here, privacy analysis, under interest the facts disclosure, would warrant the privacy since survivors assert no inter est in their own vein.
Rather, I believe that disclosure the sought medical records from the prohibited coroner the instant matter under 7(1)(a) FOIA, provides: which
“(1) following inspection copying:
(a) specifically prohibited Information from disclosure regulations adopted or State law or federal rules and 140/7(1)(a) or State federal law.” Here, sought medical office records coroner’s were provided to it under the privacy provisions medical records Code of I Civil Procedure. 735 would find 5/8—802 provided the restrictions disclosure in the Code of Civil provided Procedure when followed those records pursuant investigation to its the cause of into Thus, physicians generated death of like the first medi- coroner, cal question, copies records in as custodian of of those records, statutory must follow the same limitations on further disclosure. case,
Here, facts of unique application Code disclosure, prevent there no one provisions would since would be avail- Code. accordance with to authorize disclosure able excluded deceased, the mother was of the medical records was majority. aptly discussed statute application judgment to affirm reasons, I in the foregoing concur For the circuit court. (The People of the State
In re DETENTION OF RICHARD HAUGE Illinois, Hauge, Respondent-Appellant). Petitioner-Appellee, v. Richard
Third District No. 3 — 03—0357
Opinion filed June *7 Associates, Streator, Ltd., Reilly (argued), James T. of M.G. Guio & appellant. Feinerman, General, (Gary Madigan, Attorney Chicago S. Solicitor
Lisa Woloshin, General, (argued) At- and J. Hoffmann Linda Assistant Paul General, counsel), torneys People. for the opinion delivered the PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE court: Sexually Persons
Pursuant to the Illinois Violent Commitment