Trеnt RENNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY; International Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW); Local 1219, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-3656
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Feb. 28, 2013
Second, DeJesus argues that the Board “abdicated its adjudicative role” by ignoring his new evidence and failing to “provide any substantive analysis” of DeJesus‘s motion. Pet‘r Br. at 30, 33. To the extent DeJesus means that the Board could have been more expansive in explaining its prejudice analysis, he may be correct. But room for additional explanation does not equate to legal error. See Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 978 (6th Cir. 2011) (“While the BIA should demonstrate that it has considered [the] evidence that a petitioner presents, the BIA is not required to parse or refute on the record every individual argument or document offered by the petitioner.“) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). It was incumbent on the Board to consider whether DeJesus‘s new evidence would have supported a diffеrent outcome, and that is what the Board did. No precedent imposes a straitjacket on the Board, requiring it to tally each piece of new evidence and give an explanation why each one by itself (or in cumulation with the pieces of evidence up to that point in the analysis) fails to meet the applicant‘s burden. The Board met its duty of explanation.
III.
For these reasons, we deny DeJesus‘s petition for review.
BEFORE: MERRITT, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Trent Renner appeals the district court‘s grant оf summary judgment in favor of his employer, Ford Motor Company, and his union, the UAW. Plaintiff brought an action under
BACKGROUND
In 1999, Plaintiff Trent Renner began working for Ford Motor Company‘s transmission plant in Sharonville, Ohiо. He would have preferred to work at Ford‘s engine plant in Lima, Ohio, near where he grew up and lived, but there were no openings available at the Lima plant when he started work. He was reassured by UAW officials that he would be able to transfer at the first opportunity, but no positions became available. For the next six years, Plaintiff commuted approximately four hours each day from his home in Columbus Grove, Ohio, to the Sharonville plant. Understandably, this long commute took its toll on Plaintiff‘s family life and finances.
Under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“) between the UAW and Ford, there are two ways that Plaintiff could have obtained a transfer to the Lima plant. First, he could have quit at Sharonville and been rehired at Lima, but under this “quit and rehire” scenario, he would have lost the plant seniority that he had acquired at Sharonville. Second, Plaintiff could have applied for a position at Lima if an opening was posted at Sharonville; in this scenario, he would have retained his full plant seniority after the transfer. Plaintiff obviously preferred this second route so that he might keep his plant seniority intact, but no transfer opportunities arose during the years he worked at the Sharonville plant.
Plaintiff was reassured by then-Local 1219 Chairperson Dan Hinegardner that his seniority would be preserved. In May 2006, Hinegardner filed a grievance with Ford to adjust Plaintiff‘s seniority to his original 1999 hire date, but that grievance was denied because Plaintiff had officially quit and been rehired, rather than transferring in response to a job posting. Plaintiff‘s reduced seniority did not adversely affect him and no further action was taken until 2009, when at the height of the economic downturn for the American auto industry, layoffs were announced at the Lima plant. Plaintiff found himself on a layoff list because of his 2006 seniority date. To follow through on its promises to Plaintiff, the UAW reinstated the original 2006 grievance and reached yet another deal with Ford to restore Plaintiff‘s 1999 plant seniority in accordance with the original understanding between the UAW‘s Fox and Ford‘s Halverson. The grievance was favorably resolved in February 2009, and Plaintiff returned to work after having been laid off for approximately two weeks.
By this time, Local 1219 had a new chairperson named Dan Weaver, who was not aware of the 2006 understanding between Fox and Halverson. After learning that Plaintiff and Paradore had received what they perceived as special treatment, many employees at the Lima plant were upset. Weaver promised in a written letter to the union membership that he would investigate how Plaintiff‘s seniority had been retroactively adjusted. One of these employees, Jeremi Brayton, had transferred into the Lima plant as a “quit and rehire” employee just as Plaintiff had. Brayton, citing Plaintiff‘s treatment, filed a grievance requesting that his plant seniority be retroactively adjusted as well. After Brayton‘s grievance was initially denied, local UAW officials refused to pursue it further. Brayton appealed that decision to the UAW‘s International Executive Board (“IEB“), the union‘s governing body. The IEB launched an investigation into the seniority adjustments at the Lima plant, and in May 2010 issued a written decision in which it found that the original deal between Fox and Halverson to have Plaintiff and Paradore transferred to Lima was made without “contractual support.” The IEB found that the CBA did not provide for hardship transfers, and it ordered Plaintiff‘s grievance reinstated. Plaintiff was given a choice between remаining at the Lima plant with his plant seniority based on his 2006 transfer or returning to the Sharonville plant.
On September 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Northern District of Ohio. He asserted that Ford breached its obligations under the CBA by failing to adhere to the original 2009 resolution of his grievance, in violation of
DISCUSSION
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and drаwing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Plaintiff filed suit against Ford and the UAW under
“A hybrid § 301 suit implicates the interrеlationship among a union member, his union, and his employer.” Garrish v. UAW, 417 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Vencl v. Int‘l Union of Operating Eng‘rs, Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 1998)). “To recover against a union under § 301, the union member must prove both (1) that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation.” Id. Both prongs must be satisfied for Plaintiff to succeed against either Defendant. Id.
The UAW‘s Duty of Fair Representation
The National Labor Relations Act imposes a duty of fair representation on un
In Vaca, the Supreme Court defined the contours of the unions’ duty: “A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union‘s conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. This test provides “three separate and distinct possible routes by which a union may be found to have breached its duty.” Driver, 328 F.3d at 868-69 (citation omitted). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that his treatment by the UAW was both arbitrary and in bad faith.
A union‘s action is “arbitrary” “only if [its conduct] can be fairly characterized as so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ that it is wholly ‘irrational.‘” Air Line Pilots v. O‘Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)). A union‘s decision not to take further action on an employee grievance that it deems meritless will not violate the duty of fair representation, provided it makes that determination in good faith. See Driver, 328 F.3d at 869. Furthermore, a union does not violate its duty merely by failing to consult with an employee before settling his grievance. Courie, 577 F.3d at 631.
A union acts in “bad faith” when “it acts with an improper intent, purpose, or motive . . . encompass[ing] fraud, dishonesty, and other intentionally misleading conduct.” Merritt v. Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 613 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts examining union performance “must be highly deferential,” recognizing the “wide latitude” needed by union officials to effectively carry out their duties on behalf of union members. O‘Neill, 499 U.S. at 78. Plaintiff argues that the UAW breached its duty of fair representation with respect to three incidents: (1) the loss of his plant seniority when he was first transferred from Sharonville to Lima in 2006, (2) the union‘s handling of the restoration of his plant seniority at Lima in 2009, and (3) the union‘s 2010 decision to reinstate Plaintiff‘s plant seniority as of his 2006 transfer to Lima or allow him to return to Sharonville.
A. Loss of Seniority After the 2006 Transfer to Lima
Plaintiff claims that the UAW and Ford made “two illicit ‘deals‘” when they arranged to have him transferred from Sharonville to Lima in 2006 and then restored his seniority in 2009. In doing so, Plaintiff contends that Defendants essentially agreed with each other to violate the
First, Plaintiff argued that his 2006 transfer was the basis of his § 301 claim for the first time in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff‘s complaint focused exclusively on the UAW‘s 2010 reversal of his 2009 grievance resolutiоn. Only in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment did Plaintiff theorize that past deals between Ford and the UAW constituted violations of the union‘s duty of fair representation. It is well-settled that a plaintiff may not expand its claims to assert new theories in response to summary judgment or on appeal. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007). “At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with
Even if Plaintiff had properly raised this incident in his complaint, he cannot make the requisite showing of bad faith. Plaintiff argues that, had he been told of the deal worked out between the UAW‘s Brett Fox and Ford‘s Jack Halverson to have him transferred to Lima before a posting became available, he would have chosen to remain at Sharonville. That argument falls short of establishing that the union acted in bad faith, particularly when considered against the evidence presented to the district court—all of which indicated that the union had acted on Plaintiff‘s behalf tо facilitate the transfer that he so desperately wanted.
Plaintiff admits that he was told soon after he arrived at Lima that his plant seniority had not been preserved. Plaintiff was therefore aware that a problem existed with his plant seniority, and he was reassured by union leaders that the problem would be resolved. The uncontroverted evidence shows that UAW officials did indeed attempt to preserve Plaintiff‘s plant seniority and acted to honor the deal that
B. Restoration of Full Plant Seniority in 2009
Plаintiff‘s argument with respect to the restoration of his full seniority in 2009 fails for similar reasons. In 2009, when layoffs were imminent, the union followed through on its promises to Plaintiff by agreeing with Ford to favorably resolve the 2006 grievance and restore Plaintiff‘s full plant seniority. Plaintiff raised this second “illicit deal[ ]” for the first time in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, without seeking to amend his complaint. Therefore, this argument is unpreserved. See Bridgeport Music, 508 F.3d at 400. Nevertheless, the argument lacks merit because Plaintiff cannot show that the UAW acted in bad faith when it arranged with Ford to uphold the original deal to have Plaintiff transferred to Lima with his full company seniority intact. The union cannot be said to have violated its duty of fair representation when it successfully obtained a favorable grievance resolution—one that accomplished exactly what Plaintiff had been promised.2
C. UAW‘s 2010 Decision to Reinstate and Reverse Plaintiff‘s Grievance Resolution
Plaintiff‘s complaint alleged that the UAW acted arbitrarily and capriciously when its International Executive Board reversed the 2009 grievance resolution and reinstated the grievance with a new disposition that gave him the option of accepting plant seniority as of his 2006 transfer to Lima or returning to the Sharonville plant. After Plaintiff‘s 2006 grievance was resolved favorably in 2009, other employеes at the Lima plant became upset at what they perceived as Plaintiff improperly jumping the line and being credited with more plant seniority than he deserved. One of the Lima employees, Jeremi Brayton, who like Plaintiff had transferred into Lima as a “quit and rehire” employee, filed a grievance requesting that his plant seniority also be restored. Although local UAW officials initially withdrew Brayton‘s grievance, the union‘s International Executive Board eventually considered Brayton‘s situation alongside the 2009 agreement concerning Plaintiff‘s plant seniority.
The IEB concluded that, while the “intentions of . . . Fox were rational and honorable,” there was no contractual support for Plaintiff‘s transfer to Lima with his Sharonville plant seniority intact. (R. 41-17, IEB Decision 19.) “The CBAs,” it found, “do not provide for hardship resolutions.” (Id.) The IEB ordered Plaintiff‘s grievance reinstated and resolved such that Plаintiff could either remain at the
Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of the UAW‘s ultimate determination that there was no contractual support for maintaining his Sharonville plant seniority when he was transferred to Lima. He seems to argue that simply by changing positions, the UAW acted arbitrarily. However, this argument is tantamount to asserting that the judiciary acts arbitrarily when an appellate court reverses a lower court. The collective bargaining agreement between the UAW and Ford expressly recognizes the validity and authority of the union‘s internal appeals process. That process ran its course and ultimately ended unfavorably for Plaintiff, but there was nothing about it that was “so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ . . . as to be irrational.” O‘Neill, 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127 (citation omitted).
The IEB thoughtfully considered the difficulties of Plaintiff‘s situation but ultimately concluded that he could not be helped without treating countless other Lima employees unfairly. See Merritt, 613 F.3d at 619 (“Without more, merely alleging that a union‘s conduct favored one group over another does not constitute a breach of thе duty of fair representation.“). Especially considering that the union‘s former action was not authorized by the CBA, its final decision to undo the 2009 grievance resolution was not arbitrary. See Williams v. Molpus, 171 F.3d 360, 366-67 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] union does not have to process a grievance that it deems lacks merit, as long as it makes that determination in good faith.“). While the UAW could have kept Plaintiff better informed during the grievance process, it is well-accepted that a union does nоt breach the duty of fair representation merely by failing to consult with an employee before settling his grievance. Courie, 577 F.3d at 631 (citing Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1975)). Because Plaintiff has not produced evidence that any of the UAW‘s conduct was “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, he cannot establish a breach of the union‘s duty of fair representation. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants.3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s grant of summary judgment.