Treleaven v. DixonTreleaven v. Dixon
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Scholfield
delivered the opinion of the Court:
On the 5th day of October, A. D. 1870, Walter Treleaven borrowed ‘$6000 of Edward Morrell, for which he gave his promissory note, and at the same time, he and his wife, Jane Treleaven, executed a deed of trust on certain of her real estate, to Mahlon D. Ogden, to secure the payment of the promissory note. The note became the property of Charles H. Morrell. It was not paid at maturity, and the trustee sold the property, under the power in the deed, to Alexander J. D. Dixon and Fitz Eugene Dixon, executors and trustees under the last will and testament of Charles H. Morrell, who had died after becoming the owner of the note, and the trustee executed a deed accordingly. This bill was filed by Jane Treleaven, against Alexander J. D. Dixon, sole surviving trustee, Fitz Eugene Dixon having died after the making of the deed, to set aside that sale, on the ground that the time for the payment of the note was extended by a contract made between her husband and Charles H. Morrell, without her consent, after the maturity of the note, whereby the trust deed became, as she contends, released or extinguished as a security.
The fact that there was a contract between complainant’s husband and Morrell, extending the time for the payment of
Counsel for appellant contend, that although the court below decreed dismissing the complainant’s bill, yet that it admitted in evidence Treleaven’s testimony, and that, no cross-error having been assigned in respect of the competency of this evidence, the question is not before us. This is a misapprehension. The objection to Treleaven’s evidence is, clearly, not formal nor technical. If his testimony is inadmissible, the objection could, in no way, have been cured. In chancery cases, the whole record, including all the evidence offered, is before us, and we are required to assume that all the incompetent evidence was rejected, and all the competent evidence was admitted and considered, on the final hearing. If there is competent evidence in the record sufficient to sustain the decree, it must be affirmed; if not, it must be reversed,—and this without regard to whether the chancellor may have been right or wrong in his views as to the competency of the evidence at the hearing. Swift et al. v. Castle, 23 Ill. 209; Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 id. 382; Wille min v. Dunn, 93 id. 520; Jefferson v. Jefferson, 96 id. 556; Ritter v. Schenk et al. 101 id. 387; Smith et al. v. Long, 106 id. 485.
At common law, the husband and wife were not competent witnesses for or against each other in suits between them and other parties; and to what extent they are now competent witnesses in such cases, depends entirely upon the language of the statute. To the extent that it declares, and no farther, they are competent.
In Pigg et al. v. Carroll et al. 89 Ill. 206, where a bill was filed for partition between heirs of a common ancestor, it was held that the statute has no application; that it was intended to protect the estates of deceased persons from the assaults of strangers, and relates to proceedings wherein the decision sought by the party so testifying would tend to reduce or impair the estate, and does not relate to the relative rights of heirs or devisees, as to the distribution of an estate, in proceedings by which the estate itself is in no event to be reduced or impaired; and this was followed in Mueller v. Rebhan, 94 Ill. 142, and it has since been followed in other cases. “But it is quite plain that the principle involved in those cases has no application here. Eads v. Thompson et al. 109 Ill. 87, was not analogous to the present case. The adverse party there did not sue or defend as heir. Nothing that was said in Pyle v. Oustatt, 92 Ill. 209, militates against
In Powell v. Powell et al. 114 Ill. 329, Bridget Powell, the ivife of Daniel, was so clearly incompetent that it was not thought necessary to discuss the question. The remark that the proof failed to show that she was the agent of Daniel, was made in answer to a contention of fact by counsel. It was entirely unnecessary, and is not to be regarded as indicating any rule of law in that regard.
Excluding the evidence of Walter Treleaven, as we must, there is no pretence that there is error in the decree below. The decree is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.