505 N.E.2d 290 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1986
As an affected taxing authority, the school board moved the county board of revision to dismiss the taxpayer's complaint about real property assessments. The school board argued that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective because (a) it did not show that a notary verified the taxpayer's *313 agent's signature, and (b) it related to multiple parcels which were not "in actual physical contact with each other and with identical ownership."
Fourteen months later, the school board's counsel wrote the board of revision, requesting it to dismiss the taxpayer's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Apparently anticipating an argument about the missing verification, the taxpayer's attorney had filed an affidavit from a notary two days earlier. In that affidavit, the notary said that the taxpayer's attorney had in fact signed the original complaint in her presence and under oath. She explained that she neglected to affix her own signature and seal in the course of notarizing the lawyer's signature on multiple unrelated tax complaints.
Three weeks later, the board of revision dismissed the taxpayer's complaint that those four parcels were overvalued, "for lack of jurisdiction." On the same date, the board confirmed its jurisdiction over the merits of the school board's complaint that three of the same parcels were undervalued.
The taxpayer appealed the dismissal of its complaint to the Board of Tax Appeals. It argued that the missing notarial notation did not preclude the complaint's consideration and that the complaint properly addressed the assessment for those four parcels. To avoid any dispute whether a single appeal could challenge the order about four parcels, the taxpayer filed four separate appeals. See Ohio Adm. Code
In the course of that consolidated appeal, the parties stipulated about the parcels' relative locations, their title history, and the taxpayer's interest in them. The parties also agreed that the board could accept the notary's affidavit as her testimony. R.C.
The parties' stipulations established that three of the parcels are in physical contact and form a single uninterrupted plot. The fourth parcel lies immediately opposite that plot but separated from it by an alley. None of the parcels bordering that alley includes any part of the alley area within its legal description.
For the 1979 tax year, the taxpayer held a ninety-nine year renewable ground lease with thirty years still remaining, for one of the parcels. It held a ninety-year ground lease with twenty-six years still remaining, for the other three parcels. Two different owners held the fee simple title for the land subject to those leases. Both leases require this taxpayer to pay the real property taxes for the leased land.
The tax board rejected the school board's arguments and decided that the board of revision should consider the taxpayer's complaint on its merits. The school board then filed separate appeals to this court for each parcel. Thereafter, on the school board's motion, this court consolidated those four appeals.
"The county board of revision shall not decrease any valuation complained of unless the party affected thereby or his agent makes and files with the board a written application therefor, verified by oath, showing the facts upon which it is claimed such decrease should be made."
R.C.
The Tax Commissioner has authority to promulgate rules and forms which implement the statutory requirements. R.C.
However, the Tax Commissioner cannot change or increase the statutory jurisdictional requirements for such complaints. As R.C.
The school board argues that R.C.
We see no valid distinction between the rationale for verifying a complaint about real property assessments and a complaint about sales or use tax assessments. Hence, we apply the Akron StandardDiv. rule in construing R.C.
This taxpayer supplied all requested information necessary to evaluate its *315
complaint, so the omitted verification would not impede the board's investigation of its merits. Cf. Ratner v. Cuyahoga Cty.Bd. of Revision (Nov. 15, 1984), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 47991-47993, unreported. It provided substantial compliance with R.C.
"MULTIPLE TAX PARCELS: Only parcels in actual physical contact with each other and with identical ownership and located in the same taxing district may be included in one complaint. * * * The amounts to be reported in Item[s] 7 and 8 [complainant's valuation, current valuation, and increase or decrease asked] should be the aggregate figures for all the parcels included in the complaint."
This court has previously enforced that instruction as a lawfully established procedure which imposes a jurisdictional requirement for multiple complaints in some situations. Thus, a taxpayer cannot use a single complaint to challenge assessments for properties in different taxing districts. Bd. of Revision ofCuyahoga Cty. v. Baker Material Handling Corp. (Mar. 5, 1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 42528, unreported. The board of revision must separately assess parcels in different tax districts, so that the treasurer can allocate any resulting tax collections. Consequently, the requirement for separate complaints about parcels in different tax districts facilitates that essential governmental purpose.
By contrast, the school board suggests no significant governmental purpose for always limiting complaints to single parcels in the same taxing district. If the parcels are economically unrelated, administrative convenience favors their separate valuation. If they are economically interrelated, the contrary is true.
Indeed, the Tax Commissioner has expressly approved the use of single complaints when the parcels are "in physical contact with each other and with identical ownership." In that situation, the Tax Commissioner assists both the taxpayer and the board by permitting them to value the composite worth of such integral units. If multiple parcels form a single economic unit, an attempt to assess each parcel separately could produce highly artificial results.
With that rationale in mind, the language in the Tax Commissioner's instruction on D.T.E. Form No. 1 has greater clarity. The taxpayer can properly dispute the assessment for an economic unit composed of "parcels in actual physical contact." An intervening alley does not disrupt that "actual physical contact" if the parcels still form a single economic unit. In this case, the taxpayer's complaint states that "the principal use of [the] subject property" is as a "[h]otel and garage." The parcel across the alley apparently contains part of the garage. It represents approximately three percent of the total property described in the complaint. The taxpayer's interest in that parcel derives *316 from a long-term lease covering part of the property on both sides of the alley.
Thus, we agree with the tax board that the small parcel is "in actual physical contact" with the larger plot on the other side of the alley. The tax board reasoned that the phrase "in actual physical contact" describes "contiguous" properties, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary (4 Rev. Ed. 1968) 391:
"In close proximity; near, though not in contact; neighboring; adjoining; near in succession; or actual close contact; touching; bounded or traversed by. The term is not synonymous with `vicinal.' * * *" (Emphasis added.)
In view of the apparent purpose for allowing composite complaints about multiple parcels, the tax board's interpretation seems entirely reasonable. See, also, Teeters Packing Co. v.Tracy (Dec. 4, 1985), B.T.A. Nos. 82-B-1358 82-C-1359, unreported.
We also note that a municipality holds a determinable fee for land used as streets and alleys. Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec.Light Co. (1902),
For all these reasons, we reject the school board's second assignment of error.
We again note that the reason for valuing multiple parcels together is the administrative convenience which results when such parcels form a single economic unit. That convenience exists when the same taxpayer owes the entire resulting tax. As stated earlier, no administrative convenience results from valuing multiple parcels together, if the board must later subdivide the assessment between multiple tax districts. Likewise, no administrative convenience results from valuing multiple parcels together, if the board must later subdivide the resulting assessment between multiple taxpayers.
The real question here is whether this complainant has standing to challenge the assessment for any of these parcels, since it has the same standing for all four parcels. Its legal interest and its responsibility for taxes are essentially the same for each parcel. In each case, the taxpayer holds a long-term ground lease which requires it to pay the real estate taxes applicable to that parcel.
The code clearly allows complaints by non-owners. R.C.
D.T.E. Form No. 1 also provides for complaints by non-owners. It requires the complainant to identify both the owner and the complainant if they are not the same. This taxpayer listed the owners of the fee simple titles for the parcels, as well as its own name. The form asks for the "[r]elationship of complainant to [the] real property if other *317 than the owner." The complainant here identified itself as "Land Lessee, Owner of improvements taxpayer."
In the full context of the form and the code, this complainant had standing to challenge the assessment for each of these four parcels. As the tax board noted, this complainant "is the true party in interest." The complainant had the same right to dispute each of those assessments separately. Hence, the tax board reasonably concluded that the parcels had "identical ownership" for the purpose of joint valuation in a single complaint. Cf.Caldwell v. State (1926),
We overrule the school board's third assignment, affirm the tax board's decision, and remand the case to the board of revision for further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.
NAHRA and CORRIGAN, JJ., concur.
