169 F.2d 437 | 9th Cir. | 1948
On September 28, 1942, appellee, the United States, took for public use certain property, real and personal, in Los Angeles County, California. In the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, appellee filed a complaint on September 28, 1942, seeking condemnation of the real property, and an amended complaint on January 12, 1944, seeking condemnation of all the property, ■real and personal. All persons and corporations having or claiming to have any ■right, title or interest in or to the property
Samarkand answered the amended complaint on April 30, 1945. Its answer stated, in substance, that it owned a part of the real property and a part of the personal property; stated that'its personal property was unlawfully taken by appellee on September 28, 1942; prayed that the condemnation proceeding be dismissed; and, in the alternative, prayed for a judgment against appellee for damages in the sum of $931,104.14 — $670,000 for taking of its real property and $261,104.14 for the taking of its personal property.
Treasure answered the amended complaint on May 28, 1945. Its answer stated, in substance, that it owned a part of the real property and a part of the personal property; stated that its personal property was unlawfully taken by appellee on September 28, 1942; prayed that the condemnation proceeding be dismissed; and, in the alternative, prayed for a judgment against appellee for damages in the sum of $2,180,231.82 — $2,000,000 for the taking of its real property and $180,231.82 for the taking of its personal property.
There has been no trial or determination of the issues raised by appellants’ answers to the amended complaint. The condemnation proceeding is still pending.
At all pertinent times since September 28, 1942, appellee, by its agent, Union Oil Company, a corporation, hereafter called Union, has had possession of all the property claimed by appellants. On November 15, 1943,
On September 27, 1945,
On May 28, 1947, appellants moved the District Court to dissolve and, vacate the order of January 27, 1947. On August 4, 1947, the District Court made and entered an order denying the motion of May 28, 1947. From the order of August 4, 1947,
Appellants contend that the District Court abused its discretion in making and entering the order of August 4, 1947, because it thereby “denied to these appellants all recourse for the wrongful taking of said appellants’ personal property
Except as indicated in the last preceding paragraph of this opinion, appellants do not contend that the District Court abused its discretion in making -and entering the order of August 4, 1947.
Appellants contend that the Distric Court abused its discretion in making and entering the order of January 27, 1947, because that order was prohibited by § 265 of the Judicial Code,
As stated above, the order of August 4, 1947, denied a motion to dissolve and vacate the order of January 27, 1947. Therefore the District Court might be said to have abused its discretion in making and entering the order of August 4, 1947, if appellants’ contention that the order of January 27, 1947, was prohibited by § 265 were accepted as correct. We, however, reject that contention for the following reasons:
The condemnation proceeding was a proceeding in rem.
Because Nos. 489318 and 489319 were brought before January 12, 1944, the District Court held that, as to those actions, § 265 was applicable and, on the basis of that holding, made and entered the order of June 12, 1945, denying appellee’s petition and motion to enjoin appellants from prosecuting those actions.
Because Nos. 505967 and 505968 were brought after January 12, 1944, and involved property which, on January 12, 1944, became a part of the res in the condemnation proceeding, and because their prosecution would have impaired or defeated the District Court’s jurisdiction of that part of the res, the District Court held that, as to those actions, § 265 was inapplicable and, on the basis of that holding, made and entered the order of January 27, 1947, enjoining appellants from prosecuting those actions. The holding that § 265 was inapplicable was clearly correct; for the case came within a recognized exception to § 265.
Whether § 265 is applicable to any case in which the United States seeks an injunction is questionable.
There is no merit in the suggestion that the orders of January 27, 1947, and August 4, 1947, were inconsistent with the order of June 12, 1945; for, as heretofore indicated, the order of June 12, 1945, related to actions brought before January 12, 1944, whereas the orders of January 27, 1947, and August 4, 1947, related to actions brought after January 12, 1944.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in making and entering the order of August 4, 1947. Accordingly, that order is affirmed.
Another claimant was Sam Block. See United States v. Block, 9 Cir., 160 F.2d 604.
Before the amended complaint was filed.
All State court actions mentioned in this opinion were brought in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California.
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Los Angeles, D.C.S.D.Cal., 62 F.Supp. 1017.
United States v. Treasure Co., 9 Cir., 151 F.2d 1022.
After the amended complaint was filed.
Not the part involved in No. 489318.
Not the part involved in No. 489319.
Other State court actions (Nos. 507385 and 507386) were brought against Union, but we are not here concerned with them.
Owen v. Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co., 9 Cir., 2 F.2d 247; Kendall v. Trico Products Corp., 6 Cir., 31 F.2d 522; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaway, 5 Cir., 135 F.2d 592.
Meaning, obviously, the property involved in Nos. 505967 and 505968.
Section 265 provides: “The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.”
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729; Minnesota v. United States, 8 Cir., 125 F. 2d 636; Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 160 F.2d 182.
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, supra.
See, however, Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 43 S.Ct. 480, 67 L.Ed. 871; Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669.
This exception — sometimes called the in rem exception — was recognized in Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 24 S.Ct. 399, 48 L.Ed. 629; Riverdale Mills v. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188, 25 S.Ct. 629, 49 L.Ed. 1008; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226, 24 A.L.R. 1077; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, supra; Munroe v. Raphael, 288 U.S. 485, 53 S.Ct 424, 77 L.Ed. 910; Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100, 137 A.L.R. 967: Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47, 63 S.Ct. 472, 87 L Ed. 605.
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; United States v. Inaba, D.C.E.D. Wash., 291 F. 416; United States v. Babcock, D.C.Ind., 6 F.2d 160; United States v. McIntosh, D.C.E.D.Va., 57 F.2d 573; United States v. Dewar, D.C.Nev., 18 F.Supp. 981; United States v. Phillips, D.C.N.D.Okl., 33 F.Supp. 261.