Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA JOHNNY TRAWEEK CIVIL ACTION v. NO. 19-1384 MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL. SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions by Louisiana Department of Safety & Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc and employee Ashely Jones: (1) Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to stay discovery. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and the motion to stay discovery is DENIED as moot.
Background
This civil rights lawsuit arises from Johnny Traweek’s claim that bureaucratic incompetence delayed the processing of his “time-served” judgment, causing him to be unlawfully imprisoned in Orleans Parish Prison almost three weeks beyond his court-ordered release date.
On October 2, 2017, Johnny Traweek was arrested on suspicion of aggravated battery and detained in Orleans Parish Sherriff’s Office custody at Orleans Parish Prison. He could not make bail. *2 Seven months later, on Wednesday, May 2, 2018, Mr. Traweek appeared in state court, pled guilty to aggravated battery, and was sentenced to seven months in the custody of the Orleans Parish Sheriff, with credit for time served. [1] But Mr. Traweek was not immediately released. [2] The next day, Mr. Traweek remained in custody; Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office created a Letter of Credit showing that Mr. Traweek had served his entire seven-month sentence.
When Mr. Traweek remained in custody a week later, on May 9, 2018, Mr. Traweek’s attorney, Stas Moroz, emailed Monique Filmore and Blake Arcuri [3] at the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office asking why Mr. Traweek had not been released. Ms. Filmore responded defiantly: “First of all Johnny Traweek was just sentenced on 5/2/18 so his paperwork has not went up yet.” On Monday, May 14, 2018, Mr. Moroz again wrote to Ms. Filmore and Mr. Arcuri: “Mr. *3 Traweek is still in jail. Could you please ensure that he is released? I understand that the paperwork has to be send (sic) to [the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, or DOC], but he has now been detained 12 days past his full term date.” Mr. Arcuri unhelpfully responded that the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office could not release Mr. Traweek since he was a Louisiana Department of Safety & Corrections, or “DOC” inmate. [4] Still defiant, Ms. Filmore replied: “He can’t get released until DOC sends him a release. The whole process takes about 2 weeks. He has to wait!!!!”
On May 16, 2018, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections (DPSC or DOC) confirmed that the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office had not even begun the process of transferring Mr. Traweek. [5] It was not until May 17, 2018 that the DOC received Mr. Traweek’s release paperwork from the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office.
Although Mr. Traweek’s paperwork “arrived” at the DOC on Thursday, May 17, four days passed before DOC began to process his *4 release. On Monday, May 21, 2018, DOC employee Ashley Jones started working on Mr. Traweek’s paperwork. It is alleged that she began computing Mr. Traweek’s credit for time-served and she performed other searches relevant to his release. But she did not finish Mr. Traweek’s paperwork that day. The next day, on May 22, Mr. Moroz filed a writ of habeas corpus and motion for immediate release on behalf of Mr. Traweek. [6] Later that same day, Ms. Jones created Mr. Traweek’s certificate of release and, at about 3:30 p.m., Mr. Traweek was released from custody. Twenty days after he was sentenced to time-served and eligible for release from custody.
On February 14, 2019, Mr. Traweek filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, followed by an amended complaint on May 16, 2019, naming as defendants, in their individual and official capacities, Marlin Gusman (as Sheriff) and Monique Filmore (as an employee) of the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office as well as James LeBlanc (as Secretary) and Ashley Jones (as an employee) of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. [7] Mr. Traweek seeks to recover for a Fourteenth *5 Amendment Due Process Clause constitutional violation underlying his § 1983 claims; he also asserts Monell/Hinojosa failure to train/supervise liability against Gusman and LeBlanc, as well as various state constitutional and state law claims including false imprisonment (against Gusman, Filmore, Jones, and Does 1-10), negligence and failure to intervene (as to all defendants), and respondeat superior (against Gusman). He seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages, special damages, attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction, as well as “indemnification” (as to Gusman only). [8]
Mr. Traweek alleges that, for years, the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office [9] and the Louisiana Department of Safety and Corrections have held prisoners indefinitely beyond their release date, releasing prisoners only after their attorneys file habeas *6 corpus petitions. Mr. Traweek alleges that these widespread over detention practices violate his civil rights and confer municipal liability and supervisory liability. The State Defendants (LDSC Secretary LeBlanc and employee Jones) now move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against them, invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity, Heck v. Humphrey, and qualified immunity; they also move to stay discovery pending the Court’s ruling on their motion to dismiss.
I. A.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge a federal district
court's subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections challenges
this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),
invoking the Eleventh Amendment’s doctrine of sovereign immunity
with respect to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims seeking monetary
damages against LeBlanc and Jones in their official capacities.
The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on
the party asserting jurisdiction. Choice Inc. of Texas v.
Greenstein,
B.
The other ground for dismissal advanced by the defendant is dismissal for failure to state a claim, under Rule 12(b)(6). The standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is similar to that applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely
granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A
& M Univ. Sys.,
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
Thus, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
“accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.’” See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.
v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit,
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal,
II.
DOC Secretary LeBlanc and DOC employee Jones advance three grounds for the dismissal of Mr. Traweek’s § 1983 claims. First, LeBlanc and Jones invoke sovereign immunity insofar as Mr. Traweek asserts claims against them in their official capacities. Second, LeBlanc and Jones submit that Heck v. Humphrey’s favorable termination rule procedurally bars Mr. Traweek’s § 1983 claims. Finally, LeBlanc and Jones invoke qualified immunity insofar as Mr. Traweek seeks money damages from them in their individual capacities. The Court takes up sovereign immunity first.
A.
LeBlanc and Jones submit that the plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacities as Secretary and employee of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections must be dismissed because the DOC enjoys sovereign immunity from suit. The plaintiff concedes that dismissal of his official capacity claims against LeBlanc and Jones is required. The Court agrees.
"Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to
be sued without its consent." Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011); Frew ex rel. Frew v.
Hawkins,
The Eleventh Amendment bar to suits by private citizens against a state in federal court extends to protect state actors who are acting in their official capacities. K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010)(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978)); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)(A suit against a state official in an official *13 capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.).
There is a narrow exception to this immunity from suit: the
Ex parte Young exception, which “is based on the legal fiction
that a sovereign state cannot act unconstitutionally[; t]hus,
where a state actor enforces an unconstitutional law, he is
stripped of his official clothing and becomes a private person
subject to suit.” See K.P. v. LeBlanc,
Ex parte Young thus limits the plaintiff to prospective relief
and bars money damages. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). To determine whether Ex parte
Young's mandate is satisfied, "a court need only conduct a
straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective." See id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)(alteration in original); see also
Delaughter v. Woodall,
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff seeks only money damages against LeBlanc and Jones in their official capacities as Secretary and employee of the State Department of Public Safety and Corrections; LeBlanc and Jones have thus permissibly invoked sovereign immunity and Ex parte Young is not implicated. Mr. Traweeks’s claims against LeBlanc and Jones in their official capacities must be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
B.
LeBlanc and Jones next contend that plaintiff’s individual
capacity § 1983 claims are procedurally barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
Another Section of this Court has rejected Secretary LeBlanc’s attempt to invoke Heck in a factually-similar overdetention context, Grant v. Gusman, 17-cv-02797, R. Doc. 46 (E.D. La. March *16 27, 2018)(Brown, C.J.). There, the plaintiff, who had served seven years in state custody, was arrested upon his release based on a warrant issued years earlier for a different crime predating the one for which he served the seven-year prison term. The plaintiff pled guilty and the state court sentenced him to “a one year sentence, with credit for time served for the seven years he had just served.” Id. at 3. Like Mr. Traweek, an administrative logjam between OPSO and DOC caused the plaintiff to be detained an additional 27 days after his sentencing, notwithstanding the state trial court’s order (and the judge’s email directly to OPSO’s attorney directing) that Grant’s release be expedited. Id. at 3- 5. In moving to dismiss Grant’s § 1983 claims, Secretary LeBlanc also invoked Heck. Chief Judge Brown rejected the argument, noting “[p]laintiff does not argue that his conviction or sentence were invalid. . . . [H]e contends that DOC Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to release him from prison. Therefore, Heck v. Humphrey is not applicable to this case.” Id. at 32. This reasoning applies equally to Mr. Traweek, who, like Grant, challenges neither his conviction nor the length of his court-ordered sentence; he simply alleges that the overdetention by his jailers’ failure to timely process his release following *17 his court-ordered time-served judgment exceeds constitutional bounds.
Mr. Traweek’s lawsuit, if successful, will not demonstrate or imply the invalidity of any criminal judgment or court-imposed sentence. He simply alleges that the procedures and action (or inaction) that caused him to be incarcerated for 20 days longer than his criminal judgment permitted unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to due process. Heck’s procedural bar is patently inapplicable.
III. A.
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law; it provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability.” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). To plead a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating:
(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law,
(2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused by a state actor.
Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
This case is about state and municipal actors’ alleged knowing, deliberate choices not to process Mr. Traweek’s release, or adhering to (or failing to adopt) policies deliberately *19 indifferent to his overdetention plight, despite it being clear on the face of his paperwork compared to his state sentencing judgment that he was entitled to immediate release. Mr. Traweek charges that DOC Secretary LeBlanc and DOC employee Jones deprived him of his right to due process by unreasonably prolonging his detention after his court-ordered release. When, as here, a plaintiff seeks money damages for alleged violations of constitutional rights, government officials sued in their individual capacities may invoke the defense of qualified immunity. LeBlanc and Jones now do so.
B.
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan,
Resolving immunity defenses calls for application of a
bifurcated test: “[q]ualified immunity shields...state officials
from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
*21
the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
What does it mean for a right to be clearly established? This
is a “demanding standard,” which requires “precedent [so]
clear...that
every
reasonable official would interpret it to
*22
establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”
District of Columbia v. Wesby,
Applying these principles, Mr. Traweek has pled facts that, if true, would permit the inference that LeBlanc and Jones are liable under § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation and would overcome their assertion of qualified immunity.
1. Traweek plausibly alleges that LeBlanc and Jones violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to timely release from confinement.
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “depriv[ing] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government.” Jauch v. Choctaw Cty.,
*24 Mr. Traweek alleges that LeBlanc’s failure to adopt safeguards despite knowing DOC’s pattern of overdetaining inmates and Jones’s direct failure to timely process his release despite knowing he was overdue to be released violated his right to timely release from custody. Because Mr. Traweek has a right to be timely released from custody, his over detention, or detention absent (or beyond the expiration of) legal process, violates an incarcerated person’s right to due process. See id.
2. Traweek plausibly alleges that his right to timely release from custody was clearly established at the time that LeBlanc and Jones received his release paperwork and that their delay in securing his release was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law.
There is no dispute that an incarcerated person’s right to timely release from custody is clearly established and was so, well before 2018 at the time that Traweek remained in custody despite the court order mandating his release. See id. (citations omitted). In addition to determining that Jauch’s 96-day detention without a hearing deprived her of liberty without legal or due process, the Fifth Circuit determined that the law had been clearly established in Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. 2000); thus, the court denied qualified immunity to the sheriff *25 in whose custody the plaintiff remained for 96 days. Jauch, 874 F.3d at 436 (finding that the sheriff’s attempt to shift blame to immune judicial officers was misdirected given that sheriff’s actions and decisions caused constitutional injury: “[e]ither Sheriff Halford is plainly incompetent, or he knowingly violated the law.”).
Even before Jauch and Jones -- to underscore just how clear
the law was -- the Fifth Circuit had instructed that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the intentional tort of “false arrest,” and a
prisoner has a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to timely
release from prison. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern,
sheriff. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in failing to grant the plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict as to liability because the sheriff was “chargeable with constructive notice of the termination of all proceedings against Whirl, or alternatively, that absence of such notice was not a legal justification for Whirl’s continued imprisonment.” Id. at 793. [18]
Notwithstanding the Whirl v. Kern panel’s ostensible
dismissal of immunity prospects for jailers in a false imprisonment
civil rights case,
[19]
the
en banc
Fifth Circuit revisited the
*27
availability of qualified immunity to a jailer and held that,
indeed, “a defense of official immunity is available to a jailer
who has acted in reasonable good faith[.]” Bryan v. Jones, 530
F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc). But, the court
concluded, “the standard of reasonableness by which the
availability of qualified immunity to an official would be gauged
varie[s] according to the degree of discretion that he
exercise[s].” Douthit v. Jones,
Whirl,
Bryan, 530 F.2d at 1215). Thus, “[w]here a plaintiff alleges that he was imprisoned without valid authority, the court ruled that it would hold the jailer to a high standard of reasonableness since he exercises no discretion and is under relatively little time pressure.” Id. Whether a jailer’s overdetention of a prisoner violates due process depends on context; as a matter of law, “[d]etention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.” Id. at 532. The Fifth Circuit observed that “[t]he large number of incarcerated persons about whom [the jailer] must make decisions, while increasing his administrative burden, does not affect the scope of his narrow discretion to hold or release the individuals in his custody.” Id. at 535.
*29 Given the above-mentioned case literature, the Fifth Circuit has since unsurprisingly expressly recognized that “there is a clearly established right to timely release from prison.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). There, the court considered whether a jailer, Epps, the Commissioner of and policymaker for the Mississippi Department of Corrections, was entitled to qualified immunity in the face of Will Porter’s claim that he was falsely imprisoned for 15 months beyond the expiration of the sentence imposed by the Mississippi state trial court. Id. at 443. Porter alleged that Epps implemented the policies that led to his unconstitutional detention, that Epps was aware of the MDOC records department’s failure to interpret sentencing orders correctly, yet took no steps to institute procedural safeguards, train staff, or otherwise hire competent staff, and that Epps’s indifference resulted in Porter’s unlawful imprisonment. Id. at 444. After being instructed on qualified immunity and supervisory liability, the jury returned a verdict for Porter, awarding him $150,000. Id. The district court denied Epps’ motion for judgment as a matter of law in which he invoked qualified immunity and argued that he was impermissibly found liable on a theory of respondeat superior . Id. Epps appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed.
Having assumed that Epps violated Porter’s constitutional right and having already determined that there is a clearly established right to timely release from prison, the Fifth Circuit moved on to consider whether Epps’s actions, in light of his duty to ensure Porter’s timely release from prison, were objectively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Epps, who supervised a department that made a single mistake, was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 447. The Fifth Circuit first summarized the relevant authority regarding supervisory liability, which applies equally to Traweek’s claims against LeBlanc:
A supervisory official may be held liable ... only if
(1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause
the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements
unconstitutional policies that causally result in the
constitutional injury.” Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Prot.
& Reg. Servs.,
Taking as true his allegations, Mr. Traweek has plausibly alleged that his constitutional right to timely release was violated by both the defendants. There is no dispute that Traweek’s incarceration 20 days beyond the term of his court- ordered sentence implicates the due process clause. LeBlanc and Jones are entitled to qualified immunity unless Traweek has alleged *32 facts establishing that they violated his constitutional right to timely release and their actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
Mr. Traweek has alleged facts sufficient to overcome LeBlanc’s and Jones’s assertions of qualified immunity at the pleadings stage. Mr. Traweek alleges his paperwork (including the OPSO-prepared Letter of Credit, which was created on May 3 and showed he had served his entire seven-month sentence) had not been sent to DOC by OPSO until Thursday, May 17, 2018. That paperwork sat at DOC unreviewed until Monday, May 21, when Ashley Jones “began computing” Traweek’s credit and “performing other searches relevant to his release.” Notwithstanding Mr. Traweek’s allegations indicating that his paperwork and Letter of Credit when compared to his criminal court judgment on its face obviously entitled him to immediate release, it was not until sometime later the next day, Tuesday, May 22, after Traweek’s counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus, that Ms. Jones created Mr. Traweek’s Certificate of Release; he was released on 3:00 p.m. that day. Mr. Traweek alleges that LeBlanc and the DOC have “a well- documented pattern of overdetention.” Mr. Traweek specifically alleges that:
• four DOC employees testified in other cases that they frequently encounter inmates who are eligible for immediate release and that the DOC staff have discovered at least one *33 or two cases each week of inmates who have been overdetained and eligible for immediate release; • DOC’s counsel, Attorney General Jeff Landry, wrote an op-ed
stating that there “is a layer of incompetence so deep that the Corrections Department doesn’t know where a prisoner is on any given day of the week or when he should actually be released from prison”; • LeBlanc himself championed a review project, Lean Six Sigma,
which found that, as of January 2012, the DOC had a “1446 backlog of cases to have time computed,” resulting in an average processing delay of 110 days and once those inmates had their time calculated, more than 83% were eligible for immediate release; • Interventions by the Lean Six Sigma reduced but did not
eliminate the problem: the average days of overdetained inmates due for immediate release was reduced from 71.7 to 60.52 days;
• LeBlanc and DOC still did not fix the overdetention problem, as determined by an October 2017 audit, reporting basic data errors at the DOC at a rate of 26 errors per 100 inmates and reporting that staff used different methods to calculate the release dates on the same offender with results differing by 186 days; • The DOC’s own 2017 investigation found that it had “an average
of 200 cases per month considered an ‘immediate release’ due to...deficiencies” • LeBlanc admitted that there has not been a single example of
discipline or adverse employment activity for DOC employees who have incorrectly computed sentences or release dates from 2000 to the present.
a.
LeBlanc’s § 1983 individual capacity liability is predicated solely on his supervisory role as Secretary of DOC; there are no allegations that he affirmatively participated in the acts that caused Mr. Traweek’s constitutional deprivation. Thus, LeBlanc is only liable under § 1983 if Mr. Traweek plausibly alleged that he *34 implemented unconstitutional (or failed to implement) policies that causally resulted in his overdetention. Mr. Traweek contends that his pattern allegations overcome LeBlanc’s assertion of qualified immunity and that another Section of this Court has determined that similar allegations suffice to allege a pattern of overdetention at the DOC of which LeBlanc was aware but nonetheless acted with deliberate indifference by failing to discipline or train employees or to implement any policy to correct the unconstitutional problem. See Grant v. Gusman, No. 17-2792, 2018 WL 3869494, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2018)(Brown, C.J.). The Court agrees. Mr. Traweek’s allegations regarding DOC’s pattern of overdetention and LeBlanc’s deliberate failure to act or implement policies addressing the overdetention problem suffice to overcome LeBlanc’s invocation of qualified immunity. Mr. Traweek alleges that the DOC’s system of administrative processing, in practice, amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference. It is alleged that LeBlanc has known about the DOC’s pattern of overdetention for years and yet has failed to adopt policies to correct this problem and that this failure to adopt training or disciplinary policies to address it constitutes deliberate indifference to MR. Traweek’s constitutional right to timely release. Mr. Traweek also alleges that, consistent with the known delays inherent in processing releases at DOC, it took DOC four *35 days to even begin “computing” Traweek’s time and then another day to effect his release. This suffices to overcome LeBlanc’s invocation of qualified immunity at the pleadings stage.
b.
Ms. Jones’s individual capacity liability is predicated on her conduct in processing Traweek’s paperwork and delaying the preparation of his certificate of release until the day after she reviewed his paperwork. Mr. Traweek contends that controlling precedent renders it beyond debate that any reasonable official would know that failing to process Traweek’s release within at least several hours or at most several days of receiving paperwork making it obvious that he was overdue for release violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to timely release. Ms. Jones argues that she acted objectively reasonably by calculating Traweek’s credit and issuing his certificate of release within a one-day period. “[A]ll Ms. Jones had to do,” Mr. Traweek counters, “was compare Mr. Traweek’s sentence to his jail credit letter to see that his sentence was equal to his period of pre-trial detention. That could take five minutes or less.” Mr. Traweek alleges that it took her a day or more to process his release, which ultimately *36 may be deemed unreasonable by the trier of fact in the context here, where a jailer lacks discretion to keep in custody a prisoner entitled to release.
Ms. Jones argues that Mr. Traweek’s allegations fail to overcome her assertion of qualified immunity because Porter v. Epps does not clearly establish that taking some time less than 24 hours to process an inmate’s release constitutes deliberate indifference. To be sure, Porter v. Epps does not directly speak to what amount of time is reasonable for a jailer to process an inmate’s release and Whirl suggests that the administrative process cannot be expected to be instantaneous. However, Mr. Traweek identifies a body of persuasive authority that clearly establishes that what amount of time is reasonable is context- specific such that continuing to detain an inmate entitled to release for as few as several hours might be unreasonable as a matter of law.
That an inmate has a due process right to “timely” release
from custody after a judicial determination that he is entitled to
release begs the question: how much time is reasonable and how
much tolerance is there for administrative delay attendant to
processing an inmate’s release? “Courts have not settled on any
concrete number of permissible
hours
of delay in the context of
post-release detentions.” Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771 (9th
*37
Cir. 2004)(emphasis added). Persuasive authorities have declined
to endorse a presumptive reasonable number of hours. See, e.g.,
Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004)(reversing district
court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing official capacity
claims, finding a fact issue as to whether application of county
policies which resulted in 29-hour overdetentions was unreasonable
under the circumstances and thus amounted to a policy of deliberate
indifference to arrestees’ constitutional rights); Davis v. Hall,
Insofar as Ms. Jones argues that, as a matter of law, she
could not be instantly liable for Mr. Traweek’s overdetention, of
course the Court agrees. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern,
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that the defendants’ motion to dismiss GRANTED, in part, as to the plaintiff’s claims against Jones and LeBlanc in their official capacities, and DENIED, in part, as to the defendants’ Heck argument and as to their invocation of qualified immunity as to *41 the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against LeBlanc and Jones in their individual capacities. [25] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that the defendants’ motion to stay discovery is DENIED as moot.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October , 2019 ______________________________ MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
[1] In rendering sentence, Judge Willard stated: “Seven months Orleans Parish Prison. Give him credit for time served, all to run concurrent. State has agreed to no multiple bill. This does qualify as a crime of violence.” However, for some reason, the docket sheet entry indicated that Mr. Traweek was in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections: “>SENTENCE: >AS TO COUNT 1, >7 MONTHS, AT DOC >CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: ANY/ALL SENTENCES NOW SERVING. >INCLUDES A CRIME OF VIOLENCE. >CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.”
[2] Upon his return from court to Orleans Parish Prison, in anticipation of his immediate release, Mr. Traweek gave away his commissary items and possessions.
[3] Blake Arcuri is enrolled in this lawsuit as lead counsel for Marlin Gusman and Monique Filmore.
[4] Mr. Traweek characterizes Mr. Arcuri’s response as inaccurate given that the state trial court ordered Mr. Traweek to a sentence in the custody of the Sheriff. Regardless, Mr. Traweek alleges that the Sheriff’s Office failed either to release him or deliver him to the custody of the State.
[5] Mr. Moroz contacted Traci DiBenedetto at the Department of Corrections and learned that Mr. Traweek’s information had yet to be sent to the DOC.
[6] Mr. Moroz filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Motion for Immediate Release, and Motion to Amend/Reconsider Sentence to convert the Department of Corrections time to Orleans Parish Prison time.
[7] LeBlanc and Jones were first named as defendants in Mr. Traweek’s June 2019 amended complaint; they were served on August 1, 2019. Mr. Traweek also sues unknown individuals in their individual and official capacities as John Does 1 to 10.
[8] Mr. Traweek alleges that he suffered physical harm due to his overdetention, including an exacerbation of edema, depression, and anxiety.
[9] Mr. Traweek alleges that (and names) numerous OPP inmates were detained beyond their release dates. Traweek alleges: When [a] person in Orleans Parish is sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections, OPSO does not immediately hand that person over to the DOC. Instead, they drive that person’s paperwork to the DOC and then hold the person indefinitely in OPP until the DOC sends for them to be processed and have their sentence calculated. This sequence can take weeks or more, and OPSO does not deviate from it even when they know that a person is entitled to immediate release.
[10] Specific to the LeBlanc and the DOC, Mr. Traweek alleges that the DOC has a well-documented pattern of overdetention. He points to testimony by DOC employees who state that they typically observe at least one case of overdetention each week. In addition to DOC employee statements acknowledging such a pattern, Mr. Traweek notes that Attorney General Jeff Landry wrote an opinion piece published a couple months before Mr. Traweek’s state court plea and sentencing hearing in which Landry conceded that there “is a layer of incompetence so deep that the Corrections Department doesn’t know where a prisoner is on any given day of the week or when he should actually be released from prison.” Mr. Traweek alleges that in 2012 Secretary LeBlanc himself championed a project to improve performance and the implementing study concluded that, as of January 2012, DOC had a “1446 backlog of cases to have time computed,” resulting in an average processing delay of 110 days. Once those inmates finally had their time calculated, more than 83% of them were eligible for “immediate release upon processing.” Mr. Traweek alleges that the overdetention problem at DOC has not been fixed; to the contrary, an investigation revealed in 2017 DOC “had an average of 200 cases per month considered an ‘immediate release’ due to” calculation and data errors. Even so, Secretary LeBlanc admitted that there has not been any “discipline or adverse employment activity for DOC employees who have incorrectly computed sentences or release dates.” Finally, Mr. Traweek alleges that, in February 2019, DOC general counsel noted that “231 people across the state ... waited an average 44 days to be released after a judge ordered them free.”
[1] See Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)(observing that the Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards are similar, but noting that applying the Rule 12(b)(1) standard permits the Court to consider a broader range of materials in resolving the motion).
[11] The defendants do not mention Mr. Traweek’s state law claims.
[3] The Eleventh Amendment instructs that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State."
[12] The State’s Department of Public Safety and Corrections is
indisputably an “arm of the state.” See Champagne v. Jefferson
Parish Sheriff’s Office,
[13] Nor does Mr. Traweek dispute his jailers’ substantive
calculation of his time-served sentence. There is simply nothing
for him to dispute given his allegations (accepted as true) that
he was sentenced to serve seven months, with credit for time
served, on the first day of his seventh month in custody. Many of
the district court decisions invoked by the defendants to support
their Heck argument are distinguishable because the plaintiffs in
those other cases alleged that their sentences had been
miscalculated and, thus, those plaintiffs indeed challenged the
substantive duration of their confinement. (There is no quarrel
that the Supreme Court extended Heck to the prison discipline
context in Edwards v. Balisok,
[14] “The second prong of the qualified immunity test,” the Fifth
Circuit has observed, “is better understood as two separate
inquires: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights
were
clearly established at the time of the incident
; and, if so,
whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable
in light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of
Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998)(citations
omitted, emphasis in original). “[L]aw is clearly established,”
the Fifth Circuit has observed, “if it puts an objectively
reasonable official on fair warning that his conduct is unlawful.”
Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 469 n.2
(5th Cir. 2014)(citation omitted). This thorny second prong has
instigated scholarly criticism and debate and its misapplication
has precipitated many summary reversals by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Morrow v. Meachum,
[15] In Jauch, by county policy, Jessica Jauch was detained in the sheriff’s custody without an arraignment or bond hearing until the next court term convened, 96 days after she was taken into custody. A case of “confinement with process deferred.” Id. at 431. The Fifth Circuit held that Jauch’s prolonged detention without legal process violated the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id.
[16] Joseph Jones was held on a bench warrant for nine months without a court appearance. There, the Fifth Circuit held that Jones’s right to due process was violated because “[p]rohibition against
[18] The Fifth Circuit observed that the sheriff’s duty to the prisoner: is not breached until the expiration of a reasonable time for the proper ascertainment of the authority upon which his prisoner is detained. We are not to be interpreted as holding that a sheriff commits an instant tort at the moment when his prisoner should have been released. However, in the present case what is or is not a reasonable time is not at issue. It may safely be said that [the sheriff’s] ignorance for nine long months after the termination of all proceedings against Whirl was, as a matter of law, ignorance for an unreasonable time. Id. at 792.
[19] The court rejected invocation of a good faith defense for unlawful imprisonment, observing: The responsibility for a failure of communication between the courts and the jailhouse cannot justifiably be placed on the head of a man immured in a lockup when the action of the court has become a matter of public record. Ignorance and alibis by a jailer should not vitiate the rights of a man entitled to his freedom. A jailer, unlike a policeman, acts at his leisure. He is not subject to the stresses and split second decisions
[21] Troy Lee Douthit sued former Dallas sheriff, Clarence Jones and the deputy sheriff seeking damages for wrongful imprisonment under § 1983 and Texas state law. Id. at 529. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Jones and McCallam on the basis of the jury’s finding that they had acted on a reasonable good faith belief that they had lawful authority to imprison Douthit. Id. at 535-37 (underscoring a jailer’s “narrow discretion” to hold or release incarcerated persons and holding that the sheriff and deputy must present evidence of objective facts on which they could base a good faith belief that they had the legal authority to continue to hold Douthit once he had satisfied his sentence, but remanding to allow defendants the opportunity to present such evidence).
[22] Mr. Traweek notes that he alleges that the DOC received his paperwork four days before Jones reviewed it. Absent discovery, Mr. Traweek says he does not know whether the papers sat on her desk unreviewed for a week.
[23] Ms. Jones contends that Mr. Traweek alleges that, within one day of beginning the process of calculating Mr. Traweek’s release credit, she issued a Certificate of Release that allowed him to be released at 3:00 p.m. the next day. And yet she then makes the puzzling argument that, to state that she was liable for overdetention “would necessarily require that the Court draw the conclusion that even if Defendant Jones had received and processed the Plaintiff’s claim in less than one minute, she would still be liable for the approximately one minute of overdetention.” Not so. Critical to determining whether Traweek’s allegations overcome Jones’s assertion of qualified immunity is determining the objective reasonableness of Jones’ conduct in the context of the alleged circumstances confronting Jones at the time. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court need not indulge Ms. Jones’s hypothetical; rather, the allegations of the complaint -- that she failed to generate a certificate of release on the day that she discovered that Mr. Traweek was overdue to be released -- are taken as true.
[24] Although “no one is entitled to an error-free bureaucracy,” West
v. Tillman,
[25] The defendants did not move to dismiss the plaintiff’s state law claims.