*1 Inc. Travis v. summary judg- whether plaintiffs
We must now determine
of a
purpose
been allowed. The
sum-
ment motion should have
from a
is to allow the court
determine
mary judgment hearing
is
if there is a material
issue
fact that
forecast of the evidence
Autry-Barker-Spurrier
Co. v.
Real
Mortgage
triable. Wachovia
(1978),
Estate,
aff’d, 297
document constitute and not denied defendant and Mr. Radeker plaintiff establish acknowl- forecast of evidence which would competent Therefore, summary judgment of law. edgment as a matter in favor of granted have been rightfully should question wife. herein, trial court erred For the reasons discussed summary The decision judgment. motion for defendant’s granting reversed, summary judg- is therefore of the Court of vacated, remanded and the case ment defendant District Bun- to the for further remand of Appeals summary judgment to enter County, combe with directions plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded. ALLEN, CREEK, INC. ETHAN INC. TRAVIS KNOB J. CHARLES v. No. 151PA87 1987) (Filed 2 December of claims and 10; § contract —release Torts 7— Servant Master and discharge subsequent causes of action — that a release permitting the determine The trial court where of an plaintiffs claim for breach barred IN THE SUPREME COURT [321 *2 Inc.; Creek, plaintiff negotiated was an officer stockholder of and Knob a ten- year employment with learning Knob Creek 1979 after the sold; company going shortly was to be Knob Creek thereafter sold to Allen; plaintiff principal and the other stockholders executed releases claims, demands, discharging Knob “from all causes of action on account whatsoever”; any thing connected out of matter or plaintiffs employment Ethan Allen terminated in 1984. The release did specifically rights include future claims or non-asserted and did contain released; language implying rights being that such plaintiff claims were neither legal right had a cause of action nor had asserted a to continue work- ing signed for general Knob Creek at the time he release. Meyer dissenting. Justice join dissenting opinion.
Justices Webb and Whichard discretionary On review of a decision of the Court Ap- (1987), peals, which affirmed a J., Ferrell, judgment entered on 7 January 1986 in Superior County. Heard in the Supreme Court October CATAWBA 1987. Patrick, Dixon, Harper & by Stephen M. Thomas and R. Al- Jr., Ingram, len the plaintiff appellant. Machen, Blakeney, Alexander & by W. S. Blakeney, appellee.
defendant MITCHELL, Justice.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court permitting the find that general release of prior and existing claims against the defendants relieved them of their obligation to provide the plaintiff employment according to the terms of an employment contract. We conclude that
the trial court erred. Accordingly, we reverse the Appeals’ deci- sion, which no found error in the judgment of the trial court. Evidence at trial tended to show that plaintiff, Charles J. Travis, was an employee as well as a stockholder and officer of Creek, Inc., Knob a furniture manufacturing plant in Morganton, North In Carolina. 1979 learned that the company Allen, Inc., was going to be sold to Ethan and he negotiated with Creek, Knob Inc. for year a ten employment contract at a speci- fied salary. McBrayer, Gerald the president of IN THE SUPREME COURT signed sketched a memorandum of the agreement be- the parties. tween It stated: 40,000 year + Contract —for C.J.T. + K.C. Inc.—
Min. 7% Increase + McBray- T. Bonus —Renewable—Gerald er, Jr. McBrayer plaintiff told the contract was a “good deal.” A few weeks later the dated and document.
Shortly after this event Knob Creek sold all of its stock transaction, Ethan Allen. As part other principal stockholders of Knob Creek were asked *3 to agreed execute certain releases. Each in release stated perti- part: nent said officer hereby doth release and forever “[T]he claims, demands, actions, . discharge Knob . . from all action, causes of on account connected or of growing out or any matter thing whatsoever.” years
For the next five employed by remained the new ownership Knob Creek under and of top management however, 1984, Allen. In the Ethan management Allen be- came dissatisfied with the plaintiffs performance and terminated employment. his He sued for of his employment breach contract. The defendants their of liability, part, based denial on the signed by release plaintiff. the
At trial the the parties found that had an entered contract, employment that the had de- performed and the contract, had employment fendants breached the but re- the lease barred the plaintiffs action. that, law,
On
the
of
appeal
plaintiff contended
as a matter
his
claim,
release executed
December of 1979
not bar his
could
which
on
January
arose when he was
27
1984. The
discharged
Appeals disagreed.
of
It
reasoned that
and
scope
“[t]he
by
extent of the
be
the
governed
release should
the intention of
which
to
parties,
be determined
the language,
reference
Travis,
subject matter
of
84
purpose
App.
the release.”
N.C.
563,
at
S.E.
230 (citing
353
2d at
45
Taylor,
Econo-Travel v.
N.C.
869,
200,
262 S.E.
301
2d
rev’d on other grounds,
(1980)).
stated,
Travis 66 Ball, Inc., generally S.E. 2d See 279 N.C. (1973).” Id., 2d at 230. S.E. Am. Jur. 2d Release the this case of noted that release Appeals The Court oth- the by the “very broadly” and executed worded price in consideration a favorable of er officers Knob Creek Id., 230. plaintiff signed S.E. at The stock. 2d their contract. after signing within a month release ques- concluded For such reasons the Court “[t]he parties was intended cover tion whether release demands, ‘claims, of action . . . causes actions [or] Id., one for jury.” . . .’ contract was at disagree. 230. We of a release is respect scope general rule that: ordinarily operates
A the matters expressed release already giv- which in existence at the time of the therein are Accordingly, originating of the release. demands at ing given subsequently, time a release is demands subse- are a rule accruing, discharged by as quently maturing or falling the release embraced therein expressly unless terms import employed. within fair *4 (1952) added); Am. 66 (emphasis 76 C.J.S. Release Accord Maryland Casualty Jur. 2d See also Moore v. Release § (1909) Co., (“[T]he release shall be con- 150 N.C. parties occupied from which the at the time standpoint strued execution, of its the intention of the parties confined to at the execution”). time of such year In this had a ten case the with Al- Knob When Knob acquired Creek. Creek len, the officers of including and shareholders Knob plaintiff, signed general each releases officer stating, said “[T]he hereby discharge doth and forever Knob . . . from release Creek actions, action, claims, demands, all causes account con- of any nected or of matter or thing whatsoever.” added.) (Emphasis argues The defendant that should jury have been allowed to find that this release waived all of the plain- right tiffs his contractual to rights, including employment. conclude, instead, disagree We with the defendant and the terms of the unambiguous. release were As used in this re- lease, “claims” and “demands” referred to then or existing matured action,” of legal causes action. In terms a “claim” is a “cause of a “demand” is “the assertion of legal a right.” Black’s (5th 1979). Dictionary Law ed. There is no ambiguity to be examined no unclear to language interpreted by be jury. release,
At the time he his general neither had a cause of action nor had he asserted a legal right to continue working Until Knob sought Creek. him, discharge there was no reason for him to make such an as- sertion. His “claim” not years did arise until over four after the date of the release. The release not specifically did include future claims or existing rights, non-asserted and it did contain language or implying rights that such claims were being released. law, As a matter of the release here could bar the plaintiff’s or claim to work right under the terms of contract, because the release did not specifically refer to future Therefore, claims existing rights. of Appeals Court in holding correctly the trial court permitted determine that release barred the action. our attention to defendants have called another issue
that they to the presented Appeals Court but which that court no found need to In their address. new brief filed this the defendants no presented arguments authorities on this is- Therefore, 28(a), sue. the issue must be deemed abandoned. Rule North Rules of Appellate Carolina Procedure. reversed,
The decision of the Court case is to that for its further remanded court remand the trial court for with this proceedings opinion. consistent
Reversed and remanded. Meyer dissenting.
Justice I panel dissent for the reasons stated of the *5 opinion reported its unanimous at in this join dissenting opinion. Justices and Whichard Webb