131 Ind. 155 | Ind. | 1892
The appellee, in this case, filed her complaint in two paragraphs, against the appellant. The first paragraph was to quiet title, and the second to recover possession of the real estate.
The appellant demurred to the second paragraph of the complaint, which demurrer was overruled, and'exceptions were reserved. After the ruling on the demurrer and before judgment, the court permitted the appellee to amend her complaint. Counsel for appellant discuss, with much earnestness, the sufficiency of the second paragraph of the complaint, as it was at the time of the ruling on the demurrer, and before it was amended. There is no question before this
The appellee was a purchaser at tax sale, and had taken out a deed in pursuance of her purchase, and there was a recovery by the appellee for the amount due her, and a lien declared upon the land, and a decree of foreclosure entered.
The land in controversy was owned by oneWilliamson Dunn, at the time of the assessment for taxation, and was sold as his land.
The complaint describes, by a valid description, the land owned by Dunn at the time of the assessment, and makes no averment as to the description by which it was assessed and entered upon the tax duplicate, or tax certificate, or deed.
It is earnestly contended that under no rule of law without proper averments in the complaint, could it be shown that the lands assessed as the lands of Dunn, and sold by a different and imperfect description, were the same lands described in the complaint. In other words, that the appellee could not recover the taxes paid with penalty, and have a lien declared and foreclosed, unless the description in the tax deed and of record corresponded with the description in the complaint, and the sale declared invalid on account of some other defect; that if the description of record upon which the sale was based, and in the deed, was imperfect and different from that set out in the complaint, there must be allegations to that effect in the complaint to admit the proof. It must be remembered that the statute, section 2143, Elliott’s Supplement, providing that in actions to quiet title in such cases, “ if, upon the hearing of such causé, it shall appear that the complainant’s title was or is invalid for any cause, such suit shall not be dismissed by the court, but the
It is next urged and ably supported by the argument of counsel for the appellant, that the sale is void and ineffectual to transfer the lien of the State to the purchaser, for the reason, that the description is so imperfect as that it does not describe the land with reasonable certainty, and that appellee’s money must be refunded out of the county treasury, and this presents the principal and important question in the case.
The policy of the tax law is to secure revenues to carry on the affairs of government, and that all property shall bear its proportion of the burden of taxation; and this policy and object of the law will not be defeated by a failure of the proper officers to enter a perfect description of the property of record, and carry such description through all the proceedings, in case of a sale of the same for taxes. The State has a like lien on all real estate for its proportion of
The question of the sufficiency of a description of land to transfer-the lien has repeatedly been before this court, and it may now be said to be the settled law of this State, as-stated in State, ex rel., v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174 (186), that “ an insufficient description of the land will defeat the title, but will not defeat the lien. The lien will hold if the purchaser can show what property was intended to be taxed, but the title will not pass if the description is defective.” See authorities collected and cited in State, ex rel., v. Casteel, supra. This same rule has been adhered to and stated as-the law in subsequent decisions of this court. Morrison v. Jacoby, 114 Ind. 84; Millikan v. City of Lafayette, 118 Ind. 323: Ball v. Barnes, 123 Ind. 394; City of Logansport v. Case, 124 Ind. 254.
The sections of the statute relating to and governing the question presented in this case are so fully set out, discussed and construed in the decisions which we have cited, that no good purpose can be subserved by again setting them out, and adding additional views in support of the construction placed upon them. We regard the decisions as harmonious and have no disposition to depart from the construction placed upon the statute in such decisions, and we are only called upon in this case to apply the principles laid down in the decisions cited.
It was the intention of the law in relation to the assessment and collection of taxes, that there should be an incentive on the part of property-owners to pay their, taxes, and upon a failure so to do, that a penalty should attach which they would be' compelled to pay, and there has been a growing tendency to fix with more certainty the lien upon the property, and to remove all technicalities by which the property-owner might defeat a recovery for the taxes and penalties assessable against his property as its proportion of
In this case there are two tax deeds, in one a tract of land is described as “ the south part of the north part of lot five (5), in Burrow’s Reserve, in township twenty-seven (27), north of range one (1) east, containing forty (40) acres more or less.” In the other the description is: “ Part of lot number six (6), Burrow’s Reserve, township twenty-seven (27), noi’th of range number one (1) east, containing eighty (80) acres more or less.” In the certificates the description is abbreviated, giving the number of acres definitely as 40 and 80, and as sold in the name of Williamson Dunn. The tx’acts appear upon the duplicate in the name of Williamson Dunn, described in the same manner, giving a definite number of acres, one tract of 40 and the other 80 acres. It then appears of record that Williamson Dunn is charged upon the tax duplicate with and he is assessed for the taxes
A question is made in regard to the amount of recovery. The statute is decisive of this question. Where a lien is transferred to the purchaser and a deed has issued, as in this case, interest is computed at twenty per cent, per annum.
Counsel contend that the judgment for appellees was rendered on the second paragraph of the complaint, and that the appellant’s motion for judgment in its favor upon the first paragraph ought to have been sustained. We can not assent to this proposition.
There is no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.