Aрpellant, the workers’ compensation carrier of a statutory employer under OCGA § 34-9-8 (a), brought this action pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-8 (b) to recover pаyments made to and on behalf of appellee’s injured employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellee, ruling that aрpellant was not entitled to indemnification because appellant did not insist that the injured employee pursue a formal claim against appellee before it provided coverage.
Viewing the record in a light most favorable to appellant as the nonmovant on a motion for summary judgment, it appears that LCP Enterprises, Inc. (“LCP”), appellant’s insured, was general contractor on a project. Pursuant to an agreement between LCP and appellee, appellee was to perform the electrical work on the project. When asked about workers’ compensation coverage, appellee represented that it had its own; thus, LCP made no deductions for workers’ compensation from payments made to appellee prior to the accident involved in this case. One of aрpellee’s workers was seriously injured in an accident that was undisputedly work related. Appellant investigated the accident and learned that, despite appellee’s continued representations to the contrary, appellee had no workers’ compensation insurance. Appellee was aware of the injury and was aware of and participated in appellant’s investigation. Based оn its investigation and awareness that appellee had no insurance, appellant approved coverage and began providing benefits, even though the injured worker did not first institute proceedings against appellee. Appellant then brought this suit against appelleе for indemnification.
1. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that its action for indemnification was barred by the worker’s failure to pursue а formal claim against appellee. A general contractor on a project is liable for compensation to an employee of its subcontractor injured in the course of his work on the project. OCGA § 34-9-8 (a). However, the general contractor who pays suсh compensation is then entitled to recover the amount paid from the immediate employer, the sub-contractor. OCGA § 34-9-8 (b). Moreover, “[e]very claim for compensation under this Code section shall be in the first instance presented to and instituted against the immediate employer.” OCGA § 34-9-8 (c). Appellee asserts that the language quoted from subsection (c) “clearly” establishes a condition precedent to the genеral contractor’s right to recover under subsection (b). We do not agree that (b) and (c) are so intertwined that the language of (c) clearly requires the institution of a formal claim against the immediate employer before the general contractor is entitled to recover under (b); nor do we think
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the language of (c) should be interpreted to create such a condition precedent. “ ‘The purpose of (OCGA § 34-9-8) is to еnsure that employees in construction and other industries are covered by workers’ compensation. . . .’ [Cit.]”
Franks v. Avila,
The purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act is to alleviate the suffering of injured workers and their families by providing immediate and certain financial assistance, regardless of whether the injury resulted from the fault of the employer, as long as the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. See
Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
Appellee contеnds the institution of a claim against the immediate employer should be required in order to allow the immediate employer to defend the claim before it may be held liable on it. However, it is undisputed that appellee had notice of the accident and the re- *720 suiting injury, was aware оf appellant’s investigation of the accident and in fact participated in that investigation. Moreover, appellee pоints to no defenses to the claim that could even arguably have been raised. At least under these circumstances, appellee’s contention does not convince us that the institution of a formal claim against the immediate employer should be a condition precеdent to the statutory employer’s right to indemnification. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellee on this ground.
2. Appellee argues that even if the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground discussed in Division 1, the judgment should be affirmed based on principles of equitable estoppel. However, this entire situation is the result of appellee’s misconduct in failing to maintain workers’ compensation coverаge and then misrepresenting that it had such coverage. Thus, appellee is in no position to invoke principles of equity in its defense, see OCGA § 23-1-10, and summary judgment based on equitable estoppel would also be inappropriate.
Judgment reversed.