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Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong
384 N.E.2d 607
Ind. Ct. App.
1979
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*1 ence robbery prosecutorial the armed of the verdict on misconduct does jury not necessarily because there constitute Myers, Mrs. reversible employee, error. second Only prosecutorial was “in fear” at the where the proof no that she misconduct was places While it is true “in money position grave was taken. defendant time her testimony equivocal peril” judge’s was will the decision Myers’s Mrs. be reversed. State, (1976) she first became Maldonado v. the exact moment 265 Ind. as to afraid, reasonably of fear can N.E.2d 843. Even if error by an inference occurred not robbery. granting an act of Burton a motion for mistrial be drawn from not State, (1973) adequately admonishing 292 N.E.2d 790. jury, v. 260 Ind. the error Myers Mrs. realized a rob- will be harmless if there It is clear that is overwhelming as she testified that evidence of bery taking place guilt. Biggerstaff State, was v. 895; (1977)Ind., money State, her 361 N.E.2d Phelps when the two men demanded v. Ind., afraid,” (1977) to be and that 360 N.E.2d 191. she “was too scared money to the floor. The act she threw her case, In the instant there unequivocal testimony and this was suffi- robbery of the identification of the defendant two of probative support cient evidence of value to victims, and the other victim was able jury verdict on this count. to positively identify the trousers defendant wearing had been because of their unusual

n. color The pattern. improper remarks that it The defendant next contends directed toward the alibi witnesses would deny court to his was error for the trial persuasive not have much effect on the jury fail to admonish the motion for mistrial and light unequivocal of this identification alleged instances of miscon testimony. after two No reversible error has been During the deputy prosecutor. shown. duct Jimmy Spearman, the

direct examination of foregoing For all the reasons there was questions two deputy prosecutor asked judgment no trial court error and the trial for the same Spearman’s prior about trial court should be affirmed. trial been Spearman said his had crime. Judgment affirmed. charges against that the him continued and ar dropped. The defendant had then been GIYAN, J., DeBRULER, PREN- C. been admon gues that the should have PIVARNIK, JJ., TICE and concur. disregard time to these two ished at this they since bolstered questions and answers credibility of the state’s witness. alleged prosecutori- other instance of during the cross-ex-

al misconduct occurred witness, Harvey

amination of the defense deputy prosecutor Cummings. CO., INDEMNITY TRAVELERS Cummings testimony about his questioning Defendant-Appellant, prior why trial and it was Spearman’s at testimony his at this trial. different from ARMSTRONG, Orrie L. he could not re- Harvey stated that After Plaintiff-Appellee. testimony, deputy previous member his said, recall. You “You can’t prosecutor No. 3-1075A228. then, Harvey Cummings, lying were Indiana, Appeals Court of objected The defendant you’re lying now.” Third District. and moved for a mis- to these comments Jan. 1979. motion was overruled. trial. This improper for it is true that it is While personal opin- his express

either advocate to witnesses, the exist- veracity

ion *4 including home the installation of a new

furnace, kitchen cabinets and aluminum sid- ing. Armstrongs moved into a new home after Armstrong retired, John but they ownership farmhouse, retained which was rented to a family with six chil- dren. Armstrong Orrie continued to modernize Hughes, Winfield L. Houran and John E. after farmhouse her husband’s death. Clifford, Houran, Wagner Hoeppner, & Ev- These improvements included: the addition

ans, for Valparaiso, defendant-appellant. closets; of two the installation of hardwood George Douglas Doug- H. W. and James paneling ceiling living room, tile to the las, Douglas, Douglas Douglas, Valparai- & dining room, four, second-floor bed- so, plaintiff-appellee. rooms; and new floor tile the dining room. Armstrong Orrie testified that the HOFFMAN, Judge. very good house was in condition. Armstrong (plaintiff-appellee; Orrie L. In July Orrie Armstrong renewed Insured) owned farmhouse which suffered for three years a pol- farmowners insurance severe interior fire on October icy issued Indemnity the Travelers Com- 1972. A of insurance issued pany, through the John R. Eppl Insurance Indemnity (defendant- Company *5 Hammond, Agency of Indiana. Prior to the appellant; Travelers) provided coverage for renewal Eppl date advised the insured to $15,000. the house to a limit of A Travel- increase the amount of coverage applicable adjuster surveyed damaged ers’ claims the to the farmhouse because the of cost build- premises repairs and estimated the of cost ing materials had escalated. The coverage the by necessitated fire. When Travelers accordingly $15,000. was raised to a limit of to the pay offered to Insured an amount of On the 10,1972, afternoon of October fire money substantially less than the estimated caused extensive interior repairs, cost of she refused offer the and day farmhouse. Within a the Insured noti- brought alleging this action of con- breach agent fied her the of loss. On October deceitful, oppres- tract and fraudulent and 1972, Wayne Bognar, a investigator claims sive conduct. Travelers, for Corgich and Mike of General a plain- The returned verdict for the Repair inspected Contractors damaged the compensatory damages tiff which included premises in to order estimate the cost of $8,729.62 punitive in the amount of and repair and by restoration the occasioned $25,000. by damages stipulated of As the Bognar fire. Corgich surveyed and each parties, court computed the trial interest at room noting required all items which re- per the rate of annum on amount of 8% the placement, repair, painting cleaning. or compensatory damage award. The Bognar Within a week telephoned the judgment court then entered on verdict. Insured and her that told the estimated cost appeals judgment. that $8,729.62. repair of Bognar was offered to judgment The facts favorable to the most $4,200 pay approximately cash In- logically and the reasonable inferences $6,400 repair, sured if she not to chose to disclose Orrie L. flowing therefrom that a repair contractor if Insured to were Armstrong was owner of an old farm- Armstrong Bognar house. Orrie asked Hebron, house one mile of offer, located west explain and he that responded husband, Armstrong Indiana. Mrs. and her except he did not it understand himself that John, in who died March of lived in something there “was in the pol- ... twenty years icy raised a percentage-wise” house for that was the prop- living While house the family erty sufficiently there. was not insured to take (cost Armstrongs improvements repair). made various care of it of $4,288.58, and com- because the condition refused the offers Insured The effect, was that she Bognar, house warranted a 50% mented to across-the-board de- Insured a fair The than deal. getting less reduction. preciation attorney. then retained Travelers, supervisor A for Kevin Wein- Wayne Bognar testified that The Insured the Insured’s berg, attorney by contacted although she courteously, her dealt with letter on June 1973. Enclosed with the by offered with the settlement disagreed a letter was draft in the amount of him. $6,497.22 repairs to the Insured’s dwell- explained The letter that this ing. figure of bank- McGinley years had 39 Robert S. reducing the original was determined Hebron, For a Indiana. ing experience repair estimate a 25% across-the-board fire, McGin- prior period years depreciation factor so as to avoid better- Hebron property in the ley appraised had one-hundred-year-old ment of house. a or three times average two area on the opined Weinberg depreciation that a reduc- appraiser McGinley and another week. very just 25% only produced tion of farmhouse fol- inspection made an inspec- fair offer to Insured. The The offer was purpose the fire. lowing refused, value of the and the was returned. to determine the draft tion was cost of and to house estimate damaged initial of the attempted The disclosure livable condition. restoring the house reduction was made Travel- house was serious- McGinleynoted 1, 1973, letter, ers in the June more than required ex- ly and all rooms damaged seven months after the fire. dam- as a result of the fire tensive past experience his McGin- age. Based on ISSUES:1 repair to ley estimated the cost of roughly judgment the trial court is com- value of $8,500. The estimated be parts: compensatory of three prised dam- the fire of the land before house exclusive ages, punitive interest thereon and dam- value of the $15,000. The estimated appellant ages. alleges judg- $6,500. McGinley fire after the house is,, parts, in all contrary ment to the evi- *6 de- fire expressed opinion the that Appellant and to law. contrary dence also by value of the house creased the claims error the admission of certain repair the money necessary to amount of testimony and in giving the trial court’s and damage. give to failing certain tendered instructions. he and a Bognar that Wayne testified the dam- thoroughly inspected contractor I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES inspection that aged Based on premises. payable The loss by clause contract at repair cost of necessitated estimated $8,729.62. was bar states: estimate This fire and and to be fair reasonable [Tjhis admitted . Company “. . ... to following components: of the sum amount(s) an amount not exceeding the specified, above does insure the Insured $1,688.45 Material 5,465.61 to the extent of the actual cash Labor Profit, Overhead, 1,575.56 value of the the time Taxes property at of the loss, exceeding but not the amount adjust- mistakenly that he Bognar stated cost replace it would or policy inapplicable under an ed this claim property with like set- material of kind and offer a provision which caused him to Bog- quality within reasonable time It was a after to the Insured. tlement choice . against a such loss . all DIRECT authorized opinion policy that nar’s BY . . no more than LOSS FIRE payment to the Insured of questions appellant which fact presented involve common of law and have 1. Issues purpose been combined for of discussion. parties that the stated that the “contract of the undisputed by the insurer is It is that, burned, if property not contain coinsurance not is contract did he will value; clause. pro pay or a rata its market but that he will clause assured, is, indemnify the that save him Indemnity Company accu- The Travelers harmless, put good condition, him in as liability under the its rately claims practicable, so far as as he would have been to the actual cash value of policy is limited Washington in if no fire had occurred.” by the in- loss fire suffered the direct v. Weymouth Mills Manuf. Co. Ins. Co. Nevertheless, phrase plaintiff. sured 503, (1883), 135 Mass. 506-507. nowhere defined in cash value” is “actual insurance, parties and this it is well settled that the con Since disputed meaning. its contract have cept indemnity every underlies fire in value, argues that actual cash contract, surance it is clear the indemnity policy, replacement in this means as used pervasively interpretation affects the cost—minus—depreciation. The Insured operation payable of loss clauses in such actual cash value is an ex- contends contracts. While Indiana courts have not the full monetary terms of di- pression pass meaning had occasion to on the contemplated by as rect loss fire payable disputed, loss clause here courts in the insurance con- indemnity concept jurisdictions other have considered the that a The Insured further contends tract. meaning phrase “actual cash value” factually is not for deduction in the context of similar contracts and fac case, to hold other- supported in this settings. tual produce a result far short of wise would In Fed as v. Insurance Co. of State indemnity. (1930), 555, Pennsylvania 300 Pa. 151 A. prepared An insurance contract Supreme Pennsylvania Court of compa solely by the insurance and drafted reviewed an action on a poli fire insurance and, thus, subject bargaining no real ny cy partial dwelling for the destruction of a Freeman v. Com a contract of adhesion. goods. and household The clause in the monwealth policy was identical to that in the at case (transfer denied) “ 259 Ind. N.E.2d 177 except bar the measure of loss was ‘[a]ctu Therefore, when a court is 396. 286 N.E.2d (ascertained proper al cash value with de contract, ” interpret an insurance required depreciation) ductions . . . against will be construed ambiguities Notwithstanding the mention of deprecia the insured. Id. and in favor of the insurer policy, tion in the the court held that actual rea ambiguous contract is if An insurance cash value means what it would cost to men, reading the intelligent upon sonably building chattel replace a or a at date of *7 contract, honestly as to its would differ the fire. The court reasoned that in the v. American Ins. meaning. O’Meara States partial case of a loss the determination of 563, 109. (1971), Ind.App. 268 N.E.2d 148 Co. actual cash value must consider the use and ambiguo contract at bar is The insurance property integral of and its function us.2 position in an entire structure. Since policy contemplates recovery a sufficient to policy A insurance is a contract fire insurer, replace nearly as as property in ex indemnity whereby the of to the as of the date of money (premi possible consideration condition change for a fire, payment whole of a lesser amount um), to make the insured undertakes indemnifying would defeat the essential property of insured caused for the loss See, purpose policy. g.: Boston Insur e. Farber v. First National Bank v. fire. 159, (1952), 480, (1958), 149 Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co. 370 Pa. Ill.App.2d 17 ance Co. 776; 420; (1934), Ins. Co. 88 A.2d Metz v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co. Butler v. Aetna N.E.2d 342, 764, (1946), 711. 214. It has also been 355 Pa. 49 A.2d 64 N.D. 256 N.W. Insurance 915. § 2. See: 45 C.J.S.

614 persuaded’by v. Breeze This Court is not the rea- Falls Ins. Co. Gulf

In Glens 828, Fla., soning the Flor- or the rule of the Braddock case (1949), 38 So.2d Cottages accomplish the measure because it fails to the essential Supreme Court considered ida purpose of the insurance ten-year-old indemnifying a loss to a con- indemnity for bought hurricane. tract. Plaintiff Braddock insurance by hailstorm and caused roof protection against casualty. meant the A actual cash value windstorm said The court roof, destroyed fifteen-year-old to make the his and the money required amount of replace the repairs place so as to cost to roof was His $247. economical most company arbitrarily in the same condi- insurance reduced the nearly possible as as roof loss, replacement by a depreci- without allow- estimated cost of existing before tion then further for materials used. See ation factor and reduced ing depreciation by subtracting Mutual Insurance settlement a deductible Liberty Sperling $50 also: 297, (fire Fla., provided amount (1973), policy. 281 So.2d as The re- Company figure, sultant loss). offered to Braddock set- tlement, was While Braddock had a $11. case of Braddock v. offers the loss, fifteen-year-old roof before the Tenn., Corp. (1973), 493 Fire Ins. Memphis protection provided by his insurance 453,3 a support deduction S.W.2d him with building left a roofless and $11 a class action The case was depreciation. subtracting after the loss. Without the de- companies, insurance against numerous suit amount, loss, ductible the value of the as all sought to set aside plaintiffs wherein insurer, contended Braddock’s was $61. any depreci- in which insurance settlements replace sum was insufficient $61 The Tennessee employed. ation factor efficiency the functional of Braddock’s roof. acknowledged that a fire Supreme Court Thus, construed, policy, as failed to indemnity. policy is a contract insurance indemnify Braddock. replacement that the determined The court and the The Insured offers the case of General -less—depreciation formula cost— Rlty. (1966), ac- Adv. v. operate would Outdoor LaSalle evidence rule4 broad Although reasoned that a 218 N.E.2d 141. indemnity. It was complish casualty would fre- this case did not involve a insur- to deduct failure contract, guidance al- ance it furnishes profit for the insured quently reap By way of one at result in a loss. bar. General Outdoor considered though it could proper damages nonper- the case of measure of for a example, the court considered Braddock, (partial) injury who suf- manent tortious to a build- plaintiff, the named completely ing separate de- with value from the real es- casualty loss fered defining nonpermanent injury The cost tate. After fifteen-year-old roof. stroyed his The court to be one wherein the cost restoration replace the roof $247. were to recover does not exceed the market value of the that if the insured reasoned contended, roof, he building prior injury, new as the court held cost of a Hence, proper the loss. that the measure would be the cost profit make a on would was denied. of restoration. sought by the class the relief may Eq tion not be Explaining Bank v. American deducted from such cost Third Nat. 3. Tenn.App. because that would make the sum insuffi- Ins. Co. uitable following complete repairs rea which offered the cient to and would leave S.W.2d soning: unfinished; building and this would fall *8 indemnity in short of the contracted for the only way practical to that the “It would seem policy.” (Citations omitted). 178 S.W.2d partial damage of to a the extent measure building 915, at 925. inventory damaged its be to would only way express parts, to such dam- and the expression 4. An that of the rule is the trier of money age the of would be to count in terms may any logically facts consider evidence tend- parts, replacing so as to restore such cost of ing the to the formation of a correct estimate of building same condition it was the to the property at the time of the value of the insured just view which we the fire. And the before McAnarney Ins. loss. v. Newark Fire Co. supported reason and the the better think (1928), 247 N.Y. 159 N.E. 902. authority deprecia- greater weight is that of reasoning holding alleges following and of General the errors re- to the facts analogy some lating jury’s Outdoor bears to the verdict of compensatory bar, at of the case and circumstances damages: remedy the tort is to purpose the of (1) the jury ignored uncontroverted evi- party position he injured restore the depreciation; dence of Likewise, injury. the occupied before the (2) the trial court erred admitting the indemnity seeks a similar re- principle of expert testimony plaintiff’s of the sult. witness; appraisal fairly reasonably and In order (3) the supported by verdict not suffi- value, cash consideration must define actual evidence; cient functional effi given purpose be (4) jury erroneously the instructed. Without ciency property of the insured. value of consideration the intrinsic the such all, it apparent of from read First v. ignored. be See: Fedas property would ing the depreci record that the evidence of Pennsylvania, of of su Insurance Co. State ation is not uncontroverted. The facts of

pra. record establish that the house was nearly policy insurance serves to insure However, years one hundred old. the fire exceeding the amount stat against loss not damage primarily confined to the inte limit, of policy payment and the ed house, complete rior of the which had been limit, which is not an amount less than the ly during ten-year refurbished period the replace to restore or the function sufficient fire, preceding the majority and the of the efficiency provided by property the be al improvements eighteen were made within loss, comply with the does not fore months of the fire. The Insured testified policy. Id. good prior that the was in condition house by the fire. Her statement conflicts with The risk of loss underwritten at the issuance of the Wayne Bognar’s testimony age is not fixed that the insurer rather, subject the risk is to fluctua policy, condition home warranted a 50% wrought by passage of time and tions depreciation reduction. affecting the changes in circumstances responsibility It was the result, the risk is nec thing insured. As weigh conflicting and resolve evidence and by changing economiccon essarily affected upon to reach a conclusion based the evi ditions, as, increasing of labor costs such they dence found most credible. Fruehauf it is the insurer’s materials. Because Trailer v. Division Thornton Ind. whole undertaking to make the insured App., Clearly, 366 N.E.2d 21. re limits, augmented policy within jected testimony of Travelers’ claims resulting from increased costs of damage adjuster. This Court will not disturb that liability materials is the labor and decision. limit of the insur up to the stated insurer Co., Mut. Ins. v. Perkiomen

ance. Farber Robert a bank officer in He- McGinley, supra. bron, Indiana, that he and another testified appraiser surveyed damaged premises Therefore, actual cash phrase that the McGinley after the fire. estimated value, of the fire insur within the context (excluding fair market value of the house bar, at means policy in the case ance $15,000. land) the fire was before limit, within the money, amount past experience roughly he Based on his restore, repair, replace sufficient $8,500. repair estimated the cost of to be Falls Ins. Co. destroyed. Glens property McGinley expressed opinion then Fedas v. In Cottages, supra; Breeze Gulf the value of the the fire decreased Pennsylvania, su surance Co. State money the amount of needed to house Equita of American pra; Third Nat. Bank testified damage. McGinley also Co., supra; Cf.: General Outdoor ble Ins. appraised property in the He- supra. that he had Rlty., Adv. v. LaSalle *9 jury. Accordingly, no abuse of dis- for the of two or three average on the area bron demonstrated. He was has been twenty years. cretion a week for times it and knew the farmhouse with familiar the verdict is next claims Travelers he although recently remodeled had been evidence. supported by not sufficient years the house five inside been had last determining judg whether a In the fire. before evidence, by sufficient supported ment is opinions value objected weighs the evidence nor Court neither this McGinley claiming that McGinley by stated Rather, credibility. of questions resolves he expert as an because qualified not only the evidence most views this Court condition of the with the familiar was not judgment, together with favorable to the prior to the fire. immediately home flowing therefrom. logical inferences all to tes of a witness The qualification Inc. v. Rieth-Riley Company, Construction of is for the determination expert tify as N.E.2d 844. (1975), Ind.App., 325 McCarrell court, will be set whose decision the trial evidence that jury The heard abuse of there is manifest only where aside estimate of cost to re fair and reasonable Kuechenberg v. McCraney discretion. $8,729.62. damage was Other 171; pair the fire 629, 248 N.E.2d Ind.App. (1969), 144 damage established that the fire evidence v. Monesmith R. Co. Chicago & Erie house, to the interior of the was confined 281, N.E.2d 724. extensively recently which had been 517, (1901), 157 Ind. v. In Isenhour State appraiser An testified that the remodeled. the court said: 62 N.E. fire decreased the value of the up to set undertaken have never “Courts money necessary to by house the amount of knowledge by of scientific a standard its liveable con restore the house to former may a witness competency of which the dition. determined, gone to the and have not be witness evidence in the trial a scientific There is sufficient holding that extent of men facts learned from which reasonable could testify from record only can The property demonstration. conclude that the insured personal from him state, cases, $8,729.62. at in this the amount of damaged by rule in such fire in general that, witness least, where a seems to be was instructed that knowledge, degree exhibits such policy required of insurance the defendant observation, experiments, gained from plaintiff the full direct loss pay to source, books, or other reliable standard within limits occasioned fire opinion is of appear that his to make it as provi contained no policy, and leav- value, testify, entitled to he is some required or authorized a reduc sions court, in the exercise the trial ing to the amount of the coverage tion of below when discretion, right say sound loss. full direct shown, is and to knowledge such objected to this in- Defendant Travelers opinion what right say incorrect calling struction it “an absolute worth; and, of dis- all other cases as in interpretation” policy. Travelers ob- cretion, the action will review this court further, claiming policy says the jected discre- only when that the trial court “replace property with ma- insurer shall to have been clearly appears tion quality terial of like kind and within abused.” being impossible, reasonable time” and ap extensive McGinley’s view of In was entitled to a reduction defendant general his familiari experience and praisal unjust enrichment. damages on the basis of house, objec apparent it is ty with on Travelers did not tender an instruction at the by Travelers is directed posed tion chose, damages but proper measure expressed in As weight of the evidence. instead, ten- object to the instruction State, oth supra, and numerous Isenhour objection plaintiff. dered cases, weighing evidence the task of er *10 $6,400 policy merit. The approximately is without to a instruction contractor for $4,200 repairs the insurer shall “re- or does not state cash to her if she chose ” Rather, . . . property repair. Insured, the not to place the The believing the company the insures “to policy coverage states that insurance pay sufficient to the actual cash value of the the extent of the repair, entire cost of adjuster asked the loss, at the time of the but not property explain his offers. Wayne Bognar, the ad- which it would cost exceeding the amount juster, said that he did not completely un- repair replace property with mate- himself, derstand it but there was some- quality kind and . . . rial of like thing policy percentage-wise and the Whereas, there no evidence es- insurance high enough. was not He further impossibility with tablished explained policy provision required that a quality, objec- material of like kind the reduced offers. posed by properly Travelers was de- tion The Insured refused the offers. The nied, error was committed. There and no same offers were extended in December awarding of compensatory was no error in January 1972 and 1973 and on both dates damages. were by refused the Insured’s attorney. Weinberg, Kevin a supervisor, Travelers II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES attorney by contacted the Insured’s letter $25,000 jury punitive The awarded 1,1973, on enclosing June therein a draft in plaintiff. Travelers damages to claims $6,497.22 the amount repairs for punitive award is erroneous for the dwelling. figure Insured’s This was deter- following reasons: by reducing mined original repair esti- (1) overruling the trial court’s defend- by mate deprecia- 25% across-the-board judgment motions for on the ant’s tion factor so as to avoid betterment of the error; evidence was one-hundred-year-old house. The offer was (2) supported by verdict is not suffi- refused, and the draft was returned. This law; contrary and is cient evidence by letter marked the first disclosure Travel- attempted ers of reduction. erroneously (3) instructed. admitted, by interroga- Travelers written per- following summary is a facts tories by testimony, read into evidence and raised Travelers: tinent to the issues that there were no policy provisions which interior Fire caused severe required the offers first extended to Mrs. by the Insured. The en- farmhouse owned Armstrong. $15,- was insured to a limit of property tire judgment Travelers moved for on evi- Indemnity Company. the Travelers plaintiff’s dence at the close of the case-in- previously been insured property had chief and at the all conclusion of the evi- amount, Eppl, but John for a lesser dence. alleges error in the denial Travelers, advised the Insured to agent for claiming of those motions there was abso- guard against limit to increase the lutely oppressive, malicious, no evidence of materials. A increasing building cost of or fraudulent conduct. Travelers, accompanied adjuster for claims contractor, surveyed damaged The law is clear in Indiana that a by a repairs (di motion judgment and determined that on the evidence premises verdict) rected where there by the fire would cost must be denied necessitated $8,729.62. any legitimate esti- evidence or This fair and reasonable inference materials, tending support cost of therefrom at least one of mate was the sum of the taxes, overhead, allegations. Where there is labor, profit. In No- evidence differ, adjuster upon might contacted which reasonable minds 1972 the claims vember con telephone improper, and disclosed to directed verdict is and the the Insured flicting evidence should be left for the repairs. cost of He then her the estimated pay jury’s resolution. Mamula v. Ford Motor that Travelers would told the Insured case, present 275 N.E.2d (1971), 150 rea Co. In *11 Procedure, 849; fraud, Trial Rule 50. have sonably Ind. Rules of could found elements of malice, gross negligence oppression or min which jury heard evidence gled with the breach of contract. The evi misrepresentation to establish tended that policy provisions dence established Travelers claims ad by a policy provisions misrepresented plaintiff. were to the Al to was sufficient juster. That evidence though misrepresenta Travelers claims verdict. avoid a directed mistake, tion was a there is no evidence that the verdict next contends that the mistake shows was admitted supported by is not punitive damages Furthermore, or corrected. the offers contrary is to law. evidence and sufficient misrepresentation on the based were twice support to this con- reasoning advanced Then, reaffirmed. seven months after the gener- are punitive damages tention is that fire, theory Travelers advanced another contract actions. Fur- ally allowed in not justify pay a steadfast refusal to the esti evidence, thermore, as characterized repair. mated cost of Travelers stated that Travelers, this case clearly establishes liability policy language its under the good than a entirety nothing less in its repair limited cost minus a 25% dispute. faith reduction, depreciation across-the-board and general rule that While it is they computed offered amount so available in con damages are not punitive Insured. actions, exceptions there are tract theory deprecia- This of across-the-board party, the conduct of rule. Where tion is outside the bounds of reason and contract, independently estab breaching a n logic. Assuming arguendo proper- that the tort, a common law lishes the elements of ty damaged by fire had diminished in value damages for the punitive the assessment tear, age, as a result of wear and or inade- Sales, Auto Inc. et proper. Murphy tort maintenance, quate diminution val- 709, (1953), Ind.App. et al. 123 a l. v. Coomer logical ue would bear no relevance to the 112 N.E.2d 589. application depreciation of a factor on the damages may be Additionally, punitive labor, overhead, costs of and taxes included fraud, the elements of “whenever awarded repair in the estimated cost. It would be min malice, oppression gross negligence that the most unreasonable to contend wall Ponti controversy.” Hibschman gle in the paneling ceiling tile in plaintiff’s and Ind., (1977) ac, v. 362 N.E.2d Inc. Batchelor any house were less “installed” day on the 847, quoting, Vernon Fire & therein they of the fire than had been at the precise (1976), Sharp v. Casualty Insurance Co. moment of installation. An additional ex- 173; Ind., v. N.E.2d Hutson 349 Taber ample of the absurdity resulting from the Am,Dec. 322, 324, (1854), 61 96. 5 Ind. depreciation across-the-board reduction is However, damages based on min punitive following demonstrated item con- only proper will be gled tort elements tained in the estimate: interest will be appears public where it “ESTIMATED LABOR COST Truck puni effect of the served the deterrent debris, away all dump fees: $176.00”. In Casualty Fire & damages. tive Vernon Sharp, supra. According necessary to Travelers it was surance Co. pay only 75% of this item and all other reweigh the evi will not This Court labor costs in order to avoid betterment of credibility of wit dence nor determine the notion, yet house. That is a ludicrous it if there is will sustain a verdict nesses but necessarily from application results support value to any probative evidence of the across-the-board rationale. (1973), Ind.App. Moore v. Waitt 157 it. 456; presented From all the evidence Perry Ford 298 N.E.2d Smart & Sales reasonably could have concluded that v. Weaver oppressive conduct of Travelers was N.E.2d 718. Further, disregard of a heedless instruction is an indicative erroneous supporting punitive law, thus consequences, confusing, statement of the and will damages award. guess allow the speculate whether or not there was such conduct on claims that the trial court Travelers next part of the defendant.”- jury. erroneously instructed appears The instruction to be a fair and ten gave plaintiff’s The trial court adequate statement of the law. Defend- fol Instruction No. 1 which reads as dered objection ant’s is directed at the weight of lows: *12 evidence, properly which is the concern preponderance from a of the you “If find jury. No error has been demonstrat- the court’s instruc- evidence and under ed. guilty of tions that the defendant was false willfully injuring plaintiff by objected Travelers plain also plaintiff to the concern- representations 3, tiff’s Instruction given tendered No. as in ing legal provisions effect of the follows: con- policy, the insurance and that this you may “You are instructed that draw malicious, willful, oppressive, was or duct evidence, reasonable inferences from the made with heedless the statements were every fraud need not in case be disregard consequences, of their and that proved by positive evidence if facts and thereof, Armstrong Mrs. as a result present circumstances are from which find that damaged, you and if further fraud is inferred.” Armstrong is entitled to recover Mrs. objection Defendant’s reads: damages, or actual then compensatory also, exemplary her you may, objects allow to giving plain- “Defendant of damages as well. punitive tiff’s tendered instruction No. 3 for once again there is no any evidence of fraud damages damages are al- “Exemplary part on the of the defendant example and such punishment by way as of lowed positively proven fraud must be and not committing others from and to deter just states, as the exemplary allow dam- inferred instruction you like act. If may you in such amount as and it is therefore an incorrect statement ages, they be punish the defendant of the law.” find sufficient to act so as to be a for its conduct and We first note that actionable fraud need to others.” deterrent proved support not be in order an award objec- following made the damages. The defendant Jones v. punitive of Abriani 635; to the instruction: (1976), tion In Ind.App., 350 N.E.2d Rex (1975), Company surance v. Baldwin Ind. plain- objects giving “Defendant Furthermore, App., 323 N.E.2d 270. this instruction No. tiff’s tendered adequate advising the instruction statement of the purports to be an instruction they if find the law. Jordanich et ux. v. Gerstbauer et a l. they what can do injuring guilty willfully 287 N.E.2d 784. defendant representations or will- plaintiff by false alleges upon also error Travelers ful, conduct for oppressive malicious or give the trial court’s refusal to two instruc is not a scintilla of the reason that there tions Travelers. The first in tendered any these conditions evidence that good- struction related to the effect of a evi- present, were the uncontroverted dispute. faith The other was confined to plaintiff and defend- being dence malice, fraud, gross oppres subjects dispute about the good-faith had a ant conduct, disregard sive and heedless recovery allowable under a amount of consequences. plain- policy designated certain insurance by the No error was committed trial plaintiff No. and the tiff’s Exhibit refusing instructions tendered remedy in this situ- court sought the courts for subject Travelers because the matter ation. arbitrary. and at best For ex- covered unrealistic adequately contained therein stairway, Tingley ample, stairway, a handrail to a Chaney v. instructions. by other thresholds, windows, floors, walls, doors, N.E.2d 707. (1977),Ind.App., Therefore, indemnity must include etc. of the whole within functional restoration INTEREST III. limits. stipulated this action parties to event the in the agreed “that dam Compensatory Verdict returns a there compute interest shall the Court

ages added). (Emphasis per annum.”

on at 8% in the interest .computed

The trial court $1,785.13 and included

amount of judgment.

amount that the trial court’s contends CARSON, Wyvonia Appellant any improper, and interest award of (Defendant below), in- computation is event, mathematical *13 accurate. any effectively removes stipulation The Indiana, Appellee STATE inter- legal propriety question .of (Plaintiff below). Further- case. present est award wholly failed to No. 1-478A102. more, has since inaccuracy the mathematical demonstrate Indiana, Appeals Court of, has been shown. no error complained District. First court in all of the trial judgment hereby affirmed. matters Jan. 1979. Affirmed. J., by desig-

ROBERTSON, participating

nation, concurs. J., opinion.

STATON, with concurs concurring.

STATON, Judge, how- majority opinion,

I with concur of “actual

ever, the definition I feel clarification. needs additional value”

cash ra- its definitional majority predicates aspect of indemnity upon the

tionale that indemni- policy. It assumes

insurance restora- a functional necessarily includes

ty of “actu- This definition of the whole.

tion practical result ignores the

al cash value” may have of a house interior restored new materials with accomplished

to be may in- than used materials

rather of the house. value

crease the market “actual cash not define did Since existed, the ambiguity and since

value” the insur- against

ambiguity was construed Furthermore, of some

er. of a house the interior parts of

structural

Case Details

Case Name: Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jan 8, 1979
Citation: 384 N.E.2d 607
Docket Number: 3-1075A228
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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