210 Mo. 582 | Mo. | 1908
This is an action by the' plaintiff as the assignee of seventeen warrants issued by the county court of Livingston county to the original holders thereof for materials furnished and work and labor done for said county in the year 1890.
The petition counts separately upon each warrant and its assignment to plaintiff, its presentation to the county treasurer, and its dishonor and protest, and judgment is prayed for the aggregate of all of said warrants with interest.
Plaintiff offered and read in evidence warrants one to sixteen inclusive which correspond with the several counts of the petition based thereon, and as no point is made on them, by agreement of counsel they" were omitted from the bill of exceptions. Plaintiff then read in evidence the following stipulation:
“In the Linn Circuit Court, October term, 1904.
“C. O. Trask vs. Livingston County.
“For the purpose of saving costs, the parties in the above-entitled suit agree that the total income and revenue provided for the year 1890 for the said Livingston county, Missouri, amounted to the sum of $21,283.66.
“Second. That the following is a complete and correct copy of the register of warrants for the year 1890 in Livingston county, Missouri, and as contained in the county clerk’s warrant register No.-2 beginning at warrant No. 4963, issued on January 6th, 1890, and ending with warrant No. 5988, issued on December 30th, 1890, which are not copied herein but amount to total issue of $26,782.86. .
“Third. That the signatures to the warrants sued on, to-wit, the signatures of the county clerk and the presiding judge of the county court of said county, are genuine, as well as the signatures of the county treasurer, showing the respective dates of presentment and protest of said warrants; and also the signatures of*589 the respective assignments thereon are likewise genuine.
“Fourth. It is agreed that any additional proof may be offered by either side as to these facts or any other facts material in this case.”
Plaintiff then offered and read in evidence exhibit “B” consisting of copies of eleven warrants with their endorsements, Nos. 5379 to 5390 inclusive, all payable out of money in the treasury appropriated for Bridge Fund and each for $500', except the last, which is for $197. As no point is made as to their form it is unnecessary to set them out at length. All of which eleven warrants were payable to the Clinton Bridge and Iron Company, each for $500, except No. 5390, which was for $197, all protested May 20th, 1890, all of which were assigned to the Clinton National Bank and by it assigned to W. F. Carter, Jr., and upon which an action was brought in the circuit court of Livingston county and then pending, to the introduction of which defendant duly objected as irrelevant and not the best evidence.
" Plaintiff then offered the report of the Road and Bridge Commissioner of the bids for building a county bridge over Grand River between Chillieothe and Utica, showing the bid of the Clinton Bridge and Iron Company to be $4,874 and the lowest bid thereof, and of H. Hedges of the same company for the bridge over Shoal Creek for $820 to be the lowest bid, which were approved by the county court and contracts ordered to be let and an appropriation made for each on the 5th day of September, 1889, at the August adjourned term of said county court.
Contracts were entered into in writing by said Bridge Company and the Road and Bridge Commissioner of said county on September 7th, 1889, whereby said bridge company agreed to complete said bridges on or before January 1st, 1890, and maintain the same
At the conclusion of all the evidence defendant prayed the court to declare the law to he that under the pleadings and the evidence the finding must be for defendant, which was refused and defendant excepted. Thereupon the court found all the issues for plaintiff on each of said counts, and rendered judgment in the-aggregate for $2,407.75, to bear interest at six per cent from its rendition. On the same day defendant filed its motions for a new trial and in arrest which were-heard and overruled and defendant excepted.
I. Prom the foregoing statement, it becomes apT parent that there is one single issue on this appeal-and that is, were the warrants sued on issued in excess of the income and revenues of Livingston county for the year 18901 Or, stated in a different form, did said county become indebted on September 7th, 1889, the, date of the bridge contract, to the amount of $5,694, or on May 20th, 1890, when it issued its twelve warrants to the Clinton Bridge and Iron Company? It is conceded and agreed that the total income and revenue of said county for the year 1890, was $21,283.66, and the warrants issued that year amounted to $26,782.86, and this last sum included the twelve bridge warrants aggregating $5,694. If the $5-,694 is to he deducted from the total amount of warrants, $26,782.86, issued by the county in 1890, then the warrants chargeable against the income and revenue for that year amounted
By section 12 of article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri (1875), it is ordained: “No county . . . shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year. . . . ’ ’ Counsel for the county insist that the county did not become indebted to the bridge company until the bridges were accepted and the county court issued the warrants therefor on May 20, 1890, and in support of their position rely upon the decisions of this court in Saleno v. Neosho, 327 Mo. l. c. 639; Lamar Water
On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff distinguish those cases and insist the indebtedness accrued when, the court accepted the bridge company’s bid, made the appropriation, and the Road and Bridge Commissioner under the order of the court made and entered into the contract to pay the amount bid when the bridge should be completed according to the contract, which required the bridge to be completed on or before January 1, 1890. It may as well be stated here and now that the county did not show that the bridges were not completed according to the contract in the year 1889, though it did show they were not formally accepted until May, 1890, and the warrants issued then.
The constitutional provision found in section 12 of article 10 of that instrument has often been construed by this court. In Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. l. c. 252, it was well said: “The evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution and the people who adopted it was to abolish, in the administration of county and municipal government, the credit system and establish the cash system by limiting the amount of tax which might be imposed by a county for county purposes, and limiting the expenditures in any given year to the amount of revenue which such tax would bring into the treasury for that year. Section 12, supra, is clear and explicit on this point. Under this section the county court might anticipate the revenue collected, and to be collected, for any given year, and contract debts for ordinary current expenses, which would be binding on the county to the extent of the revenue provided for that year, but not in "excess of it.”
For a proper determination of whether the county
In Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas County, 146 Mo. 42, it was expressly held that the mere issuance of the warrants did not create an indebtedness. Hence, the indebtedness for tbesé bridges was created, if at all, by a compliance with the law governing the letting and contracting for bridges already noted. When the county became indebted on these bridge contracts must be determined by the “income and revenue provided for such year,” which under the Constitution must be looked to- for the payment of such indebtedness and it was the “income and revenue provided” for the year 1889, which the county court was authorized to appropriate for that purpose, and not the revenue for the year 1890, which at the date of the contract for the building of said bridges had never been assessed, levied or collected. The language of the Constitution is, “No county . . . shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year. ’ ’ It has been uniformly construed that this provision of the Constitution permits the anti
But it is earnestly.urged by coilnsel for the county, that the decisions of this court in Saleno v. Neosho, 127 Mo. 639, and the subsequent cases of Lamar Water & E. L. Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, and Water & Light Co. v. Lamar, 140 Mo. 156, settled this question by holding that the indebtedness of the county was not created until the bridges were completed. In Saleno v. Neosho, supra, and the kindred cases following it, the question was whether a contract by which the city agreed to pay the Water Company for the use of water for the city and other purposes $2,000' per year for a term of twenty years, was a creation of a debt in the aggregate for $40,000', or was an obligation to pay $2,000 a year if the water was supplied according to contract. And it was ruled that it was not the creation of an indebtedness for the aggregate of the instállments to be 'paid under the contract, this court saying: “A debt is understood to be an unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum at some specified time, and is quite different from a contract.to be performed in the future, depending upon a condition pre
We think that the indebtedness for these bridges was incurred, if at all, by the letting and making of the contract therefor in September, 1889.
In Culbertson v. City of Fulton, 127 Ill. 30, the Supreme Court had this question before it. The city on August 15, 1887, entered into a contract for the construction of a system of waterworks for the city,
But confining ourselves to the facts in evidence and the statute governing the building of bridges, as already said the statute required the county court to make an appropriation before the-Road and Bridge Commissioner let the contract. The record shows that
In our opinion, the bridge warrants offered and read in evidence were, if valid at all, chargeable against the revenues of said county for 1889, and we think should be deducted from the total amount of warrants issued in 1890, and this being so the plaintiff’s warrants were a legal and valid charge for the current expenses of the said county for the year 1890 and the judgment of the circuit court awarding plaintiff judgment therefor was correct and is affirmed.