50 W. Va. 611 | W. Va. | 1902
The West Virginia Transportation Company brought trespass on the case in Wood County against the Standard Oil Company and the Eureka Pipe Line Company, all corporations, and
It is very clear that a corporation can be guilty of a combination or conspiracy with other corporations or persons aimed at and accomplishing the injury of other corporations or persons. It'is a mere legal entity, impersonal, and in itself is incapable of so doing; but it is moved by human beings, is operated by human agents, and is thus an active person, not only for damage done in the breach of contracts, but for torts doing others harm. It will not avail either to say'that it has no power within the scope of its authority to do wrong, and can do only the lawful things contemplated by the state in the bestowal of its charter, and that therefore so far as its agents make it do wrong, its acts are outside the field of its legal power, ultra vires and void, not binding the corporation, and thus that no tort binds it. Such was 'the old common law rule, but it is completely overruled. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 824. That doctrine may do as to contracts; but it cannot plead this doctrine to screen itself from its wrongs done to others against their will and rights. National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699. In that ease the court says: “They are also liable for acts of their servants while engaged in the business of their principals, to the same extent that individuals are liable under like circumstances. Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604. An action may be maintained against its malicious or negligent torts, however foreign they may be to the object of its creaton, or beyond its granted powers. It may be sued for assault and battery, for fraud and deceit, for false imprisonment, for malicious prosecution, for nuisance, for libel. In certain cases, it may be indicted for misfeasance or non-feasance touching duties imposed upon it in which the public are interested. Its offenses may be such as will forfeit its existence. P. W. & B. R. R. v. Quigley, 21 How. 209; 2 Wait. Act. & Def.. 337-39; Ang. & Ames, Corp, ss. 186, 385; Cooley, Torts 119, 120.” Manifestly society must have protection against wrongful acts done by these corporate persons, now so numerous and performing so many varied business functions in our day, which so closely touch man in all his affairs. The case of
That a monopoly, a huge corporation, or associate corporations, to establish vast business and derive profits therefrom, to the great detrihient, the practical ruin of the plaintiff and others in like business is charged in the first count; but that is not enough. It must appear that this monopolistic business hurt the plaintiff; but that even will not do; it must harm it by doing unlawful things. Not only must the plaintiff have a right, but that right must be injured by the defendants, and injured too by unlawful means, by acts which the defendants had no right to do. You must establsh that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff, and broke that duty to make an actionable tort. There can be no tort, unless there is a duty from one to another, and that duty broken. You must set this down as a test of tort. “A legal right must be invaded in order that an action of tort may be maintained. The mere fact that a complainant may have suffered damage of the-kind which the law recognizes is not enough. There must also bo a violation of a duty recognized by law: In the language of the civil law mere damnum is not enough; there must also be injuria; that is, ex damno absqe injwia non oritur actio.” 1 Jag., Torts 87. We must nicely distinguish between damnum and injuria. We commonly use the words “injury” and “damage” indiscriminately; but in the rule above these Latin words are distinct. Damnum means only harm, hurt, loss, damage; while injuria comes from in, against, and jus, right, and means something done against the right of the party, producing damage, and has no reference to the fact or amount of damage. Unless a right is violated though there be damage, it is damnum absque injwia. Such is the ease under the first count of the declaration. The plaintiff had -a perfect right to operate its business. So had the defendants the right to operate theirs.
What wrongful acts does this first count state P The formation of trade combination, call it monopoly, is not actionable alone. How far the grant of exclusive privilege by the state (and this is the only monopoly, legally speaking) is valid when its right is contested, is one thing. We are not dealing with that. This monopoly is not that. It is the act of persons and corporations, by union of means and effort, drawing to them
At first blush this conduct might appear wrong; but a second thought again presents the question whether the defendants in this did any thing unlawful. The defendant companies were all in common interest. Could they not unite to further their interests ? Could not the Standard Oil Company buy from whom it ehosé ? And within the pale of this right could it not impose such conditions as it chose? Cannot the Tillage merchant say to the farmer, “I will not buy your eggs, unless you buy my calico ?” Cannot the big mill owner refuse to buy wheat from those who do not ship it oyer a railroad or steamboat line owned by him? Cannot the mill owner refuse to lease his farm to those who do not sell products to his mill ? He may be exacting and oppressive ; but can other mill owners sue him for this ? Is this right not a part and parcel of his business right ? It is the right, even when there is no common ownership, as there is in this case, of one man to buy of whom he chooses, and he .can impose arbitrary hard conditions, if the other party chooses to accede to them. So it is the clear right of the other party to sell to whom he chooses, and he having this right, how does the other party do a wrong in purchasing from him ? The right of the one carries with it the right of the other. These producers of oil had right to sell to whom they chose, to ship their oil by what pipe line they chose, and they had the right to submit to the terms-of the Standard Oil Company, and in view of this right, the company could buy from whom it chose and on such terms as it chose; for the right of the former would bear no fruitage, would be futile, without the corresponding right of contract in the company. Observe, the question here is not one of enforcing a contract in favor of a monopoly, or of determining whether its conditions are reasonable; not a question of how far the courts would go to enforce a contract between the Standard Oil Company and producers, or between the Eureka Company and producers binding the latter to transport oil only over that line. Not a proceeding by the state to forfeit a charter for misuse. The question here is, has the company by illegal act violated the rights of the plaintiff ? Counsel for plaintiff put emphasis on the charge of conspiracy and malice, but there can be no conspiracy to do a legitimate act, an act which the law allows, nor malice therein. To give action there must not only be conspiracy, but
Counsel for defendants urge that it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff to charge upon them the maintenance of a monopoly, for that the plaintiff itself, by this very suit, seeks to enforce a monopoly in favor of itself and exclude others from open trade. I do not regard this question as material in the
Another feature is to be noted. The count does not specify that the plaintiff had any subsisting contracts with oil producers for the conveyance of oil. The field was open to all. If there had been such contracts and frustrated by a malicious conspiracy, it would be actionable, in my opinion, though the cases differ. If done for one’s own benefit, it is actionable^, there being a fixed contract. Principles stated and cases cited in a Florida case clearly sustain this. It is a -luminous case. Flaccus v. Smith, 7 Am. & Eng. Dec. Eq. 557; Chiyley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; 11 Am. St. R. 3367. See Boysen v. Thorn, 21 L. R. A. 233; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333; Doremus v. Hennesy, 68 Am. St. R. 203; Perkins v. Pendleton, 60 Id. 252.
There is one charge in the first count which presents a cause of action, and that is, that defendants wickedly and maliciously, to injure the plaintiff, represented to “various persons,” customers of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff’s pipe lines and appliances were unsafe and dangerous to transport and store petroleum. The question arises whether this count is not toe general, or rather, indefinite in not naming the persons to whom such representations were made. Clearly the defendants are entitled to specification here, in order to meet the charge. But is this nomination a necessary part of the declaration ? I think not, as it can be done by bill of particulars. Considerable is said of the office performed by bills of particulars in Clark v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 39 W. Va. 732. In that excellent late work, En-cyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice, Yol. 3, page 519, the law is put in a nutshell: “A bill of particulars does not set forth the ccmse of action or ground of defense; these constitute the function of the original pleading. The chief office of a bill of particulars is to amplify a pleading and more minutely specify the claim or defense set up.” Here the charge is false representation of insufficiency of the plaintiff’s machinery and appliances, which is the ground’of action; the persons to whom the representations were made are only a specification to make definite and specific the charge, and to limit its generality. The declaration is not bad for this cause.
It is said that in addition to the charge of false representation, there should be a distinct, affirmative, allegation that the representations were false and the machinery good. That would con
Second Count. It specifies as its pointed gravamen that the defendants and Shattuck conspired to destroy the plant and business of the plaintiff, and did by threats and unfair means oblige persons owning and producing oil to ship it by other means of transportation than those of the plaintiff, which persons had before been the customers of the plaintiff, and that the West Vrginia Oil Company and Shattuck notified such customers not to ship any oil over the plaintiff’s line, and not to permit plaintiff to do any business in transporting oil, so far as such customers could prevent it. While the first count does, the second count does not, state that the defendants were engaged in the business of buying, refining and transporting oil as competitors with the plaintiff, and thus present a justification for their action, but simply charges that they interfered unlawfully and maliciously with the plaintiff’s business with malign purpose to destroy it. This, I think, is a legal cause of action. It is argued for the defendants that it is not stated that the plaintiff had contracts with its patrons with which the defendants interfered and without right induced such patrons to break such contracts, and that as such customers had right to deal with whom they pleased, the defendants could not commit an actionable wrong in inducing them to withdraw their usual patronage from the plaintiff. But it does seem to me that though those customers had such right, it did not impart to the defendants any right and immunity to step in between them and the plaintiff and induce those customers to withdraw their patronage, not for the benefit of the defendants in the exercise of the right of free competition, but in malice only to injure and destroy the plaintiff. Cases above cited show this. In Delz v. Winfee, 80 Tex. 400 26 Am. St. R. 755, it is held that while one.has a right to deal with whom he pleases, yet this right is limited to him, and does not give another the right to influence him not to deal. It is an officous act, hurtful to another, not done, in ligitimate competition, without just excuse, done only to injure a fellow. It is a boycott.” Cook, Trade & Labor Combin., s. 9; Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. R. 895; Beach on Monop. 311, 322. “In all cases, where a man has a temporal loss or -damage by the
Counsel for defendants, in answer to the second count, take the position that no contract is stated as subsisting between the plaintiff and its patrons, and that the defendants are not charged with inducing the violation of any contract, and that as these patrons of the plaintiff had perfect right to withhold their patronage, and could not be sued for so doing, the defendants did no legal wrong in inducing those patrons to do so. I do not concur in this view. The authorties above logically repel it. That there is no binding contract between employer and employe, or between trader and his usual customers, makes no difference. Presumably, the customers would have continued their voluntary patronage, but for the wrongful intervention and influence of the in-tervener. I think this contention is met by Chipley v. Atkinson23 Fla. 206, 11 Am. St. R. 367; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385, 20 Am. D. 623; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, 23 Am. R. 30.
I understand the law to be as follows: One may without liability induce the customers of another to withdraw their custom from him, in the race of competition, in order that the former may himself get the custom, there being no contract; and it is no matter that such person is injured, and it is no matter that the other party was moved by express intent to injure him, motive being immaterial where the act is not unlawful. But where the act is not done under the right of competition, or under the cover of friendly, neighborly counsel, but wantonly or maliciously, with intent to injure another, it is actionable, if loss
I think the second count states a cause of action but for certain defects. It names no customers of the plaintiff whom the defendants instigated to withdraw their custom. This is the very point of the count. The-defendants ought to have specification in this important matter. But this can be done by bill of particulars. The count avers that the defendants used threats to compel customers of the plaintiff to withdraw their custom. What threats? What did they have to fear? What was the means of intimidation? The count does not tell us. As one may, as a neighbor or friend give advice, it seems to me the declaration should negative this by importing a wrongful act; but as it charges the act as done maliciously, with intent to injure, I was put to a query whether that was enough; whether the allegations of threats was necessary; but the count goes on that theory as an elemental wrong, and it seems it ought to specify the threats, so that we may see whether they were such as to induce a withdrawal of custom. Moreover, it seems to me that the mere statement that defendants notified customers not to ship over plaintiff’s line, not to store oil with it, not to permit it to do any business, is very general. Ought not some relation or means of compulsion be shown to exist between the defendants so giving notice and the persons notified to warrant the idea that the defendants had authority to so notify, some moans of enforcing such notice, some means to influence such persons? What do the defendants have to meet under this head ? How could they prepare for trial ?
We hold the first good, and the second bad, and we reverse and remand.
Note by BhaNNON, Judgu :
After the Court had considered the above opinion, it occurred to me that for use in practice where the English books are not accessible, it would be better to state a little more fully the holdings of the two English cases cited above and so often referred to in this connection. In Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 21 Q. B. Div. 544, affirmed in 23 Q. B. Div. 598, the
Further note by BeaNNON, Judge :
Since the foregoing opinion was filed my attention has been called to the great case of Allen v. Flood, decided by the English House of Lords, after a most able and elaborate discussion from many pens of the main questions presented in the foregoing opinion. It is reported in L. R. Appeal Cases of 1898, p. 1. The syllabus is as follows:
“An act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious or bad motive into an unlawful act so as to make the doer of the act liable to a civil action.
“Discussion of the eases in which evil motive is said to be an essential ingredient in a civil cause of action, such as malicious prosecution: see per Lord Watson, Lord Ilcrscliell, and Lord Davey, at pp. 92, 93, 125, 126, 173.
“The respondents were shipwrights employed “for the job” on the repairs to the woodwork of a .ship, but were liable to be discharged at any time. Some iron workers who were 'em*627 ployed on tlie ironwork of the ship objected to the respondents being employed^ on the ground that the respondents had previously worked at ironwork on a ship for another firm, the practice of shipwrights working on iron being resisted by the trade union of which the ironworkers were members. The appellant, who was a delegate of the union, was sent for by the ironworkers and informed that they intended to leave off working. The appellant informed the employers that unless the respondents were discharged all the ironworkers would be called out or knock off work (it was doubtful which expression was used); that the employers had no option; that the iron-men were doing their best to put an end to the practice of shipwrights doing ironwork and that wherever the respondents were employed the iron-men would cease work. There was evidence that this was done to punish the respondents for what they had done in the past. The employers, in fear of this threat being carried out (as they knew) would have stopped their business, discharged the respondents and refused to employ them again. In the ordinary course the respondents’ employment would have continued. The respondents having brought an action against the appellant, the jury found that he had maliciously induced the employers to discharge the respondents and not to engage them, and gave the respondents a verdict for damages:—
“Held, Eeversing the decision of the Court of Appeals (1895) 2 Q. B. 21 (Lord Halsbury L. C. and Lords Ashbourne and Morris dissenting), that the appellant had violated no legal right of the respondents, done no unlawful act, and used no unlawful means, in procuring the respondents’ dismissal; that his conduct was therefore not actionable however malicious or bad liis motive might be, and that notwithstanding the verdict the appellant was entitled to judgment.”
Reversed.