Ny TRAN, Appellant,
v.
John BANCROFT, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Roy D. Wasson, Miami, for appellant.
Carol J. Stephenson, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
STEVENSON, Judge.
The issue for review in this appeal is whether a landlord may be liable for an *315 attack by a tenant's dog that occurs away from the leased premises on property not owned by the landlord. Because a landlord has no duty to prevent injuries to third parties caused by a tenant's dog away from leased premises, we affirm the judgment below.
The case went before the trial court on appellee's (defendant below) motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Therefore, for purposes of the motion and this appeal, all of appellant's (plaintiff below) factual allegations are accepted as true. Appellant lived next door to a house owned by appellee. Appellee did not reside at this house, but instead rented it to a tenant who owned a dog. One day the dog jumped over a fence and attacked appellant on property not owned by appellee. The trial court concluded that appellee knew that (1) the tenant owned a vicious dog; (2) the dog posed a risk of escaping from the property; and, (3) appellee could control the dog's presence.
The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question to be decided as a matter of law. McCain v. Florida Power Corp.,
In tort cases involving liability for the actions of dogs, no Florida court has held that a landowner has a duty to prevent injuries that might occur when a tenant's animal escapes the leased premises and causes injury away from the property. In a case directly on point, Allen v. Enslow,
Appellant urges this court to adopt a foreseeable zone of risk rule and hold that a landlord's knowledge of, and ability to control or prohibit an animal's presence at the commencement of the tenancy, creates a duty of care to third parties outside the property. In support of his position, appellant cites several cases where the courts have held property owners liable for dangerous conditions that result in injury off the premises. See Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., Inc.,
*316 We find that Johnson and Shelburne are readily distinguishable from the instant case. Both of those cases involved businesses where the landowner already owed a duty of care to its invitees. The courts in those two cases merely allowed the business invitee to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the landowner's duty should commence before the time that the invitee actually comes onto the premises. In other words, the landowner's general legal duty to the plaintiffs was already present. The instant case is different, however, because it involves neither a business nor an invitee attempting to get to or from the actual premises of the landowner. McCain is inapposite because it concerns an ultra-hazardous activity which was carried on by the owner itself.
The foreseeable zone of risk analysis, useful in many property owner liability cases, is simply not the prevailing rule of law in Florida in dog liability cases regarding non-owners of the dog, nor was it the prevailing rule at common law. Appellant overlooks the fact that, historically, tort liability for injuries caused by dogs has evolved with its very own unique set of statutory and common law rules. See 2 FLA.JUR.2d Animals § 35 (1977); Wade R. Habeeb, LL.B., Annotation, Landlord's Liability to Third Person for Injury Resulting from Attack by Dangerous or Vicious Animal Kept by Tenant,
Affirmed.
FARMER, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
