62 So. 528 | Ala. | 1913
Stated roughly, but with sufficient exactness to give pith to this opinion, the facts of this case are as follows:
The complainants, R. F. Trammell, Peter Clements, and S. H. Murphree, who are farmers with practically no knowledge of business affairs, but who, nevertheless, attend to their affairs and are not non compos mentis, owned in fee about 400 acres of land. This land is valuable, not only for farming purposes, but also for its minerals and especially for its coal. Of this latter fact the complainants were fully informed, and it appears that they Avere desirous of selling the mineral rights in their said lands. They finally fell into the hands of a man by the name of Wood, and, according to the complainants’ version of the story, Avere induced by Wood to agree to the formation of a corporation Avith a capital stock of $7,000, all of the stock of Avhich was to belong to complainants except one share, Avhich was to be issued in the name of Wood in order that he might
Finally, a corporation known as the Altoona Coal & Coke Company was organized, not in Blount county, but in Jefferson county. In the articles of incorporation the capital stock of the corporation was fixed, not at $7,000, but at $28,000; $7,000 of said capital stock being-preferred stock and $21,000 being common stock. Certificates for 69 shares of the preferred stock of the face value of $100 each were issued and delivered to complainants, and 1 share of this preferred stock of the face value of $100 was issued and delivered to said Wood. The common stock, representing- $21,000 of said capital stock, was issued as fully paid up to the said Wood, R. H. Coffee, George F. Jenkins, and T. F. Wood in consideration of $1,400 paid in cash into the treasury of said corporation and the transfer of the option previously obtained by said Wood on the mineral rights in complainants’ said lands. None of the complainants were made officers of the corporation, they attended none of the meetings of the stockholders, and did nothing in or about the matter, except, indeed, to sign such papers as were sent to them by said Wood for their signatures. They appear to have fully trusted Wood, and they claim that for a long period after the Altoona Coal & Coke Company was formed they were led by Wood to believe that its capital stock was only $7,000, that they owned
After the formation of the corporation, which was empowered “to buy, own, hold, lease or sell lands, * * * engage in mining coal and iron ores, etc., * * * to build, own, purchase or lease all railroads, vessels, etc., * * * as may be necessary or needful for the proper conduct of the business, etc., * * * and to do any and all other things in the transaction of such business not inconsistent with the laws of Alabama,” the mineral interest above referred to was, by sufficient legal conveyance, conveyed to the said corporation and the corporation took possession thereof. At the time of the organization of the corporation and during the period covered by this controversy the general laws of the state provided — as they now provide — that a mining corporation possessed the power “to borrow money, issue notes, bonds, or other negotiable paper, or mortgage, pledge, or otherwise transfer or convey its real and personal property to secure the payment of money borrowed' or any debt contracted,” etc. Acting under the powers thus conferred by our general laws,
From what we have already said, it is apparent that in our opinion there is nothing in the third defense. While Wood may have by fraudulent representations induced complainants to convey their lands to the Altoona Coal & Coke Company, the failure of the complainants to exercise ordinary business precautions in the matter placed the title to the lands in such a situation as to lead a member of the business public who did exercise every necessary business precaution for his own protection to innocently lend money to said corporation, and to accept as security a mortgage on said lands. Certainly complainants, who were, it is true, trustful of Wood, but plainly negligent in the conduct of their own business affairs, cannot be allowed to set up the situation which their own neglect has placed them in to defeat the rights of one who- acting in perfect good faith has advanced money to a corporation which was organized by complainants’ own business associate and which it was the business of complainants to know was organized in accordance with the terms agreed upon with that business associate. “When one of two innocent persons must suffer from the tortious act of a third, he must suffer the consequences who- gave the aggressor the means of doing the wrongful act.”- — Turner v. Flinn, 72 Ala. 532.
Our findings of fact are in accord with the findings of the chancellor, and in onr opinion the chancellor properly granted the respondent Mower the relief for which he prayed in his cross-bill.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
Affirmed.