15 Me. 82 | Me. | 1838
After a continuance for advisement, the opinion of the Court was drawn up by
The bill alleges that the plaintiff on the application of Gould to purchase a stock of cloths and other articles of merchandize suitable for carrying on a merchant tailor’s establishment in Bangor, on the 26th of October, 1835, sold him goods to the value of 1234,77 on a credit of six months; that Gould opened such an establishment there immediately after, and continued in business till June 4, 1836. That on the 19th of February, 1836, Gould, purchased of John C. Burbanlc, a house lot on the Kendus-keag river in Bangor, on which was a house frame partly boarded. That in three days after Gould purchased and took his deed of the lot, he conveyed it to George C. Angier, an Attorney at Law, without consideration, and at the same time Angier executed a deed of it to Gould’s wife, and delivered it to him,"And it was then agreed, that the deed to Angi'ér should be recorded, hut that the deed to Gould’s wife should not be put on record, but should be kept secret, that it might appear to Gould’s creditors, that he had no interest in the land. That Gould afterwards expended the proceeds of his business in finishing the house on the lot and other improvements, and when tenantable he moved into the house, and lived there till he broke up business in Bangor in June, 1836. That the lot and buildings arc worth ^1500. That though the plaintiff’s debt was payable April 26, 1836, nothing was paid up to June 4, 1836. That Gould was frequently writing that he would be able in a short time to pay him. That calling on him on June 4, 1836, the plaintiff was surprised to find Gould, had no vis
Gould is defaulted.
To this bill there is a demurrer on the part of Angier and Dole.
These two defendants contend, that the plaintiff has mistaken his remedy, and that this Court has not jurisdiction of the case; that if this was a case proper for chancery the Court would not in-' terfere, because the plaintiff might have extended his execution, and if he could have proved the transaction fraudulent, on bringing his action he would have recovered; that the plaintiff has not alleged, that he cannot prove it, or that it is exclusively in the knowledge of the defendants; that the plaintiff does not show any specific lien on this property; and that the bill is very defectively
But we think, that we can discern in the hill a particular respect to the third and fourth rules of this Court, as to practice in chancery cases. All that is necessary, is for the plaintiff to make out such a case, by his hill, as will authorize the Court to take cognizance of his suit.
The case of Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns. R. 457, is cited for the purpose of shewing, that Courts of Law have concurrent jurisdiction in all cases of fraud.
To maintain the jurisdiction for relief it is said to be necessary to allege in the bill, that the facts are material to the plaintiff’s case and that the discovery of them by the defendants is indispensable as proof; and that the plaintiff is unable to prove such facts by other testimony.
But the case here stated, shews a trust or equity binding on the conscience of the defendants. And in bills of discovery seeking relief, if any part of the relief sought be of an equitable nature, the Court will retain the bill for complete relief. 1 Story’s Eq. 90.
Here the demurrer admits the truth of the bill. The plaintiff shews, tliat he lias procured a judgment ignorant of the deed to Gould’s wife, and has now become interested in the very property by the deed which lias since been made to him.
By this deed we suppose, in the present state of the case, that lie has derived as much as lie would from a levy, and the expensé of it is avoided. It is alleged in the hill, that the plaintiff can
We have heretofore expressed our reluctance to give encouragement to demurrers, unless for very indisputable causes. This was fully communicated in the case Reed v. Noble, and others pending in the county of Cumberland, to which we refer.
We overrule the demurrer.