Trahan v. McManusTrahan v. McManus
The principal issue is whether the father and mother of an adult married child negligently discharged from the hospital by his treating physician may recover damages under
The trial court granted exceptions of no cause and no right of action filed by defendants with respect to the claims of both parents. Both parents appeal. We reverse finding that, for different reasons, both parents witnessed the injury, thus stating viable claims.
FACTS
On August 17, 1991, plaintiffs’ adult son, Terry Joseph Trahan, was admitted to the emergency room at American Legion Hospital in Crowley, Louisiana, for treatment of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. After reviewing the wrong medical chart, Dr. Robert McManus, the emergency room physician, erroneously discharged the decedent, Terry Trahan. Terry Trahan died a few hours later in the home and presence of both parents, appellants herein, from multiple internal injuries. That Dr. McManus negligently discharged Terry Trahan is conceded.
On appeal, plaintiffs-appellants maintain that
Defendants counter that
OPINION
Defendants’ Peremptory Exceptions:
“Pleadings must be construed reasonably so as to afford litigants their day in court, to arrive at the truth, and to do substantial justice.
La.C.C.P. art. 865 .
Teachers’ Retirement System v. Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, 456 So.2d 594 (La.1984); Haskins v. Clary, 346 So.2d 193 (La.1977); Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975). When it can reasonably do so, the court should maintain a petition against a peremptory exception so as to afford the litigant an opportunity to present his evidence. Teachers’ Retirement System v. Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, supra; Henson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 363 So.2d 711 (La.1978). The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition and is triable on the face of the papers; for the purpose of determining the issues raised by this exception, the well pleaded facts in the petition and any annexed documents must be accepted as true. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So.2d 618 (La. 1984); Darville v. Texaco, Inc., 447 So.2d 473 (La.1984); Eschete v. City of New Orleans, 258 La. 133, 245 So.2d 383 (1971).”
Kuebler v. Martin, 578 So.2d 113, 114 (La. 1991).
The exception of no right of action, on the other hand, is a threshold device that questions whether the litigant, who sets forth a cause of action, has any interest in enforcing judicially the right asserted. Lambert v. Donald G. Lambert Const. Co., 370 So.2d 1254, 1255 (La.1979); Meche v. Arceneaux, 460 So.2d 89, 90 (La.App.3d Cir.1984);
The relevant facts are not disputed. Rather, this dispute calls into question the intentions of the legislature in enacting
“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written without further interpretation in search of the intent of the legislature.
LSA-C.C. art. 9 ; Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So.2d 415 (La.1994). However, when the language of the law is ambiguous or susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.LSA-C.C. art. 10 ; Hutchinson, supra, at 420; Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 888 (La.1993). The meaning is sought by examining the context in which the words occur and the text of the law as a whole.LSA-C.C. art. 12 .”
In re: C.B., Applying for Adoption, 94-C-0755 (La. 10/17/94); 643 So.2d 1251.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ exceptions of no cause and no right of action. The substantive law upon which defendants’ exceptions were sustained is set forth below:
Art. 2315.6. Liability for damages caused by injury to another
A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person, or who come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter, may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress that they suffer as a result of the other person‘s injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this Article, the injured person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant‘s position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience, and the claimant‘s mental anguish or emotional distress must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result of mental anguish or emotional distress for injury to another
shall be recovered only in accordance with this Article. (Emphasis added.)
We find that
The greater question presented by this controversy is whether, under the circumstances, the parents can be said to have complied with
To state a cause of action under
In this case, because the “event causing injury” was the physician‘s admittedly negligent discharge of the decedent, there can be no question that the mother is among the classes for whom
Next we turn to the exception of no cause of action filed as to the father‘s case. The mere fact that a duty exists does not mean that it extends to everyone against every risk all of the time. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So.2d 559, 569, (La.1990), citing PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So.2d 1058 (La.1984); Hill v. Lundin and Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972). The question is whether the father too has stated a cause of action.
Although the claim of the father is somewhat different, we feel he also has stated a cause of action under
Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ settlement with the children and spouse of the decedent prevents their contesting the liability issues as to them. They rely on
Sec. 1299.44. Patient‘s compensation fund
. . . .
C. If the insurer of a health care provider or a self-insured health care provider has agreed to settle its liability on a claim against its insured and claimant is demanding an amount in excess thereof from the patient‘s compensation fund for a complete and final release, then the following procedure must be followed:
. . . .
(5) At the hearing the board, the claimant, and the insurer of the health care provider or the self-insured health care provider as the case may be, may introduce relevant evidence to enable the court to determine whether or not the petition should be approved if it is submitted on agreement without objections. If the board, the insurer of the health care provider or the self-insured health care provider as the case may be, and the claimant cannot agree on the amount, if any, to be paid out of the patient‘s compensation fund, then the court shall determine the amount of claimant‘s damages, if any, in excess of the amount already paid by the insurer of the health care provider. The court shall determine the amount for which the fund is liable and render a finding and judgment accordingly. In approving a settlement or determining the amount, if any, to be paid from the patient‘s compensation fund, the court shall consider the liability of the health care provider as admitted and established where the insurer has paid its policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars, or where the self-insured health care provider has paid one provider has paid one hundred thousand dollars.
. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The question is whether defendants’ tender to the children and spouse of the decedent, which unquestionably precludes the Patient‘s Compensation Fund from contesting liability as to their claims, Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371 (La.1990), likewise constitutes an admission of liability as to the parents, appellants herein. We conclude that it does not, because the parents’ claim arose from a separately derived duty that requires of them a greater showing, distress that is severe, debilitating, and foreseeable.
Sanctions:
Finally, appellants maintain that the trial court erred in failing to award sanctions against defendants. Their first argument relies on the premise that defendants could not contest liability as to them due to their previous settlement with the children and spouse of decedent, a ground rejected by us above. Their alternate theory resides in the “law of the case” doctrine.
According to appellants, the exceptions forming the basis of the present appeal had already been urged and rejected. Because defendants subsequently filed very similar exceptions, they maintain that sanctions and attorney‘s fees are warranted. After comparing the two pleadings, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its conclusion.
The “law of the case” principle is not to be applied so hypertechnically as to run roughshod over the rights of litigants. See generally,
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment granting defendants’ exceptions is reversed and plaintiffs’ claims against defendants are remanded for a trial on the merits. Costs of this appeal taxed to defendants. Other costs to be held in abeyance.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GUIDRY, J. Pro Tem., dissents and assigns reasons.
E.L. GUIDRY, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore, dissenting.
I would affirm the trial court‘s judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ demands.
In sum, I would affirm the trial court‘s judgment. Terry‘s negligent discharge from the hospital did not cause claimants any mental anguish. Rather, it was Terry‘s death, several hours later at their home, which caused their severe emotional distress. The provisions of
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.