4 Conn. 107 | Conn. | 1821
This case presents to the court two questions for determination. 1. Whether by virtue of the statute concerning Riots, a justice of the peace is authorized, on his own personal view, to arrest the offenders against that law, and, without written complaint or warrant, to fine, imprison, or bind them over to a superior tribunal. 2. Whether, if he does this, he is liable in trespass.
1. The first question proposed must exclusively be determined, by a recurrence to our own law. The English statutes, and that of the state of New-York, relative to the matter in question, are expressed in terms very different from ours; and require a very different construction. They explicitly authorize justices, and make it their duty, to go to the place where the force is made, and to record it, on their own view; and, in consequence, to fine each offender, and commit him to gaol, until the fine be paid. 4 Burn's Just. 76. Mather v. Hood, 8 Johns. Rep. 44. In our statute, there are no provisions analogous with these; nor in the body of the law, except as to the arrest, is the mode of proceeding prescribed.
By the act for preventing and punishing Riots,
2. Whether the defendant is suable in trespass, is the remaining consideration. For error in opinion, however palpable and flagrant, no justice or judge is responsible in trespass, if the record shews, that he had jurisdiction, and proceeded regularly. But if he has not jurisdiction over the person, and process, and subject matter, his acts in the assumed capacity of a judge, are void. In the case supposed, he is not a judge; and the authority exercised by him, perhaps with the best motives, is nothing better than mere usurpation. From The Marshalsea case, 10 Co. Rep. 76. b. to the present time, these principles have remained unquestionable. It is said in Perkins v. Proctor, 2 Wils. 384. “Where courts of justice assume a jurisdiction, which they have not, an action of trespass lies against the officer, who executes the process, because the whole proceeding was coram non judice: Where there is no jurisdiction, there is no judge; the proceeding is nothing." The point is too clear and familiar to require further discussion. See Smith v. Boucher & al. 2 Stra. 993. Grumon v. Raymond & al. 1 Conn. Rep. 40. Slocum v. Wheeler & al. 1 Conn. Rep. 429, The case most parallel with the one before us, is that of Morgan v. Hughes, 2 Term Rep. 225. A justice of the peace granted a warrant, without any information, upon a supposed charge of felony; and in favour of the person imprisoned under it, an action of trespass against the justice was adjudged to be the legal remedy. It was said, by Ashhurst, J. "Where a person is committed to prison, by the warrant of a justice, without any accusation, some person is guilty of false imprisonment; and it must be the imprisonment of the justice, who is the immediate, and not the remote, cause of it.”
The imprisonment of the plaintiff was undoubtedly illegal; and the defendant, although I have no doubt he acted from the purest motives, had no right to issue a warrant of commitment against him. He, therefore, in this respect, was a trespasser; and the plaintiff's action is rightly conceived.
New trial not to be granted.
Stat. p. 575, 6. ed. 1808.