Tracy v. Ginzberg

Mar 18, 1907
204
Versions:205 U.S. 170
27 S. Ct. 461
51 L. Ed. 755
1907 U.S. LEXIS 1428
Mr. Justice Harlan,

after making the 'foregoing statement, ‍​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff insists that the action of thе police commissioners deprived him of property' without due process of law.. The answer to this cоntention ‍​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍is that the expectation called a right, or property was of the board’s creation and therefore subject to the limitations which the board imposed.

The plaintiff also insists that by the judgment of the Su-_ preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts he has been deprived оf his property without the due process of law guarаnteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This proposition is without merit. Within the meaning of that amendment, the court, ‍​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍by its judgment, did not deprive the plaintiff of рroperty without due process of law. He sought a decree adjudging that he was entitled to the money received by Ginzberg from O’Hearn. The court, proceeding entirely upon principles of general and local law, and giving all parties interested in the question an oрportunity to be

heard, decided that plaintiff had no right tо that money. The decision of a state court, involving nothing more than the ownership of property, 'with all parties in interest before it, cannot be regarded by the unsuccessful party as a deprivation of property without due process of law, simply because its effect is to' deny his claim to own such property. If we were of opinion, upon this record, that the money reсeived by Ginzberg from O’Hearn really belonged to Tracy—uрon which question we express no opinion—still it could not be affirmed that the latter had, within the meaning of the Constitution, and by reason of the judgment below, been deprived оf his property without due process of law.. Under the оpposite view every judgment of a state court, involving ‍​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍merely the ownership of property, could be brоught here for review—a result not to be thought of. The Fourtеenth Amendment did not impair the authority of the States, by their judiсial tribunals, and according to their settled usages and established modes of procedure, to determine finally, for the parties before it, controverted questions-as to the ownership of property, which did not involvе any right secured by the Federal Constitution, or by any valid act of Congress, or by any treaty. Within the meaning of that amendmеnt, a deprivation of property without due process of law occurs when it results from the arbitrary exerсise of power, inconsistent with “those settled usages аnd modes of proceeding existing in the common and stаtute law of England before

the emigration of our anсestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited tо their civil and ‍​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍political condition by having been acted on by them after the - settlement of this country.”' Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244; Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken &c., 18 How. 272. It cannot be said that the state court in this case, by its final judgment, departed from those usages or modes of proceeding.

The judgment is

Affirmed.