In this аppeal by plaintiff, Paul Tractenberg, and cross-appeal by defendant, Township of West Orange (“West Orange” or “Township”), we are presented with an issue of first impression, whether property appraisals performed by a private appraiser at the behest of the West Orange Council fall within the deliberative process exemption of the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A 47:1A-1 to -13. Five months before the Supreme Court decided Education Law Center v. New Jersey Department of Education, 198 N.J. 274,
We hold that under Education Law Center, the appraisals are not subject to the deliberative process exemption because (1) they have not been used in the “decision making process” and (2) their disclosure will not “reveal deliberations that occurred during [the decision making process].” Id. at 280,
The impetus for the underlying litigation surrounds a 185-aere parcel of land in West Orange purchased in 1986 by West Essex Highlands, Inc. (WEHI). Approximately sixty-five acres have been developed with cоndominiums and a detention basin. The remaining 120 acres known as the Highlands represent the largest privately-owned, undeveloped real estate in West Orange and have been described as “the unique, visually prominent, and environmentally significant ridgeline and associated east face of the Second Watchung Mountain.” The entire area of the property falls within a designated residential zone.
Since 2000, WEHI and West Orange have been embroiled in litigation over the number of homes that are to be built within the Highlands and the procedures for removing trees. In 2004, the parties entered into a “Developer’s Agreement” that required WEHI to donate twenty-five acres to West Orange, and in exchange, West Orange agreed to rezone the remaining ninety-five acres to permit WEHI to devеlop the acreage at double the previously-permitted density. Plaintiff is the
the market value of this property is approximately 30 million dollars without considering its potential value to the owner, fully developed. The market value has been extrapolated from our last appraisal for the Township’s western 52 acres protected, which at $250,000 per acre. LsicJ The purchase of the [Highlands] property by [West Orange] is prohibitive as we would be unable to raise the funds to do so.
Three weeks later, Mayor McKeon authored a column in West Orange’s local newspaper entitled “Point of View,” reiterating that to acquire the Highlands “at a minimum ... will cost the taxpayers $30 million” and “property acquisition is unrealistic and it is outright deceptive to contend otherwise.”
Notwithstanding the opinions expressed by the mayor, the Township’s Director, Department of Planning and Development, Susan Borg, hosted a meeting on February 26, 2006, at which plaintiff, township residents, environmental protection groups, including the Sierra Club and the West Orange Open Space Commission, and the township engineer were in attendance. According to Borg, the Township
wanted to get as many groups together to see where we could find money from— since we all assumed it was going to be a lot of money, and much, much more money th[a]n we bought properties [at] in the past, that we wanted to get a feeling for what kind of money each of the groups could—could commit to this piece of property. And no one made a commitment, but everyone agreed that they would certainly go out and look for the ... money.
The West Orange Council subsequently adopted Resolution # 86-06, which provided in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, approximately 120.5 acres of vacant land currently exists at Block 179, Lot 32; and
WHEREAS, the Township desires to investigate such property for potential acquisition in accordance with the Green Acres Program administered by the State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection; and
WHEREAS, the Green Acres Program requires two (2) appraisals of the subject property; and
WHEREAS, Tom Rodriguez Associates and Blau Appraisal Company have performed similar appraisals regarding other parcels on prior occasions; and
WHEREAS, the Township Council desires to investigate the potential acquisition of the subject property;
NOW, BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED, by the Township Council of the Township of West Orange that the Township Council authorizes the Mayor to retain Blau Appraisal Company and Tom Rodriguez Associates at a rate not to exceed $5,000 each to perform appraisals of the property located at Block179, Lot 32 consisting of approximately 120.5 acres[.]
In October 2006, following the completion of the appraisals, plaintiff requested copies of the reports. Citing attorney-client privilege and attorney work product, the appraisals were not released. The debate about the Township’s acquisition of the Highlands continued without resolution. In September 2007, plaintiff once again sought access to the appraisals. The Township attorney refused to release the appraisals, citing attorney work product and OPRA’s deliberative process:
OPRA does not cover “inter-agency or intra-agency advisory, consultativе or deliberative material.” N.J.S.A 47:1A-1.1. Also known as the “deliberative process privilege!,]” this exclusion is meant specifically to shield communication “received by a decision maker from public [disclosure].” Gannett New Jersey Partners, LP v. County of Middlesex, 379 N.J.Super. 205, 219 [877 A.2d 330 ] (App.Div.2005). As the appraisals were received (1) prior to the decision to exercise eminent domain and (2) contained opinions, recommendations and advi[c]e, the appraisal documents qualify under the deliberative process privilege.
On November 30, 2007, plaintiff filed a verified complaint seeking the entry of an order to show cause for the release of copies of the appraisals pursuant to OPRA and the common law right of access to public records. The court entered an order directing that the matter proceed as a summary proceeding. The Township filed its answer and, shortly thereafter, filed its brief in opposition to the order to show cause. The trial court conducted its summary proceeding over two days in October 2008.
In addition to documentary evidence, the court heard testimony from a number of witnesses, including plaintiff, Borg, Charles Blau, a licensed engineer whose company performed one of the appraisals, and John K. Sayers, the Township’s Business Administrator and Police Director. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally entered its decision on the record.
The court found that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the attorney work product doctrine applied to prevent disclosure of the appraisals. However, the court was satisfied that OPRA’s deliberative process exemption prevented disclosure of those portions of the appraisals that were not purely factual.
As for the common law right of access, the court concluded that the need for confidentiality to protect the Township’s deliberative process outweighed plaintiffs need for access, and decided that the non-factual portions of the appraisals were protected. The court then ordered defendant to redact “[a]ny discussion of how they arrived at the market value as opposed to those things which are clearly factual.... ”
On October 24, 2008, the court ordered the release to plaintiff of “a portion of the requested appraisals,” but “any indication of market value or the analysis that leads to the conclusion of market value” should be “blacked out.” Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and a hearing was held on December 18, 2008. At the hearing, plaintiff argued that because defendant was unwilling to comply with the order, the trial court should do the redacting. On January 9, 2009, the trial court ordered that plaintiff receive additional portions of the appraisals. On January 23, 2009, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s denial of access to the entirety of the appraisals. On January 29, 2009, defendant cross-appealed portions of the October 24, 2008 and January 9, 2009 orders.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT i
OPRA EXPRESSLY REQUIRES ITS EXEMPTIONS TO BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF PUBLIC ACCESS AND PLACES THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE TOWNSHIP.
POINT II
NEW JERSEY HAS FAVORED PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT APPRAISALS.
POINT III
OPRA’S DELIBERATIVE PROCESS EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE APPRAISALS AT ISSUE.
A. THE APPRAISALS ARE NOT “DELIBERATIVE” BECAUSE THE TOWNSHIP DID NOT EVEN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THAT THE APPRAISALS REVEAL DECISION-MAKING DELIBERATIONS.
B. THE APPRAISALS ARE NOT “PRE-DECISIONAL” BECAUSE THE TOWNSHIP DID NOT EVEN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE USED IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.
C. BECAUSE NEW JERSEY REQUIRES PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF APPRAISALS IF A CONDEMNATION ACTION IS FILED, APPRAISERS WOULD NOT BE CHILLED BY DISCLOSURE TO TRACTENBERG.
POINT IV
OPRA’S OTHER EXEMPTIONS DO NOT APPLY TO THE APPRAISALS AT ISSUE.
A. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE [THE] TOWNSHIP FAILED TO SATISFY ITS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE APPRAISALS WERE COMMUNICATED (1) “IN THE COURSE OF [A LAWYER-CLIENT] RELATIONSHIP AND (2) “IN PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE.”
B. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE APPRAISALS WERE NOT PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION, AND, THUS, THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY.
In its cross-appeal, West Orange raises the following points:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPRAISALS QUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE AND DELIBERATIVE EXCEPTION UNDER THE OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE APPRAISALS WERE PRE-DECISIONAL AND THIS FINDING OF FACT IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE ON APPEAL.
B. THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT THE APPRAISALS WERE DELIBERATIVE IN NATURE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNING CASE LAW AND THE NEED TO PROVE THAT CERTAIN COMPONENTS REVEAL DELIBERATIONS APPLY ONLY TO THE FACTUAL PORTIONS OF THE APPRAISALS WHICH WERE ALL PROVIDED TO TRACTENBERG.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE TOWNSHIP’S ARGUMENT THAT THE APPRAISALSQUALIFIED UNDER THE WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE TOWNSHIP’S ARGUMENT THAT THE APPRAISALS QUALIFIED UNDER THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXAMINE WHETHER THE APPRAISALS FELL WITHIN THE OPRA EXEMPTION FOR DOCUMENTS GIVING AN ADVANTAGE TO COMPETITORS OR BIDDERS.
Rule 4:67-1 (a) (the Rule) permits the summary disрosition of matters which, by rule or statute, may be resolved through a summary proceeding. Proceedings instituted under the Rule are commenced by the filing of an order to show cause supported by a verified complaint. R. 4:67-2(a). The court thereafter conducts an initial hearing and, if “satisfied with the sufficiency of the application, [it] shall order the defendant to show cause why final judgment should not be rendered for the relief sought.” Ibid.
On the return date of the order to show cause, if there is an objection to the court conducting a trial on the pleadings and affidavits and the court is satisfied that “there may be a genuine issue as to a material fact, the court shall hear the evidence as to those matters which may be genuinely in issue, and render final judgment.” R. 4:67-5. At the conclusion of the prоceedings, the court must make findings of fact. MAG Entm’t, LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J.Super. 534, 551,
In the present matter, OPRA expressly provides that actions instituted in Superior Court challenging a decision withholding access to government records shall proceed in a “summary or expedited manner.” N.J.S.A. 47:lA-6. Therefore, the trial court properly conducted a summary proceeding to resolve the dispute.
I.
With the enactment of OPRA, the Legislature sought “to insure that government records, unless exempted, are readily accessible to citizens[.]” Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57,
Under OPRA, all government records are subject to public access unless the records fall within at least one of its twenty-one exemptions. N.J.S.A 47:1A-1. Included among the government records to which the exemption applies are “interagency or intra-agency advisory, consultative or deliberative material.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The language of this exemption “has been understood to encompass the common law deliberative process privilege.”
The deliberative process privilege permits “the government to withhold documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75, 83,
Our Supreme Court discussed the deliberative process privilege at length in Integrity, supra, 165 N.J. at 83-86,
Addressing the deliberative process privilege, the Court traced the exemption’s firm roots in federal jurisprudence before outlining a two-step test for its application. Id. at 83-86,
Integrity, however, did not address how to determine when material is “deliberative” within the meaning of the second prong of its test. That question was answered nine years later by the Court in Education Law Center, supra, 198 N.J. at 288,
Consistent with the Court’s long history of looking to federal law where there is a dearth of state court decisions interpreting a state statute or rule but there are federal decisions interpreting comparable federal law, the Court turned to federal decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), OPRA’s federal counterpart, for guidance. See Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 369,
In Mapother, the D.C. Circuit focused upon the objective underlying the deliberative process privilege which it concluded is to protect both deliberative material as well as the deliberative process and reasoned that the key inquiry is the relationship between the requested documents and their ability to expose agency deliberations occurring prior to the agency’s ultimate decision. Id. at 1539. Adopting the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Education Law Center, our Supreme Court concluded:
[T]he question of what is protected under the deliberative process privilege, incorporated into OPRA as an exemption from the dеfinition of a “government document.” must depend, first, on whether the information sought is a part of the process leading to formulation of an agency’s decision (not on a simplistic label of “fact” or “opinion,”), and second, on the material’s ability to reflect or to expose the deliberative aspects of that process.
[Educ. Law Ctr., supra, 198 N.J. at 295,966 A.2d 1054 .]
Applying this test to the documents sought by the plaintiffs, the Court determined the AFS memorandum was protected from disclosure by the deliberative process exemption. Id. at 300,
contained factual data converted into scenarios for the purpose of assisting in the agency’s consideration of options. This was not raw, neutral, data. It was manipulated to provide organized information useful to the DOE, specifically for the purpose of aiding the agency in deciding on an aspect of a new funding scheme. It plainly was created during, and used as part of, DOE’s deliberative process. As for the second part of the examination for deliberative-process protection, the document must be capаble of reflecting what people were thinking and considering during the process of deliberating. This [memorandum], concerning data created specifically to provide information that DOE deemed useful during its decision-making process, shows that persons were using the formatted data for the purposes of ascertaining something to be decided. The document is, therefore, reflective of DOE’s deliberations. As such, it is entitled to protection under the deliberative process privilege and, therefore, is exempt from release under OPRA. [Id. at 301-02,966 A.2d 1054 .]
Here, as noted earlier, the trial court entered its ruling five months before the Court’s decision in Education Law Center and therefore relied upon reasoning we employed in our decision, which the Court subsequently reversed. Id. at 304,
Addressing the first prong under the Education Law Center analysis, we are satisfied the Township produced sufficient evidence demonstrating that the appraisals are part of the “decision-making process[.]” Id. at 299,
Testimony from these witnesses, which the trial court credited, satisfied the Township’s
Turning to the second prong under the newly amplified law announced in Education Low Center, whether a document is entitled to deliberative process protections requires more than a fact versus opinion analysis. Id. at 294-95,
Although there are no New Jersey cases interpreting the application of the deliberative process exemption to property appraisals, federal court decisions in at least two jurisdictions have construed FOIA’s deliberative process exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency[,]” as not exempting property appraisals. In Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir.1972), the court noted that property appraisals are not “deliberative” for the purposes of the deliberative process privilege because as “the finished work product of a professional,” they are not “documents which comprise the administrative reasoning process of the government.” In Dworman Building Corp. v. General Services Administration, 468 F.Supp. 389, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.1979), the government conceded that the property appraisal at issue did not reflect intra-agency deliberations or policy deliberations. The court found “at most the appraisal was intended to and did provide raw data of a factual nature upon which decisions could be made.” Ibid. “Such reports are not generally considered part of the decisional process.” Id. at 393. Similarly, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development of the United States, 343 F.Supp. 1176, 1178 (E.D.Pa.1972), the court, in addressing the scope of the deliberative process privilege, concluded that property appraisals fall outside of the scope of the privilege, reasoning that “the gap between suggested prices and pоlicy recommendations within the protection of executive privilege is unbridgeable.”
We reject the Township’s contention that only when dealing with purely factual data must a court apply the analysis articulated in Education Law Center. The Court made clear that protection afforded under the deliberative process exemption depends upon “whether the information sought is a part of the process leading to the formulation of an agency’s decision (not on a simplistic label of fact’ or ‘opinion’)[.]” Educ. Law Ctr., supra, 198 N.J. at 295,
Defendant produced no evidence that the appraisals have the potential to “reflect or tо expose the deliberative aspects of that process” in satisfaction of the second prong. Ibid. Although appraiser Charles Blau testified that all the components of an appraisal are “intertwined,” this does not prove that the appraisals had the potential to expose the deliberative aspects of the Township’s process of determining
Likewise, the appraisals are factually distinguishable from thе AFS memorandum the Court found protected under the deliberative process exemption in Education Law Center. In addition to providing raw data, the AFS memorandum contained recommendations designed to assist the DOE in its deliberative process. By contrast, there is no indication in the record that the property appraisals here contain any recommendation as to whether the Township should acquire the Highlands. Rather, the appraisals contain raw, neutral data and an ultimate opinion as to the value of the property. Therefore, the appraisals do not have the “capacity to expose the [Township's] deliberative thought-processes” because they are “at most ... intended to ... provide raw data of a factual nature upon which deсisions could be made.” Dworman, supra, 468 F.Supp. at 393. Consequently, plaintiff is entitled to unredacted copies of the two appraisals.
II.
We next address the Township’s cross-appeal. In light of our determination that the deliberative process exemption does not apply to prevent the disclosure of the appraisals, the Township’s arguments that the court erred in determining that the additional asserted privileges do not apply to prevent disclosure of the appraisals are not moot as urged by plaintiff.
The Township argues the trial court ignored “overwhelming evidence in the record which illustrates a contentious and litigious relationship between the Township and WE HI which sufficiently provided an objectively reasonable basis for the Township to anticipate litigation shоuld efforts to acquire the [p]roperty proceed.” The Township maintains that the appraisals are “critical” to its ability to “valu[e] the [property for possible acquisition with the full understanding that litigation was not possible, but likely.”
The work product privilege offers qualified protection from disclosure of documents “prepared in anticipation of litigation rather than in the ordinary course of business.” Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4 on R. 4:10—2(c) (2010). The privilege endeavors to protect an “attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.” Ibid. A document is “prepared in anticipation of litigation if the ‘dominant purpose’ in preparing the document was concern about potential litigation and the anticipation of litigation was ‘objectively reasоnable.’ ” Miller v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 339 N.J.Super. 144, 150,
The Township next argues that the trial court failed to “fully examine the facts in the record against the governing elements of the attorney[-]client privilege” before it incorrectly determined this privilege did not apply to prevent the disclosure of unredacted copies of the appraisals. The Township maintains that the privilege is applicable because the appraisers, as its agents, performed the appraisals on behalf of the Township and communicated the results of the appraisals to its attorney in professional confidence.
OPRA exempts “any record within the attorney-client privilege” from its definition of a “government record.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The attorney-client privilege in New Jersey is statutory. See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to thеir attorneys,” Macey v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., 179 N.J.Super. 535, 539,
To qualify for the privilege, a party must show that there was a confidential communication “between lawyer and his client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence[.]” N.J.R.E. 504(1). Confidential communications are only those “communications which the client either expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney as so intended.” State v. Schubert, 235 N.J.Super. 212, 221,
The privilege extends to communications between a public body and the attorney rеtained to represent it. In re Grand Jury, supra, 241 N.J.Super. at 28, 574 A.2d 449. It also extends to “the necessary intermediaries and agents through whom the communications are made.” State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 413,
The Township argues that because the appraisers are “agents of the Township,” their appraisals are “documents of the Township” entitled to protection under the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff counters that the appraisals were not authorized or ordered by the Township attorney, and thus they were not created in the course of an attorney-client relationship. Plaintiff cites United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1065, 118 S.Ct. 731,
The record unequivocally shows that the Township Council, not the Township attorney, authorized the appraisals. As Borg testified, the appraisals were ordered to “see how much [the property] was worth” and thus aid in the council’s consideration of whether the Township should acquire the Highlands. The mere fact that the completed appraisals were addressed to the Township attorney did not establish an attorney-client relationship.
The Township produced no evidence before the trial court that there was any confidential communication between the Township Council and the Township attorney relating to the appraisals. The decision to order the appraisals was reached in a public forum and, according to the testimony of plaintiff during the summary proceeding, the Township Council adopted the resolution to order the appraisals at his urging during a Township Council meeting, and the Township acquiesced to this request. It is doubtful that elected officials would acquiesce to a request for appraisals from a member of the public in a public forum and then adopt a resolution in furtherance of that request, with the intention that the results of the appraisals would be kept from the public.
Moreover, even assuming the appraisals arose out of an attorney-client relationship between the Township attorney and the Township Council, the parties had no reasonable expectation that the appraisals would remain confidential. See N.J.S.A. 20:3-6; see also State, Comm’r of Transp. v. Testa, 247 N.J.Super. 335, 338,
The Township also argues that the trial court erred by failing to examine the OPRA exemption for “information which, if disclosed, would give an advantage to competitors or bidders,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, a contention raised in defendant’s brief in opposition to the order to show cause but not raised at the trial eourt hearing. Plaintiff contends the Township abandoned this argument because, when asked by the trial court “what privileges are you now claiming,” it failed to mention this exception. Plaintiff further notes that the Township also failed to raise this exception during summаtion.
It is well-settled that appellate courts will generally “decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available,” unless the issues relate to jurisdiction or substantially implicate public interest. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234,
In support of the application of the competitive advantage exemption, the Township relies upon a Government Records Council decision, Murray v. Twp. of Warren, GRC Complaint No. 2006-169 (February 27, 2008), included in its appendix, to argue that “[t]he disclosure of the appraisals prior to the formal commencement of negotiations and/or eminent domain proceedings, will place the Township at a substantial disadvantage.” We disagree.
In Murray, the Government Records Council denied the complainant’s access to appraisals because the complainant was the attorney of the property owner with whom the township was negotiating for the property’s purchase. Murray, supra, Complaint No. 2006-169 at 7. Based on these facts, the Council concluded,
The records responsive to this request represent a part of the negotiation phase that gives a party interested in buying or selling a property a level of bargaining power____The Township of Warren is using the records to substantiate its offer of purchase to the Complainant’s client. Disclosure of the records requested could greatly hinder the Township’s position in the negotiation process by making public the price range at which the Township is willing to obtain the property and could be used to start a bidding war between private companies.
[Id. at 7-8.]
In our view, application of this reasoning to shield appraisals that have not been utilized in actual negotiations would defeat the purpose of OPRA, which represents this state’s “longstanding public policy favoring ready access to most public records.” Bart v. City of Paterson Hous. Auth., 403 N.J.Super. 609, 617,
Here, it cannot be said that the competitive advantage exemption clearly applies to these facts. Unlike in Murray, the Township has not initiated negotiations with WEHI to purchase the Highlands, nor have they demonstrated that such negotiations are probable any time in the near future. The Township has held the appraisals for over two years, and yet the record indicates that no decision regarding the Highlands has been made. To contend that the mere potential for future negotiations, without a strong showing that negotiations are probable, satisfies the OPRA competitive advantage exemption “subverts the broad reading of OPRA as intended by the Legislature.” Times of Trenton, supra, 183 N.J. at 535,
To summarize, we reverse those portions of the trial court orders of October
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an order directing the release of unredacted copies of the appraisals. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
This article was not considered by the court during the hearing the court conducted on plaintiffs prerogative writs action. The court ruled the document was inadmissible hearsay.