The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In
Paruszewski v. Township of Elsinboro,
154
N.J.
45, 51,
I
Petitioner Hugh Schultz (“petitioner”) owns property at Lot 12, Block 229 in Stafford Township. On that property, petitioner operates his business, Manahawkin Auto Sales. Petitioner also used adjoining Lot 13 to display and store cars. On January 26, 1995, Jeffrey Pharo (“Pharo”), a Deputy Code Enforcement Officer, served petitioner with a violation notice, informing him that his “car business was being operated on [Lot 13] in violation of the Stafford Code.” Pursuant to the Stafford Zoning Code, Lot 13 was located in a residential/loeal business zone that did not allow the display and storage of cars as a permitted use.
In response to that violation notice, petitioner filed an application with the Stafford Township Zoning Board of Adjustment (“Zoning Board” or “Board”) on May 1,1995, requesting certification that the “sale, purchase and repair of automobiles” on Lot 13 *67 was a pre-existing, nonconforming use. The Zoning Board held a public hearing in July 1995 to consider petitioner’s application. Petitioner, however, provided no notice of that hearing to owners of property within 200 feet of Lot 13 and did not publish a notice in the appropriate newspaper. See N.J.S.A 40:55D-12(a). At the hearing, petitioner and five additional witnesses supported his application, stating that petitioner had used Lot 13 to store and display cars since 1963. Pharo was the only witness to testify in opposition to the application, stating that he drove by Lot 13 on a daily basis for three years and he “never” saw a ear on Lot 13 until the day he cited petitioner for a violation. No testimony was heard from petitioner’s neighboring landowners; the Township of Stafford (“Township”) attributes that fact to lack of notice. Based on the testimony presented, the Zoning Board approved petitioner’s application, finding that petitioner’s storage and display of cars on Lot 13 was a pre-existing, nonconforming use'. The Board, however, imposed as a restriction that “the use found to be exempt ... does not include the service or repair of any motor vehicle.”
In August 1995, the Township filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in Superior Court, Ocean County. The Zoning Board subsequently joined in the Township’s brief, concurring that its own decision should be overturned on appeal. Relying on
Township of Dover v. Board of Adjustment,
158
N.J.Super.
401,
The Appellate Division reversed and vacated the Zoning Board’s certification, “without prejudice to the applicant’s right to reapply to the zoning board on proper notice to the neighboring landowners.”
Township of Stafford v. Stafford Township Zoning Bd. of
*68
Adjustment,
299
N.J.Super.
188, 190,
II
When the governing body enacts or amends a zoning ordinance, “there will [inevitably] be uses which are newly prohibited ... — these are known as nonconforming uses.” William M. Cox,
New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration,
§ 11-1.1 (1997) [hereinafter
New Jersey Zoning
]. Because it is considered “inequitable to strip away a person’s lawfully asserted property rights retroactively,”
ibid.,
the MLUL attempts “to balance the municipality’s interest in being able to amend its zoning ordinances with the property owner’s interest in maintaining the use and value of his or her property.”
Palatine I v. Planning Bd.,
133
N.J.
546, 565,
The prospective purchaser, prospective mortgagee, or any other person interested in any land upon which a nonconforming use ... exists may apply in writing for the issuance of a certificate certifying that the use ... existed before the adoption of *69 the ordinance which rendered the use ... nonconforming. The applicant shall have the burden of proof. Application pursuant hereto may be made to the administrative officer within one year of the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming or at any time to the board of adjustment____ Denial by the administrative officer shall be appealable to the board of adjustment.
[NJ.S.A 40:55D-68.]
Before asking a court for relief, any person whose application to certify a nonconforming use is denied by the administrative officer or who applies more than one year after the adoption of the pertinent ordinance must first file an appeal or application with the zoning board.
R.
4:69-5 (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before action in lieu of prerogative writs may be maintained);
see also Bell v. Township of Bass River,
196
N.J.Super.
304, 314,
The zoning board’s power to certify nonconforming uses is exclusive and may not be exercised by any other municipal agency,
N.J.S.A.
40:55D-68;
N.J.S.A.
40:55D-20. The governing body, therefore, is without power to certify nonconforming uses.
See Cronin v. Township Comm.,
239
N.J.Super.
611, 618,
*70 III
Our initial inquiry is whether an applicant submitting a Section 68 application for a nonconforming use certification must provide notice pursuant to Section 12 of the MLUL. That is an issue of first impression.
With respect to most zoning and land use applications, the MLUL “requires public hearings[ ][and] an opportunity for the public to be heard.”
Township of Berkeley Heights v. Board of Adjustment,
144
N.J.Super.
291, 300,
A.
The first question presented is whether an application for a nonconforming use certification is an “application for development” in the context of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(a). An “application for development” is defined in N.J.S.A 40:55D-3 (“Section 3”) as “the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance for approval of a subdivision plat, site plan, planned development, conditional use, zoning variance or direction for the issuance of a permit .... ” (emphasis added). N.J.SA. 40:55D-7 (“Section 7”), in turn, defines “variance” as “permission to depart from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance pursuant to section [40:55D-60] and subsection [40:55D-40(b) ] and [40:55D-70(c) — (d) ]” of the MLUL. Based on the plain language of the *71 above three statutory provisions, the MLUL does not require Section 68 applicants to give notice to their adjoining landowners.
Section 12, however, requires that
applicants for expansion of a nonconforming use,
pursuant to
N.J.S.A.
40:55D-70(d) (“Section 70(d)”), provide notice to adjoining landowners. In its reversal, the Appellate Division concluded that petitioner was required to provide notice pursuant to Section 12 because his application was, in fact, a hybrid application under both Section 68 and Section 70(d). 299
N.J.Super.
at 194,
“ ‘Generally, a court’s duty in construing a statute is to determine the intent of the Legislature.’”
Stafford, supra,
299
N.J.Super.
at 195,
where it is dear that the drafters of a statute did not consider or even contemplate a specific situation, this Court has adopted as an established rule of statutory construction the policy of interpreting the statute “consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman ‘had he anticipated the situation at hand.’ ”
[AMN, Inc., supra, 93 N.J. at 525,461 A.2d 1138 (citations omitted) ].
See also Stafford, supra,
299
N.J.Super.
at 195,
The facts presented in this case illustrate the possibility that what may initially appear to be a Section 68 application may turn out to be a Section 70(d) application during the hearing process, a situation apparently not foreseen by the Legislature. As the Appellate Division correctly noted:
The problem with excepting Section 68 applications from the notice provisions of Section 12, as demonstrated by what occurred in this ease, is that prior to the hearing neither the zoning board nor the public is in a position to know whether the applicant’s request will in fact be limited to approval of an existing use, or will instead result in an expansion of an existing use. And this is true without regard to the manner in which the application is styled: whether it is an expansion or not will turn on the facts developed at the hearing. Since a zoning board can only hear an application for expansion of a nonconforming use under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d on notice to the neighboring landowners, a Section 68 application logically should be accorded the same treatment. That follows because the applicant may be claiming as pre-existing what is in reality an expansion of a use.
[299 N.J.Super. at 194-95,690 A.2d 1043 .]
Another prominent commentator on zoning and land use advocates a similar conclusion. See New Jersey Zoning, supra, § 5-2.5 (“[T]he decision by a board of adjustment on an application ... to interpret the meaning of certain provisions of the zoning ordinance have such widespread ramifications ... that lack of notice in such cases would be inequitable and highly undesirable from a public policy viewpoint.”).
We do not believe that the Legislature considered whether Section 12 notice requirements should apply to a Section 68 nonconforming use certification application. We observe that although Section 68 applications for certification of a nonconforming use may be submitted to the zoning board at any time, such *73 applications submitted within one year of the adoption of the ordinance that rendered the use nonconforming also may be submitted to the administrative officer. Unlike the zoning board, which is a quasi-judicial board, the granting of a nonconforming use certification by the administrative officer is a ministerial proceeding. Accordingly, if the Legislature had considered whether the notice provisions of Section 12 were applicable to Section 68 applications, we do not believe that the Legislature would have intended Section 12 notice to be provided for such administrative applications. However, for applications initially submitted to the zoning board, or those originally submitted to an administrative officer and then appealed to the zoning board, we believe that the Legislature would have intended Section 12 notice requirements to apply. In this case, the application was submitted to the zoning board. We, therefore, hold that petitioner was required to comply with the MLUL’s Section 12 notice requirements.
B.
Because we conclude that Section 68 applicants must comply with Section 12 notice requirements, we must now consider whether that holding applies retroactively to petitioner. We find that it does.
“This Court has ‘generally followed the traditional rule that the overruling of a judicial decision is retrospective in nature.’ ”
Rutherford Educ. Ass’n. v. Board of Educ.,
99
N.J.
8, 21,
The threshold inquiry in determining whether to apply a ruling retrospectively is “whether the rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law.’ ”
State v. Knight,
145
N.J.
233, 249,
Therefore, we now must determine whether that new rule should be applied prospectively or retroactively. In deciding that issue, “a court’s decision is guided by ‘what is just and consonant with the public policy considerations in the situation presented.’”
Fischer, supra,
143
N.J.
at 244,
“Depending upon the facts of a case, one of the factors may be pivotal.”
Rutherford, supra,
99
N.J.
at 23,
Turning to the second factor, we conclude that application of the Section 12 notice requirements does not result in prejudice to petitioner. By affording the adjoining landowners an opportunity to be heard, petitioner is not deprived of the opportunity to reappear before the Zoning Board. If indeed the use of his property is a valid, pre-existing nonconforming use, petitioner will suffer no prejudice as a result of this Court’s decision. Rather, the procedural breach in this ease will be corrected and petitioner’s right to a further hearing remains preserved. Petitioner’s right to reapply distinguishes this case from those that announce a new statute of limitations, where the plaintiffs right to recover would be eliminated if the rule were applied retroactively.
See, e.g., Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.,
144
N.J.
344, 354-55,
Because the purpose of the “new rule” announced by the Court is furthered by retroactive application and because petitioner has not demonstrated reliance on his alternative reading of the MLUL notice requirements sufficient to justify prospective application of the rule, petitioner is subject to the Section 12 notice requirements.
IV
A.
Based on that determination, we now consider whether the Township had standing to challenge the zoning board’s certifica
*76
tion of petitioner’s nonconforming use petition. In
Paruszewski, supra,
154
N.J.
at 51-52,
In
Datchko, supra,
the Appellate Division recognized the governing body’s power to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs against a municipal body “alleged to be in violation of [its] authority.” 142
N.J.Super.
at 508 n. 2,
In its decision, the Dover panel reasoned:
We are ... satisfied that so long as the board acts within the ambit of its authority, whether it has acted wisely or not, and whether it has acted correctly or not, are not matters which the governing body itself should be able to raise.
*77 An arrogation of authority is, however, quite a different matter and, in our view, is necessarily and obviously actionable by the body whose authority has been directly infringed upon.
[158 N.J.Super. at 409,386 A.2d 421 (emphasis added).]
Reading that language liberally, the Appellate Division in the instant case concluded that
we are also involved with an arrogation of authority by the zoning board, although we do not believe it was done knowingly. While here the arrogation did not directly infringe upon the governing body’s authority, the specific nature of the arrogation, holding a hearing without the required notice to the neighboring landowners, substantially interfered with the ability of citizens to institute actions on their own.
[299 N.J.Super. at 198,690 A.2d 1043 (citation omitted).]
See also Washington Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Washington Township Planning Bd.,
217
N.J.Super.
215, 223,
This Court has recognized that a municipal agency’s
parens patriae
interest in protecting the general public is insufficient to support standing to challenge an exercise of power by another municipal agency.
See County of Bergen v. Port of New York Auth.,
32
N.J.
303, 311-15,
However, the
Datchko
and
Dover
courts recognized that the governing body will have standing to institute an action in lieu of prerogative writs in certain limited circumstances.
See Datchko, supra,
142
N.J.Super.
at 508,
Although the
Dover
court addressed the issue of standing in the context of the variance procedure, its holding remains helpful in the context of nonconforming use certifications. Subsequent variance cases have applied Dover’s “arrogation of authority” requirement.
See, e.g., Vidal v. Lisanti Foods, Inc.,
292
N.J.Super.
555, 564,
B.
Applying
Dover
in this case raises two questions: (1) whether the Zoning Board exceeded its authority in hearing petitioner’s application and certifying his use without petitioner having complied with Section 12 notice requirements, and (2) if the Zoning Board did act beyond its authority, whether the Township had standing to challenge the Zoning Board’s action. Because petitioner was required to comply with the MLUL’s Section 12
*79
notice requirements, the Board exceeded its authority in certifying petitioner’s use of Lot 13 as a pre-existing, nonconforming use. “[T]he giving of statutory notice of hearing is a jurisdictional requirement, and unless notice is given as required by statute the board lacks power to hear or consider an application even if the subject matter is within its statutory power.”
New Jersey Zoning, supra,
§ 4-2.1;
see also Perlmart, supra,
295
N.J.Super.
at 236,
Our finding that the Board’s action in this case resulted in an arrogation of its authority raises the issue whether the Township had standing to challenge the Board’s certification by way of an action in lieu of prerogative writs. We find that it did. When a zoning board exceeds its authority in certifying a nonconforming use and such action threatens the public’s interest or enforcement of the MLUL, then a governing body may institute an action in lieu of prerogative .writs challenging the board’s nonconforming use certification. For example, if the Township simply were asserting that the Zoning Board had acted improperly in determining whether petitioner’s sale, purchase and repair of automobiles constituted a valid, nonconforming use, the Township would lack standing to institute a court proceeding challenging that determination. However, because- the Zoning Board did not have authority to act and deprived the adjoining landowners of notice and the opportunity to be heard and the Board of an opportunity to hear all the facts, the Township did have standing to challenge the Board’s action.
*80 c.
Finally, the Township is not precluded from challenging the certification because of its failure to challenge the Zoning Board’s jurisdiction at the hearing on petitioner’s application. That finding is particularly appropriate in this case given that this Court had not previously decided whether a township could appear before its zoning board in opposition to or in support of a specific application.
See Paruszewski, supra,
154
N.J.
at 55,
V.
This case, and its companion case,
Paruszewski, supra,
154
N.J.
45,
The power to issue nonconforming use certifications is granted solely to the municipality’s appropriate administrative officer and to the zoning board.
N.J.S.A.
40:55D-68;
N.J.S.A.
40:55D-20. The governing body has no power to hear Section 68 nonconforming use applications or to review a zoning board’s decision on such an application.
Paruszewski, supra,
154
N.J.
at 54,
We recognize that by allowing suits between governmental bodies “the prompt and orderly review of land use applications, envisioned by the [MLUL], would essentially grind to a halt.”
Washington Township, supra,
217
N.J.Super.
at 224,
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORTIZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.