TIMOTHY TOWNSEND v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(AC 44158)
Moll, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.
Argued January 11—officially released June 18, 2024
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Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (
Pursuant further to statute (
The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea of guilty to the charge of murder, under the Alford doctrine, was obtained in violation of his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions because he was not canvassed about the requirement that he register, pursuant to
- The petitioner‘s claim was ripe for review: there was a substantial question as to whether
§ 54-280a applied to the petitioner‘s 2002 conviction, and that determination would result in practical relief to the petitioner and guide the present conduct of the parties; moreover, the adversity of the parties’ interests at the time of the amended petition and return evidenced a justiciable controversy, which has not been rendered moot by the current position of the respondent that§ 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner. - This court, exercising its supervisory authority to review the petitioner‘s unpreserved claim, concluded that the habeas court improperly denied the habeas petition because the entire premise of the habeas court‘s decision, that
§ 54-280a was applicable to the petitioner‘s 2002 conviction, was incorrect: the plain and unambiguous text of§ 54-280a expressly limits the registration requirement set forth therein to offenders of eligible crimes who are both convicted of an offense committed with a deadly weapon and released into the community on or after January 1, 2014; moreover, the question of whether the phrase “on or after January 1, 2014,” applied to the petitioner‘s date of conviction or only to the petitioner‘s date of release, was resolved by reference to the requirement in§ 54-280a (a) (2) that a court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty to an eligible charge, canvass a criminal defendant about the registration requirement of§ 54-280a , and it necessarily followed that§ 54-280a (a) (2) would be rendered meaningless in the context of an otherwise eligible conviction rendered prior to January 1, 2014; furthermore, this interpretation of§ 54-280a was consistent with the department‘s interpretation of the statute, as represented to this court through the respondent‘s counsel, and its conclusion that the registration requirement of§ 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner in relation to his 2002 conviction, a representation that the habeas court did not have the benefit of in making its determination; accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to the reversal of the habeas court‘s judgment.
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Brett R. Aiello, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state‘s attorney, and Sean McGuinness, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
MOLL, J. The self-represented petitioner, Timothy Townsend, appeals, following the
the precise claim that he is not required to register as a deadly weapon offender because
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Following events that transpired in 2000, the petitioner was arrested and charged with murder in violation of
In August, 2014, the self-represented petitioner commenced the present action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) “bill of attainder / ex post facto violations due to the [DWOR]. P.A. 13-3 / 13-220.” Thereafter, on October 21, 2014, the law firm of Ruane Attorneys at Law appeared on the petitioner‘s behalf as appointed habeas counsel.
On March 1, 2017, the petitioner‘s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw its appearance. In a memorandum of law accompanying the motion to withdraw, the petitioner‘s counsel submitted that it could not pursue the petitioner‘s claims in good faith because the claims lacked legal or evidentiary support.7 On September 10, 2018, the habeas court, Sferrazza, J., denied the motion to withdraw (Judge Sferrazza‘s order). The court stated: “The court agrees that the legal claims as to ineffective assistance of trial and habeas counsel are frivolous. The court also agrees that the [dangerous weapon offender] registration statutes are constitutional. However, it appears that
On December 7, 2018, notwithstanding that he was represented by appointed counsel, the petitioner himself filed a motion titled “motion for pretrial ineffective assistance of counsel,” in which he claimed in relevant part that his counsel “insist[ed] on approaching the [DWOR] claim by making an argument of ex post facto violation, but the [petitioner] insist[ed] on approaching the [DWOR] claim by making an argument based on
the meaning of the statute (i.e., legislative intent)” in an attempt to “keep the claim in unison with [Judge Sferrazza‘s order] . . . that the . . . statutes are constitutional. . . . The petitioner simply would offer evidence as to the legislature‘s intention to make the statute prospective or retroactive . . . . [I]f the legislature intended for the statute to be prospective then the current language of . . .
On June 3, 2019, the petitioner, through Mancini, filed an amended petition for a
On August 9, 2019, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended habeas petition on the basis that the petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the hearing held by the court,
Bhatt, J., on the respondent‘s motion to dismiss, Mancini addressed the court and requested leave to file a second amended habeas petition on the basis that “the way [he] drafted the [amended habeas] petition . . . was not in line with what was in . . . [Judge Sferrazza‘s order].” Specifically, as the court described on the record, “the amended petition as filed d[id] not include the nonfrivolous claim that was identified in [Judge Sferrazza‘s order] . . . . [T]he amended petition . . . does not raise th[at] issue.” The court subsequently granted the petitioner leave to file a second amended petition and took no action on the motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, on November 7, 2019, the petitioner, through Mancini, filed a one count second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). In the operative petition, the petitioner alleged that, “[a]s a result of [
voluntarily made in violation of his constitutional right to due process.
The matter was tried to the court on February 10, 2020. The court heard testimony from the petitioner and admitted four transcripts from his criminal proceedings as full exhibits. During trial, the petitioner testified, inter alia, that he was notified by an unspecified individual that he was subject to the registration requirement of
On February 25, 2020, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petitioner‘s operative petition. The court concluded that the “[f]ailure to advise the petitioner of a collateral consequence . . . that did not exist at the time he entered that plea” does not violate due process. In addressing the petitioner‘s claim predicated on the assertion that the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty had he
On appeal, the petitioner raises for the first time the precise claim that the court improperly denied his operative petition because
subject to the DWOR on the basis of his underlying conviction. The petitioner asks that we exercise our supervisory authority to review his claim. As we explain subsequently in this opinion, the respondent now defers to the interpretation of the statute by the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), which is tasked with establishing and maintaining the DWOR; see
petitioner must register as a deadly weapon offender” and to have “the decision overturned, in the interest of justice, and a new trial or directed decision ordered.” We therefore construe the petitioner‘s claim on appeal as challenging the judgment of the habeas court only insofar as it was predicated on the presumption that
Before discussing the petitioner‘s statutory interpretation claim, we set forth the following additional, relevant procedural history. On January 11, 2024, during oral argument before this court, the petitioner, in addressing the viability of his claim raised on appeal, asserted that he was improperly precluded from raising the issue of whether
During the respondent‘s argument before this court, counsel for the respondent represented the position of the DESPP that the petitioner is not required to register on the DWOR. Specifically, the respondent‘s counsel stated: “[T]hat‘s the official position of the DESPP
. . . . I can make that representation as an officer of the court . . . . That is how they‘ve applied it . . . .
“This is the first time we‘ve heard that the [department] told [the petitioner] he would have to go on [the DWOR], and frankly, I‘m not disputing what the petitioner said . . . someone very well may have told him [that he had to register], but . . . the DESPP is in charge of this registry, and . . . they‘ve represented that [
“[The petitioner] is right, but for a different reason. . . . [His claim] is based on a foundational premise that he would have to register on the DWOR . . . . This case really should never have gone forward. . . . [T]he habeas trial is what it is . . . . I don‘t know why that fact wasn‘t established, but I am representing to this court that, according to the DESPP, he would not have to register.” (Emphasis added.)
Following oral argument and on the basis of our review of the record, we ordered, sua sponte, the respondent to file a supplemental memorandum “stating clearly the position of the Commissioner of the Department of [Correction] regarding whether
release from incarceration is a matter for [the DESPP] . . . .
“[The department] does not maintain [the DWOR], does not report individuals who are not compliant with that registry, or use the failure to register if required by law in any determination or decision it makes about an incarcerated person. . . .
“[The department] does not decide whether an individual may be released on parole or the conditions of parole. . . . [The petitioner] may, however, be released . . . prior to his end of sentence through the discretion of the [respondent] under the [respondent‘s] own release authority. . . . [R]egistration on the DWOR is not a condition or requirement of this community release and does not influence transitional housing or any other aspect of community release. . . .
“[The department] does advise individuals it is releasing . . . of their need to register for the DWOR. This advisement, however, does not affect release or any conditions of release. [The department] bases its advisement on whether outside sources have indicated that there is a registration requirement . . . . [The petitioner‘s] current computerized record indicates no DWOR requirement . . . .
“As [the department] does not use registration . . . in any of its decisions regarding incarceration or release, it is never called upon to interpret the applicability of . . . [
The foregoing representations reflect that the respondent, now almost one decade following the commencement of this habeas petition, defers to the DESPP‘s position that
it nevertheless contends that the petitioner is not entitled to relief because, inter alia, his claim is unripe and/or unpreserved. The petitioner requests that we exercise our supervisory authority to entertain his unpreserved claim and grant him relief.
I
Because it implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we first address the respondent‘s claim that this matter should be remanded to the habeas court with direction to render judgment dismissing the petitioner‘s operative petition on ripeness grounds.13 See Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 624, 822 A.2d 186 (2003) (“ripeness is a sine qua non of justiciability,” which must be resolved as threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the case before us is ripe for appellate review.
We begin with the standard of review. “[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court‘s subject
“[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . . Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, [we] must be satisfied that the case before [us] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021). We conclude that the case before us satisfies this requirement.
We turn to a review of the evolution that the respondent‘s position has taken throughout the course of this litigation with regard to the applicability of
official position on whether this statute applies to [the petitioner] and his 2002 murder conviction,” in incongruity with the admission in the respondent‘s return and notwithstanding the court‘s order to “stat[e] clearly the position of the [respondent] regarding whether . . .
This background evidences a justiciable controversy where the parties’ interests were adverse at the time of the operative petition and return, and the adversity of their interests has not been rendered moot by the current position of the respondent. See Stafford v. Commissioner of Correction, 207 Conn. App. 85, 93-98, 261 A.3d 791 (2021). There remains a substantial question in dispute, which we now resolve, as to whether
II
We now turn to the merits of the petitioner‘s claim that
233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)], a reviewing court has the authority to review such claims under its supervisory power.” (Emphasis omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 155, 84 A.3d 840 (2014). “It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. . . . Three criteria must be met in order for this court to consider exercising its supervisory authority: (1) the record must be adequate for review; (2) all parties must be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue; and (3) review of an unpreserved claim must not prejudice a party. . . . If these three threshold considerations are satisfied, the reviewing court next considers whether one of the following three circumstances exists: (1) the parties do not object; (2) the party that would benefit from the application of this court‘s supervisory powers cannot prevail; or (3) a claim of exceptional circumstances is presented that justifies deviation from the general rule that unpreserved claims will not be reviewed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jacquelyn W., 169 Conn. App. 233, 239, 150 A.3d 692 (2016); see also Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. App. 17, 36-37, 304 A.3d 481 (2023) (exceptional circumstances may justify review of unpreserved claim by reviewing court), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 936, 306 A.3d 1072 (2024). We also note that “a reviewing court, although not bound to consider a claim that was not
raised to the trial court, may do so at its discretion. . . . We are unaware of any statutory or procedural rule limiting that discretion.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 220 Conn. App. 732, 743–44, 299 A.3d 1133, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023).
The threshold requirements for the exercise of our supervisory authority to review the petitioner‘s unpreserved claim are satisfied in this case, as (1) the record is adequate to review the claim, (2) the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard on the claim, and (3) we discern no prejudice to any party resulting from our review of the claim, particularly given that the respondent no longer contends that
The following legal principles are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner‘s claim. “Whether a habeas court properly [denied] a petition for a writ of habeas corpus presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct . . . and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . The application of the habeas court‘s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 100.
Resolving the petitioner‘s claim requires us to construe
“It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and read its subsections
concurrently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 9, 905 A.2d 55 (2006). Applying this principle to
We now turn to the text of the relevant statutes. Section 54-280 charges the DESPP with “establish[ing] and maintain[ing] a registry of all persons required to register under section 54-280a as offenders convicted of an offense committed with a deadly weapon. . . .”
The next subdivision,
the court shall (A) inform the person that the entry of a finding of guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration requirements of this section, and (B) determine that the person fully understands the consequences of the plea.” Because this subdivision requires a court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an eligible charge, to canvass a criminal defendant about the registration requirements of
In sum, the plain and unambiguous text of
requirement of
In reaching its conclusion on the petitioner‘s claim below, the habeas court did not have the benefit of the respondent‘s representation that, according to the DESPP,
In sum, understanding that the exercise of our supervisory powers under these circumstances is an extraordinary remedy, we conclude that the habeas court improperly denied the petitioner‘s operative petition because the entire premise of the habeas court‘s decision, that
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment stating that
In this opinion the other judges concurred.