5 Redf. 93 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1881
The testimony, upon which it is claimed that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, is substantially that of Dr. Warner, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will propounded, who testified that he had no doubt decedent was of sound mind ; that from her appearance he thought she was of sound mind, though he did not think a physician could form a competent judgment by means of such an interview ; but he observed nothing abnormal in her condition :—that of the other subscribing witness, Mr. Bennett, who testified that he had lived in the family two or three years ; that he thought decedent’s mind was sound, and that there was nothing peculiar in her actions ; he could not recollect what was said by her at the execution, and never had any particular conversation with decedent, except casually at the table, and that he had seen her in the street alone, though she carried a card, with h.er address, to avoid being lost; that he thought her a reasonable person :—that of Mr. Anderson Bogart, father of the sole devisee, that he went with decedent to Mr. Whitbeck’s
The testimony militating against decedent’s mental capacity is, in substance, that of Mr. Searles, that decedent could not carry on connected conversation, and could not read ; when twenty or twenty-three years old, she would give him trifling presents of no value, a small amount of worthless pictures ; that her conversation was not intelligent, and she seemed to grow worse, rather than better, and after her mother’s death was not able to go about, but would, call persons by their names in the house :—that of Mrs. Holmes, that she would speak like a child ; could not tell the time of day by the clock, and would give persons pictures cut out of magazines, old pieces of calico and silk ; used to state, as her reason for not riding in cars, that she could not tell where to go when she left them ; that in his opinion her acts and conversation were not rational; she manifested an unpleasant feeling towards Mrs. Townsend, her sister, on account of her having borrowed money and not paying ; and that he heard her speak of her sister who was in the insane asylum :—that of Thomas Boese, who was one of the commissioners on the inquiry on which she was declared an idiot, that she Avas questioned before the jury, and did not seem to understand the questions or make intelligent answers :—that .of Mr. Man, the counsel who conducted those proceedings, that he
The affidavit of Mr. Cook was substantially to the same effect; and it appears that, upon the testimony of these witnesses, together with the examination of the decedent herself, she was regularly adjudged an idiot, and a committee appointed, although Mr. Bogart and his daughter seek to break the force of the testimony set forth in their affidavits, by claiming that they did not understand the nature of the proceedings, yet were not willing to testify that the statements made by them were untrue.
In the case of Mairs v. Freeman (3 Redf., 181), I had occasion to examine with care the extent of mental capacity required for the execution of a will, and the numerous authorities bearing upon that subject; and the general doctrine laid down by Swinburne, 127, 8, approved by Shelford on Lunacy (1st ed.), 37, that a man of mean understanding, yea, though he incline to the foolish sort, is not prohibited to make a testament; and that of Stewart’s Ex’r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend., 301, that a person being of weak understanding, so he be neither an idiot
In the last case, it was held that the incapacity preventing the making of a valid will, must be such as prevents a person from understanding the effect and consequence of his acts, from reasoning correctly, and understanding the relation of cause and effect in ordinary business affairs; but mere weakness of mind does not incapacitate.
In Bundy v. McKnight, above cited, the doctrine, is to my mind best expressed, that the law does not undertake to test a person’s intelligence, and define the exact quality of mind, and memory wdiich a testator must possess, to authorize him to make a will, yet it does require him to possess a mind to know the extent and value of his property, the number and names of the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty ; their deserts, in reference to their conduct and treatment towards him; their capacity and necessities ; that he shall have sufficient active memory to retain all those facts in his mind, long enough to have his wall prepared and executed ; and if this amount of mental capacity is somewhat obscure, or clouded, still.
By section 23 of 3 R. S., 60 (6 ed.), every male person of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and every female of the age of sixteen years or upwards, of sound mind and memory, may give and bequeath personal estate by will, and it seems to me that that provision is a legislative intimation, that persons under that age are presumed to be mentally incompetent to the disposition of their property by will. The discrimination between males and females must be based upon the theory, which is confirmed by common experience, that females mature earlier than males, and though the decedent was disposing of real estate by her will, yet I do not deem it necessary to consider the discrimination made by the legislature, in regard to the age of those who are authorized by statute to devise their real estate by last will and testament. This power is limited to adults, except idiots and persons of unsound mind, though I am not able to
But, accepting the statute relating to testamentary disposition of personal property as the standard and test, and comparing it with the testimony given in this case, was the decedent in her mental capacity, at the time she executed the instrument in question, up to that standard ? It is true that she appeared to recognize acquaintances, did certain routine domestic work, remembered her sister, and felt unkindly towards Mrs. Townsend for a reason which she seemed not to understand, and to entirely misconceive, for she supposed that she had borrowed money of her, and had not repaid it, while the fact was that the borrowing was of decedent’s mother, and her mind seemed to have been materially prejudiced against her sister on that account. It is true also that she attended Sunday-school, and church, and went.to familiar places alone, and made trifling purchases under the instructions of others ; that she could repeat the Lord’s Prayer, remember a text of the clergyman, and state something of what he said; that she stated she intended to give her property to her second cousin, and that her sister should not have it, for reasons above stated, and because she had neglected her ; and that she, after its execution, stated that she had made a will, thus disposing of her property, and that she went to the attorney who drew the will, and gave him instructions as to what she desired to do with her property.
Taking all these facts into consideration, with the other indisputable facts proved by witnesses on both
How can it be said that she had any intelligent understanding of the value of her property, which she was disposing of by will, when she had no appreciation of values \ That fact alone seems to indicate that she could not have known whether she was disposing of property worth five dollars or five millions.
It is very difficult to say that decedent was not laboring under an obvious delusion, which affected her testamentary disposition, in respect to her sister, Mrs. Townsend, unless she was mentally incapable of appreciating the difference between the obligation of that sister to her mother by reason of borrowing $2,000, and that to herself ; and it is equally difficult to reconcile her will with an intelligent appreciation by her of the relation she bore to her sister who was in the insane asylum, and
The circumstance that she went to the attorney, and gave instructions respecting her will, is very materially weakened by the fact that she was accompanied by Mr. Bogart and the devisee, and that the will was of the simplest character, and its terms very easily fixed upon her mind by a little tutoring.
These circumstances, aside from the proceedings in idiocy, seem to me to forbid the admission of this will to probate, but when taken in conjunction with those proceedings and their result, though they are obviously neither conclusive nor binding upon this court in the determination of this case, it seems to be impossible to escape the conviction that decedent, when she made this instrument, was not possessed of sufficient mental capacity to understand the effect of the disposition, and the condition or value of her property, or the just claims of her sisters upon her bounty. For be it remembered that these proceedings were substantially sustained by the testimony of Mr. Bogart and one of his daughters, and that all the efforts to explain and escape the force of the testimony, on the ground that they did not understand the nature of the proceedings and its purpose, in no way controvert the facts to which they testified; and the effort to belittle the significance of that adjudication, on account of Dr. Warner not being present, and the hasty disposition of the case, signally fails, for the testimony of Mr. Boese, one of the commissioners, and that of Mr. Man, an experienced and intelligent lawyer, who made a careful examination of the decedent before the proceedings were taken, and had two interviews, show that the
If this were a case of lunacy, it might very well be that the inquisition in lunacy, two years after the execution of the will in question, might not be very significant, for the reason that lunacy might be the result o£ disease or sudden accident, or development of hereditary mental taint; but the imbecility of mind which was manifested in the case of the decedent was not one of sadden development, and some of the proponent’s witnesses indicate that, in their opinion, after the death of her mother and under the care of the Bogart family, she improved-in her mental condition, and its manifestation ; and I am of the opinion that, if the decedent was an idiot when the inquisition was had, it is impossible, on the proof in this case and from the nature of the affliction, that she could have been of sound and disposing mind when this instrument was executed.
I am of the opinion that, from the proof in this case, decedent was not of sound and disposing mind when she executed the instrument propounded, and that for that reason the will should be denied probate.
Decreed accordingly.